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ABSTRACT
This thesis traces the administrative elite of the Upper Silesian region of Poland in the 
transition period of 1990-1997.
It introduces the research by analysing the historical development in the higher 
administration of the region, up to the legacy of failure in the socialist era, specifically its 
excessive centralisation and vertical fragmentation.
In 1990, despite its perceived ineffectiveness, administrative reform was introduced at the 
local level, while the two higher levels of district and region were left untouched, on the 
grounds that simultaneous reform on all three levels might destabilise the state.
The thesis examines the administrative actors of the region, their attitudes, and the shifts in 
their policies over time, in two types of institution, first, the reformed local government and 
second, the regional-level voivodship office headed by voivode -  which remains 
unreformed despite the wish for reform of the voivode himself and other members of the 
regional elite.
Local-level reform established communes as elected self-governing units, bringing to an 
end their subordination to higher levels and leading to an increase in their administrative 
capacity and efficiency.
At the regional level, the thesis focuses on the impact of two voivodes. First, the 
‘revolutionary’ Wojciech Czech who proposed radical administrative reforms and wished to 
renew Silesian ‘lost values’. The second is his ‘Bourbon’ successor, Ciszak, who wished to 
continue the socialist status quo in order to maintain the prominent position of the regional 
elite and the special status of the region built on its heavy industry.
The thesis then examines various attempts to reform regional administration, most notably 
the so-called ‘Regional Contract’ between Katowice and Warsaw, signed in October 1995.
The thesis concludes with a description of the changes which took place in the regional 
administration after the national election in 1997. This marked a watershed of the transition 
period, since administrative reform was thereafter conducted at both district and regional 
levels.
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CHAPTER 1
THEORETICAL INTRODUCTION
Introduction
This theoretical chapter is divided into four main parts. The first focuses on the 
importance of elite studies in the transition period and presents an overview of the 
administrative elite of Upper Silesia in the nineties. The second part, the methodological 
section, describes two main qualitative methods used in this research, while also 
considering the alternative approach and the arguments in favour of the qualitative 
methods chosen for this research. Moreover, it states who the interviewees are, and lists 
the research questions. The next section places the Polish administrative reforms, 1990- 
1997, in the context of European inspirations and Polish tradition. The last section 
presents the literature on elites in local government, with frequent influence being are 
also made to Polish elite studies in general as they were a strong inspiration for this 
research.
1.1 The Aims of the thesis
The role of elites was decisive during the radical political changes that took place in 
Eastern Europe in 1989. In Poland, reforms fundamentally transforming the political, 
economic and social spheres were initiated by the Round Table negotiations (6 February 
1989-5 April 1989). The Round Table Agreement within the national elite (between the 
communists and Solidarity opposition) determined that political and economic changes 
would have a peaceful character by proposing the holding of a semi-democratic 
parliamentary election. After that election and the sudden formation of the first non­
communist government, the national elite’s approval of further changes determined the 
speed of transition and the scale of the changes: parliamentary bills provoked an almost 
complete transformation of the political, economic and social spheres.
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i. What was the role o f the regional elite during the transition?
This thesis concentrates on the role of the regional elite during the administrative 
transition (1990-1997), because regional elites are every bit as important as national 
ones in the formation of a pluralist democracy. The investigation of elites is of special 
importance in post-communist countries, where elite studies as a whole were considered 
to be ‘politically incorrect’ during the socialist period.
This case study of Upper Silesia’s administrative regional elite, although taking into 
account some distinctive features that are unique to the region, may illustrate a more 
general process of decentralisation. In particular it sheds light on the rise to prominence 
of new regional-level elites that has been taking place in Eastern Europe as a whole 
since 1989. In all post-communist countries, the rise of democracy has led to a more 
balanced power structure between the centre and the periphery (region), and regional 
elites have begun to gain prominence, although this process has not settled down yet. 
However, centralisation of power has been strongly preserved in certain areas and the 
national elites have often held onto their dominant role.
First, the research aims to analyse how the regional administrative elite of Upper Silesia 
adapted itself to the administrative transition (1990-1997). The process was to lead to 
the rebuilding of the whole institutional administrative structure, starting from the local 
level and ending at the central level. The administrative transition was a time of rapid 
and radical change, requiring substantial adaptation of both local government and the 
voivodship office. Already, the administrative reform of 1989 had fundamentally 
changed the functioning of the administration at the local level and indirectly influenced 
the performance of the whole regional administration. However, these reforms 
comprised only partial reform (limited to local government), and many dysfunctional 
features of the socialist administrative structure at other levels were preserved. 
Moreover, further administrative reform was delayed, despite promises that it would be 
introduced soon, as a result of the political instability of Solidarity governments. 
Similarly after 1993, despite intensive discussion on further reform and promises of its 
quick implementation, change was again delayed on political grounds. This also 
hindered the adaptation of the regional administrative elite to the existing situation, 
especially as it was seen as temporary. A further question concerns the relations of the 
regional elite with the national elite and the impact of the existing centralised
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administrative structures on these relations. Finally, the regional administrative elite’s 
relationships with regional society are investigated.
The second aim is to analyse the role of the regional elite during the economic 
transition. Was the national elite the only key player? Or was the regional administrative 
elite similarly important at the regional level to the national elite at the national level in 
1989 during the refolution. What were the regional policies and who were the actors, 
especially in relation to the necessity of restructuring the region’s outdated heavy 
industry? Were they radical reformers of the region or defenders of an ancient socialist 
regime? Were they revolutionaries and radicals, or apparatchiki and bureaucrats?
This thesis examines the regional administrative elite of the Katowice voivodship in the 
period of administrative transition between 1990 and 1997. The research concentrates 
on the performance of this elite in two types of institutions: first, the voivodship office 
in Katowice (the public administration unit), and second, local government at the 
commune level.
The time-span covered by the research was determined above all by the timing of 
fundamental changes in the administrative structure. These were introduced in two 
waves, the first in 1990, and the second since the election in autumn 1997. This 
completed the introduction of the new institutional arrangements necessary for the 
formation of a decentralised and effective administrative structure.
In 1990 fundamental changes took place in administration at the local level. In May 
1990, after local elections had taken place, autonomous local government at the 
commune level was established, unequivocally distinguishing administrative 
functioning at that level from the situation prevailing during the socialist period. The 
transformation of administrative institutions at commune level from public 
administration units into local governments, meant that they were no longer subordinate 
to higher levels of administration. This completely transformed the administration of 
the communes and significantly improved their performance. These revolutionary 
changes in local administration were introduced by the new local post-Solidarity elites 
and coincided with the complete rotation of elites in the communes.
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In 1997 the national elections led to the return to power of the post-Solidarity elite at the 
national level. This event completely changed the situation of the regional 
administrative elite, as the second wave of radical and extensive administrative reform 
was prepared. This second wave of transition in regional administration was initiated 
from 1 January 1999 with the establishment of elective government at district level. At 
the same time the 49 voivodships inherited from the socialist period were merged into 
16 larger regions. Moreover, the administrative structure of the regions changed because 
a voivode (as the representative of public administration) began to be assisted by an 
elective regional government equipped with wide powers.
These changes, introduced after 1997, can be interpreted as the final stage in the 
transformation of the institutions of regional administration, finally dismantling and 
replacing the ineffective structures established in the socialist period. The period 
between 1990 and 1997 can be described as a unique time of unfinished administrative 
reform, as only certain administrative reforms were introduced. New structures co­
existed with old ones. This partial reform of 1990, introduced only at local level, in the 
opinion of the regional administrative elite led to a significant improvement in the 
performance of the communes. At the same time, the regional administrative elite was 
aware of its own ineffectiveness at ‘district’ and regional levels -  as a result of its being 
forced to act through ineffective institutions that were the legacy of the socialist period. 
The regional administrative elite therefore argued that further administrative reform at 
the next two levels of administration was both necessary and urgent.
The transitional period, spanning from 1990 to 1997, can be sub-divided into two 
phases for analysis. The first was the ‘revolutionary’ phase, from 1990 to 1994, and the 
second was the ‘restoration’ phase, 1994-1997. These phases differed at both national 
and regional levels, partly because of the personalities and policies of their leaders. 
These differences of leaders and policies between post-Solidarity and post-communist 
were most particularly a result of the different professional experience of the new elite 
versus the old during the socialist period. Thus, investigation of the socialist period -  
the formative period -  is particularly useful in understanding differences between these 
two groups of elites.
At the beginning of the nineties, the regional elite began to raise the problem of the 
extensive exploitation of Upper Silesia during the socialist period. This was closely tied
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to their belief that a similar policy was being continued by the central government after 
1990. The ecological conditions and worsening health of the region’s inhabitants, 
coupled with economic problems, pointed to the urgency of renovating outdated 
industrial equipment and restructuring the region’s economy as a whole, as only limited, 
single-industry reforms had been introduced up to that time. At the same time, the 
regional administrative elite viewed the national elite as incapable of initiating any 
comprehensive regional reform. In response to the actions of the seemingly remote 
central government, the regional elite attempted to take the lead and advocated the 
solution of a return to autonomy.
In the second phase, the attitudes within the elite shifted to a more moderate demand for 
decentralisation of the administration and efforts to be made to unite the regional elite. 
At the same time, some members of the old nomenklatura returned to positions of 
power, among them voivode Ciszak, whose policy was aimed at the restoration of the 
old regime.
This investigation of the transitional period is prefaced with an introduction discussing 
the regional administrative elite in two earlier periods: the inter-war period (1922-1939) 
and the socialist period (1945-1989). I maintain that in each of these periods the 
regional administrative elite had same very distinctive features related to its 
composition and governing patterns, differentiating it from the two other periods, the 
inter-war and socialist. For example, only in the early socialist period was there an 
extensive promotion of manual workers into the administration. There is, nevertheless, 
substantial similarity and continuity throughout all three periods. Some features appear 
in more than one period; for example, authoritarian rule: Grazynski (1926-1939) and 
Grudzien (1970-1980); the re-appearance of army officers as voivodes'. Grazynski and 
Zawadzki (1945-1948) and Paszkowski (1981-1985). Similarly, the domination of the 
intelligentsia among the elite appeared between 1926-1939 and 1990-1994, and 
probably beyond.
The regional and personnel policies in the transitional period were often either a 
continuation of, or a reaction against, policies of earlier periods: inter-war or socialist. 
Thus, a comprehensive understanding of developments during the transitional period 
requires investigation of these two earlier periods. For example, in the 1990-1994 
phase, emotional references to the inter-war period and its prosperity were at the heart
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of the regional administrative elite’s regional policy. The revolutionary character of the 
changes encouraged the regional elite to seek inspiration from a past ‘golden age’ in its 
search for models of efficient administrative structures. This tendency was enhanced by 
the specificity of the administrative solutions -  regional autonomy -  adopted in the 
inter-war period in Upper Silesia.
Similarly, in the ‘restoration phase’, some members of the post-communist regional 
elite looked to the socialist period for inspiration. Moreover, in this period, 
revolutionary calls for autonomy were replaced by more moderate demands for stronger 
decentralisation. The period of the ‘restoration’ was no longer, in the opinion of local 
government, a time of radical measures, but rather a time of survival until the second 
stage of administrative reform. In the meantime moderate attempts at reform were 
made, the most prominent of which was the Regional Contract.
The investigation of the regional administrative elite takes into account changes in the 
importance of regional institutions during these three periods (ie, voivodship office, 
local government and voivodship committee during the socialist period). For example, 
in the socialist period the locus of decision-making shifted from the regional 
administrative institutions into the corresponding political structures (at local, district 
and regional levels).
In inter-war Poland, regional administration revolved around a voivode holding a wide 
range of responsibilities. In the case of Silesia, the power of the voivode was 
strengthened by regulations guaranteeing the region’s political autonomy. For example, 
the voivode obtained powers over educational policy and financial matters. On the other 
hand, the voivode's powers were limited by the regional assembly called the Silesian 
Diet. This institution was unique to Silesia as a result of its autonomy, and can be 
considered as an institution of self-government at the voivodship level. The Silesian 
Diet introduced some supervision of the voivode's rule, most notably by approving the 
voivodship budget. This balance of power was especially important as the voivode's 
position was quite strong because of the autonomy of the voivodship. The existence of 
the Diet led to a more balanced structure of administrative power at a time when the 
other local government institutions -  communes and districts -  were strongly 
subordinate to the voivode. The second administrative institution of the inter-war period 
in the Silesian voivodship, investigated in this thesis, is local government. The role of
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the local government elite was limited by the strong power of the voivode and by the 
small size of the majority of towns. In the Upper Silesian part of the voivodship there 
were only two big towns, Katowice and Chorzow, and only these two towns received 
the status of town-districts.1 The investigation of the-inter-war period concentrates on 
the voivodes and their deputies, and at the level of the local government authorities, on 
the mayors of the voivodship capital, Katowice.
In the second socialist period, the thesis concentrates simultaneously on the 
administrative and the political elite of the region. The total subordination of local 
government to higher levels of state administration and political institutions, combined 
with the difficulty of obtaining comprehensive data, substantially limits the description 
of local government. The investigation of the regional elite is therefore concentrated 
mostly on the voivodes and on the first secretaries of the voivodship committee in 
Katowice. The territorial reform of 1975 is a crucial factor as it fragmented Polish 
territory and simultaneously strengthened the control of central government. In the case 
of the Katowice voivodship this meant a substantial reduction of its territory, and a 
weakening of the political and administrative position of the region through the creation 
of competing voivodship centres in the neighbourhood.
The third period -  of the unfinished administrative reform (between 1990 and 1997) -  
began with significant changes in the role of the administration in the aftermath of local 
government reform. In the Katowice voivodship, the position of local government has 
also been strengthened, first by the fact that in this small territory there are now no 
fewer than 14 big towns with populations of around 100,000. The rise in number of 
these towns to 14 was the result of population growth and the post-war changes in 
voivodship borders. The rise of big towns in the Katowice voivodship led to a situation 
in which strong local governments began to challenge the previously centralised power 
of the voivodes (or the first secretaries of the voivodship committee in the socialist 
period). As a result, in the transitional period the regional division of power was more 
balanced compared to the two earlier periods.
The second explanation for the strengthened position of towns in the voivodship is the 
fact that, between 1990 and 1997, the voivodship office itself was completely
1 The second part of the Silesian voivodship was Cieszyn Silesia.
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subordinate to central government. Thus, the voivodship office had limited opportunity 
to represent regional interests. For example, it depended heavily on the central budget 
despite the strong efforts to initiate an independent regional policy by voivode Czech 
(1990-1994). It is also important to note that the regional power structure of the 
Katowice voivodship is untypical of other Polish territories, which are less densely 
populated and where voivodship capitals are the only big towns. Typically, the 
administrative institutions -  the local government and the voivodship office located in 
the voivodship capital -  are the main administrative institutions in the whole 
voivodship. The capitals are usually surrounded by small towns and villages where the 
local government administration, due to limited financial resources and the scarcity of 
qualified members of staff, plays only a rudimentary role. As a result, the local 
governments of these small towns and villages have been unable to counterbalance the 
power of the administrative institutions located in their voivodship capitals.
To sum up, changes in the structure of the regional administrative elite do not allow 
direct comparisons between the periods to be made. However, taking into account these 
limitations, one can still observe dominant trends in the composition and style of 
governance. Such comparison shows the re-appearance of certain phenomena -  for 
example, participation in certain historic events was an important pre-condition for 
selection to the regional administrative elite. During the inter-war period, participation 
in the Third Silesian Rising was a major criterion in the selection of senior 
administrative personnel, while participation in the Soviet-dominated communist 
movement was crucial to elite membership during the take-over period of 1945-1948. 
Similarly, in the revolutionary period (1990-1994) participation in the Solidarity 
opposition performed a similar role.
1.2 Methodology
This research is based predominantly on various qualitative methods. It starts in chapter 
two with a historical narrative describing the early history of the region; it then focuses 
on the inter-war period and the regional administrative elite at that time, while the last 
part of this chapter concentrates on the regional administrative elite in the socialist 
period. This historical narrative is founded on an analysis of rare memoirs and press 
interviews with former members of the regional administrative elite and other secondary
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sources. This is supplemented by a presentation of biographical and career data for the 
members of the regional administrative elite in the inter-war and socialist periods (and 
also in the transitional period) compiled from diverse secondary sources specifically for 
this investigation.
The study of the contemporary elite is based mainly on two qualitative sources of data: 
first, unstructured interviews with members of the elite conducted between 1995 and 
1997, and second, an analysis of local and national press-interviews with members of 
the administrative regional elite over the entire transitional period of 1990-1997. 
Recognition as a member of the regional administrative elite was based on a positional 
criterion, meaning that being in a certain administrative position was crucial to inclusion 
in the sample. In the case of the voivodship office elite, the research group consisted of 
the voivodes, their deputies and director generals, and the directors of the departments 
of Agriculture, Architecture, Civic, Culture, Disaster and Security Protection, Ecology, 
Finances, Geological, Economy, Foreign Co-operation, Organisational, Legal, Passport, 
Public services, and Re-privatisation. Among the members of the Voviovdship Office 
interviewed were: Kurzok Jan, Konopka Zygmunt, Kubik Wlodzimierz, Ginko Lucja, 
Beblo Wojciech, Lebicka Czeslawa, Matuszek Franciszek, Czamik Andrzej Kiecka- 
Niechanowicz Tadeusz, Madej Andrzej, Lobzowska Bozena, Bilke Elzbieta, Wiltos 
Janusz2, Erlich Grzegorz, Stumpf Jacek and Niewiara Piotr.
The second group consisted of the mayors of the 14 ‘Big Towns’ of the Katowice 
voivodship, which, due to their size, participated in the Pilot Programme in 1994. These 
mayors were: Korpak Jozef and his successor Kinczyk Marek from Bytom, Kopel 
Marek form Chorzow, Zagula Henryk from Dabrowa Gomicza, Frankiewicz Zygmunt 
from Gliwice, Dziewior Henryk from Katowice, Ogieglo Janusz from Jastrz^bie, Lasek 
Leon, Myslowice, Sroka Edmund from Ruda Slqska, Makosz Jozef from Rybnik, Kulisz 
Wlodzimierz from Siemianowice, Czarski Michal from Sosnowiec, Gutowski Roman 
from Swiqtochlowice, Gqdek Aleksander from Tychy and Miroslaw Sekula from 
Zabrze.3 These towns had the potential to perform as town-districts and thus received
2 In a few cases, my interviewees changed their positions, for example, Wiltos who had been director of 
the Legal Department was promoted to the position of Director General. Similarly, Kiecka-Niechajowicz, 
who was first deputy director of the Economy Department, then became director in proxy after that the 
deputy responsible for the Regional Contract. Similar changes of position applied to a few other directors.
3 My research also incorporated two ‘Big Towns’; Chorzow and Sosnowiec, which withdrew from the 
project at its initial stage.
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additional tasks from the central government, substantially increasing their own powers 
and autonomy. The limited scale of this research, and the relative political weakness of 
small communes compared to the Big Towns, meant that only the latter were included 
in this research.
The elite interviews were usually an hour long, but in some cases varied from half an 
hour to around two hours. Most of the interviews were tape recorded, as the majority of 
those interviewed agreed to this. Very occasionally, interviewees asked for the tape 
recorder to be switched off for a while. The interviews with the regional administrative 
elite were carried out on the understanding that their anonymity, would be preserved by 
removing details that would enable their identification, or introducing slight 
modifications to hinder identification.
In view of the exploratory nature of this research and the non-representative character of 
the sample, the interviews were non-structured and it was not possible to ask them all 
identical questions, in exactly the same sequence. As I wished to have spontaneous free- 
ranging answers, this meant that the questions often varied according to the issues raised 
by the interviewees themselves and that were important in their minds, but were not 
related to the points under analysis. For that reason, questions and answers are not 
reproduced verbatim, but selectively. However, certain topics were raised in every case. 
They are:
1. Motivation to start work in administration
How did you start to work in the voivodship office/local government? (additional 
questions: When? Why? Who convinced you to make this decision?)
2. Evaluation of the work in administration
What do you think about work in administration? (In your opinion, is there any 
difference between the functioning of administration in local government and the 
voivodship office?)
3.a. Developments in the Vovivodship Office since 1989 -  (a question for the elite of 
the voivodship office)
How did the voivodship office function during (i) voivode Czech’s rule, (ii) the 
‘interregnum’, (iii) voivode Ciszak ‘s rule? (mergers of departments or the formation of
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new departments, personnel policy, the relation between the voivode and his deputy) 
Were there any differences in the functioning of the voivodship office during the rules 
of voivodes Czech and Ciszak?
3.b Developments in Local government since 1989 - (a question for town mayors)
How has local government performed since 1989? - what were the main changes? How 
did they affected the functioning of your town? (the Pilot Programme, the Big Towns 
reform) Was there any difference in the functioning of local government during their 
first and second term?
4. The Upper Silesia restructuring and the role of regional authorities
Are there any particular problems of regional restructuring? (especially compared to 
other parts of Poland). What is the role of the regional elite in preparing regional 
restructuring? What is their relationship with national authorities?
5. The Regional Contract
What do you think about the Regional Contract? (its signing and functioning, its main 
advantages and problems). Have you been participating in its programme? (Why? To 
what extent?)
6. Administrative reforms
How do you evaluate the opportunity of efficient administrative functioning of the 
voivodship office/ local government? What further reforms are needed? (territorial 
reform: regional and district level, the proposals of the Katowice Agglomeration 
Association, question of regional autonomy).
In general, the respondents were open and tried to answer the questions asked of them 
as best as they could. The majority of them believed that, after socialism, the 
administration had to change and became more transparent and ‘closer to citizens’. In 
very rare cases, when they saw a question as rather difficult, they would answer it 
briefly and not expand on it. Nevertheless, they did not avoid it completely. On the 
whole, they took the opportunity which these interviews presented to make me know the 
conditions under which they worked, their main achievements, challenges, and 
problems. If there was any problem it was my limited knowledge of the regional 
administration, especially during the initial interviews. As the interviews progressed this
problem was gradually overcome. This was especially, seen in relation to point 6, that is 
Administrative reforms, which was only added after the first few interviews.
The second source of data -  press interviews with the members of the regional 
administrative elite -  were attractive as they enabled the reconstruction of earlier events, 
and enriched the project by allowing the inclusion of the opinions of people who, at the 
time of this research, were no longer in office. For example, voivode Czech’s regional 
policy is reconstructed by analysing eight of his interviews. The attractiveness of press 
interviews also stems from the opportunity to identify members of the regional elite. 
This was especially the case when their opinions were radical or controversial and 
included open criticism of central government. In cases when similar opinions were 
presented during my interviews and in the press interviews, it was decided to quote the 
press interviews so that those respondents could be identified. There were a few 
situations when the press interviews and the interviews conducted by me presented 
different opinions by the same people. This occurred in the case of the Regional 
Contract, which was generally seen as a highly imperfect, partial and temporary solution 
to the problems of centralisation of power and a necessary precondition for regional 
restructuring. In the course of my confidential interviews, the Regional Contract was 
strongly criticised by many of the respondents. However, in public, the Regional 
Contract was seen by the regional administrative elite as an improvement on the 
existing situation, and they publicly advocated it, hoping that an agreement with central 
government would improve their situation, at least partially.
In all, I made use of 11 national newspapers and 25 local publications of all kinds. As 
analysis of the press was such an important source of data, it is necessary to consider 
how these newspapers were selected and whether an unintended bias may have entered 
this research. First, no newspaper was eliminated from inclusion in the research or 
reference to it if it contained relevant information: that is, the opinions of, and 
interviews with the members of the regional elite, or if it presented an event that was 
crucial in the description of the regional administration in the period 1990-1997. In the 
case of certain criticism of opinions presented in the press, although they are quoted 
they were preceded by my commentary, indicating the controversial or highly political 
opinion presented by interviewees. This was, for example, the case with the opinions of 
both Katowice voivodes supplemented by the commentary or declarations in the
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documents of the Upper Silesian Union (and also my respondents’ opinions) on regional 
autonomy.
In the second case, there has never been any serious doubt about the reliability of 
descriptions of certain regional events during the period of investigation. For example, 
the actions of regional MPs in the period of the dismissal of voivode Czech, or the 
appointment of voivode Ciszak, or the Regional Contract negotiations. If there were any 
differences between newspapers, it was at the level of criticism by certain newspapers 
of some of the regional leaders, especially if they were seen as representing different 
political opinion to the newspapers. Thus, for example, Gazeta w Katowicach was 
critical of post-communist voivode Ciszak and presented a lot of interesting details, for 
example, on the functioning of the Social Council of the Economy. Newspapers more 
sympathetic towards him avoided descriptions of these unpopular events. Nevertheless, 
sometimes the most invaluable information was gathered not from the newspapers 
critical of respondents but, on the contrary those sympathetic to them. It is likely that 
members of the regional elite were more easily persuaded to give interviews to 
journalists from the newspapers which they saw as sharing their political, social or 
religious beliefs. And it is likely that they were more open in presenting their opinions 
in these interviews. For example, the first interview by voivode Czech, on the day of his 
appointment was in the Catholic weekly: Gosc Niedzielny. Similarly, primary sources of 
data were: the monthly Nasza Gazeta, and Goniec Gornoslqski, sympathising with the 
Upper Silesian Union. As a result, some of the members of the elite, who were much 
more restrained in giving interviews elsewhere, were interviewed by these papers. The 
last newspaper of this type is Trybuna Gomicza -  The Coal-miners Tribune, where 
former coal-miner, voivode Ciszak, gave a particularly interesting interview.
As the research concentrated on regional issues, it was natural that the local and 
regional press were quoted more often than the national one. Particular effort was made 
for the widest representation of the regional press. Four main regional newspapers were 
especially important and were quite often referred to: Dziennik Zachodni and its 
supplement Dziennik Slqski; Gazeta w Katowicach, the regional supplement of the 
national Gazeta Wyborcza\ Trybuna Slqska and Wieczor. Of these four newspapers, the 
two most useful to the research to me were: Dziennik Zachodni as it had some very 
good journalists writing on current regional issues, namely Grossner, Karawat, Pustlka 
and Smolorz. As a result, it is this newspaper that presented the most comprehensive
13
coverage of regional events, enriched by informed editorials. This, to some extent, is 
due to the fact that some of these journalists started to work under socialism and thus, 
they saw current events in the longer-term regional development perspective. The other 
two Gazeta w Katowicach and Trybuna Slqska were seen as quite politically defined: 
the first being post-Solidarity and the second post-communist. Despite their political 
character, my sympathy towards Gazeta w Katowicach and the national Gazeta 
Wyborcza was related to my respect for the editor-in-chief, Adam Michnik, who 
guarantees that the newspapers are impartial as the criticism presented is also directed at 
the political stance of the newspaper itself. To make the selection of regional press even 
more representative an effort was made to include local town newspapers, for example, 
Echo from Tychy, Nowiny from Rybnik and Nowiny Gliwickie from Gliwice.
Another valuable source of data was local government publications. Some of the local 
governments edited their own town monthlies, for example, Wspolny Chorzow, where 
Chorzow authorities wished to inform town inhabitants of their actions, and the 
problems and achievements of the town. Similarly, Sejmik Samorzqdowy, published by 
the local governments of the region provided information about plans and the co­
operation of local authorities on the scale of the whole voivodship. Finally, Wspolnota 
was the national weekly representing the ‘local government option’ as often seen in its 
opposition to central government. The last source of data of this type was the academic 
monthly journal, Samorzqd terytorialny -  Local government.
Among the national press, the most common source of data was two highly respected 
weeklies: Wprost and Polityka, especially the latter’s journalist, Dziadul, who 
specialises in Upper Silesia. (The first journal has post-Solidarity origins and the second 
post-communist origins). They may be regarded as Polish-versions of Newsweek or 
Time. Among the national press the renowned daily Rzeczpospolita (The Times), was a 
very reliable source of data as this newspaper was established with the idea of 
separating it from any particular political party. Moreover, editorials by Cieszewska 
were an especially reliable source of data and provided comprehensive analysis of 
regional events.
These methods of investigation of the transitional period were additionally 
supplemented with documentary analysis. For example, in chapter six, which 
investigates the development of regional policy and the signing of the Regional
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Contract, the official voivodship office documents were especially valuable. Overall, 
therefore, in this research the qualitative approach was the predominant method of 
analysis as it seemed to better answer the aim of this thesis which was to discover: not 
only who the members of the regional elite were, but also their opinions and 
motivations. In recent case studies of local elites in Poland, qualitative methods have 
played a marginal role because and a quantitative approach has predominated. In the 
present instance, the qualitative approach seemed preferable; first, because I wished to 
supplement and balance these quantitative researches and second, I wished to 
understand a period of radical change, such as during the transition, and to recognise not 
only that the new elite had arrived but also their motives in deciding to work in 
administration.
This is not because of any principal objection to these methods. Indeed, the biographical 
analysis of the inter-war and socialist periods’ voivodes and first secretaries used 
standard prospopographical methods. But, it would have been difficult to get a very 
large sample of new elite which would allowed quantitative analysis. In these 
circumstances, it seemed unwise to initiate and invest time in quantitative methods, and 
better instead to exploring the issues using an qualitative approach
1.3 Administrative reforms 1990-1997 in the context of European inspirations and 
Polish tradition
In the Polish literature analysis of administrative reforms after 1989; including local 
government, regional administration and systemic reform of administration as a whole, 
references to Western European tradition are frequent. Polish administrative reforms 
after the period of socialism and the imposition of the Soviet model administration are 
presented as a return to its natural Western European sphere in which the Polish model 
is traditionally situated.4 However, the administrative reforms after 1989 are presented 
as a modification of foreign proposals placed in the context of Polish tradition, 
especially in the inter-war period. Nevertheless, these inspirations are mentioned more 
in the context of wider Western European tradition than in relation to recent 
administrative reforms of any particular Western European country, as a direct
4 Izdebski, and Kulesza, 1999.
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inspiration for a particular reform. This has been, for example, the case with the Big 
Town reform of 1995-1996.5 Such an approach can be found in the book: Administracja
7 Rpanstwowa -  Public administration written by Kulesza and Izdebski . Similar are 
presented by Izdebski in his Historia administracji -  History of administration (1996), 
Regulski, and Kocan (1994), and in more recent publications are made more often to 
European integration by Regulski,9 and Gilowska, Ploskonka, Prutis, Stec and Wysocka 
(1999).
The old historic inspirations of the former partitioning powers, through their influence 
on the administration of the Second Polish Republic in the inter-war period and the 
Napoleonic-French influence are still seen as fundamental. According to Izdebski and 
Kulesza (1999) German (and Austrian) administrative tradition had the greatest 
influence on the countries of Central and Eastern Europe as a whole. In the case of 
Poland, this can be found in administrative solutions adopted by local government 
reform in 1990 and further administrative reforms - both district and regional- of 1998.10 
The influence of the German (and Austrian) model on Polish administration can be 
especially seen in the local government structure. The German model based on the 
theoretical work of German reformer, Rudolf Gneist, was inspired by the functioning of 
English local government. The modified Gneist model was widely accepted in 
continental Europe.11 In fact, the Austrian model adopted later was very similar to it. 
This German model was modified in at least two important elements compared to its 
British predecessor: first, the adaptation of the dual structure of local government as an 
elective body was assisted by representatives of central government, and the second 
difference was that continental local government has its own tasks defined (in contrast 
to the British enumeration of tasks by parliament).12
5 In his analysis of ‘Local government in post Socialist cities’ Bennett suggests that development of cities 
in Poland was typical of that of other Eastern European cities as the delays in the district and regional 
level reforms made cities key actors in service delivery, not only for their inhabitants but also for smaller 
communes surrounding them. Nonetheless, he makes no direct reference to the ‘Big Towns’, arguing that 
the reforms of upper tiers are influential in enhancing cities’ capacity to perform their services. Among 
the Western European reforms, he mentions regional reforms in Italy and Spain, and in central 
government administrative regions in Portugal and Greece. Finally he describes the 1982 French regional 
reform as the most crucial experiences to guide reformers of Eastern European cities.
6 Izdebski, and Kulesza, 1999.
7 The chairman of local government reform proposals prepared for Suchocka’s government and Buzek’s 
1998 district and regional reform.
8 Expert in central government reform in the period 1991-1993 and 1995-1996.
9 For example; Regulski, 1999: 9.
10 Izdebski and Kulesza 1999: 44.
11 Izdebski 1996: 144.
12 Izdebski and Kulesza 1999: 44.
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Nevertheless, according to Bennett (1993) ‘despite this diversity, and despite the 
separate recent tradition either side of the former ’iron curtain’, the local government 
systems across Europe have a common inheritance.’13 Among them, the most 
significant are:
1. Constitutionalism - the division of powers and formal electoral representation across 
all levels of local government
2. The fundamental building bloc of the commune as the basic unit
3. The professionalisation of administration of local government.14
Thus, when Izdebski and Kulesza talk, about the principle of subsidiarity, they refer first 
to the fact that it was incorporated in the Maastricht Treaty, and then mention than it 
was also written in the German constitution. Similarly, one can find the principle of 
subsidiarity in the Polish constitution of 1997 and the 1998 administrative reform also 
enabled incorporation of this principle into the Polish administrative system.15
An important source of inspiration was co-operation within international organisations, 
especially the OECD, of which Poland has been a member since 1996.16 For example, 
Izdebski and Kulesza, when talking about the inspiration of Polish administrative 
reforms, quote the OECD’s opinion on the importance of efficient bureaucracy, the 
functionality of administrative institutions, on the development of democracy and 
market economy in the post communist countries.17
Moreover, the influence of common European values and standards can also be seen in 
different versions of the national constitutions, (in the ‘Small Constitution’ of 1992 and 
the Constitutions of 1997.18 The Charter of Local Self-government adopted by the 
Council of Europe in 1985 and signed by Poland in April 1993.19
One individual, but particularly revered source of inspiration has been Alexis 
Tocqueville’s works. For example, Kulesza and Izdebski mention his opinion on the 
importance of local government and democracy as a defence against centralism or the
13 Bennett, 1993: 1.
14 Bennett, 1993: 3.
15 Izdebski and Kulesza 1999: 20.
16 The Organisation of Economic Co-operation and Development.
17 Izdebski and Kulesza, 1999: 69.
18 Izdebski and Kulesza, 1999: 73
19 Izdebski and Kulesza 1999: 155, Verebelayi, 1993: 14, Zaucha 1999: 54.
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loss of national independence (especially attractive in the context of the still not long- 
past Soviet domination).20 It is worth remembering that even during the socialist period 
Poland was not completely separated from some general European trends that time, for 
example, the amalgamation of communes.21
Thus, Polish administrative reforms were inspired by the result of inspiration regarding 
certain Western European values and norms but its final shape was an original, mosaic- 
type, piecemeal adaptation to the Polish situation. In this mosaic-type of reform, 
inspiration was derived from various national models to adapt as well as possible to 
Polish conditions. In fact, the inspiration came more from the continental European 
models, more than the British model. For example:
• the local government model in which representation of the elected council is assisted 
by a central government representative 22
• the ‘general competence’ of local government (in contrast to particular enumeration 
of duties in Britain) 23
• the size of local government units -  the contemporary British model of big basic 
units is driven by efficiency in contrast to the continental European model of much 
smaller units that are better adapted to political representation of local societies24
Nevertheless, there are also a few interesting inspirations from British local 
government. Despite that distinctiveness, or maybe because of it the inspirations taken 
from British local government are easier to distinguish. For example, the Polish term, 
samorzqd -  is the translation of the English term, local government.25 Moreover, Polish 
reformers often refer to the concepts of civil service, and also the organisation of 
government and central administration as attractive proposals for the newly reformed 
administration system.26
20 Izdebski and Kulesza 1999: 155.
21 Marcou and Verebelyi 1993: 35-50.
22 In Poland, as a result of the 1998 regional level reform the regional government has to co-operate with 
the voivode, the representative of central government. There used to be a similar dual administrative 
structure at the district level in the inter-war period).
23 Specific institutional arrangements due to supremacy of British parliament over other institutions, 
Izdebski and Kulesza 1999: 32 and Verebeyelyi 1993: 23.
24 Norton: 1995:270-71.
25 Izdebski 1996: 139.
26 Izdebski and Kulesza 1999: 31
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This piecemeal, mosaic-approach to administrative reform also suggests comparisons 
with post-socialist countries such as the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia. 
All these countries (and within Poland, Galicia) were, at a certain time of their history, 
part of the Austrian empire, and thus there are certain similarities in their administrative 
reform due to this common experience.27 Moreover, these countries all face the similar 
difficulties and challenges of post-socialism, for example, the vertical fragmentation, 
the over-centralisation, the subordination of local government to a higher level of 
administration, and the lack of autonomy of local administration, should also strengthen 
the similarities between the administrative solutions adopted. Nevertheless, the 
differences dominate, and are stronger than the similarities.28
Finally, in my opinion, analysing the administrative reforms since 1989, two phases can 
be distinguished. In the first stage, there was a common Western European democratic 
inspiration and certain current Western European wider current trends were influential. 
For example, the recent rise to prominence of the regional level of administration was 
reflected in the 1998 reform at district and regional level.29 However, after the 1998 
reform, after the second stage of administrative reforms, the emphasis was increasingly 
on harmonisation with the objective of entering the EU. At this stage, the role of the 
domestic factor were secondary. Thus, for example, immediately after the 1998 regional 
reform, the work on the regional policy bill started to enable the preparation by its own 
authorities of a regional policy for every region. The Department of Regional 
Development was also formed within the Ministry Economy to co-ordinate regional 
policy planing at the national level. In general, to harmonise regional policies in Poland 
to EU standards, there are two main demands; first adaptation of the Polish law and, 
second, institutional changes at both central and regional level for preparation and co­
ordination of regional policies. In addition, standardisation of the new administrative 
structure to conform to NUTS units adopted by the EU is one of the primary issues.
27 Illner, 1998: 14.
28 For example: Coulson (ed.) 1995, Gibson and Hanson (ed) cl996, Kirchner (ed) 1999, Horvath (ed.) 
2000.
29 However, this reform was inspired by equally important domestic rationale, liquidation of irrational 
territorial organisation of state introduced by Gierek.
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1.4 Elites in the local government
i. The elites in local government in the context o f elite studies in Poland
Elite studies in Poland have had a relatively short tradition. The concept of the elite in 
Polish sociology was first presented by Znamierowski in 1928.30 According to him, the 
elite is ‘the collection of people which are chosen from the larger group’, and in his 
view the ‘limited contact’ which is present in all social life makes the existence of an 
elite necessary. Statements about the necessity of the existence of the elite were 
accompanied by his belief in its parasitic character. Znamierowski’s negative evaluation 
of the current elite led him to ask what conditions are necessary to preserve democracy, 
and what functions should the elite perform in the future?
ii. Elite studies during the socialist era
After the end of the Second World War and the establishment of socialism, conditions 
for the development of elite studies were unfavourable. Research on social structure was 
mostly limited to a description of class divisions. Marxist academics, for example,
q 1
Wesolowski tried to limit the elite concepts (traditionally equipped with negative 
values) to capitalist societies.
Occasionally, elite theories were applied to the description of Polish society although 
they were presented within a Marxist class-theory framework to purify them from ‘bad 
ideological connotations’. This approach can be seen, for example, in Bauman's 
definition of the elite as the social group that holds the power. Thus, according to 
him, this concept could also be used to describe socialist societies. Moreover, the 
particular achievement of Bauman is his research on the (local) elite in the early sixties. 
His research is exceptional, as the comparable research was not conducted until the 
eighties.
He showed, above all, the gradual replacement of the predominantly ideological 
communist elite which came just after the war with the new mainly technical elite.
30 Znamierowski, 1991.
31 Wesolowski 1979.
32 Bauman, 1963.
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‘Political merits and ideological virtues are no longer a sufficient qualification for 
performance of the party functions: one must possess vocational education and 
professional skills to deal with technical problems at a table with specialists of the 
highest rank’.33
Bauman’s research showing the succession of the elite over time; from ideologists to 
technocrats is also interesting and relevant to the research on the regional elite in Upper 
Silesia presented in this thesis. Bauman suggested that these two types of local elites 
were made up by two different types of personalities, as a result of adaptation to the 
different economic situation. According to him, the arrival of this latter elite was the 
result of industrialisation. In contrast, the first group started their careers as skilled 
propagandists and persons of high ideological virtues. They were already members of 
the Communist party in pre-war Poland and soldiers during the war, and after the war 
they introduced economic reconstruction. The majority did not attend secondary school, 
nor did they have managerial qualifications. Wielding managerial power, they were 
influenced by ideological values in their decision making. Gradually, they were 
replaced by a better-educated elite for whom ideology was much less important.
Referring to studies of the Polish elite during socialism, the division is to be drawn 
between two groups; first, the academics working and conducting research in Poland 
and second, the emigre Polish academics. In the first group, two authors, Wasilewski 
and Frieske, are particularly worth mentioning. The value of Wasilewski’s research was 
the extensive time span of his serious of central elite researches initiated in 197234 and 
then continued in 198635, which enabled a description of the elite over time. Moreover, 
between 1983 and 1984, he also conducted the regional elite study.
Wasilewski’s research focused on the career development of the elite. One of the main 
issues of his investigation was the role of the social origins of the elite in the recruitment 
process. Comparing the data on the social position of the fathers of the elite members, 
he indicated that the elite was formed by people coming from all social classes. 
However, comparison of data on elite origins from 1972 and 1986 indicated a growing
33 Bauman 1967: 539
34 Wasilewski, 1981.
35 Wasilewski, Soviet Studies, 1990 vol 42.
36 (Wasilewki, Soviet Studies, 1990 vol 42). The results of this research are quite similar to the main 
trends indicated by studies of the central elite and due to the limitation of this literature review, they will 
not be presented individually.
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over-representation of men coming from white-collar families. This is particularly 
interesting, for despite official declarations in socialist countries to the contrary, 
inequality of chances appears to exist from birth in them as much as in capitalist 
countries. Wasilewski’s research suggests that a rigidity of social structure was 
growing over time. Moreover, a phenomenon that was not observed in the first research 
but was noticeable in 1986 was the modest tendency to inherit managerial posts. In 
1986, 14 per cent of interviewees' fathers were managers in the middle and higher 
echelons.
Two other issues defining career development, in addition to social origins of the elite, 
were educational qualifications and membership of the communist party. The research 
suggested that development of directors’ careers depended on completion of higher 
education and, at the same time political membership. At the time of their promotion 
nearly every director had a master’s degree and belonged to the communist party.
Moreover, Wasilewski’s research is especially revealing as it shows earlier historical 
shifts of the elite or their absence over time. This is particularly relevant in the context 
of this regional elite study in Upper Silesia, and the focus on similar mechanisms of the 
changes of the elite: the complete shift of the elite at the beginning of the nineties and 
the second later change of the elite from the post-Solidarity elite to the post-communist 
one. According to Wasilewski’s comparison of the central elite of the seventies with 
that of the eighties, they did not change, as similar promotion mechanisms led to 
choices of similar personal types. According to Wasilewski, this brought about a 
situation in which the elite was made up of identical personality types, despite different 
political and economic conditions. For, example, 1974 was the peak year of Gierek's 
rule. The economy was prosperous and the government felt a high level of social 
acceptance and stability. Strong development perspectives were perceived by society 
and the level of optimism was high. By contrast, 1986 was a time of permanent 
economic crises without symptoms of recovery, strong political cleavage, social 
resistance to government actions, and a prevailing pessimism. This contradicted 
Wasilewski’s quite strong expectations that different types of elite would be formed in 
adaptation to different conditions. Finally, his research indicated the growing rigidity of 
social structure under socialism since the seventies, in contrast to Bauman’s earlier 
observations of the change of the communist elite at the beginning of the sixties.
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Frieske’s research, conducted in autumn 1987, is particularly relevant as it focused on 
the administrative elite - the central administrative elite in the period directly preceding 
the political transition. It may be interesting to see if there is a continuity of 
administrative elite in the pre-transition and transition period on which the Upper 
Silesian elite case study concentrates. Frieske’s research tried to answer a question 
about who the central administrative elite in 1987 was.37 This question was seen by 
Frieske as urgent in the period when the wide-spread signs of severe political and 
economic crises were evident and the expectations of the elite intensified. To answer 
this question, Frieske tried to distinguish typical characteristics of the central elite. As a 
result, a few subgroups of the elite with certain characteristics were distinguished.
His data suggested that egalitarian policy was to some extent, limited by the hereditary 
recruitment of various elites as the large number of directors' families were able to 
preserve their privileged social position. For example, more than half of the directors 
came from unprivileged families (rural or small town upbringing, working class or 
peasant origin of fathers). However, in contrast, one quarter of the directors came from 
families where elements of privileged social position occurred. In summing up, nearly 
all directors of departments in 1987 had at least one element of the characteristics of 
privileged social position presented above, but very often, they had several.
Moreover, Frieske’s research confirmed the exchange of personnel at the top ministerial 
positions at the end of the eighties. Analysis of personal bibliographies enables us to 
discover two periods of elite modification in the eighties. Three-quarters of 
departmental directors at the end of 1987 were new people in those positions for the 
first time. Half of them entered the bureaucratic elite in the eighties and one third took 
their first directorship post in the seventies. Although they were new members of the 
elite, they were, nevertheless, according to Frieske, experienced administration officers. 
Half of them waited for their first directorship post for 10 or more years and almost one 
third of them for between 16 and 20 years. However, despite the fact that the exchange 
of personnel took place as mentioned, three-quarters of the elite took directorial 
positions. However, the long apprenticeship they spent in administration meant that it 
was not really a new elite. Thus, despite the urgent demand for radical reformers, the
37 Frieske 1994.
23
communist authorities employed the same type of people, with only minor corrections, 
as Frieske’s research shows.
The biographical data of the elite in Frieske's opinion shows that party membership was 
a necessary condition for further promotion. Professional paid work for the communist 
party for at least some time was characteristic for one quarter of directors. This 
proportion was, according to Frieske, surprisingly low, and did not confirm the common 
opinion on the apparatchiki career paths of the elite. Nevertheless, the elite he 
investigated was the nomenklatura-type elite in the wide-meaning of this word.
The second type of research on the national elite during the socialist period comprised 
studies of Polish emigres, Bielesiak38 and Misztals,39 and western scholars such as the 
English academic, Lewis40. In the situation of political censorship in Poland, the role of 
these researches was particularly significant. The earlier mentioned researches 
conducted in Poland, despite academics’ ambitions, were relatively rare and the 
opportunity to generalise to the whole elite and to express openly it at that time, was 
difficult. However, they made unquestionable efforts trying to present their 
interpretation indirectly in the subtext. Nevertheless, the main achievement of the 
‘exile’ literature was the deep and thorough investigation of the elite over time. For 
example, Misztals’ investigation analysed the national elite from the Second World War 
until 1984. The advantages of these exile studies was that the changes of the elite and 
their policies could be freely investigated in the context of political and economic 
conditions. Moreover, they could analyse certain sensitive issues, which were essential 
for the description of the elite at that time. For example, Misztals showed the growing 
isolation of the communist elite from society and described the development of the 
illegal Solidarity elite.
The second study, by Bielesiak, examines the recruitment policy of the central elite over 
a 20-year period from 1954-1974 and its influence on integration and political stability. 
His study shows the main difficulty of obtaining of data in emigre researches, and as a 
result, this and all other emigre researches were based on relatively limited official 
communist data - mostly statistics. A particularly valuable source of data was the
38Bielasiak, 1983.
39 Misztals, 1984.
40 Lewis 1989.
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changes in Central Committee membership, as Bielasiak’s and Misztals’ researches 
indicate (similarly to Western researches in other socialist countries).
However, Bielasiak research, like other elite studies of Poland in the eighties, is inspired 
by the growing symptoms of the economic and political crises, that intensified the 
question of the elite’s competence. In this case, Bielasik is especially interested in the 
openness of elite recruitment and its importance for wider social access to policy 
making, (as he seems to believe in the reforming of the system).
The third study, by Lewis, is especially relevant in the context of this thesis on the 
regional elite, as it is concentrated on voivodship secretaries of the communist party. 
The analysis covers the extensive period from the establishment of socialism until the 
introduction of martial law. One source of information, like the earlier two researches 
was the analysis of available statistical data: such as their dates of birth, dates of joining 
of the party, first party appointment, and so on. However, this statistical analysis is 
interlinked with historical narrative presenting the influence of national politics on the 
compositions and actions of the regional secretaries. In particular, attention is drawn to 
policies of the most powerful of influential voivodship secretaries, as in the case of the 
Silesian voivodship: Gierek, Grudzien or Zabiriski were often mentioned.
To sum up, despite the rather limited number of researches on the elite during the 
socialist era, the portrait of the national elite seems to be relatively sophisticated, 
reflecting the changes in its composition and policies over time and in general 
indicating the rising rigidity of social structure and the growing inter-generation 
reproduction of the elite.41 However, the main limitation of these researches is 
concentration on one type of the elite - the overwhelmingly powerful national elite and 
especially its political branch. Regional elite studies exist, although they are rather rare. 
In drawing the portrait of the elite the researchers paid particular attention to the 
available statistical data, for example, on the composition of the members of the Central 
committee or Voivodship Secretaries. Similarly, in the case of the research conducted in 
Poland, their investigation concentrated on data gathered from questionnaires; the elite
41 This can be especially appreciated when compared with other post-socialist countries. For example, 
Best (1997: 8) writing on elite studies in Eastern Europe argues that Poland and Hungary have a 
considerable pre-1989 tradition of independent social science, which could be re-integrated into the 
mainstream of international science. This is, in contrast, for example, to the Ukraine and Bulgaria which 
had to start from scratch.
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origins, education achieved and communist party membership. The opportunity to 
widen the scope of research to include, for example, interviewees investigating elite 
attitudes, was limited due to political censorship, only in the research in the eighties did 
some liberalisation appear.42 Wasilewski (1990) in his study on the regional elite and 
Frieske (1994) had the opportunity to add a few open questions.
iii. The transitional elite - research on post-communist elite in Poland
In the investigation of literature similar to the research of the regional elite of Upper 
Silesia, a lot of inspiration were derived from and most attention was given to, the 
studies of ‘the transitional elite’, despite it being mainly concentrated on the national 
elite. The local government elite studies, in most cases concentrating on the so-called 
stable periods, were seen as less important.
Elite research intensified somewhat during the eighties, and the experience of this 
enabled academics to closely follow radical changes at the top since the fall of 
communism. For example, since 1989 Wasilewski and Weslowki, have been conducting 
a series of extensive and systematic researches of the parliamentary elite. They have 
been able to closely follow often frequent political changes; the first short tenure of the 
contract diet 1989-1991,43 the second tenure 1991-1993,44 and continued research of the 
current parliament. In Wasilewski’s45 opinion, research in this area was especially 
attractive as it was the basic area of new elites’ formation.
The novelty of this series of research was that in addition to statistical analysis, for 
example, data on the MPs’ origins, their political membership, or their earlier work, was 
enriched by qualitative analysis. In time of such radical changes as the 1989 
parliamentary election, when the Solidarity opposition for the first time entered 
parliament, it seems especially relevant not to limit research to statistical data on the 
new elite, but to ask open questions such as: Why do they decide to stand in elections? 
What they do think about their work in parliament? It seems that relying only on
42 The elite opinions sometimes indicated a sense of professional frustration, which was linked directly to 
the growing feeling of complete inefficiency and ungovernability under the socialist system (Wasilewski 
1990: 184)
43 Wasilewski and Wesolowski (ed.) 1992.
^Wasilewski (ed.) 1994.
45 Wasilewski 1997: 18
26
i prosopographical analysis to comprehensively reflect these changes is not possible, as 
quantitative methods are not able for example, to answer the question of why only 
certain members of the former opposition decided to become politicians. Thus, this 
series of research using qualitative methods to analyse the revolutionary type of changes 
and its elite, has been one of the most direct and strongest inspirations for the 
methodological approach used in this research of the regional administrative elite.
One can even talk about the blossoming of the elite studies at the beginning of the
nineties, especially on the national political elite.46 According to Wasilewski47, such 
%
emphasis on the political elite during transition was related to its central role and the 
politicisation of the whole elite. Only in the latter phase of transition - the consolidation 
of the new system (around the parliamentary election of the autumn 1991), can one talk 
about the gradual de-politicisation of the new elites and the members of these elites 
gradually returning to their primary roles. This development is evident in dynamics and 
the number of elite studies, for example, Grabowska,48 Grabowska and Szawiel, Gorat 
and Marcinak,49 on the political parties’ elite50, or more general research on the changes 
of the Polish elite over time by Sztumski51 or Wnuk-Lipiriski,52 or interesting editions of 
post-conference papers such as: ‘The elite in Poland’ edited by Palecki (1992). The two 
studies by Sztumski and Wnuk-Lipinski were preceded by a description of the socialist 
period elite which they saw as requiring some attention, that they believed it had not had 
been given in the past. At the same time, they were also convinced that the description 
of the transitional-revolutionary elite demanded the description of socialism, as this elite 
still preserved many features of the past. Their assumption is similar to that accepted in 
this thesis, where analysis of the transitional elite includes frequent references to the 
socialist period.
Wasilewski53 also suggested that this transitional (revolutionary) nature of the elite is 
reflected in the issues on which scholars’ investigation concentrated, such as; who are 
the new elites? and what happened to the old elite after the collapse of communism?
46 In 1990, the department of elite studies chaired by Wasilewski was established in the Institute of 
Political Studies in Warsaw.
47 Wasilewski 1997: 16
48 Grabowska, Sisyphus. Social Studies, vol 9, No. 1, 1993
49 Gorat, Marcinak, 1995.
50 Grabowska, Szawiel, 1993.
51 Sztumski J., 1997.
52 Wnuk-Lipinski Edmund, 1996.
53 Wasilewski 1997: 19.
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Some research has tried to investigate more general trends of post-communist elites. For 
example, Wnuk-Lipinski participated in the project on the comparison of the post­
socialist elite in Poland, Hungary and Russia, trying to answer to what extent we can 
talk about similarities between the elite changes in these countries during the transition 
period.54 They especially concentrated on the question of whether we can talk about its 
reproduction or, rather, its circulation. The first assumption of the reproduction of the 
elite was that the collapse of communism did not affect the composition of the elite, or, 
circulation of the elites, meaning that the revolution led to recruitment of the new elite. 
The research suggested that in relation to the political elite in all these three countries 
one can talk about circulation of the elite. However, in the economic sphere, the 
research concluded its reproduction. The surprising finding was the high level of 
nomenklatura education - 90 per cent held a Master’s Degree. Thus, the hypothesis of 
‘negative type of selection’, which assumed that the role of political loyalty was the 
main criterion of selection and led to promotion of people with low level of education 
was rejected.
iv. Local and regional elite studies in Upper Silesia
In Upper Silesia, since 1989 one can talk about intensification of regional studies (or 
rather local studies), and two main centres can be distinguished, the Government 
Department and the Sociology Department55 of University of Silesia. This strong 
tradition of regional studies in Upper Silesia, which after 1989 encompassed in the 
centre of its interest the investigation of local elites is rather exceptional compared with 
other Polish universities and is probably, above all, due to the historical tradition of this 
region. As a result, the Silesia University was front-runner of elite studies and thus, the 
whole presentation of the local elite literature review, apart from one study will 
concentrate on researches conducted there.
Both departments were interested in the radical change brought about by the formation 
of new institutions of the voivodship -  local government. A few research projects were
54 Szelenyi, Treiman, and Wnuk-Lipinski (ed.), 1995.
55 During socialism this department had a strongly developed centre of the Sociology of Town.
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conducted: in the Government Department by Sztumski and Dobrowolski56, and in the 
Sociology Department by Szczepanski. Most of these researches can be located in one 
theoretical and one methodological approach.
The most popular method of investigation was a survey among the representatives of 
local government, sometimes supplemented by opinion polls among inhabitants of that 
local government. As a result, opinions of the elite and the inhabitants were compared, 
for example, who really has the power in your town? Or what are the main challenges 
facing further development of the town? Moreover, the research also focused on the 
prosopgraphical analysis of the composition of the elite; according to their gender, age, 
education, political affiliation, and so on, sometimes these reflected the changes of the 
elite composition over time.
The particular achievement of these elite studies was the fact that there was such a 
strong tradition of local elite studies already under socialism and the first research was 
already conducted in 1986 and the second in 1992. Thus, it was possible to draw a 
longitudinal picture of the local pre-transition and early transition period elite that is 
quite unique. To this category can also be included the comparative research on the 
Cracowian, Katowice and Tamow elite conducted by Drqg and Indraszkiewicz, (1994) 
from the Cracow School of Economics. This research, despite certain criticisms of the 
quantitative approach adopted, is especially worth mentioning as it covers a relatively 
large group of more than 1000 people coming from three different regions and thus 
enables one to see the Upper Silesian elite against the background of the other regional 
elites. Moreover, this elite study investigated the elite of three main groups; the state 
administration, local government and business. What is probably surprising, is that this 
study shows the differentiation of the elite between these three main professional groups 
which they come from rather than the regions. This is somewhat contradictory when 
compared with the results of this Upper Silesian study, which suggests the strong 
uniqueness of this elite. This, one could argue, can be explained by the different criteria 
of analysis. For example, the Voivodship Office elite at the beginning of the nineties 
shared with the elite in other voivodships similar post-Solidarity origins but what really 
seems to have distinguished it was its values and motivation, as will be suggested by the 
evidence in chapters 3-7. To sum up, the main advantage of this prosopographical
56 The results of these research were published in a series of books: (1.) Dobrowolski (ed.) 1994, 
Dobrowolski and Fr^ckiewicz (ed.) 1994, Dobrowolski, and Wrdbel, (ed) 1995.
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method was that it facilitated the drawing up of a comprehensive and general picture of 
the elite as a group, but at the same time it took them out of the wider social and 
historical context and did not reflect their fundamental values. Thus, when I decided on 
the proposals for my research project, I wished to add to the already existing picture by 
concentrating on the elite’s values and motivation.
A particularly inspiring piece of work was Szczepanski’s and Nawrocki’s research in 
Tychy.57 This project, using mostly the qualitative approach, tries to answers rarely 
asked questions in relation to the formation of local government elite such as; What 
were the changes in the local political scene? What was the bargaining about? Why 
were certain groups able to preserve power? What were their assets, what political 
coalitions did they form?
In this context, this Upper Silesian case study, focuses on local government but, in 
addition to most of the research on the voivodship office elite is a valuable alternative 
approach, as by investigating both these elites, which are closely inter-linked, the wider- 
regional perspective is drawn. It seems that despite the fact that the voivodship office in 
the period under investigation was left unreformed, the investigation of its functioning, 
answering the question: what are the actions of the individual voiovodes? is the main 
challenge to regional studies.
Despite, the fact that it was natural under the authoritarian regime during socialism that 
most of the studies concentrated on the central elite, it seems that sometimes social 
science was left a bit behind the political changes and, for example, still concentrates 
overwhelmingly on the national elite and its ‘actors’.58 At the same time, 
prospographical research on the local elite defines it as a broad-positional 
(homogeneous) group. For example, all councillors were included, despite certain 
individuals - the main ‘actors’ being more powerful. Mayors or voivodes should be 
distinguished more vividly from the whole group59 and investigated to the extent that 
national leaders were under scrutiny. It seems that the regional reform of 1998 and the 
strengthening of regional administration helped to solve to this problem, for example,
57 Szczepanski, and Nawrocki, 1995.
58 Thus, criticism of the ‘kremlogogist’ approach, to some extent could be made both of Eastern and 
Western scholars.
59 Szczepanski and Nawrocki in their investigation of Tychy often make reference to Goffman. It seems 
that this approach is also attractive in the investigation of the regional elite.
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the extensive research project by Halamska on the local elite in Poland, in the term 1998 
-2002.60 Finally, the enlargement of the EU also increased interest in the regional 
elites.61
v. An overview o f administrative and local government elite theory and research
In this section of the literature review, the research on local elite studies in other post­
socialist countries will be investigated first, while studies of administrative and local 
elites in Europe and elsewhere will be presented in the second part.
The post-socialist transitional elite is seen as more relevant to the Upper Silesia case 
study, and investigated more comprehensively.62 One particularly interesting study 
dealing with a topic very relevant to this thesis is in a book entitled: ‘Local Democracy 
and the Process o f Transformation in East-Central Europe’, as it is a significant 
contribution to the study of local elites in post-socialist societies. The research was 
conducted in the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia in the period 
1991/1992. The authors’ interest in the study of local government elites arises: first, 
from their conviction of the importance of local government in the post-communist 
countries due to its role in the development of democracy, as it is much closer to the 
citizens than national government, and second, its opportunity to stimulate efficiency of 
public administration. The particular conditions of local government after communism, 
and the fact that both the elite and administrative institutions at the time were in the 
process of formation, were reflected in the nature of the research aims. The study is a 
successful integration of the theoretical tradition of local government studies in Western 
Europe and America to particular problems of ‘the transitional elite’, and the specific 
post-communist environment. The four research aims were distinguished as:
60 More information can be found at: http://www.euroreg.uw.edu.pl
61 Elites and Institutions in Regional and Local Governance in Eastern Europe 'One Europe or Several?' 
ESRC Programme conducted by the Government Department at the London School of Economics and 
Political Science (more information can be found at: http://www.lse.ac.uk/Depts/Government/elites.htm).
62 Higley and Pakulski (2000) argue that three main events in the last two decades lead to re-consideration 
of elite theory. First, the role of elites in fostering economic development in the ‘Asian Tiger’ countries in 
contradiction to concepts of dependency; second, interest in the role of elites in socialist and post-socialist 
Eastern Europe; and thirdly, the elite-driven demise of the Soviet Union and post-socialist Russia and the 
CIS.
63 Baldersheim (ed.) 1996.
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1. Citizens’ involvement -  what is the role of the new institutions and their elites? Do 
they make a difference after the period of forced social passivity? The research 
shows that despite relatively low trust in local government, a fairly large proportion 
of citizens in all these countries believed that the local administration improved its 
performance noticeably (according to data gathered from surveys among citizens, 
councillors, mayors and chief administrative officers).
2. Elite formation - to what extent were the old elites replaced by the new one? The 
research found that the new leaders at the beginning of the nineties were more of an 
elite than those before 1989, as there were more white collar workers and they were 
also better educated (a university degree) than before 1989. Finally, there was also a 
generation change promoting younger men as well as more restricted social 
recruitment.
3. Policy choices -  will political orientation and ideologies matter in policy choice? 
They found that there were differences between, on the one hand, Slovakia and 
Hungary, where the mayors were directly elected by citizens and personal 
characteristics were more important than party membership, and on the other hand, 
the Czech Republic and Poland, where mayors were not directly elected and where 
mayors’ individuality was seen as secondary.
4. Executive performance -  How can representation and efficient execution be 
balanced and integrated? This issue was a serious dilemma at both national and local 
levels after the long period of authoritarian rule. The fact that in Hungary and 
Slovakia mayors were elected directly meant that in those countries their leadership 
was more visible in contrast to the other two countries where the importance shifted 
towards the local council -  the representative body.
Finally, the attractiveness of this book also arise from the fact that the results of the 
research were supplemented by a comprehensive description of the environment in 
which the elites were formed, with especially detailed information on the development 
of local government. The book ends on optimistic note as the research suggests that 
local government in east-central Europe demonstrated virtuous circles as ‘good morals 
was the quality most universally appreciated in local councillors’.64 The virtuous circle 
can be sketched as: autonomy - democracy - efficiency.
64 (Baldersheim 1996: 236).
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However, after this initial enthusiasm about local government performance, the further 
administrative reforms of the regional levels were halted in Eastern Europe as a whole 
and this was also mirrored in social-science research, as since then there has been no 
other similarly ambitious cross-regional comparative project. Nevertheless, three are 
Russian studies of local and regional transitional elites, which are especially interesting 
as they indicate both similarities and striking differences. For example, examined the 
first study simultaneous institutional and elite changes; the second the importance of the 
regional or, as Matsuzato argues, sub-regional elites; and the third, by Hughes, the 
regional elite.
Duka studied the institutionalisation of the local power elite in St Petersburg.65 His 
research bears a strong resemblance to the formation of the local and regional elite in 
Upper Silesia. In both cases, the formation of the local elite was preceded by the change 
of the national elite. This was followed by free local elections. The local elections in 
Poland in 1989, and St Petersburg in Russia in 1990 bear striking similarities. There 
was a radical polarisation of political forces in Poland which meant: Solidarity versus 
nomenklatura and a certain number of independents, and in the case of St Petersburg: a 
wide bloc of democratic forces versus nomenklatura, and a third bloc of conservative 
communists. Furthermore, in both cases; the unity of Solidarity, or the ‘Democratic 
Election-90’, did not last long after electoral victory. Finally, then was a less striking 
similarity between both studies in the presentation of the elite formation in the context 
of the institutional flux - the simultaneous reform of administrative structure. In the case 
of Upper Silesia, the accent was on the establishment of a new and powerful regional 
layer of public administration. While in St Petersburg after the transfer of power from 
the central level in the second study, the question was division of power between them 
inside the city council and the council and the city administration (which led to 
dissolution of the council in 1993).
The second Russian study is a cross-regional comparison; ‘Local elites under transition: 
country and city politics in Russia 1985-1996\ 66 The main argument of this article is 
that to understand the transition of Russia, one should not only look at the central elites, 
or regional elites but look even deeper inside, at the subregional level, at the 
composition of elites and their politics, as these according to Matzsuzato, were the
65 Duka A. International Journal o f Urban and Regional Research, September 1997, vol. 21,
66 .Matsuzato, Europe-Asia Studies, Volume 51, December 1999
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driving force for transition. One of the main issues of his analysis of democratisation of 
Russia is that of replacing the former nomenklatura with younger leaders. Comparison 
among the cross-regional and sub-regional elite is in favour of those where the 
replacement took place. However, the author argues that young people are more induced 
to go into business, than to work for public institutions (meaning both state 
administration and local government). This, compared with the results of Drag’s and 
Indraszkiewicz’s study, shows that local government elites in Poland differ from 
Russian ones, as in the first case the institutional reform of local government led to the 
arrival of the new post-opposition elite. This difference of local government elite 
composition in Poland and Russia seems to be due to the more radical reform of local 
government in Poland, which completely broke down with the socialist legacy of local 
government subordination to regional administration and enabled a ‘clean-start’. In the 
third study on sub-national elite and transition in Russia, Hughes argues that despite 
formal democratisation of regional legislative bodies, two interlocking elites political- 
administrative and economic, continued to colonise these bodies. In other words, the 
regional elite showed a strong adaptation mechanism and the regional elite continued to 
be a closed elite. Similarly to Matzsuzato, Hughes identifies the privatised business 
sector despite small representation (- one quarter of deputies) as the main rejuvenating 
and reformist force.
In this literature attempts were made to identify some common trends among the post-
/ ro
communist elite. For example, Beyme compared the Eastern European elites with 
Southern Europe in the seventies, and Higley, Pakulski and Wesolowki tried to compare 
changes in Eastern Europe in 1989 with earlier revolutions69 and locate Eastern 
European elites in a model of elite configuration on the transition to democracy.70
To sum up, in this section, the prominent part was allocated to the study of the post­
socialist, transitional elite. Although, the author is against drawing permanent 
impenetrable lines between East and West European elite studies, the particular features 
of the transitional elite in the nineties, that is the change of the elite, inter-linked with 
the simultaneous institutional transition, or, for example, the role of post-communists, 
resulted in the main emphasis being placed on East European studies. Nevertheless, at
67 Hughes, Europe-Asia Studies, vol 49, no. 6, 1997
68 Beyme, Governance, 1993.
69 Higley, Pakulski Communist and Post-Communist Studies, 1994
70 Higley, Pakulski and Weslowski 1998.
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the time of writing this thesis, one can talk of early stabilisation of both the elite and 
administrative institutions, and here some brief reference is made to other European 
studies.
Among Western European studies of the local elite in the ‘more stable periods’ (in 
contrast to the transitional period) the recent British research on local leadership by 
Leach and Wilson (2000) is interesting as the analysis of case studies of local leaders 
shows similarities to Eastern Europe where the personality of reformers matters a great 
deal. In Britain, individuality of leaders also matters, despite the fact that they act in a 
more stable institutional administrative structure. However, their ‘case studies of 
leadership in action’ show that in Britain the change of party ruling the local councils, 
although much less radical than political changes in Poland in 1989, nevertheless also 
led to substantial changes in leadership policies. The much-debated issue of directly 
elected mayors indicates that in Britain (and Western Europe) institutional stability is 
not absolute but relative, and administrative reforms, although introduced in an 
evolutionary manner, can have a profound effect on the performance of local elites.
Among local elite studies it is also worth mentioning comparative studies such as, for 
example, ‘Local elites in Western democracies: a comparative analysis o f urban 
political leaders in the U.S., Sweden, and the Netherlands’71, which concentrated on the 
background of the elite, their perception of their local politics and their policies. 
Although it was hoped that wider generalisation to local elites would be made, the 
results of the study are less than promising due to the difficulty of comparing cross­
national data, as questions (not formulated in the same way) have various meanings 
depending on the country in question. Nonetheless, this study can be seen as an early 
attempt at cross-country comparisons while wider-generalisation would demand further 
research.
In the literature on elites there is also another substantial branch of research: case 
studies of national administrative elites: for example, Japan72, Malay73, Indian74 and 
among the Europeans; France75 and of more particularly relevance to this thesis, as to it
71 Eldersveld, Stromberg, and Derksen (ed.) 1995
72 Koh, 1989.
73 Johan, 1984.
74 Thakur, 1981.
75 Suleiman, 1974
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deals a large extent with the socialist legacy, is the research on the Soviet administrative 
elite. Farmer’s study is also interesting as it applies a ‘revolutionary’ approach 
comparing the shift of the elite during Gorbachev’s transformation to the French 
revolution by drawing similarities between the Party nomenklatura and Tocqueville’s 
aristocracy, and between non-Party intelligentsia and the bourgeoisie. Despite suspected 
differences between these particular countries, all these national administrative elite 
studies bear a strong resemblance to one another, as they focus around a few central 
topics such as: its recruitment and promotion, education, socialisation and modes of 
interaction, elite-society relations, sometimes values and beliefs, and accordingly, 
among them is job satisfaction.
These researches are a valuable source of information drawing the comprehensive 
portrait of the elite as a group and changes of the elite over the long-term, often inter­
linked with certain political changes of leadership. Nevertheless, in these descriptions, 
the focus is on the elite as a social group and the presentation of their background and 
careers, whereas their policies and values are of secondary importance. Thus, main 
leaders are not distinguished from the portrait for the whole research group and policies 
and values are absent, or diluted in policies of the whole group. This is despite the fact 
that among the elite itself not everybody has the same influence and power. All this 
once more stresses the attractiveness of Dahl’s study of New Haven, where in his elite 
study, an understanding of social background, careers, policies and beliefs 
complemented one another.
Finally, the classical studies of Tocqueville’s Democracy in America77 and Dahl’s book 
Who governs?78 have left a lasting legacy. Tocqueville did not study local elites though 
he was emphatic in his understanding, that local democracy was key to national 
democracy. Dahl’s portrait of local power structures in New Haven based on a set of 
lengthy interviews (but also supplemented by statistical data) not only enables the elite 
to be shown as a group, but also named and portrayed its main local leaders.
76 Farmer, 1992.
77 Tocqueville, 1994.
78 Dahl, 1961.
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Conclusion
This theoretical chapter aimed to provide an overview of the aims and method of the 
research project. Thus, it starts with arguments about the interest and importance of the 
study of regional elites in post-socialist countries. It then presents reasons to explain 
which methods are used and why. The next section of this chapter describes Polish 
reforms in the context of wider European administrative trends. Finally, the Upper 
Silesia case study is placed against a background of similar research, indicating the 
certain uniqueness of this elite but at the same time its similarity to other ‘transitional’ 
elites, thus making a preliminary contribution to elite studies more generally.
* * *
The structure of the thesis:
As mentioned earlier, the assumption that the composition of the regional elite and its 
regional policies were shaped by historical experience is reflected in the structure of this 
thesis. Chapter two concentrates on the territorial definition of Upper Silesia; it also 
gives an overview of early historical developments. This investigation is followed by 
an analysis of the inter-war period, and in the last section of this chapter, the socialist 
period. In chapter three, analysis of the transitional period starts with an investigation 
of voivode Czech’s policies during the ‘revolutionary’ phase of the transitional period. 
The policies of his successor, voivode Ciszak, are examined in chapter four. Chapter 
five focuses on local political and administrative developments in local government in 
the period 1990-1997. Chapter six examines the Regional Contract signed in October 
1995. Lastly, chapter seven presents the regional administrative elite’s proposals for 
further administrative reform.
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CHAPTER 2
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
Introduction
This historical chapter is divided into three main sections: first, the early history of 
Silesia; second, the inter-war period; and third, the socialist period. Each of these three 
main sections starts with a short introduction and ends with a conclusion indicating the 
particular importance of this time to the transitional period. The importance of this 
historical introduction arise from frequent references to earlier historical events made by 
the members of the regional elite, even ones that which one could suspect are not 
relevant anymore.
2.1 Defining Upper Silesia
i. Early history o f Silesia -  Polish Silesia in the Middle Ages
In this first subsection the historical evolution of the concept of Silesia and later Upper 
Silesia is presented. This is followed by an investigation of Upper Silesia’s historical 
ties with Poland, from its separation in the Middle Ages to its re-incorporation in 1922. 
Reference to Upper Silesian ties with Poland has been made in the debate on the 
regional and national identification of Silesians, which reappeared in the inter-war and 
socialist periods (and also in the transitional period, which is central to this 
investigation.)
In 1922 part of Upper Silesia was reincorporated into the Polish state after several 
centuries of separation. With regards to regional politics, the extremely strong role of 
regional identification is a distinctive characteristic of the region due to its early 
separation from the Polish state. In those parts of Poland that remained under Polish
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sovereignty for a few centuries before the partitions, the experience of national 
integration weakened regional identifications. This fact alone indicates the necessity for 
investigating the national identification of the inhabitants and their opinion on the 
incorporation of Upper Silesia into Poland. The national and regional (self-) 
identification of the native population, especially during voivode Czech’s tenure (1990- 
1994) is therefore one of the central recurring points of reference in this research. The 
regional policy of voivode Czech was shaped primarily by his Silesian origins. It was 
marked by strong religious accents and sometimes by the primacy of regional values 
over national ones.
Silesia is the geographical region that ‘lay on both sides of the river Odra, and stretched 
from near the source of the river north-westward for nearly 250 miles to the borders of 
Brandenburg.’79
The region’s ties to Poland date back to the seventh century A.D. At the time, the region 
was already inhabited by Polish tribes. In around the year 990, Silesia became part of 
the newly-formed Polish state. However, already in the Middle Ages, during the ninth 
and tenth centuries, Silesia, on the Polish border with the Czech and German states, was 
often invaded by them. At the beginning of the twelfth century, the Polish kingdom was 
substantially weakened by fragmentation into small duchies. The same happened in 
Silesia, and this drew the attention of its neighbours. In 1348 the Polish king Casimir 
the Great formally signed over Poland’s right to Silesia to the Czech king, John 
Luxembourg. Despite this, Silesian ties with Poland were preserved by the maintenance 
of rule in the provinces by dukes originating from the Polish House of Piast. Almost 
two centuries later, in 1526, the province of Silesia, with other Czech territories, passed 
to the Habsburgs. The Silesian branch of the house of Piast continued to rule until 
1675, when it was extinguished with the death of the Duke of Brzesko-Legnica. This 
date can be seen as marking the extinction of the Polish ruling class in Silesia, although 
the Polish language and Polish traditions were preserved in succeeding centuries among 
peasants and industrial workers.
79 Pond, 1958: 1.
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ii. The Polish administrative tradition during the Partitions, 1795-1918
At the end of the eighteenth century, the old Polish republic, unable to create a strong 
central power and with backward administrative institutions (both central and 
territorial), was divided79 among its neighbouring states: the kingdom of Prussia, and 
the Russian and Austrian empires. The long period of the partition led to the formation 
of different administrative and legal cultures in the three territories of the partition.
It could be argued that such a remote historical division is irrelevant to politics in the 
late twentieth century. However, the systemic transition was a time of national and 
regional redefinition, and the role of past events, even remote ones, was crucial. For 
example, in the Katowice voivodship, voivode Czech, referring to this period, 
emphasised the cultural distinctiveness of Upper Silesia and Prussian Poland from the 
neighbouring D^browa region, which used to form part of Russian Poland.
All three partition powers left their mark in the shape of different attitudes towards 
administration, the state, law, and the degree of preservation of national awareness. The 
three administrations differed both in their attitudes to Polish culture and national 
identity, and in their administrative efficiency. In the Prussian and Russian sections, a 
policy of denationalisation was enforced, and Poles were excluded from the 
administration as a result. However, Prussia had a long, relatively democratic (by 
comparison with Austria and Russia) tradition due to the early formation of elective 
institutions, as illustrated by the early introduction of constitutional monarchy. 
Moreover, in Prussia the strong and efficient state (which eliminated illiteracy and 
provided workers’ insurance) led to strong respect for the state and its institutions, with 
the rule of law being deeply rooted.
In contrast, the legacy of the Russian State was an absence of legal order. Russian 
officials exercised control from distant central institutions. This, in turn, led to extreme 
bureaucratic wilfulness within the decision-making process, which oscillated between 
corruption and cruelty. Poles living in Russia saw the Russian state and its 
administration as alien.
79 Three Partitions of 1772, 1793 and 1795.
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The third partitional territory, Galicia, enjoyed autonomy. Poles were employed at all 
levels of administration, some even as Prime Ministers. However, the Austrian state 
was excessively bureaucratic and characterised by complicated and time-consuming 
procedures.80
iii. Upper Silesia under Prussian rule, 1740-1922
The region of Silesia is divided into two main parts, Lower and Upper Silesia.81 During 
the sixteenth century, the term ‘Upper Silesia’ began to be used to describe the 
geographical region around the sources of the river Odra {Oder). After the Austro- 
Prussian wars of 1740-1763, the term ‘Upper Silesia’ began to be used to cover only 
Prussian Upper Silesia. In this thesis the term ‘Upper Silesia’ will be used according to 
this definition. The tiny piece of Upper Silesia left in Austria began to be called Cieszyn 
Silesia.
After incorporation in 1763 the Prussian administration encouraged the industrial 
development of the region, and industrialisation played a primary role in the 
development of Upper Silesia in the period after the Austro-Prussian wars.
iv. Regional and national identification in Upper Silesia
After the annexation of Upper Silesia in 1763, Prussia introduced a policy of 
germanisation, which became more intensive in the period of the Kulturkampf (1872- 
1886). Statistical data show that the percentage of the Polish-speaking population in 
Upper Silesia began to decrease in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, but Polish- 
speakers still made up the majority of its population. Indeed, at the end of the 
nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth centuries one could observe the 
emergence of national identification among the majority of Polish-speaking Silesians. 
The first Polish candidates to the Prussian Reichstag were elected only in 1903.
The Polish-speaking population of Upper Silesia was set apart from the German 
newcomers, not just by their language but also by their religion (Catholic Poles as
80 Hamilton and Roszkowski, 1991.
81 See map 1, page 40.
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opposed to Protestant Germans) and their lower social position (Polish-speakers were 
predominantly blue-collar workers). The still-existing Polish-Silesian prejudice against 
upward mobility is rooted in this period. As a result native Silesians are still
O'}
underrepresented among regional upper classes in proportion to Polish newcomers. At 
that time avoiding upward promotion was a way for Polish-speaking Silesians to 
preserve ties to their own cultural group. The policy of the Prussian state allowed 
promotion only for people willing to adopt the German language and complete 
separation from the group that they came from. For Silesians this meant alienation from 
their own (ethnic) group. Thus, they avoided upward mobility.83 Despite these 
distinctive cultural, religious and, finally, linguistic differences between German 
newcomers and Polish-speaking natives, the main historical division for the native 
population was the religious one. Despite efforts by the native population to preserve 
their own group identity, which without doubt went along ethnic lines, the native 
population did not see themselves as distinct from newcomers in national terms.
This rise of national awareness, which became marked at the turn of the century, did not 
end until the conclusion of the inter-war period, and some would suggest that it is not 
finished even now. Chlebowczyk (1980) applies to Upper Silesia the concept of 
borderland awareness, in which national identification is not bifurcated but rather may 
be placed along a continuum of identities. According to Chlebowczyk the continuum 
starts with ultra-nationalism at both extremes of the scale (the German and the Polish) 
and moves towards national indifference in its centre. In the case of Upper Silesia, 
German and Polish influences overlapped, and Upper Silesians were exposed to both of 
these influences. However, in certain periods, the more attractive state (economically/ 
culturally) attracted the ‘borderland’ society and inclined Upper Silesians to shift their 
identification towards it. This process can, for example, be illustrated by the mass 
emigration of the native population to Germany in the late seventies, as a result of 
discriminatory policies toward the Silesian population by the communist regional 
authorities. On the other hand, Szramek,84 one of the most prominent Silesian authors, 
compared a Silesian to a pear-tree that bears fruit on both sides of the frontier. For an 
Upper Silesian, the adoption of the Polish or German national option imply respectively
82 This was despite the fact that they were predominant among the regional administrative elite in the 
nineties. However, this reflects their stronger engagement in the public life of the region rather than their 
number per se.
83 Btaszczak-Waclawik, 1990.
84 Szramek, &lqsk, no.l, 1995.
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cultural homelessness (or alienation); being a Silesian meant the integration of both 
influences.
2.2 The tradition of administrative autonomy in Upper Silesia in the inter-war 
period, 1922-1939
The aim of this section is to describe the taking over of a part of Upper Silesia by 
Poland and its social and administrative integration into the state in the inter-war period. 
First, the national situation will be presented; the rebirth of the Polish state and the inter­
war administrative tradition of 1918-1939. The analysis starts by highlighting the 
importance of the inter-war experience as a source of inspiration to reformers in the 
nineties, at both the regional and national levels. This description of administration in 
Poland as a whole will lead to the presentation of the particular situation in Upper 
Silesia and its administration. Special attention is paid is to rights and privileges in the 
form of regional autonomy for Upper Silesia, with significant powers remaining with 
the regional authorities. This subsection also investigates the composition and 
performance of the inter-war regional administration, with special attention being paid 
to the main regional leaders, the voivodes, and their local government counterparts (the 
discussion focuses on the mayors of Katowice).
i. The rebirth o f the Polish state and the inter-war administrative tradition
After the fall of communism, members of the Solidarity opposition turned to the inter- 
war period for inspiration in their efforts to reform what they considered to be the 
completely distorted political and economic institutional systems inherited from the 
communist period. The influence of the inter-war model is also very evident in relation 
to the subject under investigation; the systemic reform of public administration. 
Proposals for reform were based on a return to the former three-tier administrative 
structure and territorial division of the country. The influence of the inter-war period 
may also be discerned in the reform of local government, which was the first step in the 
systemic reform of administration. The institutions of local government were given
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autonomy from central government, a move that was inspired by the perceived 
effectiveness of this institutional arrangement during the inter-war period.
The importance of the inter-war experience as a model for political, economic and 
administrative institutional reforms at the beginning of the nineties is rooted in the 
nation’s history. It was in the period immediately following the First World War that 
the Polish state -  the Second Polish Republic (1918-1939) -  reappeared after the 
prolonged period of the partitions. It was then that the modem state and its 
administrative institutions were formed, that the territory of Poland began to be re­
unified under its own laws and legal system, and that the training of native Polish civil 
servants began.
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Table 1. Summary of main characteristics of local government and regional administration systems in Poland 1918-1997
DURATION OF THE PERIODS TYPES OF STRUCTURE NUMBER OF UNITS
THE SECOND REPUBLIC 
(1918-1939)
1.
IN GENERAL  
2.
IN AUTONOMOUS SILESIA 
VOIVODSHIP
New and original administrative system, inspired mainly by the former partitioning powers1 
The preservation of certain distinctiveness of territorial administration among former partitions
THE FORMER AUSTRIAN PARTITION 
local government at local and district level (weak and undemocratic at district level)
THE FORMER PRUSSIAN PARTITION 
local government at local and district level and elective regional government at voivodship level
•  THE FORMER RUSSIAN PARTITION 
local government at local and district level
17 voivodships
VOIVODSHIP LEVEL -  The Silesian Diet
the right to administrative and tax bills
the executive body - Voivodship Council chaired by voivode
Also, in Silesia voivodship, the distinctiveness between former Prussian and Austrian partition was preserved (Upper Silesia and Cieszyn 
Silesia)2
THE DISTRICT LEVEL 
quite similar
THE LOCAL LEVEL
the existence of additional local government units at the level of boroughs (Arntsbezirke) in Upper Silesia but not in Cieszyn Silesia3
7 districts in Upper Silesia 
part
2 districts in Cieszyn Silesia 
part
4^
Os
1 Izdebski, Kulesza,1999: 59
2 For example, election laws distinguished these two parts of Silesia throughout the whole pre-war period
3 Sieradzka 1992
DURATION OF THE PERIODS TYPES OF STRUCTURE NUMBER OF UNITS
T H E  PO LISH  PE O PL E 'S  
R EPU BLIC 
(1945-1989)
1. 1945-50;
2. 1950-75;
3. 1975-89.4
THE ‘POLISH’ STAGE,
continuation of the institutional and structural patterns o f the pre-war period 
territorial organisation resembled Polish (and Western European tradition)
THE ‘PO LISH -SO V IET’ STAGE
Soviet type of territorial organisation o f the state was imposed -  territorial division of country was preserved but filled with Soviet-type 
institutions
THE ‘POLISH -SO VIET-FRENCH’ STAGE 
territorial division of state
In 1950 - 17 voivodships, 314 
districts
4315 communes
1972 - reduction in the 
number o f communes from 
4315 to 1354
1975 - abolition of districts, 
replacement o f 17 with 49 
voivodships5
T H E  T H IR D  REPU B LIC  
(1 9 8 9 -1 9 9 7 )6 
- the period  u n d er investigation
1990 reformed local government at commune level and unreformed district and regional level 
1994 Pilot Programme Towns and 1996-1997 Big Towns -  ‘town-districts’
4*. 4 In this diagram, the division used by Kuklinki and Swianiewicz in their analysis of Polish meso -  voivodship administration was adopted but modified.
5 Wollman Environment and Planning C: Government and Policy 1997.
6 The analysis in the period of the still current Third Republic was limited in this diagram to the changes during the period of my research.
The administrative difficulties that characterised the inter-war period, and which were 
rooted in the period of the partitions, were only partially overcome at the time. 
Throughout the whole inter-war period, the administration of the newly formed state 
faced two main problems. The first was how to unite territories divided by three 
different administrative traditions and, at the same time, create an independent state 
administration that would enjoy wide social support. Partitioning and foreign 
occupation had led to strong distrust of state institutions among the Poles, with the 
exception of those living in the Prussian partition (where, as we have seen, attempts at 
germanisation were accompanied by efficient administration and the rule of law). As a 
result, even when the independent state was formed, administration in general still 
enjoyed a low social status.91 These social attitudes distinguished Poland from other 
Eastern European countries.92
The second main difficulty was the lack of civil servants. This too was a result of 
partitioning. In both Prussian and Russian Poland, Poles had, in general, been excluded 
from the administration. In the Austrian section, the policy had been more relaxed and 
Poles had occupied a wide range of administrative positions. As a result, the Polish 
state administration after the First World War was dominated by poorly-educated civil 
servants from Galicia.93 This is illustrated by the experience of the Silesian voivodship, 
where four out of the five voivodes who held power during the inter-war period were 
from Galicia.
During the twenty-one years of the inter-war period (1918-1939) the two main problems 
facing the newly-established state (concerning the territorial unification of the state and 
the formation of highly-trained administrative personnel) only began to be overcome. 
Their influence is felt to this very day. At present, some of the territorial divisions 
dating back to the period of the partitions are still influential. My research on the period 
from 1990-1997 indicates, for example, that in the Katowice voivodship, the cultural, 
economic and political divisions between Upper Silesia and the D^browa basin have 
been preserved (Upper Silesia used to form part of the Prussian and Dqbrowa of the
91 Piekalewicz, 1975: 8.
92 Schopflin, 1993: 14-15.
93 Hamilton and Roszkowski, 1991.
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Russian partition).94 Similarly, the second of the inter-war difficulties, low social 
prestige, still causes serious hardship for the current regional administrative elite.95
ii. The administrative structure in the inter-war period
The inter-war Polish state was fashioned after the model of the Third French Republic. 
The administration was divided into three tiers: voivodships, districts, and communes 
Extended administrative powers were given to the administration of the 16 
voivodships.96 The power of voivodes (in striking contrast to the socialist and post­
socialist situation) extended to all administrative issues, with the exceptions only of the 
military, tax collection, and educational issues.97 This was expected to balance the 
power of the central government in Warsaw and to preserve the stability of the 
administration even if the central cabinets were unstable.
The Silesian voivodship was divided into districts and communes in accordance with 
the three-tier model described above and applied to the whole Polish state. Its special 
status as an autonomous voivodship modified its structure mainly by the creation of an 
additional institution, the Silesian Diet. The diet was a directly elected regional 
parliament, equipped with wide political powers.
Variations in the three-tier structure reflected the pre-independence situation and 
distinguished between the former Galicia, and Prussian and Russian Poland. For 
example, elective regional government existed only in the former Prussian partition.98 
Thus, in this thesis, the administrative structure will be presented using the model of the 
Upper Silesian part of the Silesia voivodship. The other part of the voivodship, Cieszyn 
Silesia, formerly part of Galicia, had a slightly different administrative structure. In
94 The question of whether these two areas should stay in the same voivodship was an important issue on 
the agenda of the regional elite. This conflict between Upper Silesia and the Dqbrowa basin started in the 
socialist period, when they were united in one voivodship, although there were also tensions during the 
war. In 1990, the Upper Silesian Union blamed the region’s degradation during the socialist period on the 
fact that it was dominated by the elites from Dqbrowa. The question of whether these two parts should 
stay together was also raised by voivode Czech (see chapter three).
95 The low social prestige of civil servants and negative attitudes towards administration were indicated 
during interviews with the voivodshsip office elite (see chapter three) and local government elite (see 
chapter five).
96 Map 2, page 51.
97 In Silesia voivodship, however, tax collection and education were also under voivode supervision.
98 Izdebski, 1996: 147.
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other words, different parts of the Silesia Voivodship had slightly different 
administrative arrangements, depending on the power that had occupied them during the 
‘partitions’.
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Map 4: The administrative division of inter-war Poland (source: Davies, 1981 volume 2 p.
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Hi. Inter-war regional autonomy o f Upper Silesia and historical and administrative 
continuity
At the beginning of the nineties, just like the national elite, the regional administrative 
elite of Upper Silesia looked to the inter-war period in drawing up their proposals for 
administrative reform. However, their conclusions were coloured by the specific 
characteristics of Upper Silesian administration in the inter-war years, particularly the 
experience of regional autonomy which had been unique in Poland. This strengthened 
their belief that the decentralisation of power was an urgent necessity, as was further 
administrative reform. Therefore, their demands were more radical than the proposals 
put forward by the central elite or by regional elites in other parts of the country.
The inter-war period was perceived by the regional Solidarity elite, mostly in the period 
1990-1994, as the ‘golden age’ of Upper Silesia. Regional policies were therefore 
directed to obtaining powers similar to those held by the inter-war regional authorities. 
Thus, the concept of ‘the golden age’ will be investigated in relation to the performance 
of the administration during that period, and in assessing the social and economic 
conditions of regional society. The events that led to the granting of regional autonomy 
in the inter-war period will be reconstructed in order to explain why the region was the 
only one to receive such political and economic rights. Historical developments in the 
inter-war Silesia voivodship and its administration will be investigated thoroughly as it 
is assumed that strong historical continuity is present. Thus, the belief that the region 
deserved special treatment because of its economic contribution to the nation, which 
was widely held in Silesia during the inter-war period, is still present and influential.
Due to this historical continuity, attitudes to regional policy in the transitional period 
can be completely understood only within the context of the region’s history. This 
seems to be particularly important in relation to such issues as:
■ The national and regional identification of the native Silesian population. The
manner of Upper Silesia’s incorporation into the Polish state by means of a
plebiscite sometimes raised doubts among sectors of the native population as to
whether they had made the right decision. The results of the plebiscite and the 
subsequent doubts among the native population had a very strong impact on the 
policies of the national and regional authorities towards the native population. For
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example, restrictions were first introduced in relation to their employment in 
administration in the inter-war years, and these reappeared in the socialist period.
■ The issue of class structure; that is, the consequence of the absence of a native 
Silesian upper class such that only scattered individuals were members of a regional 
elite.
■ The ways in which regional and national identification, as well as social structure, 
interacted and influenced the relationship between the native population and 
newcomers, leading to the reappearance of conflicts.
Therefore, in the following sections the inter-war voivodes, local government leaders 
and their regional policies will be presented in detail as their influence reaches far 
beyond the inter-war period, and substantial similarities and continuity have been 
preserved in regional administration.
iv. Formation o f the Silesian voivodship
The Silesia voivodship was formed out of two areas: Cieszyn Silesia, incorporated in 
1920, and Upper Silesia, added in 1922. This thesis will, in general, concentrate on the 
Upper Silesian part of the Silesia voivodship, as Cieszyn Silesia, for the whole inter-war 
period, preserved its national, social, and administrative distinctiveness.
The economic importance of Upper Silesia led to a four-year-long period of bargaining 
between Germany and Poland over the region. As a result, the voivodship of Silesia 
was the last territory to be united with Poland. In the spring of 1919, during the Peace 
Conference in Paris, it was suggested by the Alliance that Upper Silesia would be 
assigned to Poland. The Polish delegation, headed by Dmowski, had claimed the region 
for Poland on the grounds that the proportion of Poles in the region exceeded 90 per 
cent. Rymer, who was later to become the first voivode of Silesia, was present as an 
adviser to the Polish delegation concerning Silesia.
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Kaeckenbeeck, the president of the Arbitral Tribunal of Upper Silesia," recollected in 
his memoirs strong German protests. Their arguments suggested a lack of economic 
and cultural ties with the Polish state. He noted:
No point of the first draft of the Peace Treaty brought a more emphatic protest from 
Germany than the cession of Upper Silesia to Poland. In the remarks of the German 
delegation it constituted an absolutely unjustified inroad into the geographical and 
economic structure of the German Reich. Since 1163 Upper Silesia had had no political 
connexion whatever with Poland. There were no Polish national traditions in Upper Silesia, 
no memory of Polish history; nor had Upper Silesia participated in the liberation struggle. 
Germany further denied that Upper Silesia was inhabited by a clearly Polish population.1
In June 1919, the final version of proposals handed to the German delegation concluded 
that the fate of Silesia was to be decided in a plebiscite. While this was in preparation, 
Polish Risings broke out twice, once in 1919 and once in 1920.101 In the run up to the 
plebiscite each side tried to increase its support among the population. In October 1919 
the Prussian parliament introduced a bill proposing to give autonomy to Upper Silesia. 
In July 1920, the Polish parliament, trying to compete with the German offer, proposed 
autonomy to whatever part of the Upper Silesian territory was granted to Poland.
According to Ciqgwa (1997), autonomy was mainly proposed to strengthen the 
attractiveness of the Polish State and to incline the Silesians to vote for Poland during 
the plebiscite in March 1921. During the plebiscite agitation, the Polish authorities, 
aware that the new state was weak and vulnerable, wished to make the Polish offer more 
attractive by promising substantial financial and economic privileges in addition to 
wider political rights. The region was to have its own treasury with extensive financial 
discretion, and was to be equipped with its own regional diet. In the financial sphere 
regional autonomy enabled the formation of the Silesian Treasury, the institution which 
was to guarantee maintenance of the existing living conditions and the further industrial 
development of the region. In other words, the incorporation of Upper Silesia was to be 
achieved by promising to preserve the economic and living conditions that the region 
enjoyed as part of Germany. For example, wages in the region were by far the highest
99 The international court formed by the Alliance to supervise the realisation of the acts of the Geneva 
Convention.
100 Kaeckenbeeck, 1942: 4.
101 The Third Silesian Rising according to Davies (1981 volume 2 pp. 499-500) was a protest against the 
definition of plebiscite territory in the Treaty. The Second Rising started on 19 August and lasted five 
days. It was triggered by premature German celebrations of the capture of Warsaw by the Russian army.
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compared to other parts of Poland.102
In addition, Polish propaganda during the plebiscite campaign tried to show that 
incorporation into Poland would improve the Silesians’ social position as they would 
gain opportunities for better education and professional careers. One such attempt to 
reassure Silesians concerning their position in Poland was the employment policy 
concerning civil servants in Silesia voivodship, promulgated by the Polish parliament in 
May 1921. Article 3 of ‘the regional constitution’ (Status Organiczny) gave Silesian 
civil servants precedence over Poles from other regions.
Polish efforts to strengthen the Polish position during the plebiscite brought only limited 
success, and the results of the plebiscite in March 1921 were in favour of Germany. 
993,826 Silesians participated in the plebiscite, comprising 95.5 per cent of those 
eligible. Among the 190,000 emigres104 who returned for the vote, 182,288 were 
German emigrants and 10,120 Poles. Only 40.4 per cent voted for union with 
Poland.105
As a result of the plebiscite (and of the Third Silesian Rising which followed), Germany 
received 61 per cent of the 11,000 km2 area, but Poland received the richest part of the 
region: Polish Upper Silesia accounted for 74.3 per cent of coal extracted in the region 
and for 58 per cent of pig iron production.106 However, in the first years, Germans were 
able to preserve ownership of 75 per cent of heavy industry and about 87 per cent of the 
land in Polish Upper Silesia.107 Thus, regional policies that aimed at the integration of 
Upper Silesia with Poland by trying to increase Polish ownership in Upper Silesia were 
of particular importance, especially for voivode Grazynski (1926-1939).
The results of the plebiscite should not be taken as definite and unambiguous indicators 
of the ‘national’ identification of the Silesians: economic and social considerations also 
influenced their decisions. Some Polish Silesians were fearful of incorporation into the 
newly-formed Poland: many of them considered union with Poland was a leap into the
102 Rose, 1935.
103 Quoted by Ci^gwa, 1985: 141.
104 People bom in the region but living abroad who returned for the plebiscite.
105 Polish propaganda after the plebiscite tried to sweeten the results by arguing that 47.3 per cent of those 
voters actually living in Silesia voted for union with Poland.
106 Rechowicz, 1988: 15.
107 Blaszczak-Waclawik, 1990: 22.
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unknown, and its effects on their economic and social positions could not be predicted 
with any certainty. Many were doubtful of the new Poland’s economic and political 
strength. Moreover, the strong regional ties worked against the exclusion of Upper 
Silesia from Germany. The results also showed that the social structure in the region 
was significant to the final outcome, with pro-German votes dominant among the 
middle and upper classes as a whole.108
For the Polish authorities, the results raised the fundamental question of the national and 
regional identification of the Silesian population. The issue was to have a significant 
impact on regional policies towards the native population. Doubts over the 
identification of Silesians with Poland, and therefore over their loyalty to the state, 
would resurface at all critical moments of regional history; for example, in 1945 and in 
1990.
The results of the plebiscite also led to the third and the largest of the Silesian 
Risings,109 with the participation of about 60,000 Polish Silesians. This started as a 
refusal to accept the March 1921 plebiscite result and lasted for two months (3 May-5 
July 1921). The Rising convinced the Allied powers to divide the territory in a way that 
was more favourable to Poland. More importantly, these Risings, especially the Third, 
also had a major impact on the inter-war period (and to some extent on the socialist 
period) for three main reasons.
The first reason was that they projected the development of Silesian awareness from the 
regional to the national sphere. The second was that they were crucial in the formation 
of the regional political and administrative elite, especially during the Sanacja regime of 
1926-1939.110 The third was that the Silesian Risings, as well as the plebiscite, strongly
108 Wanatowicz, 1982: 31.
109 First 16-24 August 1919, Second 19-25 August 1920.
110 The Silesian insurrectionaries joined the administration in three waves. The first wave was 
immediately after 1922 but they were gradually replaced by newcomers. The second wave of employment 
of Insurrectionaries was during the Sanacja period, and the third was after the Second World War until 
about 1950. Several insurrectionaries rose to prominence in the inter-war period and even later, for 
example, Jozef Rymer (voivode from June 1922 to December 1922) and Michal Grazynski (voivode from 
1926-1939), Jerzy Zi?tek, who was deputy voivode and voivode in the period 1945-1975 and Arka 
Bozek, (deputy voivode from 1945 to 1950).
Wojciech Korfanty (1873-1939), another prominent insurrectionary, played a crucial role through the 
whole inter-war period. His exceptional position was due to his role in the emergence of Polish national 
identification among the native population of Upper Silesia; he was also a charismatic leader of the 
Silesian Risings. In 1918 he was the only politician in the region who was able to unify the Polish
56
influenced the Silesians’ view of what type of ties they wanted to have with the rest of 
Poland. Three different currents of opinion were discernible. First, there were those 
who doubted whether the region should be incorporated into Poland at all, preferring to 
remain part of Germany. Others argued that the region should be incorporated into 
Poland with a privileged status as an autonomous region. The last group suggested that 
the region should be incorporated into Poland without receiving autonomy or any other 
privileges that would differentiate it from any other region.
Most Silesians saw union with Poland as the result of a free choice made during the 
plebiscite, rather than the efforts of the newly-born Polish state. For example, military 
support for the Silesian Risings had been limited as the Polish army was engaged on the 
eastern front at the time. Silesians also felt alienated from other parts of Poland due to 
the fact that Poles from other regions had a limited awareness of the preservation of 
Polish dialect and tradition in Upper Silesia.
The Silesians’ views on Upper Silesia’s ties with Poland can be contrasted with 
attitudes in Cieszyn Silesia.111 In Cieszyn Silesia, there was no plebiscite and it was 
thought natural that the area should be incorporated into Poland. By contrast, among 
Upper Silesians the plebiscite raised doubts as to whether they wanted to belong to 
Poland at all. Since then, this fundamental question -  whether to stay within the Polish 
state or at least to have regional autonomy -  has been raised by representatives of the 
native population at all critical points in regional history.
The economic importance of Upper Silesia, German irredentism and fear of possible 
dissatisfaction among the native population with belonging to the Polish state, led to the 
adoption of protective and privileged policies throughout the inter-war period. This was 
also strengthened by the Silesians’ belief that their region was the most developed in 
inter-war Poland. One of the most striking examples of these protective actions was the 
employment policy that existed only in this voivodship and controlled the inflow of 
workers from neighbouring regions.
political parties of the region. Later, during the inter-war period, Upper Silesia lacked a leader who had 
such prestige. Korfanty did not work in regional administration as he had ambitions to become the 
national leader, trying to challenge Pilsudski’s position. In addition, he was the leader of the Christian 
Democracy, the most influential regional party.
111 Koped, 1986.
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v. Administration in the Silesian voivodship
The incorporation of Upper Silesia in 1922 was a challenging task for the newly- 
established Polish state. The difficulties associated with its incorporation were similar 
to those in other parts of the new state, but the early separation of Silesia from Poland 
made them even more severe. For example, demand for civil servants, as well as 
engineers, lawyers and teachers, was much greater in Silesia than in any other part of 
the new state. Although Silesians were guaranteed precedence over Poles from other 
parts of the country, in practice there were not enough of them with the qualifications 
required to fill the available posts. This was further aggravated by the lack of a tradition 
of higher education in Upper Silesia. In 1929/1930, a total of just 350 Silesians were 
enrolled in any type of Bachelor’s and Master’s degree courses, which meant one 
student per 2,600-2,650 people. This was in contrast to one student per 700 persons in 
other parts of Poland.112 As a result, during the whole inter-war period, nearly all senior 
positions in the regional administration and in industry were taken by newcomers -  
Poles who came from other parts of the country.113 Moreover, in Upper Silesia, a Polish 
upper class did not exist at all in sharp contrast to other parts of Poland, even those that 
had been under Prussian rule, like Posnania. This was a consequence of the long 
separation from the Polish state (from 1348 until about 1918).
Administration in the voivodship of Silesia (Polish Upper Silesia) was modified by two 
distinctive features: first, by the above-mentioned regional autonomy, and second, by 
the Geneva Convention, which established limited international supervision over the 
region for a period of fifteen years. The Geneva Convention was signed in May 1922 
by the governments of Germany and Poland, just before taking over their parts of Upper 
Silesia in June 1922. The Convention aimed to ease the difficulties caused by artificially 
cutting through the middle of an economic unit, and to preserve minority rights. The 
Convention had a significant impact on the economic development of Polish Upper 
Silesia as it preserved the privileged economic position of the German owners and 
limited some reforms. For example, the Polish authorities were unable to carry out 
agricultural reforms that involved re-distributing the land (mostly German-owned) 
among the native population.
112 Blaszczak-Waclawik, 1990.
113 Rose 1935, Wanatowicz 1982.
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More importantly, regional autonomy modified the administrative structure of the 
Silesia voivodship by establishing the Silesian Diet (legislature). The Diet aimed to 
cover social, economic, and educational issues, but its powers were limited in the 
financial and social areas. Its members were directly elected in regional elections. In 
the inter-war period, the Silesian Diet was crucial in preserving the democratic culture 
of the region. The Silesian Diet was abolished in 1945, together with the autonomy of 
the Silesian voivodship. The second institution of regional autonomy was the Silesian 
Treasury, which guaranteed that only about seven per cent of tangenta -  regional 
revenues -  went to the central budget.
a. The public administration elite
In the inter-war period in Silesia voivodship two main phases can be distinguished: first, 
‘gradual polonisation’, from 1922 until 1926; and second, radical polonisation between 
1926 and 1939. This periodisation is based on the regional policies introduced by the 
various voivodes, especially as regards the composition of the regional administrative 
elite. Presentation of the regional policies is preceded by a sociological characterisation 
of their main agents, the voivodes: their regional origins, education, administrative 
qualifications, and their weak or strong position in the region.114
During the first period -  that of gradual polonisation -  the voivodes changed frequently. 
Regional policy was, therefore, inconsistent and the voivode's power was relatively 
weak. This weakness was especially marked in regional industry, where German owners 
preserved their domination. These voivodes also had only limited ‘success’ in 
decreasing the proportion of pupils attending German minority schools (the number of 
pupils in these minority schools was significantly higher proportionally than the number 
of Germans in the voivodship). However, the distinguishing feature of the first period 
was the gradual influx of newcomers into administration.
The period of gradual polonisation can itself be divided into two phases. The first phase 
is connected with the rule of voivode Rymer. During that time one observes the relative 
domination of Silesians, but the process of importing civil servants from other parts of
114 See table 2, page 61.
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Poland had already started. However, some protective policies were introduced by the 
voivode to limit the radical fall in the employment of Silesian civil servants, among 
them former insurrectionaries. In the second phase, power was transferred from the 
native Silesian voivode to three successive newcomers who were in office for a 
relatively short period of time, about a year each, except for Bilski, who lasted a little 
longer. Their rule was characterised by the rising domination of newcomers, as stricter 
qualifications criteria were introduced in the recruitment of the administration.
Silesian politics in the inter-war period tended to shadow those at the centre. Thus, 
some changes in the Silesian voivodship in the first period were similar to those in the 
centre -  for example, frequent changes of central government. After Pilsudski’s coup of 
1926, in the voivodship of Silesia, as in central government, authoritarian power was 
exercised by former army officers. The Sanacja regime led to the stabilisation of 
political power in the voivodship: there was only one voivode after 1926 (Grazynski). 
He used this long tenure to introduce his vision of regional policy, directed towards the 
radical polonisation of industry and education. His authoritarian rule shared the main 
features of the various central governments at that time, notably the restriction of 
opposition activists. This culminated in the use of physical force against them and 
imprisonment. Moreover, the Silesian Diet, like the Sejm in Warsaw, was twice 
dissolved during Grazynski’s tenure.115
115 An important event that shaped the development of the inter-war administration at both national and 
regional level was the Pilsudski coup d ’etat in 1926, which established the Sanacja regime. In the 
aftermath of the coup, authoritarian governments dominated by military officers were established. The 
Sanacja regime made substantial efforts to unify the administrative structure and the electoral laws of the 
formerly separate Polish territories. However, the take-over of power by the Pilsudski regime also had 
negative effects on administration; in particular, extreme politicisation of the administration occurred 
(Ajnenkiel, 1977).
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Table 2: The main administrative periods of the inter-war Silesia voivodship, 1922- 1939, and the voivodes.
T H E  M A I N  A D M IN I S T R A T IV E  P E R I O D S  
O F  T H E  I N T E R -W A R  S IL E S I A  
V O I V O D S H I P  
(1 9 2 2 -1 9 3 9 )
(accord in g  to  reg ion a l p o lic ie s  in trod u ced  b y  
voivodes and th e  co m p o sitio n  o f  the reg ion a l 
ad m in istrative e lite )
N A M E S  O F  
VOIVODES
P E R I O D  I N  O F F I C E R E G I O N A L  
O R I G I N S  
(F R O M  U P P E R  
S IL E S I A , O R  
O T H E R  P A R T S  
O F  P O L A N D )
C O N T A C T S  W I T H  
U P P E R  S IL E S I A  B E F O R E  
P R O M O T I O N
A C H I E V E D  E D U C A T I O N P R E V I O U S  E X P E R I E N C E  O F  
A D M I N I S T R A T I O N
F I R S T  P E R I O D : 
G R A D U A L  
P O L O N IS A T I O N  
(1 9 2 2 -1 9 2 6 )
F ir s t  p h a se :  
r e la t iv e  d o m in a t io n  o f  
S ile s ia n s  in  
a d m in is tr a t io n  
(1 9 2 2 -1 9 2 2 )
J O Z E F
R Y M E R
(1 8 8 2 -1 9 2 2 )
(Ju ne 1 9 2 2 -D e c . 19 2 2 )
S ile sia n
T h e  c h ie f  p o sitio n  during the  
S ile sia n  R is in g s
‘se lf-ta u g h t’
(1 9 2 1 -1 9 2 2 )
C hairm an o f  th e  P rin cip a l P e o p le ’s 
C o u n c il in  U p p er S ile s ia
A N T O N I
S C H U L T I S
(1 8 6 9 -1 9 3 9 )
(F eb . 1 9 2 3 -O ct. 19 2 3 ) N ew co m er
(G alic ia )
D u rin g  the p leb isc ite , in  the 
L eg a l D ep artm en t o f  the  
com m issaria t
L L M
U n iv ers ity  o f  L w o w  
(G a lic ia )
(1 8 9 0 -1 9 1 8 )
W ork in  G a lic ia n  ad m in istration  
(1 9 1 8 -1 9 2 1 )
M in istry  o f  Internal A ffa irs  
(1 9 2 1 -1 9 2 3 )
D irector  o f  departm en t in  v o iv o d sh ip  
o ff ic e  in  L w o w
S e c o n d  p h a s e :  
d o m in a t io n  o f  
N e w c o m e r s  in  
a d m in is tr a t io n  
(1 9 2 3 -1 9 2 6 )
T A D E U S Z
K O N C K I
(1 8 7 8 -1 9 2 4 )
(O ct. 1 9 2 3 -M a y  1 9 2 4 ) N ew co m er
(G a lic ia )
N o  earlier con tacts  w ith  U pp er  
S ile s ia
L L M , L L D
J a g e llon ian  U n iv ers ity  C racow  
(G a lic ia )
(1 9 0 7 -1 9 1 8 )
W ork  in  G a lic ian  ad m in istration  
(1 9 1 9 -1 9 2 3 )
M an ager ia l p o sitio n  in  M in istry  o f  
Internal A ffa irs
M I E C Z Y S L A W
B I L S K I
(1875-after 1938)
(M a y  1 924 -S ep t. 1 9 2 6 ) N ew co m er
(G a lic ia )
N o  earlier con tacts w ith  U pper  
S ile s ia
L L M
U n iv ers ity  o f  L w o w
(1 9 0 2 -1 9 1 4 )
W ork  in  G a lic ia n  ad m in istration  
(1 9 1 8 -1 9 1 9 )
M in istry  o f  Internal A ffa irs  
(1 9 1 9 -1 9 2 3 )
D ep u ty  voivode o f  W arsaw  
(1 9 2 3 -1 9 2 4 )
Voivode o f  K ie lc e  v o iv o d sh ip
S E C O N D
P E R IO D :
R A D I C A L
P O L O N IZ A T I O N
(1 9 2 6 -1 9 3 9 )
M I C H A L
G R A Z Y N S K I
(1 8 9 0 -1 9 6 5 )
(S ep t. 19 2 6 -S ep t. 1 9 3 9 ) N ew co m er
(G alic ia )
T h e c h ie f  p o sitio n  during the  
third S ile sia n  R is in g
M A  H istory  
L L D
J agellon ian  U n iv ersity  
C racow
(1 9 2 1 -1 9 2 3 )
L ecturer at Jagellon ian  U n iv ers ity  
(1 9 2 4 -1 9 2 5 )
D irector  o f  departm en t in  M in istry  o f  
A gricu ltura l R efo rm
Table 3: The characteristics of the deputy voivodes in the inter-war Silesia voivodship, 1922-1939
NAMES OF DEPUTY 
VOIVODES
PERIOD IN 
OFFICE
REGIONAL
ORIGINS
EARLIER CONTACTS 
WITH UPPER SILESIA 
BEFORE PROMOTION
ACHIEVED
EDUCATION
PREVIOUS EXPERIENCE OF 
ADMINISTRATION
FIRST
DEPUTY
VOIVODE
ZYGMUNT
ZURAWSKI
(1878-1962)
(June 1922-June 1931) Cieszyn Silesian 
(formerly part of 
Galicia)
(1918)
Participant in Cieszyn Silesia’s 
fight for incorporation into 
Polish state
(1920)
Commissar of Polish 
Government for the Duchy of 
Cieszyn Silesia
LLM 
Univ. of Lwow
(1895-1918)
Work in Galician administration
TADEUSZ
SALONI
(1890-?)
(June 1931-Sept 1939) Newcomer
Galicia
No earlier contacts with Upper 
Silesia
LLD 
Jagellonian Univ. 
Cracow
Work in Cracow district 
administration
(Since 1921)
Legal adviser in Ministry of Interior
(Since 1926) 
work in the voivodship office in 
Katowice
(1927-1931)
Director of Presidium Department in 
the voivodship office in Katowice
SECOND 
DEPUTY 
VOIVODE 
SINCE 1935
LEON
MALHOLME
(1888-c. 1940)
(May 1935-Sept. 
1939)
Newcomer 
Russia 
(but of Polish 
nationality)
(1929-1933)
Polish consul in: Bytom and 
Opole in (German Upper 
Silesia)
(1934-1935)
Polish consul in: 
Ostrawa Morawska (Czech 
Cieszyn Silesia)
LLM 
Univ. of Petersburg 
Univ. of Dorpat
(Since 1918)
Ministry of Foreign Affairs
(1934)
Legal adviser in Polish Embassy in 
Paris
• The Voivodes
An analysis of regional policy demands presentation of the main actors; the voivodes. 
The first voivode after the incorporation of Upper Silesia into Poland, Rymer, and his 
deputy, Zurawski, were both Silesians and independence fighters.116 Their nominations 
seem to have been related to their origins: Rymer, who was a representative of Upper 
Silesia, the major part of the new voivodship, became voivode; Zurawski, who was a 
representative of Cieszyn Silesia, became deputy voivode. Rymer represented the 
‘combatant’ type of administrative career. It was based on his achievements during the 
struggle for Upper Silesia’s incorporation into Poland. In 1921, he became the chairman 
of the Principal People’s Council, whose aim it was to prepare Polish civil servants for 
the new voivodship. This experience was the dominating factor in his promotion and 
compensated for his lack of education and administrative qualifications. The pure 
‘combatant’ type of career is fairly rare in the inter-war period and can be mainly 
observed in 1922, also among his Silesian colleagues employed in administration.
Rymer’s administrative career is quite similar to that of some regional leaders of the 
socialist period, such as Zawadzki, Nowak, Gierek and Grudzien. Like them, Rymer, as 
a boy, emigrated to Germany to work as a coalminer (Gierek and Grudzien worked in 
France). Moreover, as with these post-war regional leaders, poverty prevented him 
from finishing secondary school, and he furthered his education by studying 
independently. The same features which bring Rymer near the socialist regional leaders 
also distance him from the majority of the representatives of the inter-war regional 
administrative elite. Thus, Rymer’s promotion was a rare exception as educational 
criteria excluded blue-collar workers from senior positions in administration. This lack 
of academic qualifications also distinguished him from Zurawski, who worked as the 
deputy voivode between 1922 and 1931. Zurawski’s career had some features of the 
‘combatant’ type: in the period between 1918 and 1920 he was the Commissar of the 
Polish government for the Duchy of Cieszyn Silesia during the negotiations between the 
Polish and Czech governments. However, he also shared with newcomer voivodes from 
Galicia the main features of the ‘bureaucratic career’, as he had a law degree and 
extensive experience as a senior civil servant.
116 See table 2, page 62.
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During Rymer’s tenure, the shortage of Polish personnel in administration, and also 
particularly in industry, forced the voivodship authorities to employ German civil 
servants who declared loyalty to the Polish state,117 even though the ‘national’ issue was 
one of the most sensitive. However, the second and equally important reason for 
employing German Silesians was the strong regional ties.
The next three voivodes, Schultis, Koncki and Bilski, represented the second phase of 
the policy of gradual polonisation. Their tenure coincided with a further influx of 
newcomers into the administration. The similarity of the regional policies of these three 
voivodes is probably, at least to some extent, explained by their similar origins, 
administrative qualifications (the requisite law degrees: LLM or even LLD) and work 
experience. First, they all were newcomers from Galicia. Second, they also had similar 
professional ‘bureaucratic careers’: all three voivodes had worked in managerial 
positions in central administration. Finally, Koncki and Bilski had no contacts with the 
region before their promotions, while Schultis had only short contacts during the 
plebiscite.
These three voivodes followed similar personnel policies in the voivodship 
administration. During their time in office there was a further influx of newcomers, 
much stronger than during Rymer’s tenure. As a result, newcomers began to dominate. 
For example, in 1925, Rostek was the only Silesian among twelve directors of 
departments in the voivodship office, though Silesians occupied a higher proportion of 
positions at the middle level.118 These voivodes tried to gain social support in the region 
by trying to protect the employment of Silesians in administration. For example, 
Koncki, after three months in office, explained to the Silesian Diet that he had not 
signed any promotion for a newcomer who had not finished secondary or higher 
education. Thus, the arrival of newcomers during his tenure was justified only by the 
necessity of employing in some positions people with high qualifications, which only 
newcomers had.
117 Wanatowicz, 1986: 33.
118 Wanatowicz, 1982: 42.
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The regional conflict
It was at this time that the conflict between natives and newcomers and their different 
cultures started to become evident. Since then it has had a tendency to re-appear during 
the regional crises of both the inter-war and the post-war periods. Moreover, this 
conflict between natives and newcomers has had a strong impact on the regional 
policies conducted since then.119
Silesians were also a strongly exclusive social group, in contrast to the newcomers, who 
were much more open towards other groups. For native Silesians, regional ties were of 
primary importance over national ones, while national identification was secondary or 
did not exist at all.120 Kossak-Szczucka wrote that the Poles from other regions were 
alien to them:
We were aliens for them [Silesians], such aliens. It is understandable that they hold their 
Polishness dearer than their own lives, their own Polish soul, their Polish language, but 
never did they have any sentiment toward the Poles, whom they did not know, who were 
not interested in them. History’s mistakes must be paid for.121
Attitudes towards the German population living in the region significantly distinguished 
natives from newcomers. Thus, strong regional ties and solidarity led Polish Silesians 
like Korfanty and the Christian Democratic party to defend the rights of German 
Silesians. For example, they protested against the ‘nationally’ motivated policy of 
limiting the employment and promotion of German Silesians in the voivodship 
administration (and also in industry), and of replacing them with newcomers. Thus, the 
death of Rymer, a native Silesian, was crucial for the development of employment 
policies. Despite the fact that Rymer started the quite strong influx of qualified civil 
servants from other Polish regions, the shift of power to successive newcomer voivodes 
intensified this process.
Silesians also considered themselves to be economically and culturally superior to Poles 
from Galicia and Russian Poland. Silesians enjoyed much higher living standards,122 
and statistical data of the inter-war period confirmed a higher level of participation in
119 Compare, for example, opinions of the Upper Silesian Union in 1989, chapter three.
120 Wanatowicz, 1994: 96.
121 Kossak-Szczucka in Blaszczak-Waclawik, 1990: 23.
122 Wanatowicz, 1994: 42 and Serafin, 1996.
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elections. At the same time, a lower crime-rate reflected the long tradition of legal 
order and democratic institutions in the Prussian State in comparison to former Russian 
Poland and Galicia. Moreover, Silesians were very religious, much more religious in 
fact than Poles from other regions, hence the strength of Christian Democracy123 and 
their relative immunity to communist ideology, which was traditionally strong in 
neighbouring Dqbrowa.124
In contrast, newcomers, who, in the thirties, made up only about four or five per cent of 
regional society,125 displayed the culture typical of the majority of Polish territories, 
which was centred on their noble and rural origins. They greatly respected education 
and white-collar jobs. The different class origins of Silesians and newcomers (a high 
proportion of whom occupied senior positions in the administration and in industry) 
were expressed in the egalitarian culture of the Silesians and the elitist values of the 
newcomers. The elitist character of the newcomers influenced their feeling of cultural 
superiority and their strong sense of a mission to modernise the region. The different 
cultural traditions of the Silesians and the newcomers, which led to the creation of this 
regional conflict, were further reinforced by the formation of the new social and 
economic factors. The social structure, formed after 1922, excluded Silesians from the 
regional upper classes, but most of all the conflict was intensified by the radical 
worsening of the economic conditions of the native Silesians due to widespread 
unemployment.
The departure of Germans from the Silesia voivodship after its incorporation into the 
Polish state seriously depleted the regional middle and upper social strata and led to a 
social vacuum. This was especially evident in administration and education, though the 
Germans preserved their ownership of industry. The formation of the new regional elite, 
despite the earlier declarations given during the plebiscite, was mostly based on 
newcomers. Furthermore, the extensive demand for qualified personnel in 
administration led to employment of incompetent newcomers; ‘incompetent and 
unsuitable candidates were accepted for many important posts with regrettable 
results’.126
123 Davies, 1981, volume 2, 221.
124Schopflin, 1993: 34.
125 Serafin, 1996: 20.
126 Rose, 1935:278.
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The regional conflict between the Silesians and the newcomers was also made worse by 
the Silesian expectations of preserving an egalitarian, classless social structure. The 
native Silesians were surprised by the formation of a Polish upper class, especially as 
they were almost completely excluded from this group. Arka Bozek, the spokesman for 
the Polish minority in German Upper Silesia and the post-war deputy voivode (1945- 
1950), put it like this:
We dreamt of an ideal Poland, of a righteous Poland, a Poland without lords or farm-hands.
It was to be the motherland of people who were really free and equal.127
The Silesians’ disenchantment with belonging to the Polish state and their sense of 
social injustice caused by the influx of leaders from other regions, were also 
strengthened by the feeling that their efforts during the Silesian Rising were left 
unrecognised. The same author, Bozek, added:
The Silesian people were severely mistaken. Here in their mother[land] they found 
themselves in misery and unemployed and they had to work as farm-hands.... Only the 
lords changed. The Berlin lords left, and the Warsaw-Cracow lords arrived. I would like to 
be objective but it is difficult to say which lords were worse. Everything suggests that it 
was our relatives [Poles from other regions]. There hangs over Silesia a doom, a curse 
which has made her a servant of one or the other side.128
This double sense of injustice due to the formation of the newcomer upper class and 
lack of recognition of their sacrifice during the Silesian Rising led the Silesians to 
further strengthen their regional ties. Sometimes, it even led to an ‘escape into 
regionalism’, which was expressed in their isolation from the newcomers. At the same 
time, the contrast between the Polish and German Silesians was decreasing. Silesians 
saw themselves primarily as one regional group, despite being of different nationalities 
or speaking different languages. Similar attitudes traced back to the inter-war period 
can be found in the period under investigation; for example, in the Upper Silesia Union 
declarations in 1989 and the opinions of voivode Czech.129
According to Blaszczak-Waclawik (1990) strong regional identification and the absence 
or decline of national identification in the form of an ‘escape into regionalism’ caused 
about 15 per cent of the inter-war population of the Silesia voivodship declared only
127 Koped, 1986:29 quoting Bozek.
128 Wanatowicz, 1982: 283 quoting Bozek.
129 See chapter three.
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regional identity.130 This retreat from national identity was intensified by the worsening 
economic conditions in the region, especially the high level of unemployment, with one 
quarter of the families in Upper Silesia suffering from unemployment in 1932.131 The 
social structure of Upper Silesia, with natives remaining in their low social class 
position, also strengthened their ‘escape into regionalism’. Sometimes, there were even 
hints of separatist ideas, as in the case of the Union for the Protection of Silesians. 
However, Kopec (1986) suggested that this group of natives without national 
identification arose as a result of voivodship and central administration policies.
• Voivode Grazynski
Grazynski was appointed immediately after the military takeover in 1926. His long rule 
led to stability and continuity of his regional policy. He came to power with strong 
backing from the Sanacja regime, although at the beginning his position in the region 
was weak since for the majority of Silesians he was an unknown official sent from 
Warsaw. However, within a short time, his policy of state intervention led to economic 
progress, and electoral results showed a significant rise in support for him. This could 
be measured by the decline of German votes, which is an indication of satisfaction with 
belonging to the Polish state rather than of national identification. In 1928, 42 per cent 
of the voivodship population voted in favour of German minority parties.132 After 
Grazynski had been in office for eighteen months, it was 31 per cent, and two years later 
it was 20 per cent.133
In 1926, Grazynski was appointed voivode and he remained in office for thirteen years. 
In the light of this, his tenure should be more closely examined, using the same 
variables that were used to discuss his predecessors. Presentation of Grazynski’s rule, 
as with the previous voivodes, will concentrate on four main points:
130 Estimates vary significantly and political criteria seem to be the primary factors behind the figures for 
example, voivode Grazynski did not recognise this group at all, while Korfanty estimated that it applied to 
30 per cent of Silesians.
131 Wanatowicz, 1994: 99.
132 Germans made up 15 per cent of the voivodship population (Blaszczak-Waclawik, 1990: 52). Thus, the 
much higher support of the voivodship population for the parties of the German minority should probably 
be interpreted as an indication of dissatisfaction with their economic conditions rather than national 
identification.
133 Rose, 1935.
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1. his regional origins, education, qualifications, and career development;
2. his personnel employment policy in the administration, especially concerning the 
administrative elite;
3. his authoritarian style of governing;
4. his regional policy.
First, like his three predecessors, Schultis, Koncki and Bilski, Grazynski was of 
Galician origin, and he had a law degree and experience of managerial work in central 
administration. However, in contrast to the other three he had fought in the Third 
Silesian Rising. He also had extensive knowledge of national problems and a clear 
vision of radical polonisation when he took office.
Although the inter-war voivodes, apart from Rymer, were highly qualified academically, 
Grazynski’s qualifications were particularly impressive. This may have been a factor in 
his early promotion -  he was only 36 years old when he was appointed. In addition, 
like the regional elite of the socialist period, he was promoted to a central ministerial 
position in the last of the inter-war government, as Minister of Information. He was 
nominated after the outbreak of war on 5 September 1939. Grazynski resembled the 
regional socialist elite of the eighties, which incorporated a few scholars into the 
administrative and political elite of the voivodship. He also had a high position within 
the Sanacja regime. This enabled him to conduct an anti-German policy, which was in 
conflict with the anti-Russian and pro-German policy of Beck, the Minister of External 
Affairs. Grazynski’s conflict with Beck was proof of his political skills: his anti- 
German policy was presented as the idea of regional organisations and parties, rather 
than his own idea, and therefore not something for which he could take responsibility or 
blame.
The second strand of Grazynski’s policy, the employment policy of the administration, 
is to be investigated in the context of a new phenomenon, the formation of a regional 
umbrella party. From the moment of his arrival, Grazynski based his power on the 
former insurrectionaries, who were dispersed in the regional elite, as a sort of umbrella 
party uniting people of various regional parties and associations. Among these the most 
prominent was the Polish Insurrectionaries’ Union, which aimed to unite regional 
society around ‘common national values’. The club of the Polish Insurrectionary Union 
was officially open to all insurrectionaries, but the cost of enrolment and the monthly
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fees preserved its elitist character.134 This inner circle of the elite was mainly organised 
by his colleagues from the operational group ‘East’, of the Third Silesian Rising, and 
they took the highest positions in the voivodship administration and politics.135
During Grazynski’s rule there were two deputy voivodes: Saloni and, from 1935, 
Malholme. The appointment of Saloni, a close colleague of Grazynski, is a typical 
example of the appointments of the Sanacja era, when selection for a higher position 
was based on close personal ties. The appointment of the second deputy voivode, 
Malholme, Dlugajczyk (1983) suggested, was made by Beck to weaken Grazynski’s 
position.
The regional appointment policy adopted by Grazynski was not limited to positions in 
public administration. It was also applied in regional industry and the officially- 
independent local government. The scale of this appointment system resembled the 
socialist nomenklatura system as nearly all the key positions in the region were taken by 
people loyal to the regime, and there was no place for those who tried to be apolitical. 
However, there were significant differences between these two periods as high 
qualifications were necessary for civil servants in the inter-war period, and political 
affiliation could not be the sole reason for an appointment. This was in contrast to the 
negative selection in the socialist period. In his appointments, Grazynski also took into 
account national and class origins, and ‘confirmation that their children were brought up 
in an environment promoting the Polish language and culture’.136
Grazynski’s employment policy toward Silesians has been variously evaluated. Kopec 
(1986) suggested that he deliberately tried to limit the employment of Silesians, and 
only employed them at lower positions, as a token questure. However, Wanatowicz 
(1982) believed that the low proportion of Silesians employed in administration during 
Grazynski’s tenure was due to their poor qualifications, and that the voivode made 
efforts to promote them, making some exceptions for the promotion of Silesians without 
qualifications.
134 Rechowicz, 1988:123.
135 Przewlocki, 1985:73.
136 Rechowicz, 1988.
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Thirdly, Grazynski’s authoritarian rule, in contrast to all former Silesian voivodes, was 
aimed towards the total elimination of the opposition, even of those who, like Korfanty, 
were members of the Silesian Diet and had official immunity. Similarly, he did not co­
operate with the Silesian Diet and often left Diet sessions.137 While inter-war regional 
politics cannot be reduced to clashes of personality, the role of such personal rivalries 
was crucial in Silesian and national politics.138 This domination of individuals and 
personal coteries over political parties in regional politics may partly be explained by 
the relatively weak legitimacy of administrative and political institutions due to the 
continuing identification of institutions with the partitioning powers. In the inter-war 
period in Silesia voivodship, personal conflicts seemed to have had their origins in the 
past, mostly during the Third Silesian Rising.139 Formed then, these personal conflicts 
dominated the political attitudes of the leaders and prevented political compromises 
even in extremely serious political situations. This inability to compromise is illustrated 
in the conflict between Grazynski and Korfanty. When Korfanty came back from 
political exile in Czechoslovakia only a few months before the expected war in April 
1939 he was sent to prison on a charge of peculation, which probably hastened his 
death. The personal conflict between the two Silesian leaders, Korfanty and Grazynski, 
embodied the attitudes of the two groups inhabiting the region: natives and newcomers. 
It was a division in which the newcomers supported quick integration and the Silesians 
defended regionalism and gradual integration.
The fourth issue was Grazynski ‘s regional policy aimed at the radical polonisation of 
Silesia. This had two major components. The first was the liquidation of the Silesian 
voivodship’s political autonomy via the abolition of the Diet. Grazynski advocated the 
abolition of autonomy and the special rights and privileges related to it on the grounds 
that the region should not be different from other voivodships.140 However, the huge 
popularity of autonomy in regional society quickly convinced him to withdraw his 
earlier proposals. These he later modified into a concept of changing the voivodship 
borders to increase the influx of Poles from other regions. The modification of
137Przewtocki, 1985: 75.
138 Davies, 1984; 129-148 on the duel of Pilsudski versus Dmowski.
139 During the Third Silesian Rising, Grazynski was the chief of staff o f the Operational Group ‘East’, 
whose soldiers played a crucial role in the fighting and wanted to liberate the whole of Upper Silesia. 
Their attitudes were in opposition to those of Korfanty who was the Dictator of the Rising and who did 
not believe in military solutions, preferring instead to advance Polish territorial claims through 
diplomacy. He considered the Rising as dangerous, as it could have a negative influence on Polish 
territorial claims during the Paris Peace Conference.
140 Rechowicz, 1988: 280.
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voivodship borders was also aimed at integrating the heavy industry centre of Upper 
Silesia with the Dqbrowa basin, which was intended to strengthen the political 
significance of the enlarged voivodship, too.
The second component of Grazynski ‘s regional policy was trying to win over that part 
of the Silesian population that did not have a clear national identification. The problem 
of the nationally-indifferent population was also complicated by the presence of a 
substantial German minority in the voivodship (as mentioned earlier, Germans made up 
15 per cent of the population of Polish Upper Silesia). This raised the possibility that 
the nationally-indifferent population would be attracted by German nationality. 
Grazynski main aim was to reduce the number of children educated in German minority 
schools. He also wished to Polonize industry by introducing Polish management, 
decreasing German ownership, and improving the conditions of blue-collar workers by 
means of a policy of state intervention that would increase their satisfaction with 
belonging to the Polish state. In both education and industry his authoritarian methods 
brought significant results compared to the first period.
b. The local government elite
The organisation of local government in the voivodship of Silesia was modified as a 
consequence of regional autonomy. Thus, the voivodship office was simultaneously 
representative of the central government, and the institution of local government as an 
expression of regional autonomy. The local government department of the voivodship 
office proposed both commune and district bills. The Upper Silesian part of the 
voivodship was divided into nine districts, including two towns with the status of 
district: Katowice and Chorzow.
The local government elite will be investigated using the example of the capital of 
Silesia voivodship, Katowice. During the inter-war period, there were two mayors, 
Alfons Gomik and Adam Kocur. As for the public administration elite, the description 
of these mayors will include investigation of their regional origins, education, 
professional qualifications and employment policies.141 The most important feature of
141 See table 4, page 74.
72
the local government elite was its heavy domination by Silesians, in contrast to the 
public administration elite (which was investigated above in the example of voivodes, 
deputy voivodes and directors of departments in the voivodship office). The fact that 
the local government was dominated by Silesians is worth exploring insofar as it 
influenced the professional careers and national identifications of elites in local 
administration. As in the case of the public administration elite -  the voivodes -  the 
employment policies of local government elite -  Katowice mayors -  will be 
investigated. The employment policies of the mayors Gomik and Kocur will be 
compared to the policies of the voivodes in public administration during the relevant 
periods: the first period, that of gradual polonisation (1922-1926), and the second 
period, radical polonisation (1926-1939).
The careers of both of Katowice’s inter-war mayors, Gomik and Kocur, show a number 
of striking similarities even though they held office in different periods. First, both 
were Silesians, even coming from the same town, and they were nearly the same age. 
Likewise, both followed a similar educational path: LLD at the University of Breslau 
(Wroclaw). Even their fate after dismissal was similar -  emigration to Germany. This 
similarity in their careers is a good illustration of the presence of strong regional ties. It 
also illustrates Chlebowczyk’s (1980) concept of ‘borderland consciousness’, 
characterised by the overlapping of national influences. In the case of Kocur it led to 
identification with Polish nationality. By contrast, Gomik, brought up in German 
surroundings, seemed to balance both influences and felt above all Silesian. During the 
Third Silesian Rising, he was a Korfanty supporter, and protected the economic and 
social conditions of Polish Silesians in Katowice. The national and regional 
identifications of Kocur and Gomik vividly illustrate the role of regional ties in the area, 
where society was divided according to national identification nearly by chance. In 
consequence, national identification was treated by many Silesians as less important 
than regional identification.
The policies of Gomik and Kocur (representatives of local government) had a lot in 
common with those of the public administration in the voivodship for the relevant 
periods. For example, Gomik’s employment policy shared many features with that of 
the first phase in the public administration, when Rymer was in office. Gomik declared:
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In practice I would not know Poles or Germans, but only Polish-and German-speaking 
inhabitants of towns.142
Kocur, a close colleague of Grazynski, in contrast, conducted a policy of radical 
polonisation.
Table 3: Similarities and differences in the professional careers of the inter-war mayors 
of Katowice, 1922-1939
A lfo n s  G o r n ik A d a m  K o c u r
P L A C E  O F  B IR T H U pp er S ile s ia  (K u zn ia  R acib orsk a)  
b .1 8 8 6
U p p er S ile s ia  (K u zn ia  R acib orsk a)  
b .1 8 8 4
N A T IO N A L  ID E N T IF IC A T IO N S ile sia n P o lish  S ile s ia n
E D U C A T IO N U n iv ersity  o f  W roc law  and B er lin  
L L D
U n iv ers ity  o f  W roc law  
L L D
- d urin g that period , co n ta ct w ith  P o lish  
cu ltu re and literature
W O R K  E X P E R IE N C E From  1914
w ork  in  lo c a l govern m en ts o f  U p p er S ile s ia
From  1 9 2 6  
d irector o f  S ile s ia  V o iv o d sh ip  P o lic e
R O L E  D U R IN G  T H E  P L E B IS C IT E  
A N D  T H E  R IS IN G
In 1921 a m em b er o f  th e P rin cip a l P e o p le ’s 
C o u n cil
and a d v isor  to  K orfanty o n  K a to w ice
O n e o f  th e  leaders in  the O perational 
G roup ‘E ast’
PE R IO D  IN  O F F IC E (1 9 2 1 -1 9 2 8 ) (1 9 2 8 -1 9 3 9 )
A fter  the Sanacja tak e-over, p o lit ica l attacks  
o n  h is  em p lo y m en t p o lic y  forced  h im  to  
le a v e  U p p er S ile s ia  (and h e  em igrated  to  
G erm any)
A fter  th e  S eco n d  W orld  W ar h e  
em igra ted  to  G erm an y ( lik e  a lo t o f  the  
Sanacja p o lit ic ia n s)
N A T IO N A L  P O L IC Y N atio n a lly  im partia l R ad ica l p o lo n isa tio n
In the first period, before the Sanacja take-over,143 voivodes did not intervene in local 
government actions. When Grazynski became a voivode and initiated his policy of 
radical polonisation, he also tried to subordinate local governments. He often rigged 
election results to promote Polish town mayors or replaced the democratically-elected 
councils with receivership councils (commisarial councils) headed by his supporters.
To sum up for both the national and regional elites at the beginning of the nineties, the 
administrative structures of the inter-war period were a crucial point of reference in the 
search for models to replace the ineffective administration left by socialism. This 
inspiration was especially strong in the case of the Upper Silesian administrative elite. 
Most of all, they emphasised the widespread competencies vested in the Silesian
142 Gomik quoted in Murzyn, 1979: 133.
143 Sieradzka, 1992: 77.
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regional authorities during the inter-war period due to regional autonomy, and the 
resulting extreme decentralisation of power. The native Silesians also pointed to the 
democratic character of regional institutions: the Silesian Diet had given the regional 
population the sense that ‘we, the people’ were participating in the decision-making 
process. A similar desire for democratisation of regional institutions, to participate in 
decision-making processes, to decide for 'ourselves’, was strongly felt after the fall of 
communism. This was strengthened by the widespread view that central governments 
were unable and unwilling to recognise regional interests.
The autonomous Silesia of the inter-war period was sometimes seen by the regional 
administrative elite as the most effectively-ruled region in the whole of Poland at that 
time. This strengthened the view that the period had been something of a ‘golden age’ 
in the region’s history. This rather uncritical view of the period is partly to be explained 
by the strong emotions associated with the return of the region to Poland after centuries 
of separation. However, the analyses presented above -  for example, of the conflict 
between the native Silesians and newcomers -  indicate that it was also a time of serious 
social and economic problems. Among these problems the most severe was the 
exclusion of natives from the upper classes and, in consequence, from the regional elite. 
This was assisted by high unemployment among the native population. The seventeen- 
year period between the incorporation of Upper Silesia and the outbreak of the Second 
World War (1922-1939) resulted in the limited creation of an indigenous regional 
administrative elite in Upper Silesia.144
The thorough understanding of attitudes and actions in the field of regional policy in the 
transitional period requires that they be traced back to the inter-war period in at least 
one more respect. Investigation of the inter-war period is crucial in relation to 
development of regional and national identification of the Silesian population. For 
example, the results of the 1922 plebiscite left a lasting impact on perceptions of the 
Upper Silesians’ ‘Polishness’. Doubts about their commitment to the Polish state had a 
fundamental impact on the national and regional authorities’ policies towards the native 
population. The influence of these policies reached far beyond the inter-war period: 
similar policies reappeared during the socialist period, and their impact is still to be felt 
in the politics of the region today.
144 Wanatowicz, 1982: 54.
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Analysis of the performance of the administration during the inter-war period seems to 
confirm the native regional elite’s view: the extensive powers vested in the regional 
authorities made Silesia the most effectively-ruled region in Poland during the inter-war 
period. Nevertheless, there were severe regional economic and social problems 
(mentioned above) which the regional administration was not able to overcome. 
Although the opinion of the regional elite at the beginning of the nineties about the 
inter-war period seems to have been uncritical, nevertheless it was a valuable inspiration 
for decentralisation of power and systemic reform of administration.
As the inter-war period was seen as the best in regional history, and its administrative 
actions as extremely efficient, regional administrative elite demands were directed to 
obtaining political power similar to that of the inter-war regional authorities. However, 
proposals to return autonomy to the region presented at the beginning of the nineties 
were not well received outside Silesia. Rather than being seen as a positive effort to 
decentralise power, they raised fears about Silesian separatism. These fears were 
strengthened by the long-standing doubts about the national self-identification of the 
Silesians, doubts that were reinforced by memories of the German occupation of Silesia 
during the Second World War.
2.3 The national and regional administration in the socialist period, 1945-1989
The first part of this section investigates the role of administration in the socialist period 
in Poland as a whole, while the second part focuses exclusively on the Upper Silesian 
administration. The section starts with a presentation of the role of nomenklatura. In 
addition, the main administrative phases are distinguished. The next subsection focuses 
on the role of the heavy industry type of economic development, and its impact on 
administrative centralisation and vertical fragmentation among various sectors. 
Reference to the role of heavy-industry economic development will be also made in the 
second subsection of this section when the privileged position and extreme power of the 
Upper Silesian regional elite will be investigated. The last subsection concentrates on a 
presentation of the main changes in the administration during the socialist period, 
especially the 1975 reform. References to this reform are often made by members of the 
regional administrative elite in describing their existing situation, but most of all when
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they demanded a return to the pre-1975 administrative situation.
In the second part of this chapter, the development of administration in the Upper 
Silesia region is investigated. The description of the regional elite concentrates on two 
groups: the administrative regional authorities themselves, and the political regional 
elite, the latter of which often exercised control over the former. I identify six main 
administrative periods. Through the whole time, the performance of the regional elite 
was strongly affected by the radical external political changes. Thus, for each of the 
administrative periods the central and particular political features are distinguished; for 
example, the Volskliste issue after the war, the Stalinist purges (1948-1956), the 
administrative reform of 1975 during Grudzien‘s tenure, and then the employment of 
intellectuals in the period after martial law. These events were so important that they are 
included despite the fact that they were characteristic of just one administrative period. 
At the same time, the limitation in availability of the data causes separate issues to be 
distinguished for each period, which are not followed in the subsequent periods. For 
example, the Upper Silesian employment in administration is undoubtedly the crucial 
variable. However, it can only be presented in relation to the period 1945-1970.
i. The legacy o f the socialist administration
The socialist period left behind it an extremely centralised and ineffective 
administrative structure that was also highly fragmented vertically, both in terms of 
chains of command and territorial spread. However, from the Upper Silesian regional 
administrative elite’s point of view, the effects of administrative reform are particularly 
analysed in relation to the restoration of the traditional three-tier administrative structure 
with 17 large regions. This reform further strengthened administrative centralisation by 
transferring power from regional and local authorities to numerous territorial special 
administration units directly subordinate to individual ministries. Thus, the two main 
challenges to systemic administrative reform after the fall of socialism were to 
overcome its extremely centralised administrative structure and its concomitant feature 
of vertical fragmentation.
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a. The role of administration in the socialist state
• The nomenklatura changes and the main administrative phases of the socialist 
period
During the socialist period, the role of the state was all-embracing, as private ownership 
in the economy was marginal. In all spheres, the policies of the communist party were 
considered identical to the aims of the state. Other economic and political associations 
did not exist, or were directly subordinate to the party.
The functioning of the national and regional administrative (and political) elite during 
the socialist period was influenced by two main factors: first, formation of the 
nomenklatura -  the socialist elite145 and its cyclical changes at the top of the communist 
party; and second, the socialist concept of rapid industrialisation.
First, the nomenklatura system secured the communist political elite’s monopoly over 
the public sphere. The authoritarian rules of the nomenklatura blocked channels for 
presenting opposition ideas and limited the opportunities for social mobility within the 
political elite. As a result, post-war history is marked by waves of social unrest leading 
to political crises (in 1956, 1970 and 1980) that were accompanied by conflicts within 
the ruling elite.146 Changes in the party leadership occurred directly after displays of 
worker and student unrest culminating in political crises. These led to cyclical shifts in 
party leadership and affected the composition of the political and administrative elites at 
central and regional levels.
In examining the socialist era, six main political periods at central level (also relevant at 
regional level) will be distinguished.147 The first two were the take-over (1945-1948) 
and Stalinism (1948-1956), both of which occurred during Boleslaw Bierut’s rule 
(1945-1956). Wladyslaw Gomulka’s rule (1956-1970) constitutes the third period,
145 Voslensky, 1983.
146 Erlich, 1991.
147 See table 5, page 80.
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followed by Edward Gierek’s rule (1970-1980), the interregnum (1980-1981), and the 
last period, Wojciech Jaruzelski’s rule (1981-1989). In all six periods, political power 
was concentrated in the hands of the first secretaries of the communist party.
79
Table 5: The political and administrative elite of the Katowice voivodship in the socialist period, 1945-1989, in the context of main 
national trends
N A M E  O F  T H E  F IR ST  
S E C R E T A R Y
B O L E S L A W  
B I E R U T  
( 1 9 4 4 - 1 9 5 6 )
W L A D Y S L A W
G O M U L K A
(1 9 5 6 -1 9 7 0 )
E D W A R D
G I E R E K
(1 9 7 0 -1 9 8 0 )
S T A N I S L A W
K A N IA
(1 9 8 0 -1 9 8 1 )
W O J C I E C H
J A R U Z E L S K I
(1 9 8 1 -1 9 8 9 )
IDEOLOGY
T a k e-o v er
(1 9 4 4 -1 9 4 8 )
S ta lin ism  
( 1 9 4 8 -  1956 )
N ation a l co m m u n ism C o m m u n ist fa ca d e  and  
p rom ise  o f  e c o n o m ic  
d ev e lo p m e n t
U ncertain ty From  m ilitary  cou p  to  
n ego tia tion
ORIGINS OF THE ELITE C om m u n ist e x i le s  from  th e S o v ie t  U n io n  and  th e  com m u n ist  
resistan ce
G radual r ise  o f  exp erts F orm alised  bureaucracy Purges M ilitar ised
ELITE RELATIONS: 
The Communist Party, 
Administration, Industry, 
the Military
D om in a tio n  o f  the co m m u n ist party b y  th e  m ilitary , and secu rity  
serv ice  b o th  w h ich  w ere in filtrated  b y  R ussian s
S u p erv is ion  b y  the P o lish  
co m m u n ist party o f  other 
in stitu tion s
U n ited  under the  
co m m u n ist party
D isu n ited , gradual r ise  o f  
m ilitary
D isp la cem e n t o f  p o lit ica l e lite  
en a b lin g  n ego tia tion s b etw een  
the arm y an d  the So lid arity  
op p o sitio n
FIRST SECRETARY IN 
THE KATOWICE 
VOIVODSHIP
M A R I A N  B A R Y L A
(F eb . 1945  -  F eb. 19 4 6 )
E D W A R D  O C H A B
(F eb . 1 9 4 6  -  A pril 19 4 8 )
Z E N O N  N O W A K
(M a y  194 8  - O ct. 1 9 4 8 )
R Y S Z A R D  S T R Z E L E C K I
(O ct. 1948  -  Feb. 1950 )
J 6 Z E F  O L S Z E W S K I
(F eb. 195 0  - 1957 )
E D W A R D  G I E R E K  
(M arch  195 7  - D ec . 1970 )
Z D IS L A W  G R U D Z I E tf  
(D e c . 1 9 7 0  - S ep t. 1 9 8 0 )
A N D R Z E J  Z A B IN S K I
(S ep t. 198 0  - Jan. 1 9 8 2 )
Z B I G N I E W  M E S S N E R  
(Jan. 1 9 8 2  - D ec . 1 9 8 2 )
B O G U M IL
F E R E N S Z T A J N
(D e c . 1983  - N o v . 1987 )
M A N F R E D  G O R Y W O D A
(D e c . 198 7  - N o v . 1989 )
VOIVODES OF 
THE KATOWICE 
VOIVODSHIP
A L E K S A N D E R  Z A W A D Z K I  
(M arch. 1945  - O ct. 19 4 8 )
B O L E S L A W  J A S Z C Z U K  
(O ct. 1948  - Feb. 1952 )
j d Z E F  K O S Z U T S K I  
(A pril. 195 2  - Feb. 1954)
J E R Z Y  Z IIJ T E K  in  proxy  
(F eb. 195 4  - D ec . 1954 )
R Y S Z A R D  
(D ec . 19 5 4
N IE S Z P O R E K
A pril 19 6 4 )
JE R Z Y
(A pril
S T A N I S L A W
K I E R M A S Z E K
(June 1975  - June 19 7 8 )
Z I ^ T E K
9 6 4 -  June 1 9 7 5 )
Z D IS L A W
L E G O M O S K I
(Ju ne 1978  - D ec . 19 8 0 )
H E N R Y K  L I C H O S
(D e c . 1 9 8 0 - D e c .  1 9 8 1 )
R O M A N  P A S Z K O W S K I
(D e c . 1981 - M ay 1 9 8 5 )
T A D E U S Z  W N U K  
(M a y  1985  -  M ay  1 9 90 )
00o
Between 1944 and 1956 the communist party, with Bierut as first secretary, established 
and maintained a monopoly over political power. On the whole, this was a strongly 
ideological period, with the emphasis on Poland’s subordination to the Soviet Union. 
The Soviet authorities wanted to create the impression of an independent Polish army 
(security forces), politics and administration. However, Russian officers (often of Polish 
origin, the most striking example being Marshal Rokossowski) took crucial positions in 
the state.
Gomulka (1956-1970) tried to unite communist ideology with Polish national tradition. 
This attempt was reflected in the phrase ‘the Polish road to socialism’ which 
emphasised that each socialist country should have the power to decide its economic 
and political policies freely as long as the socialist framework and ideology were 
preserved. His rule ended in 1970 after workers’ strikes which demonstrated the 
workers’ disillusionment with socialism.
The next period, 1970-1980, with Gierek as the First Secretary, showed the strong role 
of the heavy-industry lobby of Katowice. This regime came to power with awareness of 
the high level of social dissatisfaction and lack of ideological support. As a result, 
Gierek’s policy was essentially a contract between the communist party and the general 
population. Each side agreed to withdraw some claims: the communist party relaxed 
control over public life in general and promised to improve living standards; in return, 
society was expected not to challenge socialist authority. The political liberalisation of 
the seventies led to a crystallisation of the opposition. In the mid-seventies small 
unofficial groups were formed, such as a Workers’ Defence Committee (KOR) and 
numerous Catholic Intelligentsia Clubs.
The next period, 1980-1981, began with workers’ strikes in August 1980 when the 
Solidarity Trade Union was created. The strikes ended only after prolonged negotiations 
with the government authorities. These led to the signing of national agreements at 
Gdansk and Szczecin, allowing the establishment of the trade union organisation, 
Solidarity, totally independent from the communist authorities. During the Gdansk 
negotiations between the striking workers and the government, a crucial role was played 
by the opposition intelligentsia linked to the KOR or Christian organisations.
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During the 1980 crisis, the central elite tried to avoid the use of force, instead adopting a 
more gradual approach in order to eradicate workers’ protests. However, the scale of 
social support was much larger than they had expected. Overnight, Solidarity 
membership rose to 10 million out of a population of about 38 million people. Even 
more significant was that at least one third of the communist party rank-and-file 
members enrolled in Solidarity. This unexpected growth of social support for Solidarity, 
and rising radicalism on both sides, culminated in the introduction of martial law (13 
December 1981) by General Jaruzelski. However, negotiation with the Solidarity 
opposition eventually took place in 1989 and an agreement to conduct partially free 
national elections was obtained. This last phase can be interpreted as an ‘unorthodox’ 
one for socialist countries as power shifted from the party elite to the military. The top 
military officers took positions in the ranks of the party and in the cabinet. Moreover, 
military officers gained power through the acquisition of positions within the 
voivodship and local administration, as well as in many industrial plants.148
The implementation of the nomenklatura system made it difficult for those outside the 
communist party to gain a foothold in public administration or other state institutions. 
The role of the administration itself changed to some extent reflecting to political and 
reshuffles at the top. In general, the fact that the administration did not produce material 
goods led to the communist interpretation that the administration was subordinate to the 
industrial sector. The position of the administration was also weakened by its 
dependence on the communist party. Furthermore, supervision by security forces eroded 
the administration’s ability to react. The main task of the public administration was 
therefore to implement party resolutions; its secondary function was to preserve a 
democratic fa?ade. Thus, its role was reduced to the more superficial, formal functions 
of government.
Until the administrative reorganisation in 1975, some power was preserved at the 
regional level and voivodes had relatively strong political positions. Afterwards, the 
territorial administration (regional and local) in general wielded little influence over the 
territory nominally under its control. Instead, its power was shifted to the directors of 
big companies backed by voivodship secretaries.149
148 At that time General Paszkowski was the voivode in Katowice Voivodship.
149 Erlich, 1991, Regulski and Kocan, 1994.
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• The domination of the economy by heavy industry and its influence on the 
administrative structure
Of equally important influence on the functioning of the national and regional elites and 
in addition to the nomenklatura system and cyclical changes at the top, was the concept 
of the economic growth that underpinned the communist party’s economic policies. The 
assumption was that rapid growth could be achieved only through extensive 
industrialisation. Within the industrial sector, the crucial role was played by heavy 
industry -  ‘key industry’.150 The importance of this sector of industry was strengthened 
by the domination of coal over Polish exports.151 All these factors meant that after the 
war Upper Silesia continued to be a region of enormous economic importance. As a 
consequence, its regional elite had unprecedented political powers and was granted wide 
financial resources.
The heavy industries were administered centrally, in contrast to enterprises producing 
consumer goods which were administered by the regional and local administration. 
Decisions related to heavy industry were taken by the central elite. The majority of 
decisions regarding industrial investment and other planning matters were based on the 
individual circumstances of each case, and detailed procedures to be followed. This 
centralisation of the decision-making process also led to wilfulness on the part of the 
national elite in the preparation of plans in relation to costs, location of firms, size, and 
so on. However, as the example of Upper Silesia indicates, in certain regions the 
authorities had been able to preserve wide powers; for example, Gierek during 
Gomulka’s tenure.
1. Vertical fragmentation
The socialist economy was divided into several sectoral lobbies of various ministries 
fighting with each other over limited financial subsidies and personal privileges. This 
led to vertical fragmentation, which meant the division of power among numerous 
ministries and their dependent units at the regional and local levels. These units 
answered directly to their ministry in Warsaw and were isolated from similar
150 See for example Prud’homme, 1992 or Hamilton and Roszkowski, 1989: 148-149.
151 Pond, 1958: 206.
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administrative units operating in the same region or locality but responsible to a 
different ministry. In theory, the activities of different units would be co-ordinated by 
means of agreement between the ministries at the centre. In practice, communication 
between various ministries and departments at the central and regional level was 
absent.152
This vertical fragmentation is particularly interesting as it seems not to have been 
investigated to the degree it deserves, probably because it is a unique feature of socialist 
administration. Its consequences were one of the most severe hindrances to effective 
administrative performance in the post-socialist countries. Moreover, this vertical 
fragmentation had a significant impact on the functioning of the general administration 
authorities at regional and local levels, as the scope of their power was significantly 
circumscribed, in contrast to the inter-war period.
Under socialism, vertical fragmentation resulted from intense competition over the 
division of political power. The formation of a particular ministry reflected the political 
strength of a relevant sector of industry. It was believed that the formation of a separate 
ministry or any other administrative institution would facilitate the gaining of additional 
privileges and financial resources. Gradually, as a result of the political bargains among 
the national elite, the number of ministries was rising contrary to any economic 
rationale. This had serious effect on the co-ordination of national policy; increasingly, 
different administrative ministries conducted contradictory policies.
2. Extreme centralisation
According to Goralczyk,153 vertical fragmentation was an inextricable feature of 
extreme centralisation and thus there is a reciprocal relationship between the two. This 
interpretation seems to be confirmed by the analyses of changes in Polish administration 
under socialism: periods of centralisation policies were always accompanied by a rise in 
the number of ministries, while the subsequent waves of decentralisation were always 
assisted by cuts in the number of ministries.
152 Erlich, 1991.
153 Goralczyk quoted in Taras, 1993.
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For example, the first post-war government in 1944 was divided into 13 ministries, but 
two years later the number had grown to 20. In 1949 the Ministry of Industry and 
Commerce was replaced by six new ministries. The disappearance of this particular 
ministry was significant as it gave rise to intense conflict among various successor 
ministries responsible for narrow industrial sectors. In the following years (1950-1953) 
eight more ministries were created. This centralisation phase culminated in social unrest 
in 1956. This prompted the national elite to try to introduce a more socially acceptable 
decentralised model of the state. Certain powers were then delegated to the local level 
of administration and, at the same time, ten existing ministers were replaced by five new 
ones. However, subsequent waves of centralisation occurred. Similarly, when Gierek 
came to power in 1970 and Jaruzelski in 1980, following social unrest, they also tried to 
decentralise administration by merging ministries and transferring some power to the 
intermediate level. However, the tendency to centralise reappeared in the later phases of 
their rule, leading to a gradual rise in the number of ministries.
In his analysis of the waves of centralisation and decentralisation after 1956, 1970 and 
1980, Goralczyk suggests that the extreme concentration of power led to an increase in 
the number of ministries because the previous ministerial structure, with few ministries, 
was not able to exploit its power sufficiently. However, after a certain period of time, 
centralisation and the concomitant fragmentation of ministerial power led to 
inefficiency in the decision-making process, and thus to economic difficulties, which 
culminated in cyclical social unrest and subsequent decentralisation attempts.
b. The administrative structure and its reform during the socialist period
The abolition of the traditional three-tier administrative structure and the associated 
historic territorial organisation were quickly revealed to be fundamental obstacles to 
effective performance by the regional administrative elite during the period under 
investigation. These two issues constituted a ‘bottleneck’ that hindered effective 
transfer of power to regional authorities.
The communist state was characterised by an extremely centralised system of decision­
making and implementation of economic policies. State administration formed a
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pyramid organisation, with a rigid hierarchy of central, regional and local institutions.154 
The lower the level an administrative institution occupied the pyramid, the more limited 
was the level of discretion allowed it and the greater was the supervision by a higher 
level of authority.155 The administrative centralisation of the state was introduced in 
two main waves, the first in 1950, and the second between 1973 and 1975. As a result of 
the first reform in 1950, local governments stopped being independent administrative 
units responsible to the local communities which elected them. This was in contrast to 
the inter-war period. Instead, local government began to be completely subordinate to 
the higher levels of administration.
In the second wave, between 1973 and 1975, Gierek’s reform distorted the 
administration even more: centralisation became extreme. The three-tier structure which 
had consisted of 17 voivodships, over 3,000 districts and 4,000 communes was replaced 
with a radically new system based on two levels. The entire middle level of the 
administration was tom out as districts were abolished.156 The old communes were 
merged to produce around 2,500 new ones, while the 17 old regions were broken up 
into 49 new ones. The new voivodships were very small, one-third of the size of the old 
regions, and only a small proportion of their historic boundaries were preserved. Thus, 
they were both weak and artificial, and could no longer carry out the ‘ambitious’ tasks 
that the old regions used to perform. After the reform, these tasks were taken to the 
centre, while the competencies of former districts were taken on by the new small 
regions.
Surazka (1993) suggests that although the 1975 administrative reform was the most 
radical, territorial merging and subdividing was a constant practice of the communist 
leaders as they tried to destroy ties among the local and regional elite. This opinion is 
shared by Gorzelak and Mularczyk (1990: 18), who believe that the 1975 reform 
increased the power of the central elite on a scale which had not existed before. Surazka 
also argues that the formation of new voivodships also led to a decrease in political
154Piekalewicz, 1975, Regulski and Kocan, 1994.
155Prud’homme, 1992, Regulski and Kocan 1994.
156 This reform abolished district territories, which were historically rooted as far back as 500 years and 
supported local integration of rural areas with district or voivodship towns. Districts formed a level of 
intermediate administration between regions and communes, and were descended from historical units of 
local self-government administered by the landed nobility. Moreover, the geographical extent of the 
districts reflected the spread of local networks of communication between the district-towns and 
surrounding villages. These had developed through the centuries; in general, the villagers could make the 
return journey to their district town on the same day by horse and cart.
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control over society, and illegal opposition developed. This is shown by the study of the 
two regions of Katowice and Bydogoszcz, where the political structures and personnel 
remained almost intact. As a result, in those two regions the opposition developed 
much more slowly than in the rest of Poland.
Moreover, the effectiveness of the territorial structure prior the 1975 reform indicates 
that even during the socialist period these divisions enabled the regional and district 
party leaders to co-ordinate numerous administrative units in their territories to conduct 
a coherent regional policy. However, replacement of the districts with these new regions 
-  artificial structures -  quickly led to administrative chaos. These 49 regions were so 
ineffective that the central communist authorities, wishing to pursue a centralised style 
of ruling and to have some control of regional administration, established, ad hoc, 
around 120 different territorial units directly subordinate to ministries. What is 
particularly interesting is that most of these special administrations, directly subordinate 
to ministers, had to be introduced on the basis of the 17 traditional regions and districts. 
As Surazka et al (1996: 443) put it: ‘The central government was swelling and 
fragmenting at the same time, each ministry developing its own empire’. This also 
meant that the opportunity for even minimal co-ordination of policy at regional and 
district level did not exist at all.
To sum up, this reform significantly weakened regional and local authorities. It also led 
to even greater fragmentation of administrative structures at all levels by enhancing the 
vertical fragmentation of administration. Thus, most of the proposals for administrative 
reform put forward by the regional administrative elite stressed the need to return to the 
pre-1975 situation, when the local and regional authorities had had certain powers, even 
under socialism.
ii. The administrative and political elite o f Upper Silesia during the socialist period, 
1945-1989
The experiences of the Katowice voivodship during the socialist period left a strong 
impact on the post-socialist administrative elite in three main areas. Firstly, the minimal 
participation of Silesians in the administrative and political institutions of the 
voivodship was mostly caused by the Volksliste and Grudzien’s discriminatory policy.
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Secondly, the ideological orthodoxy of the regional elite delayed the formation of the 
regional opposition elite. Thirdly, the economic privileges of the region were in contrast 
to those in other parts of Poland and produced animosity in other regions. Finally, the 
whole socialist period indicates the unprecedented role of heavy industry and 
consequently, the domination of the socialist regional elite by coalminers. Even during 
the transitional period the coalmining lobby tried to use its exceptionally strong position 
to defend its sectoral interests by maintaining the heavy-industry character of the region, 
however obsolete.
Throughout the socialist period, there were two voivodship power centres: one 
‘administrative’, the other ‘political’. The first was the voivodship office; the second 
was the voivodship committee of the communist party. Thus, the description of the 
socialist regional elite will be focused on both the administrative and political elite 
although there were some shifts in the importance of these two institutions over the 
years. In general, the regional political elite supervised the administrative elite, leaving 
little discretion to the voivodship administration; it was only during Grudzieri’s tenure 
(1970-1980) that regional administration was totally subordinated to him. However, 
there were two exceptions to the primacy of the political regional elite: first, the period 
of 1945-1948, when the position of voivode Zawadzki was higher than that of the first 
secretaries of the voivodship committee; and second, after the introduction of martial 
law in 1981, when voivode General Paszkowski (1981-1985) was given a free hand in 
the voivodship.
Similar features of sociological description of the regional elite in the inter-war and 
socialist periods are considered for the purpose of comparison (regional origins, period 
in office, education, earlier professional experience, political affiliation and age). 
However, this investigation includes the specific feature of the socialist period, that is, 
the frequent promotion of the first secretary of the voivodship committee to the central 
elite. This promotion from the regional elite to the central elite was not so important in 
the other two periods (the inter-war and the transitional periods).
During the socialist period, six main phases were distinguished at the central and 
voivodship levels, as the changes in composition and policy of the national communist 
elite during the socialist period had an overwhelming influence on the actions of the
voivodship elite.157
a. Formation of ‘the Upper Silesia voivodship’ -  political and social consequences
‘The Upper Silesia voivodship’ formed after the war was different from the inter-war 
one in its territorial and ethnic composition. The new ‘Upper Silesia voivodship’ was 
created in January 1945 out of three main parts: firstly, the inter-war Silesia voivodship 
(Polish inter-war Upper Silesia); secondly, Opole Silesia (German inter-war Upper 
Silesia, after 1950 the separate Opole voivodship); and lastly, the significant part, the 
D^browa basin.158
157 See table 5, page 80.
158 See map 3, page 90.
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b. The main administrative phases in the socialist period in Upper Silesia
• The communist take-over in Upper Silesia, 1945-1948
The political take-over of power by the communists was initiated by the liberation of 
Upper Silesia and the Dqbrowa basin at the end of January 1945 by the Red Army. They 
transferred power directly to the communist authorities, although the Resistance 
movement of Upper Silesia was made up of soldiers of various political affiliations, 
among them the Home Army. Moreover, the Polish communists were very few in 
number due to limited social support and the inter-war Stalinist purges. In consequence, 
they were not strong enough to take over and preserve regional power in 1945 without 
the Red Army and NKVD backing.
The Red Army treated Upper Silesia as a traditionally German land, especially the 
inter-war German part of Upper Silesia. Consequently, it was there that their hatred of 
the Germans was expressed and revenge for the German invasion of the Soviet Union 
was to be extracted.159 The policy of the Soviet authorities towards Upper Silesia 
influenced the communist regional elite who came directly from the Soviet Union and 
who had also served in the Red Army. As a result, they too perceived Silesians as 
Germans, with the exception of Zawadzki whose attitude was more moderate.
The role of Upper Silesia in the period just after the war was crucial as Poland at that 
time was an agricultural country. From that region alone came 40-42 per cent of 
industrial production, 50 per cent of direct exports, and 75 per cent of indirect exports. 
According to Blasiak (1990:91), this had serious political consequences, because after 
the liberation of Upper Silesia, the most prominent Polish communists arrived in the 
region. The group arriving directly from the Soviet Union was headed by General 
Zawadzki, who became its voivode from 1945 to 1948. A month later, in February, the 
first secretary of the voivodship committee, Baryla, arrived. After that, the two regional 
power centres were established, presenting different regional policies.
Officially, Zawadzki had a high position in the communist party, as his membership of 
the Politburo of the communist party suggested, but above all he was a colonel of the
159 Davies, 1984: 79.
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NKVD.160 Evaluation of voivode Zawadzki’s role is difficult. There are extremely 
varied opinions concerning his actions.161 Wozniczka offers an extremely negative but 
popular opinion on the D^browa-originating elite rule under the leadership of Zawadzki, 
comparing it to a sort of occupation:
The power in the voivodship was held by the people from central Poland, and mostly from 
D^browa. In Upper Silesia people began to comment ironically that there was a sort of 
occupation by Dqbrowa. This led to the discrediting even of local Resistance members of 
the PPR. The activity of Gestapo collaborators also influenced the discrediting of local 
communists...162
The more moderate opinion of Walczak (1996: 130) seems to better explain Zawadzki’s 
actions. On the one hand, Walczak characterises Zawadzki as an orthodox Stalinist or, 
even more strongly, an NKVD colonel, but on the other hand, he also observes that he 
chosen a Sanacja civil servant, Zi^tek, as his deputy. According to Blasiak (1990: 93), 
Upper Silesia was the only voivodship in the country where the voivode had a higher 
position than first secretaries of the voivodship committee. Even more significant is the 
fact that he conducted an unorthodox national policy as he did not wish to eradicate 
national and regional distinctiveness. Zawadzki position’s was so strong that he was 
able to override the more orthodox views of the communist party at central and regional 
levels. This allowed Zawadzki to conduct his own non-discriminatory policy towards 
the regional native population. This was particularly visible in his attitude towards 
Silesians having German Volksliste, and in the employment of Silesians in the 
voivodship administration. Among them were several Silesian insurrectionaries holding 
managerial positions. At the same time, due to ‘the internationalist communist doctrine’, 
all national sentiments were recognised as dangerous. Thus, the negative attitudes 
towards Silesians not only arose due to the accusation regarding their possible 
inclination towards Germany, but the Silesian insurrectionaries were also seen as 
dangerous even though they were fighting for the region’s incorporation into Poland . 
For example, in confidential documents the communist authorities attacked former 
insurrectionaries for their active engagement in the public life of the region.
In the first period, 1945-1948, there were three first secretaries of the voivodship 
committee, and each was in office for only a relatively short time. Firstly, their most
160Davies, 1984 and Toranska, 1987.
161 Compare Wozniczka, 1996 and Walczak, 1996.
162 Woiniczka, 1996:22.
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striking common feature, although natural after the war, was their military experience. 
Baryla was in the communist resistance, Ochab was in the Red Army and later a general 
in the Polish army in the Soviet Union, while Nowak was also a soldier in the Red 
Army. Similarly, in the regional administrative elite, Zawadzki and Zi^tek had both 
been officers in the Polish Army in the Soviet Union and Zawadzki had been in the Red 
Army prior to that. The fact that members of the political regional elite had that ‘Soviet 
experience’ seems to have had a major impact on their vision of socialism, which was 
Stalinist. Their experience of the Stalinist terror during the war163 and the complete 
submission to the Soviet authorities facilitated adaptation of their regional policies 
according to the national Stalinist model.
Secondly, all three first secretaries were members of the Central Committee, while 
Zawadzki had a higher political position as a member of the Politburo. Thirdly, all three 
secretaries were newcomers. Fourthly, they were inter-war communist elite members of 
the small KPP, which was nearly totally exterminated by Stalin. With the exception of 
Ochab, they were blue-collar workers, and Nowak, as well as Zawadzki, was a 
coalminer.
To sum up, the regional administrative and political elite (analysed here using the 
examples of Zawadzki, Baryla, Ochab and Nowak) reveals a striking uniformity in its 
regional origins and political careers. In addition, it should be emphasised that its 
members were one type of communist, the ‘Soviet-bred communist’, who had spent the 
war in the Soviet Union and served in the Red Army.
The presentation of the regional policies conducted by the voivodship office and the 
voivodship committee in the take-over period will concentrate on two main agendas; the 
Volksliste issue and the employment policy of the administration. The persecution of the 
native population as a result of the Volksliste was a particularly traumatic experience 
which had a primary influence on development of the Silesian attitudes and regional 
policies in the period of investigation, 1990-1997. The Volksliste issue was very 
important as it influenced the social position of Silesians in the voivodship and shaped 
the composition of the voivodship administration. Moreover, it had a crucial impact on 
the widely-held view among native Silesians who saw themselves as being ruled by an
163 Toranska, 1987.
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‘alien elite’, and, in the most radical form, by the ‘Dqbrowa Mafia’. Thus, it is not 
surprising that at the beginning of the nineties the new regional administrative elite was 
predominated by the Silesians reacting to socialist-period discrimination by suggesting a 
return to regional autonomy.
The persecution, as a result of the Volksliste, is extremely important because it applied 
to 95 per cent of Silesian society whom the Germans had considered to be German or 
potentially so. These people were accused of having betrayed Poland and of identifying 
with Germany.164 Their Polish citizenship was suspended, which meant that they had 
no civil rights nor any opportunity to defend themselves. Very often, all their private 
property was confiscated and there was no possibility of appeal. A substantial number 
of Polish Silesians were also imprisoned or deported to Germany. In 1945, there was 
even a serious danger of the deportation of the whole Silesian population, an action 
limited only by Zawadzki’s intervention.165 The suspension of Polish citizenship had a 
fundamental impact on the formation of the socialist regional elite, as the Silesians were 
prohibited from entering politics or taking any senior administrative or managerial 
posts.166 To sum up, the persecution as a result of the Volksliste was an extremely severe 
and traumatic experience that fundamentally influenced the relationship between 
Silesians and newcomers. In consequence of the Volskliste issue and the accusation of 
national betrayal, one can observe the movement of some Silesians away from Polish 
culture, and national identification towards the Germans. This can be illustrated in their 
shift towards speaking German in public in 1947.167
The above-mentioned regional policy of Zawadzki, in contrast to other members of the 
communist elite, did not try to eliminate all form of national or regional distinctiveness. 
This is most clearly reflected in his cautious attitude towards the Volskliste issue. The 
positive attitude towards Silesians was, at least to some extent, due to the influence of 
his deputy, Zi^tek. Zi^tek was not only a Silesian, but had been a middle-ranking civil 
servant in local government in the inter-war period. His long administrative experience
164 These accusations resulted from of a lack of knowledge of the specific circumstances concerning the 
borderland. Chlebowczyk’s concept of ‘borderland awareness’, where national identification took the 
form of a continuum instead of clearly-formed, bifurcated national divisions, seems to better describe 
national identification in Upper Silesia. However, the communist authorities often used the German 
Volksliste categories as the sole criterion when deciding on the national identification of Silesians.
165 Blasiak, 1990: 75.
166 Blasiak, 1990: 72.
167 Walczak, 1996: 216
94
(1922-1939) and his high competencies compared to other members of the socialist 
regional administrative elite made him, in reality, not the deputy voivode (1945-1964)
1 fiRbut the main manager of voivodship administration (see the memoirs of Olszewski 
and Gierek169). However, his inter-war career in administration and, some suggest, his 
Silesian origins, made it impossible for him to hold the position of voivode (he could 
only achieve the position of deputy voivode) until 1964. Zi^tek’s career was also 
distinctive as he stayed in power for thirty years even though during the socialist period 
many regional political leaders changed quickly and their personalities and policies 
faded into obscurity.170
The second area in which the influence of Zi^tek on Zawadzki seems to have been 
important was in the formation of the voivodship administration, especially personnel 
policy encouraging the employment of Silesians. The voivodship administration was 
heavily based on inter-war patterns; for example, the role of local government in the 
voivodship. This improved the performance of the administration during the socialist 
period when political criteria often dominated over economic ones.171 Based on voivode 
Grazynski’s Sanacja period model, Zi^tek formed his own type of insurrectionaries’ 
party -  the Union of Veterans of Silesian Risings. On the board of the Union were close 
colleagues of Zi^tek, who were appointed senior civil servants or sub-prefects and town 
mayors.172 The Silesian insurrectionaries were among the limited number of Silesians 
employed in the regional administration, as the fact that they had participated in the 
Silesian Risings confirmed their Polish nationality and weakened accusations of 
national betrayal because of the Volksliste. Statistical data quoted by Blasiak (1990) 
confirm the different regional composition of the voivodship office from that of the 
voivodship committee. In 1946, more than half of the senior civil servants in the 
voivodship office were Silesians, whereas in the voivodship committee the number of 
Silesians was marginal. In fact, Ochab openly declared a discrimination policy towards 
Silesians.173
168 Walczak 1996
169 Rolicki, 1990 (b)
170 Szewczyk, Gosc Niedzielny, no. 33, 1988.
171 Walczak, 1996: 130.
172 Walczak, 1996: 203.
173 Walczak, 1996: 219.
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The smallest number of Silesians was in the militia and the security forces. This was in 
contrast to the inter-war period when natives were dominant in the police. In the 
socialist period, inhabitants of the D^browa basin dominated in both institutions. The 
predomination of Dqbrowans is important as the number of abuses was extremely high 
there and this had a strong impact on the popular perception of the communist 
authorities and helped to nurture animosity towards Dqbrowa.174
Walczak (1996: 135) believes that the under-representation of Silesians in the 
voivodship political and administrative authorities and the arrival of cadres from 
Dqbrowa was firstly rather a result of the lack of qualified (inter-war) local cadres. The 
second reason was that Silesians themselves were not interested in working in 
administration but preferred to look for jobs in industry. This moderate opinion is in 
contrast to popular arguments among local scientists. For example, Blasiak (1990), 
Smolorz (1990) and Wozniczka (1996) suggest that the domination of Dqbrowa 
inhabitants was mostly due to their exclusive policy and discrimination of Silesians.
• Upper Silesia during the Stalinist period, 1948-1956
In 1948, extensive changes of personnel took place among the Silesia-D^browa 
voivodship elite. In just one year, the voivodship first secretaries of the voivodship 
committee changed three times (Ochab, Nowak [for only five months] and again 
Strzelecki) and at the same time voivode Zawadzki was replaced in the administration 
by Jaszczuk.
These rapid changes of personnel reflect the turbulence at a national level at the 
beginning of Stalinism. During that phase, the members of the voivodship elite, 
Zawadzki (in 1948) and Jaszczuk (in 1950), were promoted to the central elite. Like the 
first period (1945-1948), this period saw the continuation of the rule of newcomer first 
secretaries of the voivodship committee: Strzelecki (1948-1950) and Olszewski (1950- 
1957). Voivodes Jaszczuk (1948-1952) and Koszutski (1952-1954) were also 
newcomers. However, in 1954, a Silesian, Nieszporek, was appointed.
174 Blasiak, 1990.
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As in the take-over period, the Stalinist elite was made up of inter-war communists 
(KPP). However, in contrast to the first period, not all of them had spent the war in the 
Soviet Union: Jaszczuk spent the war in a German concentration camp while Strzelecki 
fought in the communist resistance. However, the fact that not all of them were Soviet- 
bred communists did not mean political liberalisation. Instead, it was a period of further 
strengthening of the communist position. The total elimination of political enemies and 
Stalin’s declaration in 1947 in Szklarska Por^ba, led to the introduction in Poland of the 
most orthodox version of socialism.
The shape of the regional elite during the Stalinist period was influenced by three main 
policies: first, the total centralisation of power and complete subordination of lower 
levels of administration; second, internal purges of the administrative and political elite; 
and third, the composition of the regional elite was shaped by the introduction of 
rigorous political criteria in the appointment of administrative personnel.
The most fundamental principle of Stalinism was the total political subordination of 
Poland to the authorities of the Soviet Union. This meant the centralisation of power at 
national level, with the communist party considered as implementing the ‘only proper 
vision’ of socialism. In such a system, the role of the regional elite was reduced to the 
implementation of directives from the central communist elite. This went to such an 
extreme that, for example, even the number of lamps for specific streets was decided by 
the central authorities.175 At the height of the Stalinist period the economic plans 
prepared at the centre totally subordinated regional and local interests to the central 
elite’s definition of the national interest.
During this period Upper Silesia’s resources were heavily exploited. The lack of any 
long-term planning was to cost the region dear, especially regarding some very serious 
ecological and health problems. This extensive development of Upper Silesia was in 
contrast to the inter-war period. As a result, at the beginning of the nineties, the native 
regional elite regarded the economic development that had taken place during the 
socialist period as the expression of unequivocal subordination of regional interests to 
national ones -  hence the concept of ‘internal colonisation’.
175 Walczak, 1996: 282.
176Regulski and Kocan, 1994.
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This unquestionable subordination of the regional elite to the aims proposed at the 
central level is illustrated in the way Katowice town was renamed Stalinogrod by the 
voivodship committee (1953-1956). Three days after Stalin’s death, Bierut informed 
Olszewski that the voivodship committee was to propose renaming the town.177
Secondly, Stalinism also fomented internal conflicts within the communist national and 
regional elites. The attacks on the ‘anti-socialist’ opposition that had characterised the 
take-over phase continued, but now there were also intensive purges within the 
communist elite, with the accusation of nationalism being the main weapon. As with the 
political terror in the central elite, purges and imprisonment took place among the 
Silesian elite. The internal fighting within the regional elite led to substantial weakening 
of the take-over phase elite. For example, Bozek, the deputy voivode until 1950, was 
dismissed (at that time there were only three deputy voivodes). The former deputy 
voivode of 1945, Wengierkow, was imprisoned and Ziqtek survived Jaszczuk’s rule 
only as a second-rate official. The rare exception to these purges among the regional 
political and administrative elite was the first secretary of the voivodship committee, 
Olszewski (1950-1957), who remained for the whole seven years. According to Albert 
(1994: 208), he was one of the strongest voivodship committee secretaries at that time. 
As a result, he could conduct a relatively independent policy in which, for example, he 
tried to distance himself from the attacks on nationalism. He tried to change the 
negative attitudes towards Silesian culture and raise the number of Silesians recruited 
into the voivodship committee. Thus, among the Stalinist regional elite, according to 
Szewczyk (1988), Olszewski could be positively singled out.
The composition of the regional administration was deeply affected by political purges. 
The purges were directed against so-called ‘political enemies’ outside the communist 
party who were dismissed, having been accused of nationalism. In Upper Silesia, this 
had serious consequences as Silesian insurrectionaries, the tiny part of native society 
which due to the employment policy of Zawadzki (and Zi^tek) worked in the 
administration, were now dismissed and sometimes imprisoned. The vacancies thus 
created at all levels of regional administration were filled with appointment of blue- 
collar workers. This extreme rise of ideological orthodoxy marks the beginning of the 
rule of the new voivode, Jaszczuk. On his arrival, he declared purges within the regional
177 Lewandowski, Slqsk, no. 9,1996.
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elite, a ‘fight with right-wing national deviation’ as 17 per cent of the voivodship office 
civil servants were still former inter-war employees.178 The purges in regional 
administration were backed by the first secretary of the voivodship committee, 
Strzelecki.
The dismissal of experienced and highly-educated inter-war civil servants led to 
permanent changes in the administration as the ideologically-correct employees -  blue- 
collar workers -  were not effective. They too were, therefore, repeatedly dismissed. 
Thus, a combination of centralisation and the low efficiency of civil servants led to a 
state of complete chaos in administration.179 This was true especially after 1950, when 
the last element of effective functioning of administration was eliminated, as until then, 
autonomous local government had been subordinate to state administration.
This preference for the ‘ideologically-correct’ candidates (ie, blue-collar workers) was 
most evident at the highest level of voivodship administration. Nieszporek, who was 
appointed voivode in 1954, had only a primary-school education, unlike voivodes 
Jaszczuk and Koszutski both of whom had MSc degrees, but he was ‘ideologically 
correct’. He was a former coalminer, an inter-war communist activist (KPP) and a 
Silesian. At that time, according to Walczak (1996), Warsaw wanted to have a Silesian 
voivode in the region.
Nieszporek (1954-1964) was the first Silesian voivode since the war, although after him, 
during the socialist period, there were two more Silesians: Zi^tek (1964-1975) and 
Kiermaszek (1975-1980). In fact Silesian voivodes ruled in administration for more than 
half of the socialist period. This fact suggests that although, in general, the position of 
first secretary of the voivodship committee was more important than that of voivode, the 
popular myth of being ruled by aliens, mostly from D^browa, should be interpreted 
more cautiously.
After Zawadzki (1945-1948) and the short tenure of Nowak (May 1948-October 1948), 
the rule of the coalminers started again from 1954 and continued nearly without break 
until the end of socialism. This extended period began with Nieszporek (1954-1964), 
and after 1957 four coal miners were also the first secretaries of the voivodship
178 Walczak, 1996: 249.
179 Walczak, 1996: 261.
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committee: Gierek (1957-1970), Grudzieri (1970-1980), Zabinski (1980-1982), and 
Ferensztajn (1983-1987).
• National communism in Upper Silesia, 1956-1970
The appointment of Gierek in 1957 began the long rule of first secretaries of the 
voivodship committee from D^browa: Gierek (1957-1970) and Grudzien (1970-1980). 
Both had fairly similar careers. Gierek and Grudzien both finished their education early 
(although after their promotion they officially received MSc degrees) to start work in 
the coalmines; and during the inter-war recession, they worked in French coalmines. 
After their return to Poland, their careers were also similar as both started to work in the 
voivodship committee of Katowice.
The similarity of Gierek’s and Grudzien’s professional experience is reflected in their 
similar policies concerning the development of regional heavy industry. Their regional 
policies, however, had some clear differences: for example, Grudzien’s rule was marked 
by totalitarian tendencies and the regional elite during his rule was extremely arrogant. 
Relations with the regional Catholic Church became tense, and discrimination against 
Silesians was aimed at eliminating their regional distinctiveness.
The year 1957 was also a watershed in that, with Gierek’s appointment, power shifted 
from the Soviet branch of communists to the ‘French elite’ of the coalminers, Gierek 
and Grudzien. Furthermore, after that, the new first secretaries of the voivodship 
committee were not newcomers, although they came from the same part of the 
voivodship (D^browa). Their extended period of ‘D^browan power’ reinforced the myth 
of domination by D^browans.
Examination of Gierek’s rule will concentrate on:
1. his industrial policy and his vision of regional development;
2. co-operation with the administration;
3. Silesian participation in voivodship institutions.
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First, the political turnover in 1956 led to the strengthening of the role of the 
administrative authorities. After that, the voivodship committee concentrated most of its 
energy on industry, leaving other issues to be decided by the voivodship administration. 
Concentration on regional industry was important for Gierek as the region was 
noticeably losing its dominant economic position. In 1950, the voivodship made up 36.5 
per cent of state production; however, in 1970 it accounted for only 18.6 per cent.180 
Thus, the regional political elite -  the ‘coalminers’elite’ -  wanted to preserve the 
region’s prominence by concentrating solely on heavy-industry development, despite 
Gomulka’s plans.181 In other words, it was the interests of the regional elite that opposed 
the central elite plans of modernisation of the region by gradually limiting the role of 
heavy industry.
Despite Gierek’s autonomous (and often illegal) actions concerning heavy-industry, in 
politics he wanted to preserve Gomulka’s support and he demonstrated his political 
devotion by promoting ideological orthodoxy. For example, in 1968, Gierek organised 
the first ‘indignation march’ against student protests, thereby showing ‘full support’ for 
Gomulka’s policies. The voivodship was ‘famous’ throughout the rest of Poland for its 
ideological rigour, and thus most social scientists and artists had left the area.182 
However, during Gierek’s tenure, the exception was his attitude towards the Catholic 
Church, which was not attacked on ideological grounds. As a result, the subsequently- 
formed regional opposition was closely tied to the Catholic Church.
Gierek also wanted to gain the support of regional society by a substantial improvement 
of living standards. He tried to balance economic development with the improvement of 
living conditions by building new flats and improving the supply of food and other 
goods. However, the best supplies went to the coalminers.183 During Gierek’s rule, 
standards of living in Upper Silesia were significantly better than in the rest of Poland. 
This was during a period of extensive development when the social needs of society 
were not recognised by national communist authorities.
180 Walczak, 1996: 430.
181 Walczak, 1996: 432.
182 Walczak, 1996: 334.
183Hirszowicz, 1980: 122.
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During this period Gierek’s de facto autonomous regional policy,184 rich financial 
resources available to the region and the much better living conditions in Upper Silesia 
created a situation that strongly resembled inter-war conditions. In the inter-war period, 
the regional authorities similarly had wide political autonomy, the region had numerous 
economic privileges, and living standards were much higher than in the rest of Poland. 
Gierek’s achievements -  the substantial economic development of Upper Silesia and 
improvement of living standards in the region coupled with the importance of heavy 
industry -  led to his appointment as first secretary of the communist party in 1970.
The second issue under investigation in relation to Gierek’s rule is his co-operation with 
the administration. This good co-operation with the administration and the especially 
close relationship between Gierek and Zi^tek, with Gierek showing ostentatious respect 
to Zi^tek,185 led to the previously-mentioned significant improvement in living 
standards in Upper Silesia. Smolorz (1990) suggests that although Gierek had had a 
very strong political position for many years, nevertheless, apart from his political 
power, Gierek stood in the shade of Ziqtek, who was seen by regional society as a 
charismatic leader in ‘the alien world of socialist apparatchikV. However, the 
popularity of Zi^tek did not weaken the co-operation and friendship between Gierek and 
Zi^tek. According to Walczak, the region’s development was predominantly due to 
Zi^tek’s abilities, and Gierek’s role was limited to political patronage, making 
autonomous actions possible.
At that time (after 1956) the voivodship administration was strong as it had relative 
autonomy in its decision-making process due to its financial and ‘legal’ autonomy. The 
voivodship committee limited its role to supervision of the top posts in administration. 
The voivodship office had substantial financial resources as it kept 35 per cent of 
regional revenues. Moreover, Gierek’s financial resources were also boosted by 
unofficial inflows from heavy industry, which ‘sponsored’ the building of new roads, 
shops, flats, recreation centres in the neighbouring mountainous areas and new factories 
for unemployed women.
184 Walczak, 1996: 429.
The following quotation confirms these real autonomous actions: ‘These independent actions of the 
regional political and administrative elite, which made possible intensive regional development, led to 
popular comparison of Upper Silesia with Katanga in Zaire. This rich province in Africa wanted to 
preserve its richness by declaring its independence’ (Gierek, 1993: 33).
185 Walczak, 1996: 391.
186 Walczak, 1996: 326.
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Gierek’s role was also to preserve political patronage for Zi^tek’s initiatives, which 
often went against the official policies of the national elite. The intensive regional 
development was due to semi-legal adaptation to the centralised and ineffective 
structure of the state. For example, during a voivodship committee meeting, Gierek 
declared: ‘There are rules, but life often suggests something else’.187 Thus, regional 
development was achieved ‘even [by introducing policies which were] breaking the 
existing law’.188 For example, illegal actions were sometimes used to exaggerate the 
needs of regional heavy-industry and the extra money being spent on improvement of 
living conditions. However, it was clear that if the true destination of the funds were 
declared by the authorities, money would not be received from the central budget.
There is little data on the third issue under investigation, that is the personnel policy in 
the voivodship administration and politics and Silesian participation. The sole analysis 
is Walczak’s reconstruction of personnel policy on the basis of the regional origins of 
civil servants. According to Walczak (1996: 333), after 1958, the documents concerning 
the voivodship office directors and the voivodship committee secretaries did not 
indicate promotion according to the regional origins of persons who were promoted. He 
takes this fact to suggest that because the promotion of Silesians was after that date no 
longer subject to ‘political correctness’, there were no limiting quotas for the 
advancement of Silesians in voivodship institutions. In other words, the formal barriers 
to the promotion of Silesians were dropped, as had earlier been the case. Although 
‘regional quotas’ enabled the minimal participation of Silesians, at the same time, they 
also limited Silesian promotion in that the numbers could not exceed the strictly-defined 
quotas. However, despite this ‘regional opening’, there was no substantial increase in 
the number of Silesians in voivodship institutions.
Given the lack of scientific research concerning the participation of Silesians, some
light is cast on this issue by the memoirs of the voivodship committee secretaries, Pyka
1 80and Szydlak, who were both Silesians. Pyka suggested that the appointment of 
Silesians was restricted. He emphasised the animosity felt towards the promotion of 
Silesians to senior political positions or to the Ministry of the Interior. This was due to 
their close ties with relatives living in West Germany (the result of the post-war
187 Walczak, 1996: 427.
188 Gierek qoted in Rolicki 1990.a: 43.
189 Walczak, 1996.
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deportations), which presumably made them more susceptible to infiltration by foreign 
intelligence forces. However, Szydlak did not agree with Pyka. According to Walczak, 
it is most probable that the political restriction of Silesians applied to only a few 
positions, where their promotion was limited for security reasons.
Moreover, Walczak’s (1996: 344) analysis suggests a higher percentage of Silesians in 
the voivodship committee than in the voivodship office chaired by Ziqtek. This fact is 
even more difficult to explain and needs further scientific investigation. However, the 
opinion widely held by regional journalists suggesting the deliberate elimination of 
Silesians from voivodship institutions has to be considered more carefully. Also, at 
least to some extent, the traditional Silesian preference for work in industry has to be 
taken into account. However, irrespective of the cause of the absence of Silesians in the 
voivodship political and administrative elite, the natives’ sense of persecution was 
actually felt, and this was very strongly expressed at the beginning of the nineties.
The second cause, in addition to doubts about the national identity of Silesians and 
certain political restrictions mentioned above strengthening the Silesian sense of 
political persecution, was the intensive influx of newcomers after the war. After 1958, 
native Silesians formed less than 50 per cent of the regional population. This was in 
striking contrast to the inter-war period, when newcomers made up only four per cent of 
the regional population. In the inter-war period, newcomers had arrived to take the few 
top positions in administration and industry. In other words, they had come to form the 
regional elite. After the Second World War a large number of blue-collar workers 
arrived, mostly from backward, rural areas, often gaining promotion to middle and 
lower positions over natives.
• The promise of economic and social prosperity, 1970-1980
In 1970, when Gierek became First Secretary of the communist party, his powerful 
deputy in the voivodship became first secretary of the voivodship committee. Thus, 
Gierek’s patronage substantially strengthened Grudzien’s position. According to 
Walczak (1996: 396), Grudzien did not have either the character or the intelligence of 
Ziqtek, but his devotion to carrying out Gierek’s whims led to a situation in which more 
and more duties came under his supervision. His position was also further strengthened
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by his control of regional nomenklatura as he was the Personnel Secretary of the 
voivodship committee.
At the time of his promotion, Gierek recognised that the political support of the Silesia 
voivodship was crucial to the preservation of his power.190 Thus, choosing as his 
successor an authoritarian and devoted secretary was especially important in the period 
of the extreme social isolation of the elite. For example, Gierek, in his memoirs, 
describes a situation when even ministries did not identify with the official state 
policy.191
However, during Grudzien’s ten-year-long rule, he was not only devoted supporter of 
Gierek’s policy but he also developed strong totalitarian tendencies. His policies went to 
such an extreme that they were even in contrast to the more open policies of the central 
authorities. In his memoirs, Gierek observed that Grudzien was a megalomaniac and 
celebrated his personality cult on an unprecedented scale.192
Analysis of administrative performance during the Grudzien’s tenure will focus on four 
main issues:
1. his industrial policy;
2. the subordination of the voivodship administration to the voivodship committee;
3. the territorial administrative reform;
4. his attempt to eliminate the cultural distinctiveness of the Silesians, which was 
directly related to the configuration of the post-Solidarity native Silesian elite at the 
beginning of the nineties.
First, Grudzien’s tenure led to continuous single heavy industry development, which in 
this period began to resemble a Stalinist caricature of development as mineral resources, 
labour, and ecological repercussions were completely disregarded. At that time, several 
gigantic heavy industry complexes were built, which were to be exemplaries of the 
advancement of the socialist economy, among them Katowice Steelworks. This over­
investment in the region also enhanced the position of the regional nomenklatura.
190 Gierek quoted in Walczak 1996: 464
191 Rolicki, 1990. a: 141.
192 Gierek quoted in Rolicki 1990. a.: 148
105
Grudzien’s regional policy becomes very clear when one studies his investment policy, 
as his priorities were very evident. During his tenure there were only two large-scale 
projects in the region that were somehow not linked to investment in the heavy industry 
sector. The first was the luxurious voivodship committee headquarters, which gave rise 
to legends about its extravagance and aroused the disapproval of regional society. The 
second construction was the militia voivodship office. Schopflin (1993: 174-5), writing 
about the Polish national elite of that time, emphasised that it manifested arrogance on a 
scale unprecedented in other Eastern European countries. However, it appears that the 
regional elite headed by Grudzien went to an extreme which surpassed even the 
behaviour of the national elite. Thus, regional society perceived the social structure as 
‘them’ -  the rulers -  and ‘us’ -  society.193 At the same time, Grudzien‘s rule in the 
voivodship left Upper Silesia behind other regions in the creation of an opposition. In 
other big towns, monitoring of the intelligentsia was relatively weak, and opposition 
was gradually formed from the mid-seventies onwards. In the Katowice voivodship, 
political supervision was rigorous, and all of the more liberal intelligentsia migrated to 
other regions.
The second feature of Grudzien‘s rule was the total subordination of the voivodship 
administration. After 1972, Zi^tek’s administrative activity was increasingly paralysed 
by Grudzien‘s close monitoring. Paradoxically, Zi^tek’s position had been stronger 
when he was a deputy voivode than when he became a voivode during Grudzieri‘s rule. 
Zi^tek also lost his voice in the choice of the senior civil servants in the voivodship 
office, who were replaced by Grudzieri‘s appointees. He appointed his close associates, 
voivodship committee secretaries as new deputy voivodes. Grudzien, in contrast to 
Gierek, refused from the beginning to accept that something could be decided in the 
voivodship without his participation in the decision-making process. Thus, Grudzien‘s 
attacks on Zi^tek were natural as the latter was the only person who dared to criticise his 
decisions openly.194 At that time, the voivodship administration began to receive 
detailed instructions from the voivodship committee -  so-called ‘intervention telephone 
calls’. As a result, during Grudzien‘s rule the voivodship committee became the sole 
institution wielding any power in the voivodship, and the voivodship administration was
193Marody, 1993, Gierek qoted in Rolicki 1990.a.: 134
194 Smolarz, 1990.
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totally dependent and passive.195 This totalitarian style of Grudzieri‘s rule, which is so 
evident in his complete subordination of the administration, is an interesting example of 
the extreme distortion of regional policy under socialism. It is investigated here in detail 
as it is believed to have had a crucial effect on the relationship between the regional 
elite and regional society.
In 1975, Zi^tek ‘retired’; Kiermaszek, who had been first deputy voivode since 1973, 
and Zi^tek's close colleague for ten years, was nominated to succeed him. Although 
Kiermaszek was not a Grudzien favourite, his administrative experience and the 
pressure of time forced Grudzien to accept his candidature.196 There is little data on 
Kiermaszek’s rule. According to Pustulka,197 he continued Zi^tek’s policy and tried to 
consult with Zi^tek about most of his decisions. This was to prove to be one of the 
reasons for his dismissal. However, due to his lesser abilities and weaker personality, 
his tenure was evaluated as being worse than his predecessor’s. By contrast, Walczak 
believes that in the middle of Grudzien‘s rule the change of voivode was not important 
and that nobody could have changed the totally subordinate role of the voivodship 
administration, whatever his personal abilities were.
The third issue which had a crucial influence on regional administration during 
Grudzien‘s tenure was the territorial reform introduced in 1975, after which the political 
power of the regional elite was significantly weakened. The demand to return to pre- 
1975 territorial division was also the main proposal of the regional elite after the fall of 
communism, which was seen as a pre-condition for substantial decentralisation of 
power and finances.
The main reason for Gierek’s reform was to bring about the subordination of the 
regional level authorities by fragmenting them. Moreover, the new First Secretary
1 Qfiwished to appoint his own political cadre at the regional level. The administrative 
reform meant for Grudzien a restriction of his competencies as the Katowice voivodship 
became just one of 49 voivodships. The reform lead to the formation of two new 
voivodships with capitals in Czestochowa and Bielsko-Biala, out of the single Katowice 
voivodship. The Katowice voivodship was weakened as its population decreased by 25
195 Walczak, 1996: 490-492.
196 Walczak, 1996: 501.
197 Dziennik Zachodni, 23-25 September 1994.
198 Gierek quoted in Rolicki, 1990.a.: 121.
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per cent, and its territory by 60 per cent. However, Grudzien was able to ensure that 
nearly the entire coal production would continue to be located in the Katowice 
voivodship (despite the drawing of voivodship borders against traditional regional 
identifications).
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Fourth, Grudzien’s regional policy was aimed at the elimination of Upper Silesia’s 
cultural distinctiveness. During his tenure, only one Silesian worked in the voivodship 
committee.199 Grudzien also wanted to weaken Silesian tradition, for example, by the 
liquidation of traditional Silesian districts. His policy of persecuting Silesians was 
reinforced by Gierek’s emigration policy. In his efforts to improve relations with the 
German Federal Republic, Gierek agreed to demands for the repatriation of the ‘German 
population’ living in Poland. This policy of emigration was conducted by Gierek, 
although the voivodship committee and Zi^tek tried to protest against it on the grounds 
that it would actually lead to Silesian emigration. As a result of this emigration policy, 
of the total of approximately 500,000 Silesians, the 120,000 who declared German 
nationality left. The rest, about 380,000 people, stayed in Poland.200
The emigration of Silesians was caused not only by their drifting towards German 
nationality but was, for the majority, a result of the economic and political weakening of 
the Polish state.201 Moreover, it also reflected the lack of opportunity for Silesians to 
preserve their own cultural identity within Poland. Equally important was the reuniting 
of Silesian families, divided by the immediate post-war deportation. This emigration 
revived the sense of ‘national distrust’ towards Silesians among Poles from other 
regions. In this context, it is worth adding that the German minority was estimated to 
make up four per cent of the population of the Katowice voivodship in 1993, according 
to voting for minority parties in elections. (There is no data concerning the seventies.202)
• The period of uncertainty in the Katowice voivodship, 1980-1981
On 28 August 1980 the first coalmine went on strike in Jastrz^bie (the Silesian part of 
the voivodship). In the next few days the strike spread to the majority of the region’s 
coalmines. On 3 September 1980 the Jastrzqbie Agreement was signed, just five days 
after the Gdansk national agreement, which established social guarantees and new 
political rights. However, the Jastrzqbie Agreement was concerned with only the social 
conditions of work in the coalmines, and regional issues. This agreement was signed
199 Smolorz, 1990.
200 Walczak, 1996: 488.
201 Despite, the fact that the living conditions in Upper Silesia were much better than in the rest of Poland, 
in the same way as in the inter-war period, they were relatively much lower than in Germany.
202 Walczak, 1996: 490.
110
with one particular occupational group, the coalminers. As a result of this success the 
coalminers recognised their political strength in the new regional Solidarity 
movement.203 The Jastrz^bie Agreement also shows another feature characteristic of 
Upper Silesia -  the weak role of the regional intelligentsia. During the Jastrzqbie 
negotiations, the leaders of the strikes were not assisted by regional intelligentsia 
advisers, unlike their counterparts in the earlier Gdansk negotiation.
Despite this delayed support for Solidarity, the movement quickly gained strong support 
in the region. According to Holzer (1990: 129), Upper Silesia was the strongest region 
in the movement since at the beginning it accounted for one third of Solidarity 
members. For example, in Bytom, 80 per cent of workers joined Solidarity.204
In 1980, as a result of the formation of Solidarity, the change of the communist political 
leadership extended to the regional level. Within a few months, nearly all the first 
secretaries of the voivodship committee were changed and a new first secretary 
Zabinski, arrived in Katowice. He was the first not to have been an inter-war communist 
activist and was also the first Silesian to hold this position. Zabinski’s rule should 
modify the evaluation of rulers whose origins were in Dqbrowa, especially of Zawadzki 
(so often accused of national betrayal), as it was Zabinski who had been groomed by the 
Soviet authorities to be the next First Secretary of the communist party in the event of 
Soviet intervention, due to his devotion to the Soviet authorities. After Zabinski, all 
other first secretaries of the voivodship committee were Silesians (Gorywoda) or 
newcomers (Messner and Ferensztajn) who had, however, been tied to Upper Silesia for 
decades by their residence or place of education and by their further professional 
careers.
Like his immediate predecessors Gierek and Grudzien, Zabinski was a coalminer, 
although very early on he began to work in the communist youth organisation and later 
in the voivodship committee. Zabinski’s professional career is a model nomenklatura 
career as his political activity made up for his low level of education (although like 
Gierek and Grudzien he formally received an MA degree after working in a high
203 Thus, their earlier privileged position in the socialist regime, due to the economic importance of the 
mines, began to be paralleled by their important role in the development of regional Solidarity.
204 Ash, 1983.
205 Dziadul, 1991
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position in the party apparatus). As continuation of a successful nomenklatura career 
depended on the maintenance of the predominant position of the party, he was one of 
the most devoted defenders of its interests. In autumn 1980, he organised the Katowice 
Party Forum, an association uniting the most conservative party forces inspired by 
Stalinist orthodoxy. Thus, he was in opposition to the ‘moderate’ rule of Jaruzelski and 
demanded closer co-operation with the Soviet Union, expecting their intervention. From 
the beginning of his rule he was clearly in conflict with the Solidarity opposition, using
OCifkall available methods, often Machiavellian ones.
At that time, changes similar to those in the voivodship committee took place in the 
voivodship administration, where the voivodes changed twice: Legomski (June 1978- 
December 1980); and Lichos (December 1980-December 1981). Legomski and Lichos 
were both from D^browa, both represented the nomenklatura type of career, and both 
during their tenures co-operated closely with the voivodship committee.
• From military coup to negotiation in the Katowice voivodship, 1981-1989
The imposition of martial law in December 1981 in Upper Silesia showed two main 
features: first, the strong resistance of blue-collar workers, and second, the long silence 
of the opposition assisted by the emigration of regional leaders. In December 1981, 
Upper Silesia showed strong resistance as about 50 firms went on strike out of 200 in 
the whole country. As in August 1980, the strikes in December 1981 were concentrated 
mostly in coalmines and big ‘socialist’ plants. Seventeen coalmines -  one third of the 
total number - went on strike. The strength of the opposition was also shown by the 
prolonged strike in the Ziemowit coalmine, the longest strike in the country, by more 
than 1,500 coalminers, which only ended on 24 December, when the food supply ran 
out. Holzer and Leski (1990: 17) believe that the pacification of the region was 
exceptionally brutal. The number of militia and forces gathered there was large. Upper 
Silesia was the only region where the use of force by the militia while breaking strikes 
led to nine deaths. Jedynak, the regional leader during the underground period, wrote 
that after the imposition of martial law the division between ‘obedient’ Upper Silesia 
and the rest of Poland disappeared: the resistance to martial law washed away the
206 Mink, 1992: 50.
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region’s socialist stigma. The region’s support for the Solidarity opposition was 
recognised by the country and even more the region became the leader of the opposition 
protests.
Paszkowski’s rule is negatively evaluated due to his ‘successful’ breaking of the 
opposition, the results of which are, according to some, still felt in the region.207 In 
addition, he was criticised for not being very creative (according to one of my 
respondents in the voivodship office). Voivode Paszkowski represents the second 
professional group, the army officers, who, after the coalminers, dominated the regional 
elite during the whole socialist period. His age, at 65 years old, distinguished him from 
most of the voivodship administration, and all the voivodship committee first 
secretaries, with the exception of Messner. Messner was 53 at the time of his 
appointment, but all the other regional political leaders were men in their forties; only 
Ziqtek was about the same age when he was formally appointed voivode.
A month after Paszkowski’s arrival, a change took place in the position of first secretary 
of the voivodship committee: Zabinski was replaced by Professor Messner, a newcomer 
who had however, lived in Upper Silesia since his student years. He stayed in office 
until the end of 1982. He was later appointed Deputy Prime Minister and, in the period 
1985-1988, Prime Minister. Writing about Messner, Rakowski (1991), a successor to 
the position of Prime Minister, defined him as a limited reformist unable to introduce 
tough reform although the need was severely felt by the communist authorities at the 
end of socialism. His successor, Gorywoda, was also considered a conservative 
politician. Dhigosz (1992: 180) considers Messner an outstanding professor and 
specialist in his area of accounting, which had a strong impact on his thinking, but sees 
him also as a person who stood in the shadow of Jaruzelski. He has a much better 
opinion of Gorywoda, who had a strong personality and was able to present his 
independent opinion to Jaruzelski, which, according to Dhigosz, was a rare quality 
among the administrative elite at that time.
Messner had been the first secretary since Ochab, in 1946, to have a Master’s degree (in 
fact he had a PhD as well). His successors, Ferensztajn and Gorywoda, also had PhDs 
and Gorywoda, like Messner, was an academic. A similar trend towards the advent of
207Pustulka, Dziennik Zachodni, 23-25 September 1994.
208 Dudek, 1997: 56.
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academics into the political elite took place at the national level. For example, 
Rakowski recalls that in Jaruzelski’s government there were eight professors -  more 
than the numbers of generals. According to Staniszkis (1982), this suggests the baroque 
phase of the socialist system preceding its fall. In this phase leaders were able to display 
ostentatious ornaments as camouflage but were not able to transform the system or 
adapt to changed conditions. These three appointments, of Messner, Ferensztajn and 
Gorywoda, were in contrast to the earlier apparatchiki careers of Grudzien or Zabinski, 
who last spent nearly their whole professional careers in political institutions (they 
received their extramural MSc degrees officially while working in the party apparatus). 
In contrast, the regional elite of the late eighties was formed by ‘technocrats’ who had 
spent several years in scientific institutions or universities and were later co-opted into 
the political elite.
The professional careers of Messner, Gorywoda and Ferensztajn were also similar in 
one more respect. All three successive first secretaries of the voivodship committee 
were also promoted from the regional elite to the central administrative elite: Messner 
became Prime Minister, Gorywoda Deputy Prime Minister (1983-1987), and 
Ferensztajn a minister (1987-1989). This exchange of personnel suggests that 
throughout the eighties in the Katowice voivodship, coalmining lobbies played a crucial 
role among the national elite.209 However, in the case of Gorywoda, his career went 
from central to regional level.
In the middle of the eighties, the Jaruzelski regime began to replace army officers in 
national and regional institutions with civilians. In the Katowice voivodship, the deputy 
voivode, Wnuk, took over Paszkowski’s position. He was a young economist of 
Dqbrowa origin who had wide administrative experience: he had been deputy mayor of 
Sosnowiec (the capital of the Dqbrowa basin) before becoming deputy voivode. His 
career in administration was a rare example of an ‘internal career’ as in the socialist 
period he had worked since his graduation in local or regional administration. The 
second example was Kiermaszek, a close colleague and successor of Zi^tek, who had 
worked in the voivodship office for more than two decades before his promotion.
209 Compare: Kuron, 1995: 258 and Jaruzelski, 1992.
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Wnuk's D^browa origins, like those of Legomski and Lichos at the beginning of the 
eighties, implied stronger recruitment from the D^browa part of the voivodship. This 
seems to have been caused by stronger support from the D^browa inhabitants for the 
socialist system.210 Thus, the inhabitants of D^browa more often chose professional 
careers in political institutions (as did Legomski and Lichos), or graduated in subjects 
like economics (Wnuk) which were strongly politicised and offered promising avenues 
to nomenklatura careers. Wnuk was recognised as a man of wide perspective compared 
with his predecessor (according to my interview with the voivodship office elite 
member). A similar opinion was expressed by Pustulka211 who portrayed him as an 
elegant and educated man on the basis of interviews with members of the regional elite.
To sum up, the socialist period substantially hindered any effective performance of the 
administration in the transitional period. Reformers in power during the transitional 
period had to operate within a system that was extremely centralised and at the same 
time vertically fragmented. Thus, the regional administrative elite, after the fall of 
communism, saw as urgent the restoration of the historic territorial organisation and a 
three-tier administrative structure as a pre-condition for effective performance. This 
reform was to be assisted by the abolition of numerous territorial special administration 
units, whose powers were to be transferred to general administration units at local, 
district and regional levels.
First, on the whole, the impact of the socialist period on the present economic and 
political situation in Katowice voivodship, as well as on the regional administration, is 
to be considered negative. It left a legacy of ineffective administration at national and 
regional levels: structures were centralised and vertically fragmented, and political 
criteria dominated in the appointment of personnel in both the voivodship office and the 
voivodship committee. Moreover, these problems alienated society from the 
administration and strengthened negative social attitudes towards it. This encouraged 
the view that ordinary members of society should not engage in public life, leaving this 
domain entirely to nomenklatura members. The period left a legacy of a passive and 
subordinate regional society as a whole, with weak development of opposition and a
210 For example, election results since 1989.
211 Dziennik Zachodni, 23-25 September 1994.
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weakly-established intelligentsia. Thus, the recruitment-base for the post-socialist elite 
was much shallower than in other regions.
Secondly, the policy of the regional elite in the socialist period had negative effects on 
the preservation of Silesian regional identification and Silesian culture. The two events 
which were especially negative were the Volksliste issue and the emigration of the 
native population in the seventies. The socialist period also maintained the marginal 
participation of Silesians in regional administrative and political institutions, as well as 
at the national level, despite the great influx of the regional elite into central 
administration. The promotion of the elite of Dqbrowa origin and, to some extent, of 
newcomers (Messner) to the central administrative elite showed the crucial role of the 
heavy-industry lobby. After the fall of communism in 1989, as the role of this sector 
decreased, the influence of the regional elite was consequently diminished substantially. 
The situation did not change between 1993 and 1997, during the post-communist rule.
Thirdly, the socialist period, with its vision of the regional development of heavy 
industry, preserved the inter-war opinion of the privileged position of the region (which 
will be referred to later). However, the extensive regional development that took place 
during the socialist period was marked by extreme economic wilfulness. This can be 
illustrated by the building of gigantic and economically irrational constructions and by a 
blatant disregard for the environmental consequences of such developments. In the long 
run these policies led to deep and prolonged regional crises.
Finally, a sound evaluation of the legacy of the socialist period in the Katowice 
voivodship, about which a lot of myths now exist, demands further investigation, 
especially as most of the documents referring to this period are not yet available. 
Moreover, strict censorship during the socialist period made the regional press a poor 
sources of data. Consequently, the main source of available data are fragmented 
interviews and the memoirs of a few members of the regional elite.
116
Conclusion
In this chapter three main historical periods were distinguished: the Middle Ages, the 
inter-war and the socialist periods. The first two can be characterised as positive sources 
of inspiration for the transitional elite while two opposite is true of the last period which 
was, above all seen as a threat to the regional identity. It was also viewed as a time of 
social exclusion of Silesians from the regional elite, and of economic irrationally. In the 
next chapter which follows just how alive these opinions were among the Silesian 
population and its organisations is examined. The debate on the regional past and 
especially the socialist period vividly raised by the Upper Silesian Union will be 
presented. Finally, reference to the socialist period will also be made in chapter four, 
where, within the investigation of voivode Ciszak’s polices, attention will be paid to 
inspirations going back to socialism.
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CHAPTER 3
THE REVOLUTIONARY RULE OF VOIVODE CZECH,
1990-1994
Every new government since 1956 has raised the issue 
o f decentralisation, but little has been achieved. 
Consequently, fa r  too much authority remained 
concentrated in the centre for it to be able to exercise 
it in an effective manner.212
Introduction
This chapter concentrates on the rule of voivode Czech and the voivodship office in the 
first ‘revolutionary’ period, 1990-1994. The chapter starts with a description of the 
situation at the national level and the administrative reforms prepared there. The first 
section covers local government reform. Consideration of these reforms is essential to 
the investigation of the performance of both regional institutions: the voivodship office 
(in this chapter) and local government in the Katowice voivodship (chapter five).213 
The next section analyses why administrative reform remained unfinished. In 
particular, it emphasises the instability of post-Solidarity governments, which led to the 
package of parliamentary bills for further administrative reform not being prepared for 
introduction until 1993. Then it discusses the political reasons for delays in 
administrative reform after the taking over of power by the post-communists.
212 Taras, 1993: 19.
213 The activity of local government in the period under discussion is presented separately in chapter five. 
This division is required due to the striking differences of opinions: the local government elite’s positive 
attitudes towards administration in general and their own work in this area are in stark contrast to the 
negative attitudes towards administration in the voivodship office. This is related to the different 
administrative experience of the respective elites. Local government was re-established as an autonomous 
administrative institution, which significantly improved its performance. In contrast, the voivodship 
office was preserved as a ‘socialist institution’ totally subordinate to central government, and despite 
efforts by the voivodship office elite, opportunities to improve their performance were minimal. The 
local government elite saw themselves as effective in contrast to a highly frustrated voivodship office 
elite, who despite its efforts, saw the effectiveness of their administrative actions as extremely limited. In 
the following chapters six and seven (which analyse the Regional Contract and the regional 
administrative elite’s view on further administrative reforms respectively) where the divisions between 
public administration and local government are not evident, their opinions will be analysed together.
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The second part of this chapter concentrates on the regional level and describes the rule 
of voivode Czech and the functioning of the voivodship office throughout the post- 
Solidarity period. It starts with a description of the post-Solidarity take-over and an 
overview of the past and future of the region presented by the Upper Silesian Union, 
followed by an investigation of the appointment of voivode Czech and a sociological 
description of him. In presenting his regional policy, particular attention is paid to the 
territorial and structural dimension of the reform. Finally, the radical restructuring of the 
voivodship office and the shift of the voivodship office elite are investigated.
The poor performance of the regional administration (that is the voivodship office and, 
to a lesser extent, local government) in the period from 1990 to 1997, was influenced by 
the slowing down of administrative reform. The reform was ‘unfinished’ as it was 
limited to the lowest level -  that of the communes -  and it was not followed by the 
anticipated next stages of administrative reform, at district and regional levels. The 
need to bring administrative reform to its logical conclusion was felt most severely by 
the voivodship office elite. They eagerly awaited regional administrative reform, which 
was to transform the completely dysfunctional system inherited from the socialist 
period. They expected the reform to transfer substantial power and resources to the 
regions. The reform of territorial divisions was also expected to decrease the number of 
voivodships to between 12 and 17. This meant that the territory under the jurisdiction 
of the voivodship office in Katowice would expand about threefold. Thus, the 
performance of the voivodship office in the period under investigation was affected by 
the fact that the elite remained in a state of suspension waiting for the reform which they 
thought was inevitable. However, its inevitability did not prevent its postponement into 
the indefinite future. Local government was also affected indirectly by the lack of 
further reform, in that it was forced to function within a provisional, centralist structure 
of administration, with no co-ordination at the regional level.
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3.1 Post-Solidarity rule in Poland 1989-1993
i. The refolution and change o f elite
The performance of the voivodship office and local government elite in Katowice was 
shaped by the national transition (and by the administrative reform, which although 
limited, was a part of it). In 1989, the prolonged economic and social impasse that 
characterised the last phase of the socialist period induced the communists to begin the 
Round Table negotiations with the leaders of the Solidarity movement. Negotiations 
ended with an agreement to hold parliamentary elections in which the opposition would 
be allowed 35 per cent of the seats in the Sejm. This election resulted in an 
overwhelming victory for the post-Solidarity opposition as they won all of the available 
35 per cent of seats in the Sejm and 99 per cent in the Senate, where all the seats were 
open to competition. The results of the national election unexpectedly led to the 
creation of the first non-communist government, led by Mazowiecki, and a virtually 
clean sweep of the communist elite from their political positions.
The post-Solidarity opposition was suddenly given extensive legislative and executive 
powers. At the same time the external conditions were favourable as the political crises 
in the Soviet Union made possible the introduction of radical reforms in Poland, which 
essentially re-established the democratic system and a free market economy.214 The 
political and economic changes initiated in Poland in 1989 in the aftermath of the 
Round Table Agreement, as well as subsequent similar events in Eastern Europe, 
represent a fairly peaceful transfer of power accompanied by fundamental changes in 
the political, and consequently the economic, system. The absence of violence (with the 
exception of Romania) and the preservation of substantial power by the representatives 
of the nomenklatura (the ancien regime) modified the traditional meaning of revolution 
as it now revealed that did not necessary have to be violent.
Ash (1990: 14) proposes the term refolution to describe the changes in Poland and 
Hungary in autumn 1989. These, he argues, were a mixture of reforms initiated by
214 Balcerowicz, 1995.
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elites and revolutionary pressure ‘from below’. In the case of Poland and in contrast to 
Hungary, it was initiated by workers' strikes and then followed by negotiations between 
ruling and opposition elites. However, in both of these countries there was interaction 
between the two processes.
These peaceful revolutions did not lead to the elimination of the nomenklatura. Thus, 
the new elites in Eastern Europe were formed by representatives of both the old and the 
new system.215 Accordingly, Higley and Gulther (1992) refer to the congregation of 
elites formed as a result of negotiations at the top. On the other hand, like the classical 
revolutions, these revolutions made possible rapid career advancements for the 
opposition, particularly in areas which, until then, had been reserved for communists. 
Dahrendorf216 mentions certain social groups which had been totally excluded from 
participation in public institutions until 1989 and which, during the transition, entered 
this sphere.
ii. Why was the administrative reform needed, and why was it halted?
After the fall of socialism in 1989, fundamental changes in the administrative 
institutions were initiated. There was also a redefinition of roles among different levels 
of administration as a consequence of the formation of local government at commune 
level and the partial decentralisation of power (a decentralisation that was expected to 
become deeper and to extend to the next levels of territorial administration as time went 
by). Thus, it is necessary to give a more detailed description of the local government 
reform and of proposals for further reform of the administration at district and regional 
levels before moving on to consider the responses of the regional elite.
a. The re-establishment of local government in 1990
The local government reform introduced in 1990 will be discussed from three main 
aspects. First, the fundamental importance of the reform; second, an explanation of 
why, despite the importance of reform, only its more moderate version was introduced,
215 Pawlak, 1994: 94.
216 Dahrendorf, 1993: 87 after Eckstein 1984.
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as the reform was limited to the lowest level; and third, the speed with which the reform 
was introduced. The discussion will also focus on the political weakness of the 
reformers, who did not have wide social support but wished to implement reform before 
the powerful but fragmented opposition could consolidate.
As early as the Round Table negotiations, administrative reform -  the re-establishment 
of an elective local government independent from the public administration -  was 
already a crucial issue. Solidarity raised the issue at the Round Table negotiations 
during the spring of 1989, and their delegation presented a framework of local 
government reform. Accordingly, this reform was a priority for the first post-socialist 
government of Mazowiecki: all the main bills were passed during the first eight months 
of his tenure. The first local election took place on 27 May 1990. This was immediately 
followed by the re-establishment of autonomous local government at the commune 
level.
This reform also has to be seen in the context of the political situation, as it was 
introduced almost immediately after the Round Table Agreement with the then ruling 
communists. This was the first free election, as the national election in 1989 had been 
only semi-democratic. The importance of this reform was twofold: first, local 
government was to become the first effective administrative institution, due to the 
establishment of its property, financial independence and legal rights, and second, it was 
to be the first elective unit and thus truly representative of the interests of local 
communities.217 The Solidarity elite intended this reform to have an impact on 
administration at higher levels. They expected local government to become the main 
reformist centre, applying pressure from below for the further restructuring of the higher 
levels of the administration.
It was believed that local government would be the voice of the local communities and, 
after a few years, when the next stage of reform would be launched, the district and 
regional societies and their elites would be significantly strengthened. Democratic local 
governments would influence public discussions on, for example, the number and size 
of regions which were to be formed and whether they would be self-governing bodies, 
or at the same time both self-governing and organs of central government. It was
217 As a consequence of the socialist period, the social structure was generally seen in terms of ‘us’ 
(society) and ‘them’ (the communist elite) and thus society as a whole tried not to engage in public life.
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believed that these issues would be discussed by gradually formed local and regional 
societies.
The significance of local government reform was also related to the fact that it was 
expected to destroy the political monopoly of nomenklatura by dismantling it ‘from 
below’.218 This was especially important since the Round Table Agreement promised to 
preserve some power for the communist side at the national level. Pokladecki (1995) 
describes this administrative reform as the ‘self-government revolution’, which affected 
the most centralised base of the state. He considers this as one of the most important 
elements of the transition of the political system to democracy, especially as the Round 
Table Agreement enabled the peaceful shift of political leadership by promising to 
preserve some power for the communist side. The eradication of the nomenklatura 
system from the bottom up is very significant in this context. Economic considerations 
were also an important argument for local government reform as Mazowiecki’s 
government wanted to decrease the public deficit.219
In sum, the reformers assumed that democratisation and the formation of civil society 
would first consolidate at the lowest, grass roots level and then spread to the higher 
levels. The logic of this programme was that the reform of central administration would 
be the final stage. Local government reform was seen as an element of a wider 
administrative reform with significant social and political implications. The whole 
administrative structure was seen as distorted as a result of socialist reforms; these had 
led to extreme centralisation and vertical fragmentation of administration. Thus, the 
formation of an effective administrative structure implied the need for a systemic 
administrative reform, decentralising power to the lower units of administration: 
regions, districts and communes.
b. The gradual approach to regional and district reforms
First, the lower administrative units had to be strengthened, as the existing 49 
voivodships were too weak to be able to perform new tasks. After formation of about 
12 regions, decentralisation of tasks currently performed by voivodships demanded
218 Pokladecki 1995.
219 The comparison of local government performance is presented in some detail in chapter five.
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formation of a supra-local body of districts. Thus, local government reform was 
discussed in the context of the establishment of a three-tier structure of administration: 
regions, districts, and communes. Mazowiecki’s government seriously considered the 
reform of the next levels of the territorial administration: districts and regions. There 
were proposals for the formation of between 12 and 17 large regions. The 49 regions 
would be merged, and replaced with the new regions equipped with substantial 
responsibilities and financial powers. The territorial structure was to be similar to the 
inter-war period structure. But this radical project of administrative reforms was 
rejected.
Opponents argued that the regional and district reform would be very costly due to the 
huge scale of reorganisation of administrative offices that it would entail. However, the 
main argument was political: reform along these lines could seriously destabilise the 
country. Regulski, who in Mazowiecki’s government was the Government Plenipotary 
for Local Government Reform, noted that the introduction of administrative reform 
from the lowest level (with districts and regions to be formed later) was seen as the best 
solution. It would make possible the creation of the administrative structure from the 
bottom up, which would be the most favoured by local and regional society. In 
consequence, reform at the regional level was postponed until a period when local and 
regional awareness would have risen and local government would have gained both 
experience and a strengthened position.220
Regulski and Kocan (1994) recall that from the beginning the reformers had met with a 
well-organised opposition. At the same time they emphasise that the local government 
reform was prepared by a relatively small ( and isolated) group of academics, who did 
not have strong social and political support. The significance of the re-introduction of 
autonomous local government was hardly appreciated by a society at large, which, after 
the period of authoritarian rule, did not fully understand the significance of these 
democratic changes: since the Second World War there had been no local democratic 
tradition in Poland. This contributed to a near-total lack of comprehension as to the role 
of elective local government administration.
220 Regulski and Kocan, 1994: 53.
124
These changes were not supported by the public institutions at the centre either. The 
public administration wanted to preserve its domination (and hinder the formation of 
local and regional governments, which would be responsible to local and regional 
societies instead of, as until now, to the central administration). The re-establishment of 
local government autonomy required the public administration to give up certain tasks 
and delegate them to local government (at commune level and later to local government 
at the district level and to regional government). This greatly disturbed the public 
administration. Until reform was established, each of the numerous ministries would 
exercise power through its special separate administrative units at regional and local 
levels. After the reform, the responsibilities for the administrative units at local level 
would be united in the local government office. This was supposed to lead to better 
recognition of local aims as well as to the improvement of economic performance. 
Thus, local government reform led to strong opposition from ministers who did not 
want their powers limited by the delegation of responsibilities to local government. 
This decreased local government’s sphere of responsibility, and the division of tasks 
was based on political decisions more related to powers of certain industrial sectors than 
to objective criteria.221
Moreover, local government reform was prepared in a quite difficult political situation 
as the Polish parliament was only in part democratically elected and the communes until 
then were the lowest level of public administration. As a result, reform had to 
overcome several barriers simultaneously.222 At the same time, such a quick call for 
local elections after the formation of the first non-communist government was important 
in the situation of the unfinished revolution. Mazowiecki did not consider it wise to call 
for another fully democratic parliamentary election as this could destabilise the country. 
As a result, the local elections in 1990 were a substitute for a national election. Thus, 
the local government became the first institution to be elected in a completely free 
election since the end of the Second World War, an event of particular symbolic 
importance.
The fact that this was the first free election created considerable self-confidence in local 
government. The local government elite sometimes saw itself as the only institution 
that really represented society as the parliament was still only semi-democratic. Thus,
221 Regulski and Kocan, 1994: 61.
222 Regulski and Kocan,1994: 59.
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its members saw themselves not only as representatives of their local communities but 
also, by virtue of being the first fully democratic institution, as advocates of further 
reform in general.223 Thus, they even believed that they should oppose the centre which 
was still seen as conservative and interested in maintaining the status quo.
iii. Solidarity rule -  the delay o f further administrative reforms and personnel policy
The performance of the voivodship office at this time was directly influenced by two 
factors. First, after the rapid start on systemic administrative reform with the reform of 
local government in 1990, the further stages of reform at the district and regional levels 
were delayed. The voivodship office was therefore functioning in a state of suspension, 
expecting inevitable further regional reform which would put an end to the extreme 
inefficiency of administration at that level -  a situation that it regarded as both 
unacceptable and untenable. Most of all, it expected that the 49 small voivodships 
would be replaced by a few strong regions.
Second, the personnel changes in administration, especially concerning the appointment 
of voivodes, were also an important factor influencing the performance of the 
voivodship office administration. The personnel policy in administration is also 
interesting in the context of increasing politicisation during Pawlak’s tenure, which led 
to the appointment of the next voivode of Katowice, Ciszak, in 1994.
In considering the causes of the ‘unfinished reform’ during the post-Solidarity period, 
three main factors must be taken into account. First, the sudden shift of power to the 
post-Solidarity governments resulted in the absence of a vision of systemic 
administrative reform; second, the fragmentation of the Solidarity opposition, and 
strong personal conflicts within the post-Solidarity leadership, further delayed the work 
on reform; and third, the increasing isolation of the post-Solidarity elite from society led 
to a shift of power in 1993 to the post-communists. The post-communists wanted to 
preserve the existing territorial administrative divisions and delayed the formation of 
effective regional administration, forcing the voivodship office to continue operating 
within ‘provisional’ structures.
223 For example, opinion of Dziewior, Mayor of Katowice, Sejmik Samorzqdowy, August 1995.
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a. Mazowiecki’s government -  the absence of a vision of systemic administrative
reform and his personnel policy
The ‘unfinished reform’ resulted from both the lack of a comprehensive scheme for 
dismantling the structure of the socialist state, and the lack of any complete vision of the 
administrative institutions by Mazowiecki’s government or anybody else in the post- 
Solidarity elite.224 Later, the comprehensive reform of the administration was delayed 
by the instability of the post-Solidarity period as the government changed four times 
between 1989 and 1993. The lack of qualified personnel also hindered any quick 
transition from the administrative institutions left by the socialist system.
During Mazowiecki’s government an almost complete change of personnel at 
voivodship level took place. During the eighteen months of his tenure 44 out of 49 
voivodes were dismissed.225 Voivode Czech was appointed during this period and he 
‘maintained’ power throughout the next three governments as personnel changes during 
the post-Solidarity period were rather limited.226 However, the pace and scale of the 
change of administrative personnel as a whole, and especially in the top positions in 
ministries, during Mazowiecki’s tenure were far from revolutionary. The change of 
voivodes was the most radical among the personnel changes, while the smallest changes 
occurred in the Ministry of National Defence and the Ministry of Internal Affairs. The 
limited change in these ministries, which continued to be dominated by personnel 
appointed in the socialist period and headed by post-communist ministers, was 
predominantly due to the fear of disobedience or rebellion, which could not be ruled 
out. Mazowiecki's policy was interpreted by Dudek (1997) as a conscious attempt to 
unite the whole of society around the most basic national interests, and to erase the past 
divisions that arose during the socialist era, between those who were members of the 
nomenklatura and worked in administration and those who were outside its institutions.
The more radical change in the ranks of the voivodes, compared to that of top officials 
in ministries, seems to have been encouraged by pressure from regional post-Solidarity
224 Dudek, 1997: 81.
225 Dudek 1997: 83-84.
226 During the next three post-Solidarity governments, each lasting about a year, personnel changes in 
administration were relatively limited, with about one fifth of voivodes changed by each government.
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elites demanding the dismantling of regional nomenklatura’, for example, the dismissal 
of voivode Wnuk and the appointment of voivode Czech in the Katowice voivodship.
During Mazowiecki’s tenure, former nomenklatura personnel dominated the national 
elite. However, by time of the second government of Bielecki the new elite had already 
begun to predominate. Sztumski (1997: 138 and 142) argues that participation in the 
underground Solidarity (‘combatant origin’) was the main criterion in decisions 
surrounding promotion, taking precedence over qualifications and the moral evaluation 
of candidates.
b. The fragmentation of the post-Solidarity elite
The recognition of the Solidarity opposition (illegal during socialism) and the 
parliamentary election in 1989 radically changed the situation of Solidarity.227 The 
fragmentation of the post-Solidarity elite began very early, with the division of 
Solidarity into two camps: the supporters of Walesa, and those of Mazowiecki. This 
initiated the process of the formation of several post-Solidarity parties and the gradual 
disintegration of a post-Solidarity elite, unable to unite around common aims.228 The 
Solidarity opposition was united during the socialist period through having a common 
enemy. However, with the fall of communism and the disappearance of the common 
enemy, the main mechanism of their integration suddenly ceased to exist. The political 
situation changed radically, and the social structure was also going through an equally 
radical transition. Solidarity had to adapt to this new situation. At first, they responded 
to the new conditions by extreme fragmentation along various political, social, religious 
and economic lines. At the same time, the perception of common interest and the 
integration of various small parties and groupings were slow. Often, the main element 
distinguishing the various post-Solidarity parties and groupings was not their political 
agenda but their political leaders.
227 In this work referred to as 'post-Solidarity' after that date, to distinguish it from the Solidarity 
opposition in the period 1980-1989.
Wal?sa started this ‘war at the top’ by attacking Mazowiecki, the Prime Minister of the first non­
communist government (despite having been earlier proposed by him for this position).
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Moreover, recognition of the legitimacy of the state and the authority of administrative 
institutions was also slow. Being in opposition, and criticising the functioning of the 
state, were still understood to be positive and patriotic behaviour. As a result, some of 
the post-Solidarity elite decided not to accept public office but preferred to stay in 
opposition. In addition, individual opinions were still highly valued, and 
subordination to the formal party agenda was seen as ‘a betrayal of free thinking and 
individual courage’. For instance, deputy Prime Minister Goryszewski voiced opinions 
that were sometimes radically at variance with the formal policy of Suchocka’s 
government.230
The conflict between Walesa and Mazowiecki eventually led to the fall of the 
Mazowiecki government. This marked the beginning of a period of weak, short-lived 
governments all of which were unable to form a coherent policy. The post-Solidarity 
governments, each lasting less than a year, were therefore not able to introduce 
comprehensive administrative reform. The exception was a set of administrative 
reforms prepared by Suchocka’s government (the last post-Solidarity government). The 
reforms covered district and regional reform, reform of civil servants and the central 
administration. However, these were rejected by the next parliament, which was post­
communist.
To sum up, during their rule in the period between 1989 and 1993 the post-Solidarity 
parties were divided by personal ambitions and sometimes the extreme value of 
individuality among politicians. As a result, they were not able to unite around common 
agendas and interests. This delayed the introduction of coherent government reforms.
c. The Solidarity governments’ isolation and the return of the post-communists
In 1993, the victory of the post-communists in the national election forced post- 
Solidarity, for the first time, to unite around common aims. The post-Solidarity elite 
began to be aware that it needed to preserve its electoral support if it was to be able to 
continue its own vision of reform. It also concentrated more attention on its personnel 
policy and on how its politicians should communicate with society.
229 Wasilewski, 1994: 15.
230 Dudek, 1997: 232.
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iv. The proposals fo r  district and regional administrative reform
In 1993, the last post-Solidarity government of Suchocka prepared the second stage of 
administrative reform. The reform was planned to begin with the reintroduction of self- 
governing districts above the communes (which had been reformed in 1990); this would 
be followed by the formation of a few large and strong regions by merging the 
territories of the existing 49 voivodships. The district and regional administrative 
reforms were aimed at substantial delegation of power according to the principle of 
subsidiarity. There were different proposals concerning the number of new regions to 
be created; the numbers mentioned were 12, 17 or 25. The division into 12 regions 
seemed to be best suited to attracting foreign co-operation, and was closest to European 
standards of relatively large units. The new regional authorities were also to integrate 
the administration at the regional level: numerous special administrative units directly 
subordinate to ministers were to be replaced by a general administration subordinate to 
the voivode.
These proposals for the creation of a few strong regional units formulated by the post- 
Solidarity elite were, to a large extent, based on the inter-war system. There were three 
main arguments for the territorial reform: political, economic and social. From the 
point of view of the regional elites, the core of regional administrative reform was 
related to the political argument, the redrawing of voivodship boundaries and the 
redefinition of the responsibilities of the centre and regions. This was expected to 
involve substantial delegation of power to the regional level. One result would be to 
insulate the regional administration from the effects of political instability at the centre 
(this had been an important consideration during the inter-war period as well).
The partial reform of 1990 had remained the ‘district’ and regional levels, and their 
relationships with the centre as they had existed under socialism. Thus, the quality of 
performance of the administration above local level was very low. In other words, 
improvements at district and regional levels and at the centre depended on the 
elimination of such extremely dysfunctional features of socialist administration as 
excessive centralisation and vertical fragmentation. However, this could be done only 
after the reform of the territorial division of the state by the formation of big and strong 
territorial units.
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The second argument raised by post-Solidarity was an economic one. They argued that 
although territorial reform would be costly in the initial stages, in the longer term the 
creation of large decentralised regions on the western European model would lead to 
economies in public expenditure, greater flexibility and improved efficiency in 
government. Moreover, they argued that co-operation within the EU necessitated the 
formation of strong regional units, similar in size to the German Lander or the French 
provinces (the majority of western European countries are divided into regions several 
times larger than the voivodships of the socialist period). This, according to 
Hryniewicz, (1995) would enable them to be equal partners in regional exchange and 
enhance co-operation.231 Furthermore, the introduction of larger voivodships would help 
to create a better environment for investment. It is easier for larger regions to advertise 
their economic potential and generate independent centres such as scientific and 
university institutions. Moreover, larger regions may develop their own banking 
facilities and produce highly-qualified professionals that meet international 
expectations. The larger voivodship structure also seems to be much better for efficient 
industrial restructuring, as it is argued that the structure of administration can facilitate 
the modernisation of industry, encourage the arrival of new technologies and increase 
export production potential.232
A final and sociological argument was presented by the post-Solidarity governments. 
They proposed that as society is integrated around traditional local and regional borders, 
the reform should re-establish these regions. Only after the establishment of such 
regions would the formation of a fully-fledged democratic system, with strong social 
participation, be possible.233
231 See maps: 5, page 132.
232 Hryniewicz, 1995: 33-34.
233 Surazka, 1993: 92.
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Map 5: The Suchocka government’s proposals for the administrative division o f Poland into 
12 voivodships similar in size to other European regions (source: Koter, W sp d n o ta ,  no. 20, 
1996, p.8)
Unexpectedly, after the vote of no-confidence in Suchocka’s government, President 
Walesa decided to dissolve parliament. The newly-elected parliament led to the 
formation of the post-communist government of Pawlak, which, wishing to preserve the 
status quo, suspended district and regional reform.234 It was only after intense political 
pressure that the most advanced element of the district reform -  the Pilot Programme 
aimed at the formation of town-districts -  was introduced.
3.2. Czech’s tenure in the voivodship office, 1990-1994
/. The post-Solidarity take-over o f the voivodship office, 1990-1994
The shift of power to the Solidarity elite started at the national level. After the Round 
Table negotiations in April 1989 between the communists and the Solidarity opposition, 
the non-communist government of Mazowiecki was formed. This government was 
exceptional, in part because it was the first government for many years without 
ministerial representation from the Katowice voivodship. This fact is extremely 
significant and can be interpreted as a substantial weakening of the position of the heavy 
industry lobby.235
The Solidarity movement’s surge to political power at the national level led to changes 
in the regional and local elite in the whole country. Two parallel processes took place: 
first, the appointment of new voivodes of Solidarity origin. As noted above, during 
Mazowiecki’s rule from August 1989 until December 1990, 44 out of 49 voivodes were 
replaced. Second, eight months after the national election on 27 May 1990, local 
government elections were held. Throughout the country power went to the Citizens’ 
Committees, which took 45 per cent of the votes.237
The first Citizens’ Committee was formed as an advisory body to Walesa during the 
Round Table Negotiation in December 1988 and were characterised by the presence of 
the intelligentsia and even intellectuals. During the parliamentary election in 1989, the
234 Pawlak’s vision of administration is presented in chapter five in the section on the introduction of the 
Pilot Programme.
235 Domaranczyk, 1990: 156.
236 Zycie Czqstochowy, 14 January 1994.
237 Surazka, 1993: 86.
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Citizens’ Committees organised the Solidarity campaign, as they did later during the 
local elections in 1990. The Citizens Committees united people of various political 
views around one common idea: opposition to the socialist regime. After the 
parliamentary election in 1990 post-Solidarity parties began to form and the Citizens 
Committees movement slowly disappeared. This was hastened by Walesa’s efforts to 
eliminate the intelligentsia from the Solidarity movement and limit Solidarity to a trade 
union organisation with a strong blue-collar character.
In the Katowice voivodship, the emergence of a new regional elite of Solidarity origin 
in both the voivodship office and local government took place at the same time as in 
Poland as a whole. The new voivode was appointed on 25 May 1990 and the local 
elections took place two days later. Consequently, reforms in these two types of 
administration influenced each other and strengthened the new post-Solidarity regional 
elite. The post-Solidarity regional elite in the voivodship shared most of the 
characteristics of the national Solidarity elite (a history of participation in underground 
organisations, membership of the Citizens’ Committees, lack of experience of work in 
public institutions, or origins in the intelligentsia). However, the elite in the Katowice 
voivodship also had a very particular and distinctive character that set them apart from 
their counterparts in other regions. This was directly related to the regional policies 
they proposed.
The return to democratic politics in 1989 in Upper Silesia led most of all to actions 
aimed at preserving the regional identity of the native population and the promotion of 
their democratic participation in the public life of the region. Thus, in Upper Silesia the 
local election was also seen as an opportunity for native Silesians ‘to rule in the region 
themselves’, as they used to say. In the voivodship office, the preservation of regional 
identity was at the heart of Czech’s regional policy. At the same time, the most 
distinctive feature of the new revolutionary period elite which arrived in 1990 (directors 
of the voivodship office appointed by voivode Czech and councillors elected in local 
elections) was their Silesian origins. The pre-dominance of Silesians among the regional 
elite further strengthened their policy for the preservation of regional identity. It was 
also a primary influence on their views of how the regional administration should be 
organised. In this chapter, these two phenomena will be investigated during Czech’s 
tenure.
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ii. The Upper Silesian Union and its vision o f regional policy, 1989-1990
At the beginning of the transition the most important source for the recruitment of the 
new native Silesian cadres was the Upper Silesian Union, an organisation which at that 
time participated in the movement of the Citizens’ Committees.238 The Upper Silesian 
Union tried to answer some burning questions: who are we Silesians? What is our 
history? What is our relationship with Poland? This need for native Silesians to 
reinterpret their own history was especially intense after the period of socialism, which 
many of them saw as a time of severe persecution and the nearly successful attempt to 
eliminate their distinctive identity.
Thus, during the first phase of the formation of the regional elite (ie the revolutionary 
period roughly coinciding with voivode Czech’s rule, 1990-1994), the political scene 
was dominated by the Upper Silesian Union’s intelligentsia and by their vision of 
regional policy. Their members were connected to the main economic and political 
forces in the region.239 Thus, the Upper Silesian Union’s policy is investigated more 
closely.240 The Upper Silesian Union, like the Sanacja, declared that it was not a 
political party.241 Like this inter-war organisation it also formed an ‘umbrella party’ and 
its institutions attempted to cover the whole of the regional elite (in both the ‘wide’ and 
‘narrow’ sense of the term). However, in contrast to the Sanacja, the Upper Silesian 
Union united mostly the native population.
238 A similar revival of regional movements took place in other Polish borderland regions such as Greater 
Poland and Pomerania (Szczepanski, 1994: 85). However, it was only in Upper Silesia that regional 
movements with a separatist character arose, like the Movement for Silesian Autonomy (Wodz, 1993: 
17). There were also regional organisations of the German minority. The estimated number of the German 
minority was about 70,000 in the Katowice voivodship, and additionally 200,000 more in the Opole 
voivodship (Blasiak, Nawrocki and Szczepanski 1994: 35).
239 Blasiak, Nawrocki and Szczepanski, 1994.
240 All quotations come from the policy documents of the Upper Silesian Union, written at the turn of 
1989/1990 before the nomination of voivode Czech and the May 1990 local government election. The 
quotations have been selected to present the Upper Silesian Union’s policy at the time of its formation as 
its policy has evolved since then.
Consequently, to maintain precision (relating to the differences of opinion within the movement itself) in 
the second part of the chapter, concerning regional policy, most of the opinions presented are quotations 
from voivode Czech’s interviews in the local press.
241 The fact that Upper Silesian Union members belonged to various political parties makes it difficult to 
estimate correctly the number of Upper Silesian Union members among the elected councillors, MPs and 
the voivodship’s civil servants.
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a. The revitalising of regional culture
The Upper Silesian Union was particularly aimed at revitalising the native culture of the 
region and uniting native Upper Silesians independently of their political attitudes.242 
Most of the cultural values emphasised by the Upper Silesian Union were, according to 
them, formed when Upper Silesia belonged to Prussia. This distinguished the cultural 
heritage of the area from that of other parts of Poland. According to the Upper Silesian 
Union, these values are, above all, an attachment to Christian values, a work ethos, and 
commitment to social equality.243
The debate on the revitalisation of the regional culture was put into an historical context 
by means of reference to the two recent periods when Upper Silesia had formed part of 
Poland: the socialist and the inter-war periods. The socialist period is presented first; 
this was naturally assessed very negatively by the Upper Silesian Union. Its opinion of 
the inter-war period was quite the opposite; in fact it was very positive and, as will be 
revealed, not always realistic (some much weaker references are made to the Medieval 
period -  the period of Polish Piast’s rule).
b. The condemnation of socialism
The formation of the Upper Silesian Union, as its documents show, was basically a 
reaction to the socialist period. In the Upper Silesian Union declarations, the entire 
socialist period, and all the actions of the then ruling elites, whether regional or central, 
were described negatively as totalitarian. The Upper Silesian Union condemned 
centralisation and the economic policies carried out then: they were seen as the cause of 
the region’s increasing economic backwardness. The state or its centre was compared 
to ‘a gigantic sucking pump living at the expense of its borders, these peripheries 
[regions]’.244 They also claimed that socialist rule had caused a decline in living 
standards, ecological crises, the disintegration of Silesian culture and the elimination of 
the native elite.245 However, the major explanation for the Upper Silesian Union’s 
uniformly negative assessment of the socialist period was the perceived threat to the
242 Declaration of the Upper Silesian Union ‘Biuletyn Zwiqzku Gornoslqskiego\ 1990: 2.
243 Declaration of the Upper Silesian Union, ‘Biuletyn Zwiqzku Gornoslqskiego ', 1990: 2.
244 Chojecka, ‘Biuletyn Zwiqzku Gornoslqskiego’, 1990. b.: 2.
245 Chojecka, ‘Biuletyn Zwiqzku Gornoslqskiego ’, 1990. a.: 6.
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identity of the Silesian population: the whole period was unequivocally condemned as 
endangering the preservation of the regional culture and identity of Upper Silesia. For 
example, Chojecka very emotionally described the whole socialist period as one big 
trauma due to the treatment of the Silesians:
Out of it rose the immense collective trauma of lack of appreciation and hunger for respect 
by the native population. At the least, their sense of alienation.246
This ‘trauma’ was caused especially by national distrust directed towards Silesians,247 
which prevented them from ruling in their own region (‘their own home’, as they used 
to say). Moreover, the Upper Silesian Union held that the region had been ruled by 
‘aliens’ (newcomers) who did not have even a basic knowledge of Silesian culture and 
history. This limited even further the freedom of the natives to preserve their own 
identity as, for example, the quotation below by the same author indicates:
One more thing which is especially predominant in Upper Silesia is its decades-long 
complete lack of freedom to rule in its own state [my italics]. Also because people who 
were sent to rule came as a result of abrupt decisions, they thus came without knowing 
anything about the region.248
The Upper Silesian Union declarations mentioning the rule by ‘alien’ people, who were 
sent to the region abruptly without having been prepared for their role, and the 
exclusion of Silesians from public life all point to the renewal of the inter-war conflict 
between natives and newcomers. However, the Upper Silesian Union’s documents 
emphasising the D^browa-Silesia conflict during the socialist period suggest that this 
dimension was especially important and it was re-shaped mostly as a conflict of the 
Dqbrowa elite versus the natives.249
This unambiguously negative assessment of the socialist period is not entirely bome out 
by the facts. Upper Silesia was possibly the most economically and politically 
privileged region during the socialist period.250 The fact that economic development 
was accompanied by severe ecological deterioration is indisputable. However, the
246 Chojecka, ‘Biuletyn Zwiqzku Gornoslqskiego’, 1990. b.: 2.
247 Chojecka, ‘Biuletyn Zwiqzku Gornoslqskiego’, 1990. a.: 6.
248 Chojecka, ‘Biuletyn Zwiqzku Gornoslqskiego’, 1990. b.: 3.
249 Chojecka, Biuletyn Zwiqzku Gornoslqskiego’, 1990. a.: 6
250 Hirszowicz (1980), Schdpflin (1993).
The privileged character of the region is also indicated by the fact that Upper Silesia had the highest 
wages in the whole of Poland, even higher than in Warsaw (Rocznik Staytstyczny Wojewddztw, 1988:70).
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completely negative assessment seems to be exaggerated. It is likely that these negative 
perceptions were strengthened by Upper Silesia’s history of being the most privileged 
region in Poland and by comparison with the ‘golden age’ of the inter-war years when 
the Upper Silesian Union considered Upper Silesia to have been the most developed 
region in Poland.
As we have seen in the preceding chapter, after its incorporation in 1922, Silesia was 
distinguished by its political and financial autonomy throughout the whole inter-war 
period. The fact is, the weaker role accorded to heavy industry after the transition in 
1989 threatened Upper Silesia’s privileged position. The political position of the 
Katowice voivodship elite compared with the socialist period was also significantly 
weakened (as indicated by the composition of Mazowiecki’s government, where there 
were no ministers from the region). Furthermore, during the transition, living standards 
had fallen substantially, and this was especially noticed in Upper Silesia, which had 
grown accustomed to its privileged status. Thus, criticism of the socialist period central 
government rule was prompted by a negative evaluation of the situation during the 
transitional period and its prospects for the future. This is illustrated by Otte, one of the 
Upper Silesian Union’s leaders who referred to the worsening of the living conditions:
Forty years of socialism brought Upper Silesia enormous devastation due to central 
government policies. This region became an internal colony, significantly below the 
country’s average measured by the index of living-standards.251
The Upper Silesian Union’s assessment of socialism as internal colonisation of the 
region has to be seen in the wider historical perspective going back to Prussian rule. At 
that time, Upper Silesia became a centre for the production of raw materials and simple 
industrial goods,252 with much lower living conditions than the western German 
territories.253 In addition, ethnic divisions were aligned with class divisions. It was at 
this time that Polish-speaking Silesians began see the region as ruled by ‘alien’ 
outsiders, beginning with the Germans. In the inter-war period, the rulers changed to 
Poles from other regions, and finally, after the war, the ‘aliens’ came from Dqbrowa.254 
Smolorz, a Silesian journalist, sees this myth of being ruled by ‘aliens’ as having been
251 Otte quoted in Nasza Gazeta, a special edition from annex 9 of Memorial w sprawie odwolania 
...1992: 5.
252 Blasiak, Nawrocki and Szczepanski, 1994.
253 Rose, 1935.
254 Kutz quoted in Walczak, 1996: 21.
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rooted in past centuries and uncritically presented by Silesian regional organisations to 
put the blame on ‘others’:
There is in us, Upper Silesians, a gigantic complex, which force us to believe endlessly that for
centuries we were have been persecuted and nobody has let us spread our wings. We were not
allowed to be in power -  as the legend says -  and continuously, ruled by activists sent from
anywhere. But maybe we were not so terribly unappreciated as was repeatedly claimed by the
255regional activists full of complexes.
c. The inter-war and medieval inspiration
Whether justified or not, this extremely negative evaluation of the socialist period and 
its administrative structures had a great impact on the Upper Silesian Union’s proposals 
for administrative reform. They were aimed at radical decentralisation, and sometimes 
autonomy was mentioned. The view of the socialist period as endangering the 
preservation of the region’s identity and culture also led to the Upper Silesian Union’s 
attempts at cultural renewal based on inter-war and medieval inspirations. The inter- 
war model was also proposed for the voivodship administrative reform, as a guarantee 
of its effectiveness, as opinion of voivode Czech, on the day of his nomination 
illustrates:
Till the Second World War cultural conditions in Upper Silesia were very high. What 
happened later was the decline from the level achieved earlier -  and I look stubbornly back 
to those lost values ,256
The inter-war period is presented as a golden age, overlooking such negative features 
for the natives as high unemployment and the domination of the regional elite by 
newcomers. The important difference is that this period did not lead to the above- 
mentioned endangering of regional identity and its culture, as the socialist period did. 
Moreover, the inter-war period had one particularly important feature, regional 
autonomy, which guaranteed decentralisation of the decision-making process. Thus, 
most decisions were taken in the region and some of the inter-war institutions -  for 
example local governments -  were dominated by natives. At the same time, autonomy, 
according to the Upper Silesian Union, made possible the maintenance of a high level of 
economic development and much better living standards than in the rest of the country.
255 Smolorz, Dziennik Zachodni, 3-5 June 1994.
256 Czech quoted in Gosc Niedzielny, no. 23, 1990.
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As a result, the Upper Silesian Union contrasted regional development in the inter-war 
period with that of the socialist period. It also believed that despite the scepticism 
towards autonomy outside Upper Silesia, it should be the inspiration for a democratic 
and decentralised administrative structure, as the opinion of Chojecka, in one of the 
Upper Silesian Union’s official documents, indicates:
I have noticed an interesting phenomenon. Up to now, even in independent circles, the 
advocates of autonomy are not very favourably viewed. They are, from the beginning, held 
guilty of the sin of separatism. However, is it not the case that our state is moving in the 
direction of a new form of autonomy? The concept of self-government assumes autonomy.
Here let’s not be afraid to recall the Silesian tradition of autonomy in the inter-war period -  
its self-governing character -  as our experience preceded that of other regions: Lesser 
Poland, Pomerania, Mazovia. We have a tradition of Silesian autonomy, of self- 
government. Let’s not feel ashamed of it.257
Thus, the inter-war period began to be idealised and seen as a golden age. Inter-war 
regional administrative institutional design was regarded as a model solution for the 
present-day administrative problems. In 1989, the administrative concepts were only 
beginning to be formulated and were thus quite imprecise as will be seen when Czech’s 
concept of administration is examined later in this chapter. Nevertheless, Upper 
Silesian Union references to autonomy, implying a marginal role for central 
government, can be interpreted, despite its denials, as having separatist hints (the above 
quotation is a good example). However, its statements were so vague (whether 
deliberately so is not clear) that a number of interpretations are possible. It is possible, 
for example, that autonomy (meaning self-government) was being proposed for all of 
the new regions and not just for Silesia. This possibility has to be taken into account 
when analysing the positions taken by the Upper Silesian Union.
After 1989 the public debate concentrated on the national political and economic issues. 
Regional identification throughout most of Poland was rather weak and, in most of the 
regions, regional and local issues were seen as subordinate to those of the national 
transition. Thus, the strong regional identification expressed by the Upper Silesian 
Union, its emphasis on the regional scale of problems and its demands for the 
decentralisation of power and for regional autonomy were quite unique.258 This can be 
explained only by the strong regional identification created by several centuries of 
separation from the Polish state, as a result of which regional identity was much
257 Chojecka, ‘Biuletyn Zwiqzku Gornoslqskiego', 1990. b.: 2.
258 Compare also quotations of voivode Czech in later parts of this chapter.
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stronger in Upper Silesia than in other parts of Poland. Thus, for the native Upper 
Silesian elite, Polish nationality was expressed by close identification with the region, 
while identification with Poland as a whole country was blurred. In other words, on 
many occasions the region was identified with Poland as a whole, although sometimes 
as the sole and only motherland.
It seems this overwhelming concentration on the regional perspective could be 
favourable to the development of separatist tendencies in the long run, although such 
opinions seem to have been embryonic. Thus, at the time they were rather implied in 
statements by Chojecka, one of the Upper Silesian Union leaders, and by Czech on the 
idea of Euroregion and Greater Silesia (see quotations below). For example, in the 
following extract, Chojecka, (despite her fierce defence against the accusation of 
separatism) talks of Silesians, not as part of Poland, but as a ‘nation’, and compares the 
Silesians’ search for identity to the exodus of the Jews from Egypt:
Where does the similarity to the Biblical exodus from Egypt lie? It is in our enslaved nation 
[my italics] taking its own fate in its hands and deciding for a fate full of risks: break with 
the world assuring a relatively stable minimal existence, [...]. They go, leaving a country of 
little stabilisation, and what waits for them is not a land of milk and honey but a desert, 
misery, despair and the great unknown.259
It is likely that memories of the inter-war period were even more precious as a source of 
inspiration as the only other period of union with Poland was in the Middle Ages. In 
consequence, the two periods -  inter-war and socialist -  were seen in an idealised black- 
and-white perspective. This type of perspective seems to have been enhanced by the 
Upper Silesian Union members’ experience of the anti-socialist opposition, when 
uncompromising, romantic attitudes against the socialist authorities were considered a 
virtue. These attitudes were radicalised further by the experience of imprisonment after 
the introduction of martial law.260 However, this type of attitude seems best suited to 
totalitarian times, when the existence of legal opposition was considered to be a threat 
to the state. Nevertheless, this bifurcated black-and-white perception of politics 
survived the transition to democratic rule after 1989, and the virtue of compromise 
among various political options was not recognised.
259 Chojecka, ‘Biuletyn Zwiqzku Gornoslqskiego', 1990. b.: 2.
260 ‘My conception of regional policy was formed finally in ... prison!’ (voivode Czech quoted in Kurier 
Zachodni, 10-11 January 1992).
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The second source of inspiration, in addition to the inter-war period, was the Silesian 
tradition during the Piast rule. This is illustrated by the words of Klasik one of the 
Upper Silesian Union’s leaders:
The Upper Silesian Union defines Upper Silesia’s territory by referring to its history and 
culture deeply rooted in its Slavonic and Piast past. The task is to also recognise our 
heritage from later centuries, formed not just by one nation and not only by people living 
here for centuries.261
This demarcation of Upper Silesia’s territorial extent, referring to periods when the 
region had multi-national character including Czechs, Germans and Poles, has serious 
consequences for the territorial claims of the new region to be formed, given the historic 
ties with Moravia in the Czech Republic. These ties were often underlined. The ties 
with the other ‘nation living here for centuries’ -  implicitly the Germans, were not 
stated at all. This was probably because of the sensitivity of the possible iiredentism, as 
a result of the shift of the post-war borders westward and the mass emigration of 
Silesians. But the issue of relations towards German Silesians is not so clear, and is 
even contradictory, for example, the attempts of Buszman, one of the Upper Silesian 
Union’s leader and the chairman of the voivodship assembly, to create a German 
Consulate without consulting with the Foreign Ministry seem to be suspicious.
iii. The appointment o f the new post-Solidarity voivode
The appointment of voivode Czech resulted from the efforts of the regional elite of the 
Solidarity movement to introduce its own representative after the electoral victory at 
national level. The attack on voivode Wnuk had an unequivocally political character. 
In the middle of January 1990 voivode Wnuk was attacked by the chief of the Dqbrowa- 
Silesia Solidarity Trade Union for his nomenklatura background and for having backed 
the imposition of martial law. The Trade Union did not however propose a candidate of 
its own. As a result, at the beginning of April the initiative was taken by the Club of 
the Catholic Intelligentsia (KIK), an organisation with a well-established structure of 
leadership, developed during its decade of existence. In 1989, after political liberation, 
the Upper Silesian Union was formed on the basis of the KIK. These close personal ties
261 Klasik, ‘Biuletyn Zwiqzku Gornoslqskiego', 1990: 6.
262 Gazeta Katowicka, 25 May 1990.
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between the KIK and the Upper Silesian Union reflect the traditionally strong 
attachment of Upper Silesians to Catholicism. Together, these two institutions decided 
to propose Wojciech Czech. Czech was one of the leaders of the KIK and a member of 
the Social Council of Katowice Diocese, as well as one of the founders of the Upper 
Silesian Union.263 An appeal to the Union of Citizens’ Committees was sent to Prime 
Minister Mazowiecki in support of his candidacy.
In the middle of April, Czech and four other candidates for the position of voivode 
proposed by other Solidarity-derived regional organisations were invited to the Palace 
of the Upper Silesian Bishop for a meeting where representatives of the OKP (the 
Parliamentary Solidarity Club of MPs) were gathered. The vote was for Czech.264 
However, Czech’s candidacy was not supported by the Solidarity Trade Union, which 
was fighting to preserve its influence. This led to a prolonged discussion on the part of 
the Solidarity-derived organisations over the division of votes in the ‘voivode election’. 
Eventually the Union of Citizens’ Committees was successful in proposing negotiations 
between the main political forces of the regional Solidarity movement and 
representatives of the Catholic Bishop of Katowice. This struggle within the post- 
Solidarity regional elite showed that the conflict was concentrated around personal 
influence rather than political programmes, and also highlighted the crucial role of the 
Catholic Church in the region.265 This selection had an elitist character as the new 
voivode, Czech, was chosen at a meeting of the regional (Solidarity-based) elite on 14 
May 1990, but his candidacy was unknown to the general public in the region.266 His
O f \ lcandidacy was later approved by Prime Minister Mazowiecki.
As in the preceding chapter concerning the inter-war and socialist periods, discussion of 
the regional policies pursued by the voivodes will be preceded by a sociological 
description of the main agents -  voivodes Wojciech Czech (1990-1994) and Eugeniusz 
Ciszak (1994-1997).268 This description will investigate their regional origins, 
education, administrative qualifications and career development. The second issue dealt
263 Biuletyn Zwiqzku Gornoslqskiego, 1990.
264 This procedure was not exceptional as on many occasions during the national election the national 
Solidarity leaders asked the regional church authorities to recommend candidates for election as the 
members of the Citizens’ Committees and the Church had also participated actively in the Round Table 
negociations in 1989 (Geremek, Zakowski, 1990).
265 Blasiak, Nawrocki, Szczepanski, 1994: 26-27.
266 Kurier Zachodni, 10-11 January 1992.
267 Prime Minister Mazowiecki was also a KIK activist.
268 See table 6, page 145.
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with is their regional policy. Third, their employment policies in the administration of 
the voivodship office will be examined using a sample of the administrative elite 
(directors of departments).
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Table 6: The transitional period Voivodes in the Katowice voivodship, 1990-1997
NAMES OF VOIVODES 
OF THE KATOWICE 
VOIVODSHIP, 
1990-1997
PERIOD IN OFFICE REGIONAL
ORIGINS
ACHIEVED EDUCATION PROFESSION AND WORK EXPERIENCE 
BEFORE PROMOTION
POLITICAL CAREER
1. WOJCIECH CZECH 
(1945 - )
(25Mayl990-l.Machl994) Silesian Technical University of Cracow 
1968 MSc in Architecture
History of Art 
Jagellonian University
1968-1981 Architectural and environmental 
institutes
1981-1986 Director of the Environment 
Protection Institute
1986-1990 Lecturer at the Technical 
University of Silesia
1956-1987 In youth organisations 
(scouts)
1980 Member of Solidarity
In 1981 Political prisoner
One of the founders of Katowice
Branch of the Committee of Catholic
Intelligentsia
One of the founders of Upper 
Silesian Union
2. EUGENIUSZ 
CISZAK
(1929- )
(Ure 1994-21.011997) Newcomer The Technical University of Silesia MSc coal 
mining
1956-1964 Lecturer at the Technical 
University of Silesia
1956-1983 In coalmining research institutes 
1964-1968 In India
1983-1987 Deputy minister in Coalmining 
Ministry
1988-1989 In Geneva on the Coal Commission 
of the United Nations
1994 Chairman of Board of Coal Industrial - 
Trade Chamber in Katowice
Until 1989 in PZPR
iv. Sociological description o f voivode Wojciech Czech, 1990-1994
The appointment of the first voivode -  Wojciech Czech -  after the fall of the communist 
regime resembled that of voivode Rymer in June 1922. Both careers could be classified 
as ‘combat’ types. This type of career was an exception in the inter-war period when 
emphasis was put on professional qualifications and only the first voivode was chosen 
because of his combatant merits. In 1922 the appointment of voivode Rymer, a Silesian, 
followed from his role in the Third Silesian Rising and in the formation of an 
indigenous Polish Upper Silesian administration. Czech’s career could also be defined 
as that of a ‘combatant’ due to his activity in the Solidarity opposition. In addition he 
was interned in 1981, after the imposition of martial law. It seems that participation in 
the Solidarity movement and ‘internment’ were ‘heroic events’ which played the same 
role in the selection process in 1989 as participation in the Silesian Risings had done in 
the twenties.
The appointment of a Silesian as voivode in 1989 was important too because it 
emphasised the government’s respect for the regional opposition, especially after the 
period of socialism, when out of 11 voivodes only three were Silesians.269 In 1922, the 
appointment of a native was in recognition of Upper Silesia’s efforts to be incorporated 
into Poland; similarly, in 1990, the appointment of a native was interpreted as 
recognition by the central government of Sileisan’s own efforts to oppose the 
communist regime, especially during the imposition of martial law. The appointments 
of Rymer and Czech are also similar in that both had only limited knowledge of 
administration: Czech had not worked in administration at all, and Rymer had been the 
chairman of the Principal People’s Council and had had only a year’s experience of 
work in administration. The lack of administrative experience of Polish Silesians at the 
time immediately preceding incorporation into Poland was due to the fact that they had 
been excluded from work in administration270
In 1989 the situation was similar to that at the beginning of the inter-war period. The 
regional post-Solidarity elite’s aim to break with the nomenklatura cadres and appoint 
its own voivode meant that no potential candidates would have administrative
269 Cieszewska, Rzeczpospolita, 22 December 1994.
270 This resulted from their lack of professional qualifications since there were only a few who had 
finished secondary or high school.
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experience, as all managerial positions in administration during the socialist period were 
taken by the nomenklatura. In addition to the fact that neither Czech nor Rymer had 
administrative experience, neither had the professional qualifications which could be 
expected to be best suited for a voivode -  Rymer had not finished his secondary 
education and Czech was an architect. Judging by the criterion of qualification, the 
previous socialist voivode Wnuk, who was an economist, seemed better suited for the 
position.
However, there was one striking difference between Rymer and Czech despite the fact 
that both were native Silesians. Unlike Rymer, Czech had a high level of education: an 
MSc in Architecture, advanced courses in the History of Art and the experience of a few 
years of lecturing at university. This was extremely important as voivode Czech and his 
colleagues from the Upper Silesian Union were representatives of the educated Upper 
Silesian elite -  the first native Upper Silesian elite since 1922 (earlier, the natives in the 
regional elite had been isolated individuals among the newcomer majority). Finally, it 
should be emphasised that voivode Czech was a typical representative of the new 
regional administrative elite at the beginning of the nineties. Like most of them he had 
participated in the Solidarity opposition, he was of Upper Silesian origin, he had shared 
the sense of mission. And like most of his colleagues, his policy was developed under 
the inspiration of the Upper Silesian Union, at least in the early stages.
3.3 The Regional Policy of Voivode Czech
Analysis of voivode Czech’s regional policy concentrates on two primary issues:
i. the territorial dimension of his vision of the future of Upper Silesia,
ii. the structural dimension related to his demands for decentralisation of power and 
strengthening of voivodship (regional) administration.
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i. ‘From historic region to the concept o f Great Upper Silesia * -  the territorial 
dimension
The first territorial issue will be analysed in the context of the revival of regional 
tendencies in Poland as a whole. The Round Table Agreement of 1989 had initiated 
political openness and led to a revival of regional cultures. This, in turn, raised 
questions regarding the re-establishment of the historical regions that had existed before 
1975. The arguments were also economic, in that these big administrative units were 
expected to be more efficient and, at the same time, better suited to the needs of 
economic restructuring.271 Similarly, voivode Czech believed that:
The economy cannot be restructured only within the borders of voivodships, especially of 
49 voivodships.272
According to Jalowiecki, in all regions except Upper Silesia the economic problems 
arising from the period of transition were at the centre of the debate on the restoration of 
the historic regions that had existed up to the 1975 reform. However, in Upper Silesia 
the economic agenda was subordinate to issues of regional and national identification.273 
Under voivode Czech these regional sentiments found expression in three main issues:
a. the demand for the traditional area of Upper Silesia to be re-united under a single 
regional administration
b. the question of whether the Dqbrowa basin should stay as part of the new 
voivodship
c. the traditional ties of Upper Silesia with territories now located outside Polish 
territories (which later evolved into the concept of Great Upper Silesia).
a. The traditional region of Upper Silesia
In relation to the first issue -  the demand for the union of the traditional territories of 
Upper Silesia -  voivode Czech called for union with Bielsko and Czestochowa 
voivodships which before the territorial reform in 1975 had formed part of the Katowice 
voivodship. This resembled the situation in the majority of other Polish regions, where
271 Surazka, 1993: 99-100.
272 Czech quoted in Gazeta Katowicka, 10 January 1992.
273 Blasiak, Nawrocki and Szczepahski 1994: 28.
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the divisions created by territorial reform were beginning to be questioned. However, 
voivode Czech also wanted integration with Opole, a traditional, historical part of Upper 
Silesia that had been separated in 1950.274
Since the beginning I have emphasised that my policy cannot be limited to the Katowice 
voivodship. So the closest areas of interest are also the voivodships of Bielsko, 
Czestochowa and Opole, of course without infringing on the actions of the voivodes of 
those voivodships.27
These territorial changes proposed by the Katowice voivodship office were not 
supported by the voivodes of the neighbouring voivodships with their greatly-diversified 
industrial production. It was assumed that the Katowice voivodship elite wanted to 
burden the neighbouring voivodships with the costs of restructuring its heavy industry. 
These expansionist tendencies were especially evident in the drawing up of the 
proposed new region’s borders along lines most favourable to Upper Silesia.276
b. The Dabrowa basin question
The second issue -  that of union with Dqbrowa -  was presented less precisely. On the 
day of his appointment Czech stated:
The problem has arisen of what to do with Dabrowa.[...] In my opinion, this land leans 
towards Silesia, especially in the economic area, in transportation, or more gradually in 
relation to cultural and economic ties. However, the inhabitants of Dabrowa have to make 
the final decision.277
On another occasion he stated:
Its base [the new region] should be formed by the present Opole, Bielsko-Biala, 
Czestochowa and Katowice voivodships. However, the eastern border of Lesser Poland [the 
Dabrowa basin] should be decided according to the demands of the inhabitants of these 
regions.
These statements by Czech suggest some double standards in the formation of the 
region. Most of the territory incorporated into the region of Upper Silesia was to be
274 Opole had been the historical capital of Upper Silesia until 1922.
275 Czech quoted in Goniec Gornoslqski, 13 May 1994.
276 Blasiak, Nawrocki, Szczepanski, 1994.
277 Czech quoted in Gosc Niedzielny, no. 23, 1990.
278 Czech quoted in Kurier Zachodni, 10-11 January 1992.
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decided on the basis of historical ties (and also by the borders of Catholic Church 
dioceses). Only Dabrowa could be integrated at the request of its inhabitants as it had 
not fulfilled the condition of historical ties. Moreover, Czech spoke of integrating 
Dqbrowa with Upper Silesia, and not of uniting the two territories. This suggests that 
he did not view the two as equal and that he expected the people of Dqbrowa to look up 
to Silesia as a model to which they should adapt. This illustrates the widespread feeling 
of economic and cultural superiority towards Dqbrowa.
Upper Silesia and Dqbrowa were united in 1945. That is why this issue was directly 
related to the elite’s view of the socialist period and the regional Dqbrowian personnel 
who ruled during that time: it was only then that those (in their opinion) very distinctive 
territories were re-united. Their distinctiveness went back to the time of the partitions, 
when Upper Silesia had belonged to Prussia and Dqbrowa to Russian Poland. The 
economic, political and especially the cultural division of these two regions between the 
Prussian partition and Russian Poland were emphasised. Voivode Czech and the native 
elite associated these divisions with the superiority of German civilisation, the long 
tradition of the rule of law and, most of all, with Europe. By contrast, Russia was 
considered a part of Asian (that is, wild, barbarian and totalitarian) civilisation. The 
socialist period was seen as a continuation of this due to the domination of Soviet-style 
authorities and centralisation. Thus, according to the elite, the division between Upper 
Silesia and Dqbrowa was not only a division between neighbouring Polish regions but a 
cultural division between Europe and Asia.
77QBlasiak sees this sense of Silesian superiority as a reaction to the degradation and 
disdain they had ‘suffered’ until then. The regional elite’s opinion on the ‘integration’ 
of Dqbrowa into the Silesian voivodship during the socialist period was rather negative, 
in spite of the fact that economic motives had given rise to plans for a similar 
integration during the inter-war period. These had been shelved when the war broke 
out. In the context of Czech’s doubts about the preservation of Dqbrowa as part of the 
voivodship Cieszewska accused him of pursuing a discriminatory policy. This policy 
was aimed not only at the inhabitants of Dqbrowa but also towards newcomers,
279 Blasiak, Dziennik Zachodni, 14-16 January 1994.
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including those who arrived in Upper Silesia in 1945 from the ‘lost territories’ in the
c. The concept of Great Upper Silesia
Reconstruction of voivode Czech’s vision of Upper Silesia is to be put in the wider 
context of the region’s future as viewed by two regional organisations: the Upper Silesia 
Union and the Movement for Silesian Autonomy. These organisations suggested 
regional autonomy, a proposal that was often interpreted as a hidden demand for 
separation. Was Czech’s proposal for a Great Upper Silesia hiding autonomy proposals 
(and separatism)?
After 1992 it became evident that the regionalist tendencies in the Katowice voivodship 
were not limited to a demand for the unification of its traditional regions, as in the rest 
of Poland. In 1992 after the appointment of a new chairman, Joachim Otte, the Upper 
Silesian Union became the largest regional organisation, with 6,000 members. Its 
strength gave it the confidence not only to suggest regional autonomy, but to officially 
declare it as their aim.281 The radicalisation of the Upper Silesian Union in 1992 is to be 
seen in the wider context of separatist tendencies within Upper Silesia itself, as well as 
outside Silesia, in Germany. In 1989, Otto von Habsburg, a member of the European 
Parliament, called for the renewal of the inter-war plebiscite. In 1993, Hupka, a leader 
of the Silesian Compatriots proposed a change in the Polish-German border as the 
existing line presented a state of political injustice.282 In 1990, the rather tiny 
Movement for Silesian Autonomy (MAS) was also formed. Nevertheless, the 
organisation was important because of its radicalism. It proposed from the beginning, as 
the first stage, autonomy similar to that of the inter-war period and eventually ‘full 
autonomy’. According to Blasiak, Nawrocki and Szczepanski (1994), this meant the 
creation of an independent state. Autonomy was seen as a solution to the social and 
economic problems of the voivodship.
280 Cieszewska, Rzeczpospolita, 22 December 1993.
281 The other regional political forces were weak compared to the Upper Silesian Union, for example, the 
largest -  the SLD -  had 2,500 members and the UW 900 members (.Rzeczpospolita, 24-25 April 1993).
282 Blasiak, Nawrocki, Szczepanski, 1994: 104-105.
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The Movement for Silesian Autonomy shared with the Upper Silesian Union the strong 
criticism of central government; the concept of internal colonisation was used to explain 
the economic situation which existed in the voivodship. For example, Musiol who was 
the leader of the Movement for Silesian Autonomy and an MP, declared that Upper 
Silesia together with Opole and Cieszyn Lands produced 35 per cent of the national 
budget but received only two or three per cent of the central budget. The central 
government was also accused of not being active enough in protecting against further 
deterioration of environmental conditions. Similarly, Otte, the chairman of the Upper 
Silesian Union, stated:
The decline of the state and economic crisis has shown that Warsaw does not provide any 
marvellous solutions which enable us, here in Silesia, to exist. The decline of the state 
means that we present our demands in an extremely radical and forceful form. We are 
convinced that a form of autonomous region is the best.283
The belief that the central elite did not have an interest in the restructuring of Upper 
Silesia led the regional elite to redefine itself dramatically in relation to the centre. Otte 
declared an end to the regional elite’s dependence on the national elite:
Larger and larger circles of the regional elite of Upper Silesia began to understand that the 
opportunities and the will of the present centralist state are in practice limited. No help can 
be expected from there.284
At the same time, the Upper Silesian Union began to perceive itself as the main (and the 
only) organisation to articulate the ‘true’ regional interest, ‘the first authentic and 
democratic organisation in this territory’.285 The Upper Silesian Union’s confidence 
that it was the true representative of the region rose particularly from the public support 
it enjoyed and which was confirmed by its high membership. Their confidence was 
further strengthened by a comparison of its membership with those of the other regional 
organisations, among them political parties, which all had far more limited 
memberships. This situation was also the result of a condition that Surazka (1993) 
described as a ‘political vacuum’ at the regional level. This resulted from the 
concentration of interest groups at the national level. It was strengthened by the 
administrative structure as elective institutions only existed at the central and local
283 Otte quoted in Cieszewska, Rzeczpospolita, 4 May 1992.
284 Otte quoted in Rzeczpospolita, 24-25 April 1993.
285 Otte quoted in Slqsk, no. 2, 1996.
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levels. Nevertheless, the main source of legitimacy for the Upper Silesian Union was its 
Silesian origins, which gave its members the ‘right’ to represent regional interests:
We want to represent the values and aspiration of Upper Silesia at the national level. 
Analysing in the context of the present industrial and political situation of our country one 
can clearly observe that the main reason for the frustration of Upper Silesian society is the 
bad and contradictory organisation of state institutions defined by constitutional 
arrangements. This is the contradiction between perception of opportunity for regional 
development on the basis of authentic regional self-government and the adopted model of a 
centralised state.286
A reconstruction of Czech’s vision of Great Upper Silesia (and his attitude towards 
autonomy) must start with his territorial definition of Upper Silesia. The territorial 
definition of the region will help to answer the question as to how much power and 
autonomy regional authorities should have. In the debate about the role of the regional 
authorities, the fundamental question was related to the extent of the territory over 
which these regional authorities would exercise their new powers. The concept of Great 
Upper Silesia will also be useful to see how this vision was related to the autonomy 
proposals presented above by these two regional organisations.
In the debate about the territorial definition of the region the voivodship office took the 
initiative and published its own ideas about the future borderlines of the Great Upper 
Silesia region. This was to be a preparatory analysis for the purpose of further territorial 
administrative reform at the regional level introduced by the government. However, in 
drawing the ‘historical’ lines of the region the territories located now in the Czech 
Republic were seen as an inseparable part of the region. The Upper Silesia Union 
declared that these projects abided by constitutional law and preserved the unitary 
character of the state (in contrast to federalism).
However, according to Szczepanski (1995) these new regional borders were based on 
the most favourable historical lines and did not take into account the historical changes 
in politics and economy, so that historical divisions going back several centuries were 
more important than later changes. As a result, this project was highly controversial. 
For example, the most radical assessment of voivode Czech’s policies was presented by 
the Katowice branch of the far right-wing KPN party, which interpreted this policy as 
aimed at recovering autonomy. In its view, the logical conclusion of Czech’s approach
286 Otte quoted in Nasza Gazeta, a special edition from annex 9 of Memorial w sprawie odwoiania 
...1992:5.
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would be the formation of a Euroregion with the Czech Republic, which would 
undermine the most basic state interests as it could lead to Upper Silesian secession.287 
According to the KPN, the establishment of the Union of the Upper Silesian and 
Northern Moravian Communes (Moravia is situated in Czech territory) in September 
1992 was already pointing to the formation of the Euroregion. Moreover, Cieszewska 
interprets Czech’s actions as being aimed at the achievement of regional autonomy, as 
at that time this was considered by him to be a necessary condition for restructuring.288 
His calls for a ‘Europe of Regions’, as the quotation below suggests, were interpreted as 
being closely tied to calls for autonomy (with their potential for separatism), and 
therefore as weakening the unity of the state:
I believe that the civil service, at the end of the twentieth century in Central Europe, cannot
be limited only to state borders. So the next circle must be European societies.
Although Czech officially tried to distance himself from the policy of the Upper 
Silesian Union after taking his position,290 a similar emphasis can be detected in the 
voivode's interviews. Autonomy was the central idea around which his concepts of 
regional administration developed. However, the proposal for autonomy (if that is what 
it was) was never expressed explicitly, probably to avoid raising fears of separatism 
among non-Silesians. It could be only inferred when Czech talked about Great Silesia 
and the opening of Europe. Questions arise as to the reasons for these quite ambiguous 
declarations: was there a hidden agenda for autonomy, or even independence, or was 
their ambiguity a reflection of the early stage of thought on regional policy? After all, 
this was a time when the political and economic landscapes were undergoing 
fundamental changes, and when the concepts needed to handle the new conditions were 
not yet fully developed.
Czech’s declarations confirm his belief in the effectiveness of inter-war administrative 
autonomy, but that does not necessarily mean that he was seeking regional autonomy. 
His statements referring to the inter-war period or to the idea of a Great UpperSilesia, 
and the opening of Europe, indicate dissatisfaction with the situation at that time and 
reflect his attempts to find the solution to this situation. However, the proposals were 
preliminary, and thus they are often confusing, and even contradictory. In consequence,
287 Memorial w sprawie odwolania ...1992: 1.
288 Cieszewska, Rzeczpospolita, 4 May 1992.
289 Czech quoted in Goniec Gdrnoslqski, 13 May 1994.
290 Gazeta Katowicka, 10 January 1992.
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they cannot be seen as political statements of a well-developed regional agenda. 
Nevertheless, certain statements that seem to have been purposefully provocative 
suggest that Czech might have preferred to press for autonomy had the political 
conditions been favourable.
ii. The vision o f administrative structure
Voivode Czech’s aims to strengthen regional administration by redrawing regional 
borders (the concept of Great Silesia) have already been discussed in the previous 
section. This section will concentrate on the second area of voivode Czech’s vision of 
reform -  the administrative structure. This was most of all related to changes in the 
relationship between central and regional administration by means of the transfer of 
competencies to the regional level and strengthening the voivode's role.291 Next, his 
proposals for regional administration in reaction to the current situation will be 
investigated.
a. The structure of administration -  redefinition of the relationship between central and 
regional administration
The reconstruction of Czech’s vision will start with his diagnosis of the administrative 
structure’s problems at that time.292 Voivode Czech criticised the existing
administrative structure as extremely ineffective, with the exception of local
291 Czech also tried to improve the functioning of the regional administration by introducing changes in 
the voivodship office itself. First, he streamlined the administration of the voivodship office by merging 
several small and ‘narrow’ departments into a few big ones. At the same time this meant ending the 
legacy of socialism thereby doing away with the sectoral administrative divisions in the voivodship 
office. Second, he replaced nomenklatura cadres in most senior positions in the voivodship office (as 
directors of departments). However, the main preconditions for improving the regional administration’s 
performance were outside the voivodship office itself and were related to the whole administrative 
structure. Thus, arguments related to the administrative structure and the voivode's role as of primary 
importance will be presented first. In the next section, the changes introduced in the voivodship office 
itself will be described.
292 Czech’s opinion of the existing administrative structure seems to be more explicit than his vision of 
Upper Silesia (regional autonomy or the concept of Great Upper Silesia). However, the solutions to the 
existing situation, decentralisation of power and further administrative reform have to be related to these 
two issues (regional autonomy or the concept of Great Upper Silesia). However, as these issues were 
never presented explicitly, Czech’s intentions in relation to further administrative reform are difficult to 
interpret precisely.
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government. In contrast to local government, the regional-level administration was still 
characterised by extreme centralisation and vertical fragmentation. He emphasised that 
most decisions were still taken at the centre and that the role of the voivode was 
marginal. At the same time, there were no elective institutions representing regional 
interests. In consequence, the regional interests were still defined at the centre. This 
negative evaluation of the existing administrative structure is illustrated by his opinion 
as expressed below:
The present Republic is characterised by centralism, with some minimal successes of decentralisation, 
these are powers given to the communes. Decisions are still mainly taken at government level. The 
voivode is a representative of the government and even his decisions, are in reality, government -  
‘capital’ [in the sense of being concentrated in Warsaw as administrative power] decisions, and that is 
why one of the most important features, in my opinion, of rebuilding national polity is recreating a 
regional entity. This means creating opportunities for the regions to take over a large proportion of the 
decisions from the centre...293
Voivode Czech also held that the administrative structure was ineffective not only 
because of centralisation, but also due to the preservation of the sectoral orientation 
inherited from the socialist period. At the regional level this was expressed by the 
existence of more than one hundred territorial units. These were responsible to the 
centre, rather than to a voivode with powers of direct supervision over all 
administrations existing at the regional level, as Czech would have wished. Czech’s 
dissatisfaction with this system is clear in the following quotation:
The second feature of the centralist system is the large number of special administrations, 
which are dependent on ministries without the mediation of a voivode[...]. There are more 
than a hundred such institutions. That also must be changed.294
b. The voivode
The voivode was at the heart of Czech’s vision of a reformed regional administration: 
the strengthening of the regional administration’s role was to start with the 
reformulation of the voivode's role. Unlike the voivodes of the socialist period, the 
holder of the reformed office would not be a passive agent executing minutely-defined 
actions directed by numerous sectors of central administration. Thus, although this was 
not explicitly declared in his interviews, it can be deduced that his ideas were modelled
293 Czech quoted in Wiadomosci Zaglqbia, 7-13 April 1992.
294 Czech quoted in Wiadomosci Zaglqbia, 7-13 April 1992.
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on the office of the inter-war voivode, with his strong power and responsibilities 
extending to the regional co-ordination of other central administration territorial 
units.295 The opportunity for the voivode to unite and supervise territorial administrative 
units at the regional level was especially relevant in view of the large number of units, 
each conducting its narrow sectoral policy.
His criticism of the ineffective regional administrative structure with the marginal role 
of the voivode was also related to three other areas:
1. the lack of a central government information policy (with complete lack of 
communication and consultation between the central authorities and the voivodes),
2. the absence of regional financial funds
3. the non-existence of legal responsibilities.
The lack of communication between the centre and the regions meant that the voivode 
was not consulted even on the most crucial issues related to the regional economy. A 
voivode was expected to be a ‘passive agent’ introducing central government policies, 
as the following extract from Czech’s interview indicates:
Most of all it should be said that the centre does not expect thought from a voivode, nobody in 
Warsaw consults him about key decisions concerning die voivodship. For example, about the 
restructuring of the coalmining and iron industries, he collects information from the mass media.296
The voivode had no any say either on the amount remitted to the centre or on the use to 
which locally-collected funds would be put. The voivode also had no financial 
resources of his own, as all revenues for the region were sent from the centre by each 
ministry separately, in the form of earmarked funds. For example, funds saved by one 
department could not be transferred to another. Similarly, the voivode did not have any 
legal responsibilities as voivode Czech reminds us in the ‘angry’ quotation below:
What means to manage a voivodship are, at the moment, in the hands of a voivode? Legal 
means? -  only in residual form. Financial means? -  none.297
295 Wiadomosci Zaglqbia, 7-13 April 1992.
296 Czech quoted in Goniec Gornoslqski, 13 May 1994.
297 Czech quoted in Goniec Gornoslqski, 13 May 1994.
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However, of these three limitations (legal, financial and, as cited in the quotation before 
last, the lack of central government information policy) the financial one was the most 
strongly emphasised by Czech. This issue will therefore be presented more 
comprehensively. The existing financial regulations aroused a sense of deep injustice. 
A voivode could not be mobilised to govern a region economically. The rules were an 
obstacle to any form of rational management, as a voivode could not transfer financial 
or human resources from one sector into another, or even set priorities. As a result, the 
financial regulations were at the heart of the call for decentralisation. This extreme 
dissatisfaction with the system of financial regulation at the time is clear in the 
quotation below:
I remind you that in 1991 voivodes had their voivodship budgets taken away. [...] Strictly speaking, 
the role of voivode is symbolic.298
and in a second of voivode Czech’s opinions:
I remind you that at present the voivodship does not have its own budget and a voivode is only an 
agent for that part of the budget which is allocated to him. The situation is such that revenues earned 
in the regions go to the centre, which divides them indiscriminately, or at least without any criteria 
known to me. The voivode receives funding already divided by the ministries and he has no influence 
on its size. At the moment, a voivode does not even now know what the amount of taxes gathered in 
the region is and what part of the state budget it forms. In other words, what is the share of the 
voivodship in the national GDP?299
The above statements by voivode Czech300 describing the absence of financial resources 
sound even stronger when compared with the more explicit statement by Otte on the 
lack of relation between a region’s financial performance and volume of funds sent back 
to the region for further investment:
One could work more but get nothing out of it, as in the end Warsaw would take 
everything.301
The financial helplessness of the voivode was highlighted by comparisons with the 
opportunities available to the communes. In Czech’s opinion, the re-establishment of
298 Czech quoted in Goniec Gornoslqski, 13 May 1994.
299 Czech quoted in Goniec Gornoslqski, 13 May 1994.
300 The debate about what share of national GDP is generated by individual regions arose in the context of 
fair financial treatment of regions by central government. Regions protested that all money went to the 
central budget. In the regions very little was left. For example, they often believed that they did not 
receive from the central budget even the money needed for necessary modernisation of profitable 
productions, despite their high contribution of revenue to the central budget.
01 Otte quoted in Cieszewska, Rzeczpospolita, 4 May 1992.
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independence from the central government and the introduction of legislation 
guaranteeing their own financial resources had allowed the communes to blossom:302
There should be a simple correlation between the effort of a region and its economic condition. At 
the moment, in 1991, the communes have gained this opportunity.!...] From the beginning it has 
mobilised them to govern better.303
Voivode Czech advocated the need for uniform financial regulation in the form of the 
permanent allocation of taxes to each level of administration: commune, district and 
region. For example, in one of his press interviews he stated:
If a large share of taxes was left at the local and regional levels, there would be the larger effort of 
working out how to increase these taxes, and as a result, there would be increased production as a 
whole. It is a simple correlation. There should, for example be a 30 per cent share of national taxes 
left for the local level, another 30 per cent for the regional level, and the remaining 40 per cent for the 
centre. Then it would be a proper division of taxes.
c. The regional administration’s reaction to the current situation
After his dismissal, Czech’s criticism of the administrative system became even more 
explicit. He declared that the role of voivode was no more than that of a figurehead, and 
that the administrative structure was completely ineffective:
I could not realise my vision of regional policy, as the [administrative] structure of the Polish
Republic is sick, and the responsibilities of a voivode do not really exist.305
His criticism of the ineffective administrative structure at central and regional levels 
was especially due to two issues mentioned earlier: the centralisation of power and
vertical fragmentation, and the figurehead role of the voivode, in particular his limited
financial resources which had very serious consequences. Czech assumed Warsaw was 
not competent to rule the region. In consequence, he believed that during the time of 
the transition the voivode needed to break with its traditional role as agents of the 
central government and to take the initiative and ‘usurp’ power in order to start regional
302 However, Czech’s optimistic opinion that there was a correlation between local development in the 
communes and further local investment in them was not shared by the mayors of Silesian towns. They 
were much more critical and they found faults with the current financial regulation. However, their 
situation seemed relatively better than that of the voivodship authorities.
303 Czech quoted in Gosc Niedzielny, no. 18, 1992.
304 Czech quoted in Gazeta Katowicka, 10 January 1992.
305 Czech quoted in Trybuna Slqska, 11 March 1994.
306 Compare also Otte’s quotations, in the section on the Concept of Great Upper Silesia.
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restructuring. The following two declarations define his vision of the voivode's role at 
that time:
(1) I am an Upper Silesian and nobody can tear this out of me.307
and,
(2) Then in spring 1990,1 presented the terms without which I would not offer my ‘service’. In the 
new conditions [after the end of socialism] I wanted the position of voivode not to be treated in the 
capital only as the representative of central government in the voivodship, but also as the 
representative of regional interests to the government.308
It was possible that conflicts would arise between the voivode's role as a representative 
of the central government in Upper Silesia, and that of regional representative at the 
centre.309 On the day of his appointment, he declared the primacy of being an advocate 
of regional interests:
And if there was a conflict -  I do not conceal the fact that I consider the interest of the region more 
important. I believe that the development of the state depends on the condition of her regions. The 
more quickly conditions in Upper Silesia improve, the more conditions in the whole state will 
improve.310
As the quotation above indicates, voivode Czech’s taking the initiative in his own hands 
was justified by his role as the representative of the interests of regional society, which 
at that time were not represented by anybody else. Moreover, as the quotation below 
suggests, Warsaw did not even recognise the need for the formation of regional policy 
as the national policy was supposed to encompass all various interests:
In Warsaw, they fear regionalisation. They say that the state will ‘disintegrate’. That is nonsense. It 
is very sad that the centre does not trust the Poles, at regional or at local level, so we do not trust 
ourselves.311
This lack of opportunity to present regional interests to the central government, ‘not 
being heard in Warsaw’, (as my respondents used to say) was seen as extreme. The 
popular belief that regional interests were not taken into account by the centre, and that
307 Czech quoted in Jajszczok, Trybuna Slqska, 27 April 1994.
308 Czech quoted in Kurier Zachodni, 10-11 January 1992.
309 His shift in favour of the interest of the region was not isolated; for example, Surazka (1993: 96) 
suggested that many voivodes supported their own voivodships at the time when state property was 
transferred to the communes (when the local government was established in 1990).
310 Czech quoted in Gosc Niedzielny, no 23, 1990.
311 Czech quoted in Goniec Gornoslqski, 13 May 1994.
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neither the opportunity nor the means existed for regional views to be put forward, was 
rooted in the experience of extreme centralisation during the socialist period. It is likely 
that Silesian dissatisfaction was also strengthened by memories of the Silesian Rising, 
when the Silesians found themselves in the position of deciding their own future as 
Poland was ‘busy’ fighting on its eastern borders.
However, in reality, Czech’s attempts to extend his powers were closer to Gierek’s 
‘semi-legal actions’ at the time of ‘Katanga’ than any actions of the inter-war voivodes, 
with the possible exception of some actions taken by the authoritarian Grazynski. These 
autonomous (semi-legal) actions took the regional authorities beyond the narrowly- 
defined roles set down for them by the central authorities. This was their form of 
adaptation to a centralised and inefficient administrative structure: by strengthening 
regional administration, more effective development of the region could take place. 
These efforts to strengthen regional authorities were not only aimed at increasing their 
responsibilities (something that was anyway formally impossible), it seems that most of 
all they concentrated on promoting the regional elites’ views on regional development 
in opposition to those emanating from the central administration.312 At the beginning of 
the nineties, the regional reformist elite was in opposition to the more conservative elite 
delaying regional restructuring.
The sense of conflict between the central and regional elites was reflected in the local 
government elite's language. Thus, Czech’s struggle to increase his responsibilities and 
to promote his vision of regional development was an aspect of the competition between 
the old and new vision of administration: the ministries’ (Warsaw’s) efforts to preserve 
the old, socialist sector-orientated structure against the regional reformers attempts to 
start afresh. The following quotations illustrate his attitude towards central conservative 
administration:
In the fight for the new, one can see the forces wanting to preserve the subordination of society and at
the same time the centralist state structure.313
and:
312 For example, Gierek (first secretary of the voivodship committee, 1957-1970) promoted the 
preservation of single type heavy industry regional development in opposition to the central elite 
(Gomulka).
313 Czech quoted in Kurier Zachodni, 10-11 January 1992.
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This tradition is enormously needed to build the Third Republic, which has to be a Republic of local 
communities. [...] It cannot be a Republic based on the Asian philosophy of a strongly-centralised 
state.314
These statements also show that the aim of systemic reform was to replace an 
ineffective and strongly centralised state with a new administrative structure that would 
enable development of local and regional communities. This meant that, as with the 
communes, the regions needed their own elective, self-governing institutions.
3.4 The radical restructuring of the voivodship office
In 1990 the restructuring of the voivodship office in Katowice took place. This was a 
twofold process: first, a substantial reduction in the number of departments took place, 
and second, the majority of the voivodship office elite was replaced by the post- 
Solidarity one. These two processes were complementary. First, the radical restructuring 
of the voivodship office could only possibly be carried out by the new elite with a 
different vision of administration, not limited by the legacy of the socialist style of 
governing. This took place even though they were without administrative experience 
when they introduced these mergers!315 At the same time, the merging of departments 
eased the change of managerial personnel and the arrival of the post-Solidarity elite. 
These two processes, as well as national revolutionary political and economic reforms, 
had a significant impact on the change of the voivodship office’s performance and 
vividly distinguished the transitional from the socialist period.
i. The merging o f departments
Throughout the socialist period the voivodship office structure was highly bureaucratic 
and dysfunctional.316 When socialism fell in 1989, the structure of the voivodship office 
in Katowice was so fragmented that there were seven deputy voivodes trying to co­
ordinate its activities. The voivodship office structure of twenty-nine departments meant
314 Czech quoted in Gazeta Katowicka, 10 January 1992.
315 The radical national political and economic reforms were also introduced by outsiders without 
practical experience.
In the inter-war period the number of departments had been significantly smaller. In 1938 there were 
fourteen departments in the voivodship office. Similarly, the number of central ministers throughout the 
inter-war period was around twelve.
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that the deputy voivodes acted more as directors of various economic sectors, each 
usually supervising about three to four departments.317 In reality, the deputy voivodes 
formed the next level of the voivodship office structure. Consequently, the role of 
directors of departments was even more limited (of course at that time a voivode himself 
had rather restricted competencies as he was strictly supervised by the voivodship 
committee secretary).
Rice (1992: 117) indicated that fragmentation of departments and ministries was a 
typical feature of post-socialist Eastern Europe. It was one of the main difficulties in 
formulating systemic reforms as administrations had difficulty breaking with the 
socialist vertical fragmentation and initiating co-ordination among ministries to 
formulate comprehensive visions of reform.
The freedom to re-design the voivodship structure in 1990 according to the specific 
requirements of voivodships was used by voivode Czech to restructure the voivodship 
office radically. This restructuring is one of the most positive features of the Solidarity 
take-over in the Katowice voivodship and can be seen in the context of administrative 
restructuring, radically breaking from the legacy of the socialist period. The merging of 
departments meant the rationalisation of the voivodship office structure; it ended the 
duplication of functions caused by the extreme administrative fragmentation. The 
number of departments was radically cut to sixteen, which eliminated half of the 
previously-existing departments (and also led to a substantial cut in costs). The merging 
of departments also led to the recognition of common interests by departments which 
had previously fought over limited resources, and improved communication and co­
ordination among them. For example, one strong Department of Economy was formed 
out of four departments: the Department of Industry and Trade, the Department of 
Agriculture, the Department of Crafts and Services, and the Voivodship Planning 
Commission. However, after 1991, the tendency was reversed as voivode Czech formed 
a Department of Privatisation and, in 1992, a Department of Disaster and Security 
Protection.
Another difficulty in the creation of an effective national and regional administration 
which the socialist period had left was a passive and politically subordinated civil
317 This departmental fragmentation of course mirrored the fragmentation of central government.
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service.318 Thus, unquestionably, the voivodship office restructuring was also 
conducive to a break with socialist passivity, at least to the extent that the common 
regional interest began to gain attention. For example, the Department of Economy 
initiated ambitious plans for regional restructuring because no such plans were prepared 
by the central administration nor could any be expected in the near future. In 1992, this 
department prepared the Programme of Regional Economic Policy of Upper Silesia 
even though the responsibilities and opportunities of the voivodship office 
administration were at that time limited. It was due to the extreme centralisation of 
power, which was so dysfunctional that often a voivode was not consulted by ministries 
on crucial regional issues. Despite this, the programme tried to adapt to the existing 
situation and increase the influence of the voivode in the regional economy.319
To sum up, the year 1990 was critical in the voivodship office because several radical 
and external changes occurred at the same time; the shift from a command economy to a 
free market, and changes in the national political conditions of Poland as a whole.
Equally important were such internal changes as the merging of departments and the
arrival of a new elite with its radically different vision of administration, as one of 
departmental director interviewees mentioned:
The substantial changes in the functioning of departments [...] after 1989 were related to radical
changes of conditions in which the department was to function, but above all, of change of external
conditions in which the voivodship office as a whole was to function. [...] The voivodship office as a 
whole was going through the restructuring after voivode Czech was appointed, and it was fragmented 
until departments were merged into a few big departments.
In the opinion of this departmental director the two other conditions in which the 
voivodship office had to perform were also influential; the delegation of certain tasks to 
communes, and the decrease in the number of voivodship office inner elite. The voivode 
was to be assisted only by one deputy voivode and the director general.
However, it must be remembered that the voivodship office restructuring initiated by 
Czech quickly reached its limits due to the external condition that administrative reform 
remained unfinished. Socialist centralisation continued, with ministers playing the 
dominant role and the voivodship office having marginal discretion and limited 
financial competency. Thus, it seems that a total change from the previous
318 Germek, Zakowski, 1990: 288.
319 Compare chapter six on the Regional Contract.
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administrative style of subordination was not possible as the voivodship office was still 
closely supervised by central government. Moreover, the effects of re-designing the 
voivodship office were also limited by the fact that the absence of voivodship reform 
meant that the Katowice voivodship remained one of 49 voivodships, so the Katowice 
voivode and voivodship elite remained comparatively weak in relation to the central 
level. However, chapter six (on the Regional Contract) shows that they actively tried to 
change this situation and speed up the transfer of responsibilities to the voivode and the 
start of regional restructuring, by signing the Contract in 1995 and redefining the 
division of responsibilities between regional institutions and central government. The 
pressure of the voivodship office elite also increased because of critical prognoses of 
further regional economic development.
The 1990 voivodship office restructuring was variously regarded by the voivodship 
office elite, their opinions varying in relation to who was considered responsible, 
voivode Czech and his vision of a different role for administration, or the change in 
external political and economic conditions which demanded radical adaptation of the 
voivodship office structure. Nevertheless, the change in the voivodship office’s style of 
functioning before and after 1990 was noticed by most of the elite -  those who had 
worked there before 1990 and those who came with voivode Czech. The resulting 
increase in the rationality of the voivodship office’s structure and functioning was 
indicated.
Rather surprisingly, one departmental director whom I interviewed in contrast to the rest 
of my respondents did not emphasise the distinction of the year 1990 in the functioning 
of the voivodship office, at least in relation to the role of his department. However, 
when he instead put the emphasis on the virtue of administrative continuity and 
emphasised the professionalism of his work during socialism, his attitude seems to be 
explainable by his nomenklatura origins. In addition, in the reference to voivodship 
office restructuring, departmental directors who had worked in the voivodship office 
before 1989 mentioned the ‘purge’ of the old elite and the arrival of a new ‘unprepared 
voivode\ Instead, voivode Czech and his sympathisers related the voivodship office 
restructuring to his vision of a regional administration which would be highly 
decentralised and in which regional power would have extensive responsibilities and 
play a crucial role in further regional development:
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Most of all I dream that administration will not be rigid. I dream about rebuilding the administrative 
structure of the state at the voivodship level from the present orientation by sector to orientation by 
subject.320
They also suggested that the restructuring of the voivodship office, a watershed after the 
socialist period, was achieved due to Czech’s vision. This is especially illustrated by the 
formation of the Department of Economy, replacing the division of the voivodship 
office departments according to industrial sectors. These changes even preceded the 
merging of national ministerial departments, to form a single Ministry of Industry, 
replicating their sectoral divisions.
Two other directors of the voivodship office interviewed by me did not distinguish 
between Czech’s and Ciszak’s redesigning of voivodship office departments, believing 
that each voivode needed to adapt the voivodship office structure to his own taste and 
preferences. Nevertheless, they did note the 1990 voivodship office restructuring 
although for them it was rather the result of adaptation to external political and 
economic changes in Poland as a whole, when the command economy suddenly failed 
and the existence of many departments became unnecessary.
In general, the voivodship office structure after 1990 was seen by almost all my
respondents as more rational and thus more efficient than what had been before.
Sometimes, a high opinion of Czech’s voivodship office restructuring was closely 
related to opinions of the voivodship office’s different political role before the 1989 
transition. Czech’s sympathisers saw the voivodship office structure of the socialist 
period as the effect of politicisation. Although it was inefficient in the management of 
the regional economy, its vertical fragmentation made it easier to maintain 
subordination and the supervision of administrative officials, as the existence of several 
departments, each concentrated on one narrow industrial sector, led to substantial 
limitation of responsibilities and the overlapping of functions. Moreover, as one of the 
directors mentioned, the break with the past meant not only the end of subordination to 
the communist party but also of co-operation with the police:
Of course, you can look for ideological explanations of the previous structure, related to the
totalitarian structure of the state which lost its reason for existence after 1989. Now, it is
unimaginable that any department would co-operate with the police to watch any person, but such 
situations have happened before.
320 Czech quoted in Gosc Niedzielny, no. 23, 1990.
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Others respondents emphasised that during the socialist period the voivodship office 
had performed a completely different role in allocating limited goods and machines to 
local companies and private firms and strictly supervising everything by ruling on each 
case separately. For some, the most important element of change in the voivodship 
office’s functioning was the fact that until 1990 the communes had been subordinate to 
the voivodship office. After that they became independent units with which the 
voivodship office had to co-operate and negotiate instead of giving orders as before. 
Often, their negative opinion of the functioning of the voivodship office at that time 
went together with their negative opinion of the former socialist period.
For some members of the regional administrative elite there had been no radical change 
in the voivodship office’s functioning at the turn of 1989/1990, the changes being 
evolutionary instead. This was related to their high estimation of Czech’s predecessor, 
voivode Wnuk, and the effectiveness of voivodship office functioning during his tenure. 
Furthermore, the voivodship office elite who had worked in the voivodship office 
before 1989, instead of emphasising the reduction in the number of departments, 
concentrated on the scale of personnel changes, seeing as unnecessary the ‘purges’ of 
nomenklatura employees. They saw these as political, and emphasised that they led to 
the dismissal of sometimes highly qualified personnel (despite the employment of 
professionals in administration being especially difficult due to their low social prestige 
and low salaries).
I believe that this reorganisation in 1990 was needed to adapt to a market economy. This meant that 
some departments formed under socialism lost their reason for existence. On the other hand, I heard 
later that voivode Czech suggested that, under the pretext of reorganisation which was absolutely 
necessary he had got rid of a large number of well-qualified cadres.
Another person emphasised the drawback of these changes: that is, the absence of 
administrative qualifications especially among the inner elite and the voivode himself. 
He saw the merging of departments as an adaptation to the personality of voivode 
Czech, to his qualifications and interests, whereas economic issues were the province of 
deputy voivode Wnuk.
Merging of departments is normal behaviour when a new voivode comes, and Czech admitted that the 
organisational structure did not fit him, so he changed it. It is not worth making a sensation out of it.
If I remember, changes of organisational structure appeared not only in the nineties but also before.
Voivode Czech did not know about and did not like industrial matters, and so he pushed them away 
from himself. The burden of these issues was moved to deputy-voivode Wr6bel.
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The organisational structure of the voivodship office in 1992 also indicated voivode 
Czech’s limited interest in the economy, as he supervised only four departments: 
Architecture and Landscape; Finance; Culture; and later Disaster and Security 
Protection. However, deputy voivode Wrobel supervised eight departments, among 
them the departments of Economy, Privatisation, and Public Enterprises, and director 
general Klatka six other departments. (At that time there were 18 departments.) 
Sympathisers of voivode Czech also declared that deputy voivode Wrobel had a free 
hand and that Czech never interfered in the work of the departments he was in charge 
of:
Voivode Czech himself selected the candidates and especially the deputy voivode, in whom he had 
full trust. In effect, he did not want to deal at all with issues which were in the deputy’s competency, 
he did not want to hear about them at all.
ii. The rotation o f the elite
The second feature, in addition to the voivodship office restructuring, was the radical 
shift of personnel, which will be examined in relation to two issues: the revolutionary 
character of the changes; and the sociological description of new voivodship office elite 
in relation to their regional origins, education, administrative qualifications and age.
a. The revolutionary characteristic of the voivodship office personnel policy
The personnel shift in the voivodship office in the Katowice voivodship (after the 
appointment of voivode Czech in May 1990, nearly a year since the formation of 
Mazowiecki’s government) varied from the shift of personnel at the national level at 
that time. Mazowiecki’s policy was far more moderate, and civil servants who had been 
nomenklatura appointees from the socialist period still dominated the national 
administration. The much more radical change of the voivodship office elite can, at least 
to some extent, be explained by the different personalities of Mazowiecki and Czech. 
However, the main reason seems to be the greater political stability after May 1990, 
when voivode Czech was appointed. When Mazowiecki’s government was formed, it 
recognised the limitations of the political situation and it was natural that Ministries of
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the Interior and Defence were led by representatives of the ancien regime, and above all 
that the presidency was reserved for Jaruzelski, as established by the Round Table 
Agreement. By July, 1990, the Minister of the Interior and the Minister of Defence had 
stepped down and President Jaruzelski had agreed to shorten his term in office. On the 
other hand, during Ciszak’s rule the reverse tendency was seen; when wide-ranging 
purges took place in central government,321 the voivodship office was left virtually 
untouched and the only political scapegoat was deputy voivode Wrobel. However, on 
the whole, the personnel changes were moderate.
The issue of the revolutionary character of the elite appointed by voivode Czech322 was 
related to:
1. the total shift of the inner elite -  the top three positions of the voivodship office: 
voivode, deputy voivode and director general;
2. the scale (but not the pace) of the personnel changes, as most directors of 
departments were replaced;
3. the rapid promotion of outsiders without administrative experience in both the inner 
elite and positions as directors of departments;
4. the absence of institutional barriers to promotion, since personal contacts with a 
leader were the main source of promotion (in addition to a second, much smaller 
source of cadres; selection according to managerial effectiveness in local 
government; and thirdly, marginal retention of nomenklatura cadres);
5. the reasons why they had started to work in administration -  a deep sense of 
revolutionary mission.
First, in relation to the change in the inner elite, the appointment of voivode Czech, an 
outsider, was claimed by his opponents to have had a crucial impact on the performance
321 Most of the purges at the national level at that time were conducted by one of the post-communist 
governments, that of Pawlak. It was, above all, related to his personal desire to control the administration 
by replacing post-Solidarity leaders with his peasant party appointees in managerial positions (to the cost 
of his coalition partner SLD). Thus, these purges in contrast to Solidarity time-personnel changes, were 
not so much related to the redefinition of administrative functions.
322 These revolutionary features of Czech’s personnel policy differentiate it from Ciszak’s which was in a 
more stable period. Thus, Ciszak’s policy differed from his predecessor’s in the scale of personnel 
changes, which was much more limited. Moreover, the rapid careers of outsiders were replaced by paths 
to promotion based on seniority within the voivodship office, from the position of deputy to that of 
director. During Ciszak’s tenure, the appearance of political barriers to promotion was visible regarding 
certain positions, as appointment was dependent on the fulfilment of political criteria. Finally, in contrast 
to the revolutionary period, the role of voivode Ciszak in shaping his elite was much more limited.
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of the voivodship office. His lack of administrative qualifications and experience were 
responsible for his limited interest in regional policy, especially economic and industrial 
issues. Instead, his professional interests as an architect dominated, as expressed by his 
efforts to preserve architectural and landscape monuments like churches, chapels, and 
alleys of trees -  as illustrated, for example, by the opinion of one of my interviewees 
from the regional administrative elite, and as mentioned in numerous regional press 
articles:
When voivode Czech came, all administration was a blank page to him as he had never had anything 
to do with administration. He was an architect. He had never directed any groups of people before. So 
you can see that he fell into the VO suddenly.
Criticism of Czech’s voivodship office was stronger among those who remembered his 
predecessor, voivode Wnuk, who was an economist. One person who had previously 
worked in the voivodship office also suggested that Czech’s lack of experience and 
qualification, in addition to the similar background of the two other members of the 
inner elite, nearly caused a state of chaos in the voivodship office. However, another 
emphasised the radical changes also occurring in the external economic and political 
conditions in which the administration had to operate and which affected the 
performance of the voivodship office:
Firstly, voivode Wnuk was an economist; in his policy, economic issues dominated.[...] Later, in place 
of voivode Wnuk, arrived a voivode [Czech] who preferred a totally different type of work and had 
totally different interests.
Deputy voivode Wrdbel was in the same situation. Only the director general, at some (time, about 
twenty years earlier I think), had contact with administration. Of the three, he was a lawyer and most 
quickly began to find his way around. So it was a learning period for them.
The second member of the inner elite, deputy voivode Eugeniusz Wrobel, who arrived 
in the middle of June 1990, was a university lecturer in computer and information 
science. He was a highly-qualified outsider (PhD in Information Science) but his 
background did not seem to be the best qualification for the position. Director General 
Zenon Klatka, appointed a few days after the voivode at the beginning of June 1990, 
was also an outsider promoted directly to this position. In contrast to the voivode and 
deputy voivode, he had had brief contact with administration in the sixties, when he had 
worked in the voivodship office. Moreover, it seems that his law degree eased his 
adaptation to the new position. The changing, within a period of less than a month, of 
all three positions also indicates the revolutionary character of personnel changes.
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Second, these changes were also revolutionary due to their scale. They were 
accompanied by a complete shift of personnel in the positions of directors of 
departments in the period 1990-1992 (the last department was formed in 1992). Only 
one quarter of the directors who already worked in the voivodship office before 1990 
stayed, although their deputies were, in general, left untouched by the 1990 reshuffling. 
One of directors already working at that time in the voivodship office, recollected it like 
this:
It was a learning-period for the inner elite and later for people who came here as directors
of departments. For many of them, it was their first contact with the work in administration.
The year 1990 was a year of total adaptation also for the civil servants who stayed because
they had to perform in a totally different system of governing and that involved adaptation.
The third issue, that of the rapid promotion of outsiders and the shift of personnel in the 
voivodship office, can be interpreted in two ways. It could be considered to resemble 
the situation in the United States or France (and in contrast to Great Britain) where, after 
elections, substantial changes in crucial administrative positions take place in ministries 
and local governments. In these countries, the term ‘civil servant’ is much more limited 
and political appointees take a substantial proportion of positions. According to this 
model, a victory for the Solidarity opposition would naturally lead to a change of 
political appointees in administration at national, regional and local levels.
However, the radical shift of the regional administrative elite in the voivodship office 
can be seen instead in the context of revolutionary changes after the fall of the 
communist regime. Although the regime had very early on lost its legitimisation (in the 
seventies), it nevertheless preserved, until the end, the strongly-integrated 
nomenklatura, expressing totalitarian control over personnel policy in the state. One of 
the main Solidarity leaders during the Round Table negotiations, Geremek, recollects 
that the decision to give up some power to the opposition was not related to any 
ideological attachment to socialist values but was causing fear of diminishing the 
position of the nomenklatura. In this context, the replacement of the nomenklatura in 
Poland at that time cannot be compared to the existence of interest groups in democratic 
states (as for example, mentioned above, in the case of the United States or France) and 
political turnover in top administrative positions of the national, regional and local 
levels after elections. Thus, as Geremek, recollects, limitation of the nomenklatura's 
position was a prerequisite for the efficiency of the post-Solidarity elite and for the
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323preservation of the democratic state built after the 1989 parliamentary election:
The main issue during [the Round Table negotiations] was not doctrine or ideology but the very real 
interests of the nomenklatura, for which the government created by us would become a deadly threat.
From the beginning of this process we were convinced that if we did not break out of the 
nomenklatura system, we could not accept participation in power as it would be a fictitious power.324
This exclusiveness of nomenklatura personnel meant that the take-over of power by the 
post-Solidarity elite would mean the arrival in administration of people who had not 
previously worked there. Thus, there were no Solidarity administrative cadres at the 
national or regional levels.
Since opposition was illegal in Poland during the socialist period, personal contacts and 
activity in informal underground organisations substituted for the institutional selection 
mechanism existing in countries where it was legal.325 The only legal institution of 
opposition was formed in 1989 -  the Citizen’s Committees, which played a crucial role 
in the selection of the parliamentary elite in 1989 and of local government leaders in 
1990 (also in the Katowice voivodship).
The arrival of the new post-Solidarity elite in the voivodship office in the Katowice 
voivodship resembled the formation of the national elite at that time. In both cases, 
haphazard appointments took place, even at the level of ministers in Mazowiecki’s first 
non-communist government, as the opposition did not have prepared cadres. The only 
difference was the scale of the changes in the voivodship office as they were much more 
radical. However, in both cases the sudden arrival of the opposition in power led to the 
appointment of candidates without preliminary selection, and without experience in 
administration (or politics at the national level). Moreover, a similar process took place 
in local government country-wide.326 Kuron,327 the Minister of Labour and Social 
Security in Mazowiecki’s government, suggested that the main place where 
Mazowiecki looked for possible ministerial candidates was his ‘private address-book’. 
According to him, the political base of his government, the Solidarity Parliamentary 
Club, did not have any influence on the formation of his government. Thus,
323 Although at the central level, the uncertainty of the political situation caused only a moderate shift of 
personnel.
Geremek and Zakowski, 1990: 228.
325 Wasilewski and Wlodzimierz, (ed.) 1992, and Wasilewski (ed.) 1994.
326 This is described, using the example of the Katowice voivodship, in chapter five.
327 Kuroft, Zakowski, 1997: 73-78.
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Mazowiecki’s government was in some sense isolated from the post-Solidarity 
representation in parliament which was giving full support to the government’s 
legislative proposals. However, this support was forced by circumstances rather than the 
result of their spontaneous approval. On the other hand, Mazowiecki had complete 
personal confidence in his fellow ministers and therefore provided them with wide 
responsibilities and a free hand in their decisions.
A similar selection mechanism was seen in the voivodship office during Czech’s rule. 
The primary criterion for selection was personal acquaintance with the voivode. The 
lack of qualified opposition cadres also brought about chance appointments and the ‘use 
of the voivode private address-book’, where he looked for possible candidates among 
his former colleagues, who were selected because of their specific professional 
qualifications which could be useful in their new positions. As one of the directors of 
department recollected:
I was selected, as one might say, ‘from the address-book’. This means that somebody looks for an 
address, he finds an address and says, ‘Well let’s phone him; he is a good chap’. I worked in the 
Scouts movement with voivode Czech. [...] We worked there from about 1977, we worked for a while 
but later came the time when the voivode [to be] was interned, so our co-operation weakened so to 
speak. Besides, the voivode stopped working in the Scouts movement and so did I, so we separated a 
bit. However, in year 1990 he made me an offer to take this post. I won’t say that I was not surprised 
and I thought about it for quite some time; however, he persuaded me to take this job.
It seems that acquaintance (or even friendship) with voivode Czech (and deputy voivode 
Wrobel, who also participated in the activity of suggesting candidates for directors of 
departments) dominated. The two other sources of candidates were selection on the 
basis of achievement in local government work, and the use of the internal resource of 
cadres of the voivodship office as some directors of departments retained their 
positions.
Fourth, the absence of institutional barriers to promotion, since personal contacts with a 
leader were the main source of promotion, was also typical of a period of radical and 
rapid change. In the voivodship office at that time the political criterion seemed to be 
secondary, and administrative appointments did not have to be confirmed by the 
political regional elite (as at national level by the Parliamentary Solidarity Club); for 
example, as in the case of the appointment of deputy voivode Wrobel. There seemed to 
be the absence of formal typical of barriers a revolutionary period. In other words, at 
both levels the main criteria for selection were personal contacts. Only the main
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decision to replace voivode Wnuk with Czech was taken on the initiative of the regional 
post-Solidarity elite.
When voivode Czech was in office he pulled the deputy voivode out of a hat. Deputy voivode Wr6bel 
was not from any party, or appointed or recommended by anybody. It was just that he had a good, 
trusted friend. I would define it like this; at least, this is what I saw, that they had this type of 
relationship. Thus, Czech could trust him totally and did not check what he was doing: he didn’t need 
to.
Among the important channels of selection was the Katowice Scouts movement, in 
which, for example, voivode Czech, the deputy voivode and the directors of the 
Departments of Public Services and Disaster and Security Protection had participated 
for several years from the middle of the seventies. These ‘chance’ appointments were 
preceded by several years’ acquaintance (and friendship) and meant that voivode Czech 
had great trust in his colleagues. This undoubtedly strengthened the unity of the 
voivodship office elite.
This last feature, suggesting the revolutionary character of the elite appointed by 
voivode Czech, was also their explanation for why they had started to work in 
administration, namely, that they felt a deep sense of revolutionary mission. During my 
interviews, when directors explained how they had begun to work in administration, 
they often mentioned the request of the voivode, who was looking for somebody with 
certain professional qualifications, or they referred to activity in the scout movement. 
However, Cieszewska,328 and Blasiak, Nawrocki and Szczepariski, (1994) believed that 
the either membership of the Upper Silesian Union or sympathy for it was the main 
criterion for their selection of directors of departments and the deputy voivode.
My interviews do not confirm this and my respondents suggested that Czech himself 
gradually drifted away from the Upper Silesian Union after his appointment. How 
important the role of the Upper Silesian Union was is illustrated by the example of one 
of the founders of the Upper Silesian Union who became a director of department. 
However, he was also a highly-qualified specialist (PhD and adviser to the Word Bank) 
in an area which had been extremely neglected during the socialist period with its near 
total absence of regional cadres.329 In other words, was he selected on the basis of 
ideological or professional criteria? It seems that sometimes these criteria overlapped.
328 Cieszewska, Rzeczpospolita, 22 December 1993.
329 From the beginning of the nineties the department supported the organisation of courses conducted by 
foreign specialists to prepare regional specialists.
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However, this limited representation of regional society and dominance of native 
Silesians is not likely to have been caused by restrictions against certain groups, with 
two exceptions. There were some reservations about the inhabitants of Dqbrowa, and 
directors of departments, appointed before Czech’s arrival and who were identified with 
the nomenklatura, had some difficulty retaining their positions. On the other hand, it 
seems that membership of the Upper Silesian Union, (and to some extent of the Club of 
the Catholic Intelligentsia) was not a necessary criterion.
In this case, I would not have had any chance of working in the voivodship office if it had been 
completely like this; I never belonged to the Upper Silesian Union.
To the Club of the Catholic Intelligentsia ?
I had some ties with the Club of the Catholic Intelligentsia when it was formed, for a very short time. 
However, I simply did not have the time to attend the meetings regularly. I was never one of its 
activists, just a member. I suspect that voivode Czech did not remember me from that time; probably 
we did not meet then. I also had nothing in common with the Scouts movements -  neither with the 
Upper Silesian Union, nor the Scouts movement; nor could it be said that I have any shared Rybnik 
Land origins. So, somebody could say I should not be here.
The main reason for the limited social representation among the voivodship office elite 
was not so much discrimination against certain groups, as the selection mechanism 
itself. As Czech put so much emphasis on personal trust, only certain groups and 
organisations in which he had taken part could be represented in the voivodship office 
elite. In addition, strongly negative attitudes towards the administration caused the self­
selection of possible candidates, eliminating a wide spectrum of regional society, while 
those who decided to enter the voivodship office administration did so, to a large extent, 
at the voivode's request:
I don’t have any Solidarity origins, I was not in Solidarity, I was never a member of the Club of the 
Catholic Intelligentsia . Sometimes I went to their lectures, but there were no close ties. It was a 
matter of trust in a person [selected by Czech]. We had worked in the Scouts movement together a 
good few years, so the voivode knew me well.
The directors appointed by the voivode suggested that they had come because voivode 
Czech or his deputy, Wrobel, had asked them and/or that they had been chosen for their 
specialist qualifications. Nearly all of them mentioned their doubts and hesitation about 
working in the administration, declaring that the arguments and persistence of the 
voivode had persuaded them to take their positions. It is also likely that their 
consciousness of having a rare professional qualification was decisive as they believed 
that finding people with such abilities would be difficult. However, there was also a 
young departmental director whom the voivode had known for several years whom he
175
trusted and who, after graduation in his first month, had to develop a plan for how to 
organise this department from scratch. He had to adapt his specialist engineering 
qualification to the conditions of work in administration.
The conditions on which the new elite in the voivodship office had agreed to work in 
the voivodship office also reflected their reluctance to work in the administration. For 
example, one of them had made an agreement that he would take the position of a 
director of a department for a certain period of time, until he had finished his task,330 as 
he had a negative opinion of administrative work, and felt ‘ashamed’ of being a civil 
servant. Another agreed to take the position of departmental director provisionally until 
a successor could be found. Most of them mentioned the bad reputation of 
administration and the difficulty of seeing any results of their work. Thus, it was 
Czech’s achievement to attract first-rate specialists to work in the administration despite 
the low salaries offered to them and, especially, the low prestige of the work. Therefore, 
that negative social attitudes towards administration and low salaries were the main 
reason why the voivodship office did not represent a wide range of social groups.
These long-standing acquaintances among the voivodship office elite had a significant 
impact on relations between the voivode and his deputy as well as with the directors of 
departments. In general, voivode Czech trusted his colleagues a great deal and gave 
them a lot of discretion, as was especially evident in his co-operation with voivode 
Wrobel. During his tenure, there was a clear division of responsibilities in the 
voivodship office with the same wide discretion for directors of departments, and the 
voivode did not like to intervene as he respected their decisions. The voivode would 
certainly not force them to do anything, leaving them a free hand. Czech’s tenure 
contrasts with the Ciszak period, when there was a certain conflict between Ciszak and 
his deputies (Wrobel and Machnik). Ciszak also intervened in the decisions of directors 
of departments, often after somebody from outside the office had asked him to do so, so 
that in the middle of a project he would change the decisions of departmental directors.
The attitudes of the voivodship office elite towards voivodes Czech and Ciszak were 
also different. For example, they generally respected Ciszak for his qualifications and 
economic experience, and for such rare accomplishments as perfect knowledge of
330 He kept his promise.
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etiquette and of some foreign languages. Nearly everybody had a positive attitude 
towards Ciszak. The attitudes of the voivodship office elite towards Czech were much 
more emotional, as his frank opinions left nobody indifferent. Among some members of 
the voivodship office he aroused fears of separatism and regional animosity. However, 
among his supporters he was admired for his vision, which was often unpopular and 
irritating but they emphasised that after a time it tuned into appreciation. The strong 
emotional ties among his sympathisers, often of friendship (with him and also his 
deputy), meant that loyalty was directed primarily towards a person, not an institution, 
and this may explain the strength of the loyalty. For example, director Beblo resigned 
after the dismissal of deputy voivode Wrobel. Ciszak certainly did not have such 
devoted followers and his dismissal did not cause strong protests in the voivodship 
office.
These deep emotional ties between the voivode and the elite he appointed can be 
assumed to be typical of charismatic leaders of revolutionary periods in general. Later, 
when voivode Ciszak arrived, the period was much more stable, and the relationship 
was based on legal order, the personality of the voivode played a much more limited 
role. The attitudes of the elite were also different in each period, and devotion began to 
be replaced by casual daily routine. This admiration of voivode Czech was reciprocated 
by the voivode, who, after his dismissal, praised the exceptional qualifications and 
achievements of his elite:
The personnel of the voivodship office is one of the best not only in the country, but in the world.
Perfect professionals on ‘starvation salaries’ accompanied me in my work.331
The second source of appointment to the new voivodship elite, although much smaller, 
was selection according to effectiveness in managerial positions in the first year of local 
government. The Director of the Department of the Economy, Czamik, had previously 
been deputy mayor of Tamowskie Gory, and the deputy mayor of Bytom Labno became 
Director of the Department of Culture. The arrival of the directors of departments 
selected by Czech reveals a feature typical of revolutionary periods: rapid careers 
starting immediately with positions as directors (as in the inner elite). This could also 
be applied to the directors, Czamik and Labno, who had relatively short tenure in local 
government, although in managerial positions.
331 Czech quoted in Goniec Gornoslaski, 4-11 March 1994.
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The third rather marginal source of cadres was the retention of directors who had 
worked in the office before 1989. There were only four such directors; those of finance, 
law, organisation and maintenance, and three of them were already directors at the time. 
In contrast to those who came with Czech, their career paths had followed the 
mechanism of seniority, with a long period of apprenticeship before promotion. Three 
of them had worked in the voivodship office since the middle of the seventies and one 
since the middle of the fifties, and their apprenticeship before promotion to the positions 
of directors extended from at least nine years to 37. The careers which followed the 
slow path of seniority were in two cases preceded by work in the positions of deputy 
(from three to ten years) while in two cases promotion to the position of departmental 
director was direct.
As in the case of the first two groups of directors, and of the deputy voivode, 
acquaintance with the voivode and specific qualifications were the most important and 
the political criterion was less important (the majority were sympathisers of Solidarity 
but not main-stream activists). However, in the case of the third group -  the directors 
who had worked in the voivodship office before 1989 -  negative political selection took 
place. Thus, in their opinion, the ability to be apolitical and loyal, as well as their 
specialist qualifications, enabled them to keep their positions:
I started work in the seventies. I observed all that was going on. I then adopted the principle that I 
would not belong anywhere, and I never belonged to anywhere. That is probably also the reason why 
I have been in charge of this department for so long. From the beginning of my work, I decided to 
take the option of professionalism, which I always tried to maintain very constantly, and as it turned 
out, it was good for me.
The domination of the new appointees in the revolutionary period who, before 
promotion, had not worked in administration, had a decisive influence on the 
functioning of the regional office and led to temporary disruption at the time of their 
arrival. However, for Czech, the appointment of people whom he could trust and also 
people who had professional qualifications which were in short supply was more 
important than the preservation of administrative continuity:
For me it was all completely new. When I came here, I began to gather information about what the 
work of administration was. It took a while before I could start. For the first three months, I thought 
out how to organise this department.
An even more influential effect than the fact that the majority of the elite had not 
worked in administration, was that they represented the arrival of ‘the opposition’. This
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group had different values, for example, in their attitudes towards citizens, the state and 
other administrative institutions. This was reflected in their behaviour: at that time, the 
voivodship administration stopped issuing orders to local governments and began 
instead to negotiate. In correspondence with citizens, the words ‘sir’ and ‘madam’ 
appeared, showing them respect instead of giving categorical orders to be obeyed by 
them. The arrival of the opposition also showed the change of attitude of some parts of 
society, which until then had been ‘against the state’, which but now entered state 
institutions; the public sphere was until then reserved for the communists.332 After that 
time, being patriotic did not mean being in opposition and avoiding engagement in 
public activity, but instead, being active in public life. In other words, it seems that not 
only the barriers erected by the communists like the nomenklatura system, but also 
negative social attitudes, had been the main factors causing a large proportion of society 
to avoid participation in public life.
At the beginning of the nineties, the opposition entered the administration for the first 
time and directly assumed high managerial positions. As some of them mentioned, they 
had earlier, during the socialist period, been offered managerial positions due to their 
qualifications but they had naturally turned them down as acceptance of a managerial 
position was, for them, related to entering the nomenklatura system.
This regional administrative elite in the voivodship office, who entered administration 
only at the beginning of the nineties, still preserved quite ambivalent attitudes towards 
administration. This was reflected in their negative opinion about administration as a 
whole despite the fact that they themselves worked in the regional administration. These 
negative attitudes towards the administration had been strengthened by the socialist 
experience of the alienation of public institutions from society. However, they might 
also be traced back to the tradition of the partition period, when work in administration 
was understood as a betrayal of national interests. This attitude distinguished the 
voivodship office elite from the local government elite, who, nevertheless, was also 
aware that administration was, on the whole, not socially respected. However, to some 
extent the local government elite felt indifferent to such attitudes because, although they 
saw these deeply-rooted social attitudes changing, they felt that society was beginning 
to see the first effects of their work, in the form, for example, of new pavements and the
332 Dahrendorf, 1993.
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rebuilding of schools and hospitals, and the local government elite believed that in the 
long run social opinions would change.
These two groups of the administrative elite had different opinions about the effects of 
their activity. It seems that after the 1990 local election and the beginning of the rule of 
the new local government elite, they felt that their actions were effective and that local 
development was taking place, as a result. By contrast, the voivodship office elite saw 
their actions as having only a limited effect, and sometimes even felt powerless. This 
may be seen, for example, in their attitudes to the issue of regional restructuring, about 
which they had to learn from newspapers. Thus, it seemed that their sacrifice -  of 
money, time and prestige -  was not recognised or socially appreciated and their sense of 
dissatisfaction prolonged their negative opinion of the administration.
However, the number of individuals engaged in the public sphere in 1989 and 1990 was 
still very limited and they became the national and regional self-selected elite. The rest 
of society was relatively unaffected by this social mobilisation. As a result, the new 
elite was often seen as a continuation of the communist elite since society, both national 
and regional, saw them in terms of ‘them’ -  alien elites caring only about themselves -  
versus ‘us’ -  society. This situation was deeply felt by the voivodship office elite. 
However, according to Baylis (1994: 319) the same attitude was spread throughout the 
whole of Eastern Europe, and new governments and elites after 1989 had weak 
authority with origins in the socialist legacy. The voivodship office elite’s negative 
attitudes towards the administration were also strengthened by their sense of isolation. 
They often commented on the poor understanding of administrative functioning as 
people did not know to which institutions they should turn to deal with their problem. 
However, the voivodship office elite emphasised that they had given a lot of attention 
to trying to inform people and modifying their habits.
The attitudes of the voivodship office elite also suggest that they did not yet fully 
identify with their new professional roles. A similar feature was observable at the 
beginning of the nineties in the new MPs, who did not want to see themselves as 
politicians as that area of public life was reserved for the nomenklatura,333 The second 
reason why they decided to enter the administration, which was as important as the
333 Pank6w, 1994.
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continuous persuasion of voivode Czech, was their belief in the particular historic 
moment. This revolutionary-period motivation to enter the regional administration 
resembled the motivation of the national elite. Geremek wrote, for example that ‘they’ -  
Solidarity -  felt ‘the exceptional historic moment’ sometimes as going far beyond 
Poland, and saw themselves as leaders of those changes.
I never forget especially the conversation with Sacharov and this very special moment, when in his 
press-conference he said that: ‘There would not be Gorbachov, there would not be Sacharov in Paris 
if there would not be Polish ‘Solidarity’. I would like to remind then nothing was known! We did not 
know what would happen in Poland and even less how politics would go in Eastern Europe.
It was a moment of breakthrough for me, as for the first time I began to be so explicitly 
conscious and for the first time I began to believe in our particular position, which was to 
start and steer the road from communism to the Europeanisation of Eastern Europe.334
Similarly, research on the parliamentary post-Solidarity elite in 1989335 and memoirs of 
Balcerowicz, the Minister of Finance in Mazowiecki’s government, showed that they 
believed in an exceptional historic moment. Thus, they changed their attitudes radically 
and decided to enter public institutions until then reserved for the communists:
For me it was evident that in 1989 there stood before us a historic chance, which in the history of a 
nation appears only once in several hundred years, and that it would be a big sin not to use the 
chance.
The regional administrative elite entered the administration in a period of ‘extraordinary 
politics’,337 when society and the elite were capable of exceptionally radical sacrifice 
although for a relatively short time because they expected quick results. For the regional 
administrative elite, it was a conscious decision to work in the administration at jobs 
which were low in prestige and financially unattractive, demanding long hours at work 
‘which they could otherwise spend with the family’. One of the departmental directors 
spoke about his financial losses being several times greater that in the previous period 
when he had been an entrepreneur:
I did not treat these four years as ‘having a post’. I believe that I am in public service, 
which is not about being in power in any circumstance.338
334 Geremek, Zakowski 1990: 29.
335 Wasilewski and Wlodzimierz, (ed.) 1992.
336 Balcerowicz quoted in Toranska 1994: 18.
337 Balcerowicz, 1995: 262- 265.
338 Czech quoted in Jajszczok, Trybuna Slqska, 27 April 1994.
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Another influential director of department appointed by Czech mentioned socially 
negative attitudes towards work in administration and suggested similar attitudes 
towards the voivodship office, where he worked:
I think that work in administration is not good. Administration has never had a good reputation... The 
functioning of the administration is improving but I have no illusions that it will at any time have any 
high prestige.
Similarly, another of voivode Czech’s appointees said:
Later [after the political changes of the Round Table] I went crazy and agreed... to be a representative 
of the Citizens’ Committees. I definitely went crazy because I stopped earning money, and the 
difference was several times less. From that time I have never ever earned good money, I thought that 
there was a new Poland and that this was needed. Voivode Czech ... tried to persuade me to come here 
for nine months I knew then it was not a good decision from a personal point of view, but in the end I 
accepted the position o f... and for the second time I did badly and earned even less.339
Voivode Czech also talked about the work of a voivode as a service to society, not as 
leading to promotion or a professional career:
It is a very poorly paid job. This was the most expensive hobby [working in the voivodship office] 
which I had in my life.
The regional administrative elite (voivodship office and local government) which as a 
whole had rather strong post-Solidarity origins, was affected by this sense of mission, 
inspired by the national elite in 1989, and when they came to power in 1990 they were 
strongly influenced by this idea. However, the sense of mission of the regional 
administrative elite was related to modernisation of Upper Silesia, not to Poland as a 
whole. For example, this is apparent in the Regional Contract and its sense of the need 
for immediate and efficient regional restructuring, as well as its opinion that there had 
been a lack of action by the national elite, which caused it to focus strongly on regional 
issues instead.
The motivation of the people who had worked in the voivodship office before 1989 to 
enter administration was different from the ‘sense of revolutionary mission’ of Czech’s 
elite.340 Often it was their first or second job. One of these nomenklatura directors had 
received a state scholarship and as a result was ‘forced’ (his word) to work in the
339 Some details have been omitted to preserve the anonymity of the holder of this opinion.
340 In this group there were two women but I do not distinguish gender, to prevent their identification.
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voivodship office,341 although the job was not as attractive as the job in which he had 
worked for a year after graduation. Another person mentioned that there had been a 
vacancy in the voivodship office, so he had decided to enter the administration, 
although before, during his studies, he had had very different interests (and a seemingly 
negative attitude towards the administration).
b. The composition of the elite
This investigation of the regional administrative elite will concentrate on five main 
issues: their regional origins, education, administrative qualifications, age and gender. 
These features played a crucial role in the definition of their administrative role, and 
were typical of the revolutionary phase during which they took their places in the 
regional office and local government.
■ Silesian elite
This is the most significant feature, as Czech’s revolutionary elite was heavily 
dominated by natives. Among those appointed by voivode Czech’s elite, only one fifth 
were newcomers (people bom outside Upper Silesia); the rest were people bom there.342 
This sense of Silesian domination is additionally enhanced by the total elimination 
among the elite of those of Dqbrowa origin. In other words, a member of nomenklatura 
still stood a small chance of staying in the voivodship office, but someone of Dqbrowa 
origin stood no chance whatsoever.
Particularly important was the fact that the new voivodship office (and the local 
government) elite were the first regional elites since the incorporation of Silesia in 1922, 
when the native Silesians entered the regional elite in large numbers. Earlier, native 
Silesians were sometimes members of the elite, but as a whole, the regional elite was 
dominated by newcomers and that means that it took nearly 50 years of Upper Silesia’s 
belonging to Poland for it to have fairer representation than that afforded by isolated
341 As a form of repayment for the scholarship.
342 The data gathered indicated place of birth within or outside Upper Silesia. Although this is not 
synonymous with being of Silesian origin, since fact not all people bom in the region were native 
Silesians, it nevertheless shows the very heavy domination of Silesians.
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native leaders. This overrepresentation of Silesians cannot be explained wholly by its 
exclusiveness towards other social groups, except for the inhabitants of the 
neighbouring region of D^browa, from which it was believed most regional leaders 
during socialism came. It was more the absence of other active and coherent groups in 
regional society. It could be said that the primary legacy of socialism was not the 
complete elimination of certain social groups from the public office, for example -  
Silesians -  but the evidently narrow social representation as these positions were 
preserved exclusively for the nomenklatura. In other words, it was not only Silesians 
who were (at least according to some interpretations) politically discriminated against, 
but society as a whole that was not engaged in work in administration, or other public 
offices.
Putnam (1976) writing about the revolutionary elite, suggested that a sense of 
deprivation was the primary cause of strong overrepresentation of certain groups among 
revolutionaries. He illustrated this with the example of the high percentage of Jews 
fighting in revolutionary movements in eastern Europe. It is likely that the native 
Silesians had a sense of deprivation due to such critical events as their exclusion from 
the elite after the Volksliste issue in 1945, and the mass emigration in the seventies, as a 
result of their discrimination by regional authorities. Thus, the high proportion of 
Silesians in the regional elite in the voivodship office and also in local government, 
where they were elected and not appointed, suggests the greater social activity of 
Silesians in the public life of the region. This deprivation probably also caused a quicker 
and stronger crystallisation of their interests. However, it is likely that, to some extent, 
this engagement in public life also had its origins in the much stronger tradition of 
democracy and civil society in the region going back to the time of Prussian rule (in 
contrast to the situation in two other partitioned territories: Russian Poland and Austria).
The Silesian origins of the elite and the fact that being a member of the administrative 
elite was not a prerequisite for recruitment to the national elite, is important in 
understanding their independence and criticism of the central elite. This also caused 
strong identification with the region -  they had a strong sense that ‘we are the people’.
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Education
It is clear that the new elite of the revolutionary period (in both types of regional 
institutions) did not have administrative qualifications at the time of their arrival, as 
among them were only four lawyers and three economists.343 This revolutionary period 
elite mainly had a scientific type of education (with the exception of two other social 
science graduates and one doctor). What is striking, however, especially in the 
voivodship office, is that, despite this heavy domination of science graduates, not one of 
them graduated from the coalmining department of the university. This is crucial, 
especially when compared with the later ‘restoration’ period policies conducted by 
voivode Ciszak, who was a coalminer himself, and whose position was strengthened by 
the appointment of another coalminer, deputy voivode Machnik. From the point of view 
of promoting administrative reform, the main virtue of this revolutionary elite was not 
their administrative qualifications, but the fact that they were in opposition to the 
coalmining lobby. The lobby wished to preserve the coalmining industry’s predominant 
position, even if it meant maintaining the backwardness of the regional economy.
The next distinctive feature of the regional administrative elite in relation to their 
education is their previous academic careers. Nearly one third of the voviodship office 
elite and, to a lesser extent, the local government elite members, were academics at 
local universities. The academic careers of the regional elite seem to be typical: 
revolutionary elites in Eastern Europe at that time had similar backgrounds. This was 
probably due to the relative political autonomy of universities and the fact that political 
opposition was quite strongly rooted there. Also, among these academics were the 
loudest voices demanding preservation of regional Silesian culture. Moreover, the 
Upper Silesian Union had an elitist character: for example, all of its three subsequent 
leaders were professors. Thus, it seems that an academic career was an important 
channel of recruitment. Social mobilisation in 1989 at the national level, and in 1990 at 
the regional level, was limited, and it seems that one of the groups which most actively 
reacted to political changes was academics who decided to enter the public sphere. 
Schopflin344 observed that Mazowiecki’s government, was ‘the nearest to a government 
of philosophy kings witnessed in Europe since the war’. Another factor, which could
343 However, many of them after their appointment took diploma courses in management and 
administration.
344 Schopflin, 1993: 271 -272
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have caused this relatively strong arrival of academics was the personality of voivode 
Czech, who had himself for some time been a lecturer and was looking for people with 
a similar background.
■ Gender
The specific feature of the voivodship office elite was the relatively high number of 
women who were appointed as directors of departments. There were six women among 
22 departments, one fifth of all directors,345 although there were none in the inner elite 
of the voivodship office. This indicates a conscious policy of openness by voivode 
Czech, although it was still only partial openness as the highest positions were still 
reserved for men. Nevertheless, this feature is significant when compared with the 
simultaneous situation of the complete exclusion of women from the highest positions 
of the national elite and the Upper Silesian local government elite. Among the local 
government elite the only woman among 14 mayors of Big Towns was Rawska, the 
mayor of Swietochlowice. Similarly, at the national level, among the seven 
governments since 1989, only one was headed by a woman -  Suchocka. This almost 
total elimination of women, with the exception of Czech’s personnel policy, was a 
continuation of the personnel policies of the inter-war and socialist periods when 
positions in national and regional elites were completely unavailable to women.
In summary, the voivodship office elite formed by voivode Czech was a cohesive group, 
having several common features: shared regional origins, a high level of education, and 
the same career paths outside administration before promotion. They also participated in 
or were sympathisers of Solidarity, but were, not however, mainstream activists. 
Because of those Solidarity origins however, they shared the same sense of 
revolutionary mission emphasising that they took the administrative positions, even 
though they were accorded extremely low social respect. They often spoke of a sense of 
duty, emphasising that they had sometimes resigned from faer more financially 
attractive jobs. They openly expressed frustration at the central administration’s failure 
to appreciate Silesian problems and at attacks by the regional press, which they saw as 
unprofessional.
345 Wawrzynak Trybuna tflqska, 28 May 1994.
186
Above all, it needs to be emphasised once more that the most striking feature of the 
regional administrative elite in the transitional period was its Silesian origins. These 
origins had a profound impact on proposed regional policies and especially on 
administrative solutions which demanded radical decentralisation and delegation of 
substantial powers to the regional authorities. Also, the fact that members of the 
voivodship office elite were often well-known acquaintances, or even sometimes 
friends, of voivode Czech substantially strengthened an extreme cohesiveness which is 
only possible among a revolutionary elite who share similar values and have a deep 
sense of mission to serve regional society. One striking illustration of this cohesiveness 
of the regional elite and its close emotional ties, is the resignation of director Beblo 
from his position after the dismissal of deputy voivode Wrobel by voivode Ciszak.346
Conclusion
This chapter first analysed the local government reform: its importance in relation to 
administrative effectiveness and development of democracy, and at the same time the 
difficulties involved in its implementation were shown as it was only introduced in 
moderate form. This is followed by sections on the expectations of the regional and 
district reform as the next steps of the whole administrative reform and the political 
reasons lying behind its delay. In the second part of this chapter investigating Czech’s 
regional policy, constant reference is made to the issue of the functioning of regional 
administration in the conditions of ‘unfinished administrative reform’.
The analysis of voivode Czech’s tenure focused on his revolutionary character. This was 
reflected in radical changes he demanded in relation to the role of the regional 
administration or which he was able to introduce in certain cases: the mergers of 
departments of the voivodship office and the appointment of the new elite. However, 
the analysis of the administrative reform showed that his proposals were not only 
radical, (as for example, financial decentralisation), but there were some issues which 
were also highly controversial. The controversy was especially seen in relation to the 
concept of Great Upper Silesia and the second issue, who does he represent -  the centre 
or regional society? Can he himself define his own role? Thus, in explaining his policy, 
we should note its second feature, which was his Silesian identity. In addition, the fact
346 Compare chapter four, for details of dismissal of deputy voivode Wrobel.
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that the elite appointed by him was in the majority Silesian, and was the first native elite 
since its incorporation into Poland, is significant. Finally, the analysis of the 
revolutionary, romantic post-Solidarity voivode Czech and his elite will be contrasted in 
the next chapter with the contradictory policy of the restoration period.
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CHAPTER 4
THE ‘BOURBON’, VOIVODE CISZAK, 1994-1997
Introduction
This chapter focuses on the ‘Bourbon’, voivode Ciszak’s rule (1994-1997). First, 
Zaremba’s comparison of restoration rule in France and post-communist rule in Poland 
as a whole will be presented, with especial attention to the particular features of 
personnel policy in this period. Zaremba’s concept of restoration is applied to the 
political changes at the national level which influenced the subsequent changes at the 
regional level. Moreover, Putnam’s description of revolutionary and post-revolutionary 
elites will be discussed to illustrate the difference between the national and regional 
post-Solidarity versus post-communist elites. The description of Ciszak starts with an 
analysis of his biographical profile and his attitude towards the regional restructuring 
and administrative reform. In both these dimensions his policy is compared with that of 
his predecessor, voivode Czech. Moreover, the particular features of the restoration 
phase, such as the politicisation of the administration, are investigated.
4.1 The arrival of the post-communist national elite
In 1994, the arrival of a new voivode and a change of regional elite in the voivodship 
office took place as a consequence of the post-communist parliamentary victory in 
autumn 1993. This resembled the change of the regional elite in 1990 after the 
ascension to power of the post-Solidarity national elite in 1989. A similar shift to the 
left took place around 1993 in the nearly whole of eastern Europe after the first 
hardships of the economic transition to the free market were felt.
According to Zaremba,347 the post-communist period in Poland after 1993, and even 
more so after Kwasniewski’s election as president in 1995, had some features in 
common with the ‘restoration’ of the ancien regime of the Bourbons after the French
347 Zaremba, Gazeta Wyborcza, 24 December 1995.
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revolution (although a complete application of that pattern to Poland is not justified). 
For this thesis, concentrating on voivodship administration, the comparison with France 
offers an interesting example of differences in ‘revolutionary’ and ‘restoration’ periods 
which is relevant to the distinction between the Czech and Ciszak tenures. These are 
comparable with the post-Solidarity (revolutionary) and post-communist (‘restoration’) 
periods at the national level. The only difference of ‘restoration’ at the regional level is 
about half a year’s delay in the regional leaders’ appointments and dismissals in relation 
to the changes at the national level.
‘Restoration’, according to Zaremba, is not to be defined as a total return to the situation 
before the revolution. In the case of France, the Bourbons accepted many of the reforms 
introduced by Napoleon; the legal procedures and administrative reforms, as well as the 
appointment of a certain number of prefects and sub-prefects, for example. This 
acceptance of changes introduced during the Napoleonic era was caused primarily by 
the remoteness and dysfunctional of the old pre-revolutionary patterns -  that is, an 
inability to return to the former administrative divisions of France.
The French restoration style of rule has, according to Zaremba, four general features, 
which he applies to his analysis of post-communist rule in Poland.
i. The first is the lack of a comprehensive vision of transition as those in power
were fixated by past experience and unable to look to the future: their actions 
were consequently aimed at preserving the status quo',
ii. The restoration meant not only stopping reforms due to a lack of vision but
holding up other reforms in order to prolong the status quo',
iii. Moreover, some of the changes which occurred during the revolutionary phase 
did not end during restoration, but in certain areas a deliberate retreat to 
conditions before 1989 took place;
iv. The last issue is personnel policy during the restoration.
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i. Avoiding reform and preserving the status quo
The post-communists’ actions to preserve the status quo were also evident in Prime 
Minister Pawlak’s policies; for example, he withdrew all proposals for bills for 
administrative reforms prepared by former governments.348 Moreover, all the 
administrative reforms introduced by him were limited to certain areas of 
administration, without any comprehensive vision of the whole administration.349 This 
is illustrated by the introduction of the Pilot Programme, or later, the bill on Big Towns. 
However, these were the result more of political pressure than of the government’s own 
initiative. The fragmented and conservative reform of central administration was 
introduced by the next post-communist government, that of Oleksy in January 1997. In 
relation to Upper Silesia, the concentration of effort upon preserving the heavy-industry 
character of regional development on the part of the national post-communist elite and 
voivode Ciszak vividly illustrates this feature.
ii. The suspension o f reform
The suspension of reform can be illustrated with the example of a reform of retirement 
schemes, which, although perceived as necessary, was delayed as it would have been 
unpopular due to the demographical structure of Polish society. Privatisation was also
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slowed down, although it was the main driving force of the Polish economy. 
Similarly, systemic reforms were not introduced in the health sector, education and 
administration, to mention only the most important areas.
At the beginning of 1997, it was openly declared that regional administrative reform 
would be postponed until the parliamentary election in autumn 1997. This issue divided 
the PSL and SLD coalition since the introduction of reforms, which the SLD was in 
favour of, would have meant breaking the coalition and an forcing ill-timed election. 
Instead, the restoration was a time of gestures and demonstrations. Mock actions were 
carried out to show the importance of these issues and central government’s efforts, for 
example, Minister Strok’s discussion with local government representatives on the
348 Izdebski, 1996: 312.
349 Izdebski, 1996: 313.
350 Dudek, 1997: 307.
351 Dudek, 1997: 326.
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formation of districts in 1994, and the subsequent withdrawal from the project.352 There 
were other discussions too about the formation of regions at the end of 1996, and again 
the government withdrew from the project of regional reform. One of my respondents, a 
mayor of the Katowice voivodship, emphasised the deliberate replacing of real reform 
with discussions about preparation for reform, which was then displaced by discussion 
about the next proposed reform.
If one looks for a while, one will see that the [post-communist] governments are always 
playing with something. They just say that they will reform education; they talk and talk 
and then they get bored, and give it all up. Then they talk about the health service reform 
and also talk a lot ...
Central government’s talk about the introduction of reforms was interpreted by Zaremba 
as arrogance and a desire to prolong a convenient situation. This central government 
desire to preserve convenience for itself at the expense of ‘others’ can be illustrated, for 
example, by the unequal financial treatment of central as compared to local government. 
This unequal treatment was maintained without the slightest pretence of action, which 
resembled the behaviour of the socialist regime.353 Here is just one example, given by 
the same mayor as quoted above:
Suddenly, out of the blue, we [the local government] were assigned the local forests. Well, 
what about grants allocated for this delegated task? We received 200 zloty in all for it, 
when even a notice saying ‘no admittance’ is more expensive.
According to Zaremba, the Bourbons returned with a sense of injustice and 
demonstrated an aggravation and arrogance reminiscent of their former rule. Moreover, 
Zaremba found similar behaviour in Poland in, for example, the use of political 
positions to conduct private business in the Polisa case, where the wives of Prime 
Minister Oleksy and President Kwasniewski owned shares in this company. Zaremba 
claimed that the behaviour of the central elite during this period resembled the 
arrogance of Gierek’s and Jaruzelski’s times.
The fall of Pawlak’s government was caused, to a large extent, by accusations of 
corruption against the Prime Minister and some of his ministers. As a result, in March 
1995, power shifted to the SLD, and the former apparatchik, the first secretary of the
352 See chapter five on local government for more detail on his subsequent total withdrawal from the 
project of district reform.
See chapter five, on local government, for more details.
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voivodship committee in Bielsko Biala, Jozef Oleksy, became Prime Minister. During 
my interviews, the regional administrative elite referred to the arrogance of the Minister 
of Administration, who joked about local government arguments and did not respond to 
the regional administrative elite’s accusation of prolonging comfort for central 
government through the unfair financial treatment of local government. In the same 
way, another member of the local government elite recalled a meeting of local 
government representatives from the whole country with ministers where a deputy 
minister publicly declared that whether or not the mayor of a certain town would receive 
grants would depend only on his whim.
iii. A deliberate retreat
An example which illustrates the tendency to retreat deliberately to conditions before 
1989 is the centralisation of central government revenue which increased while local 
government revenue fell from 17.2 per cent in 1992 to 15.6 per cent in 1995.354 General 
subsidies were also replaced by earmarked grants. Moreover, central government’s 
detailed supervision procedures increased by means of the introduction of a number of 
legal restrictions on the regional administrative elite’s actions.355 To sum up, tendencies 
toward centralisation led to a substantial increase in government power at the cost of 
limiting local government’s discretion; this also led to comprehensive control over the 
private sector. Centralisation was additionally assisted by an increase in the size of 
central government; for example, in 1994, there were 12,900 employees and in 1996 the 
number rose to 13,300.356
354 Dudek, 1997: 307.
355 See chapter five for more details.
356 Dudek, 1997: 307.
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iv. Personnel Policy
According to Zaremba, the fourth issue is personnel policy which, during the 
restoration, had two main features:
a. the return of people from the old system and the formation of entry barriers for 
outsiders, in contrast to the inclusiveness of the first revolutionary period;
b. it demanded people whose personalities and qualifications were different from those 
of the first revolutionary period.
a. The return of people from the old system and entry barriers
First, after the 1993 election, in politics, and therefore in administration, positions were 
assigned according to a pool of spoils, and the post-communist elite often promoted a 
return of people from the old system -  the nomenklatura cadres. This return of the 
political post-communist elite was eased by the strong position of post-communists in 
business where there had been no change of elite and the post-communists had kept
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their crucial dominance. This can be illustrated by the case of the Katowice 
voivodship voivode Wnuk, who took a managerial position in the banking sector.
Strqk,358 the minister directly responsible for the appointment of voivodes, openly 
announced the return of people from the former system, even unpopular hardcore 
nomenklatura people, like former secretaries of voivodship committees.
In reality, the former officials are returning. That is normal. During the past four years, the 
young angry men introduced reform, which could not be done with the former officials.
Now these are returning to new structures and adjusting everything.359
Some of these new administrative officials were appointed despite accusations of 
wrongdoing and nepotism.360
357 Wnuk-Lipinski, 1996: 15.
358 Gazeta Wyborcza, 23 October 1994.
359 Strqk quoted in Gazeta Wyborcza, 23 October 1994.
360 The Wall Street Journal, 4 January 1996 and Zycie Czqstochowy, 20 April 1994.
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In contrast to the revolutionary period, during the restoration period barriers were 
erected. For example, the Minister of the Interior, Miller, approved a proposal (the Bill 
on Civil Servants, 5 July 1997) to appoint civil servants only after seven years of office 
apprenticeship. However, the main aim of this bill was not to improve administrative 
excellence by emphasising qualification and experience; rather it was aimed at 
excluding Solidarity candidates because they had not worked in administration before 
1989. In other words, this was to be the legal justification for the promotion of people
*2/C l
from the previous system. 
b. Personalities and qualifications
In the case of Poland, the return of the socialist-period elite was assisted by the 
politicisation of appointments. In other words, people who had not necessarily been in 
senior positions in the former socialist system (the core nomenklatura) were appointed, 
despite their lack of experience and because of their devotion to the post-communist 
elite. Thus, political subordination and devotion can be seen as the main criteria for 
appointment. This politicisation, as Zaremba emphasised, was so extreme that it caused 
a fierce fight over the spoils, even within the ruling coalition. In addition, according to 
Zaremba, in France, the restoration led to the arrival of colourless, uninteresting and 
subordinated personalities. Similarly, in Poland, Zaremba argued the restoration was a 
period of boredom, suspension and weak, colourless personalities.
Writing about the post-revolutionary elite, Putnam also emphasised the difference in the 
aims of the post-revolutionary and the revolutionary elite. While the revolutionary elite 
concentrated on ideology, the post-revolutionary (bureaucratic) elite focused on control 
and management:
Some scholars have hypothesised that in the postrevolutionary period, ideologues are 
progressively displaced by bureaucrats, agitators by apparatchiki, revolutionary 
modernisers by managerial modernisers, specialists in ideas by specialists in control and 
cohesion. The thesis is plausible, for once power is achieved, propagandising becomes less 
crucial, managing more crucial.362
361 Mac, Stachura, Wprost, 31 May 1998.
362 Putnam, 1976: 201.
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In Poland, the replacement of revolutionaries and ideologues with bureaucrats and 
aparatchiki was observable at both the national and regional levels. The most strikingly 
radical feature was the replacement of an elite which had been driven by ideological 
values, without concentrating on the preservation of power, by the post-communist elite 
concentrating on preservation of power and managerial skills, avoiding any ideological 
reference. For example, writing about President Kwasniewski, Szczypiorski declares 
that his abandonment of ideology went to such an extreme that the president and his 
generation tried to avoid presenting a definite opinion on any issue at all.363 This lack 
of definite opinions in Kwasniewski’s generation distinguished them not only from the 
Solidarity opposition formed in the eighties but also from the older generation of 
apparatchiki. In the same way, Prime Minister Pawlak tried to avoid presenting any 
definite opinion -  he was variously silent or spoke vaguely.364 His lack of decisiveness 
was evident even in his personnel policy. For example, the dismissal of the Chief 
Commandant of the Police was discussed for a few months and in the end he remained 
in his post.365
The second feature of the Polish restoration was the overwhelming desire of the post­
communist elite to preserve social popularity. As a result, the implementation of 
unpopular decisions regarding the economic and political reforms was only undertaken 
by the first group, the ideologists of the beginning of the nineties, despite their limited 
experience and qualifications, and their awareness that the reforms could lead to their 
losing power.
4.2 The restoration tenure of voivode Ciszak
i. The dismissal o f voivode Czech in March 1994
The dismissal of voivode Czech and appointment of voivode Ciszak, both occurring at 
the beginning of 1994, can be seen in the context of the radical politicisation of the 
administration, which contrasted with the policy conducted until then by the post- 
Solidarity governments. According to Dudek (1997: 305), among the personnel changes
363 Szczypiorski Gazeta Wyborcza, 13-14 April 1996.
364 Dudek, 1997: 309.
365 Dudek, 1997:310.
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in the administration as a whole, the changes at voivodship level were the most 
dramatic, as 27 voivodes and 28 deputy voivodes were dismissed. These changes of 
voivodes after the change in the ruling coalition at national level in 1993 can be 
interpreted as a rather negative phenomenon, destabilising regional policies, although 
not as destructive as at the national level. At the national level, changes of government 
took place nearly every year and the lack of continuity was very evident, for example, in 
relation to administrative reform.
After the appointment of Pawlak, a comprehensive and rapid change of personnel of a 
clearly political character took place; during the first hundred days of his rule, 19 
voivodes were dismissed. Minister Str^k openly announced the politicisation of 
positions, declaring that in France, after a change of political coalition, about 60 per 
cent of the prefects are changed. At that time, extensive changes also took place in 
central administration, as one third of the ministers, their deputies, and directors of 
departments were replaced. Thus, radical, revolutionary-type (in both pace and scale) 
personnel-changes took place not during the first government of Mazowiecki, but in 
1993. Between August 1989 and June 1990, only 23 out of 49 voivodes were 
changed,368 and Mazowiecki was even attacked for not automatically dismantling the 
whole nomenklatura staff, as some people remained in the Prime Minister’s Cabinet 
(URM) who had worked there before; voivodes were also not automatically replaced.369 
In other words, despite their internal fights, the post-Solidarity elite paid much less 
attention to the systematic allocation of positions as the spoils of victory. Thus, during 
the post-Solidarity governments’ rule, the appointment of people from various political 
groups was possible, especially as they wished to break with the nomenklatura style of 
exclusiveness of members of the communist party. Instead, they tried to pay more 
attention to professional abilities and did not wish to exclude the opposition completely.
On 1 March 1994, voivode Czech became the twenty-fifth voivode dismissed by 
Pawlak.370 His dismissal had first been called for by the regional coalition MPs, who 
accused him primarily of lack of co-operation with the post-communist MPs. He was 
also criticised for promoting Upper Silesian Union sympathisers to crucial positions in 
the administration (the deputy voivode and directors of departments in the voivodship
366 Koral, Gazeta Wyborcza, 14 February 1994.
367 Mistewicz, Wprost, 9 January 1994.
368 Dudek, 1997: 84.
369 Subotid, Rzeczpospolita, 7 February 1994.
370 Gazeta w Katowicach, 2 March 1994.
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office).371 His dismissal by Prime Minister Pawlak, as with the other voivodes, was not 
supported by professional reasons.372
Voivode Czech’s vehement attacks on the socialist period and the post-communists, 
especially after the 1993 election, only speeded up his dismissal, but in any event, 
Czech would probably have been dismissed for being a post-Solidarity sympathiser, 
although his successor had not yet been agreed upon by the PSL and SLD coalition in 
the voivodship. His negative attitude toward the new post-communist government was 
illustrated by his open declaration of unwillingness to co-operate with the new 
government even though it had been formed through democratic elections.373 This 
black-and-white view of post-communists held by the post-Solidarity groups is a legacy 
of the socialist period, when uncompromising battle was a highly-estimated virtue of the 
severely-persecuted opposition. However, in the new democratic polity, this black-and- 
white approach, although it was natural that it would continue for some time, was not 
conducive to stability and continuity in administrative personnel.
ii. The appointment o f voivode Eugeniusz Ciszak in June 1994
The appointment of new voivodes by Pawlak’s government in line with the proposals 
presented by regional MPs also dangerously changed the political balance of power at 
the voivodship level, according to the dismissed voivode of Kielce, Plosonka (who had 
‘survived’ five governments). The new centre of power now began to be not the central 
government but the coalition parties (MPs) in the voivodships, which enabled them to 
put strong political pressure on voivodes or even to control them totally. For Plosonka, 
this was a return to the socialist method of ruling.374 Furthermore, the arrival of new 
voivodes set off a snowball effect in the changing of administrative personnel, for 
example, of deputy voivodes and directors of departments, especially in two of these 
departments: Agriculture and Privatisation.375
The politicisation of voivode positions meant that the division of positions within the 
ruling coalition (the PSL and the SLD) was also important. Prime Minister Pawlak,
371 Gazeta Wyborcza, 4 January 1994.
372 Gazeta Wyborcza, 11 February 1994.
373 Goniec Gornoslqski, 13 May 1994.
374 Gazeta Wyborcza, 4 January 1994.
375 Subotid Rzeczpospolita, 7 February 1994, and Pardowska, Wilczak, Dziadul, Gotkowski, Henzler, 
Janicki, Kuziak, Urbanek, Polityka, 21 May 1994.
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although a leader of the PSL, the junior partner in the post-communist coalition, 
nevertheless ensured that the PSL gained 19 voivode posts while only two went to 
supporters of the SLD. This was against the earlier agreement, which was to divide 
voivode positions within the coalition according to whether the PSL or the SLD 
dominated in the parliamentary election in a particular voivodship. The most evident 
break in the agreement was in the two voivodships of Wroclaw and Katowice, where 
the SLD had twice the votes of the PSL.
Like Czech’s appointment in 1990 and dismissal in 1994, the appointment of voivode 
Ciszak was decided on the basis of political criteria after the shift of power from post- 
Solidarity governments to a post-communist one. Not only did the political element play 
a primary role but there was not even a description of the professional qualifications and
'1HH
abilities expected of a voivode by the regional and national elite.
After a few months’ delay following the dismissal of Czech, candidate Ciszak was 
unexpectedly proposed by Prime Minister Pawlak. At the time, the ruling regional 
political elite (the SLD and PSL members of parliament) were united after nearly half a 
year’s debate over the candidacy of Graczynski. Graczynski’s candidacy was proposed 
by the SLD members of parliament and supported by the regional PSL, apart from its 
leader, Gqsiorczyk, a member of the Upper Silesian Union. The candidacy of Ciszak, 
a person unknown in the region, showed the division between the central and regional 
elite and aroused the surprise of the PSL members of parliament themselves.379 His 
candidature also brought strong protests from the SLD party at the national level. They 
threatened to end the coalition. The SLD argued that they had won the national election 
in 1993 in the Katowice voivodship, and thus had the right to propose Graczynski as 
their own candidate. However, no arguments were raised against Ciszak’s candidacy, 
except by Zaborowski, an SLD member of parliament, who charged that the 
appointment would be the promotion of a figurehead without any political base as 
Ciszak was unknown even among the regional PSL elite.380
376 In the 1993 election the PSL gained 15 per cent of votes compared with the SLD’s 20 per cent, 
according to Dudek (1997: 291).
377 Cieszewka, Rzeczpospolita, 22 December 1993.
378 Klimczyk, Starzynski, Gazeta w Katowicach, 31 May 1994, and Trybuna &lqska, 23 May 1994
379 Dziennik Slqski, 6 May 1994.
380 Trybuna Slqska, 16 May 1994.
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Ciszak’s appointment indicated a fight over the spoils within the national coalition since 
it resulted from Pawlak’s efforts to put in place his own candidate. There were even 
difficulties in finding a proper candidate, as in the Katowice voivodship the role of the 
peasant party was marginal because of urbanisation and the domination of its heavy 
industry. Thus, the candidate chosen was 64 years old. At the time he was on sick-leave 
following an operation (appendectomy), and the proposal came as a surprise even to 
him.
iii. Biographical description o f voivode Eugeniusz Ciszak
In the inter-war period, Korfanty and Grazynski can be regarded as representative of the 
two sides of regional society -  the natives and the newcomers -  and of the different 
regional attitudes of each group. In the same way, the two voivodes after 1990 represent 
two distinct political options -  post-Solidarity and post-communist. Their 
correspondingly different regional policies have their roots in their different 
professional careers during the socialist period and the different political attitudes that 
formed then.
During the socialist period, Czech did not work in administration, staying instead 
outside the voivodship nomenklatura. He participated instead in the Solidarity 
movement and was a member of the Christian Intelligentsia Club, a religious 
organisation focused around national and regional tradition. As a result, during his 
tenure, Czech chose the anti-communist side and declared his inability to co-operate 
with the post-communist group. He also announced that he would resign if they won the 
election, although in the end he did not fulfil his promise and was instead dismissed.
By contrast, Ciszak represented the post-communist group, although he presented 
himself as apolitical and as cut off from any political ties, including the Upper Silesian 
Union. During the socialist period he had been a member of the nomenklatura for 
several years, belonging to the communist party. He also worked in a managerial 
position at the heart of regional industry, in coalmining. In addition, before his 
appointment as a member of the nomenklatura, he had experience of work in 
administration as a deputy minister of coalmining. Thus, at least formally, he seemed to 
be better prepared than Czech for the position of voivode.
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Czech and Ciszak also had different regional origins, which was very evident at least in 
Czech’s regional policy which concentrated on the redefinition of the role of the 
Silesian region, and exerted pressure for decentralisation and more power for the 
voivodship administration (ie, regional and local governments at district and commune 
levels). The differences in the policies of voivodes Czech and Ciszak cannot be 
explained as a moderate change of policy in a ‘stable period’; instead, a division into 
revolutionaries and bureaucrats in the post-revolutionary (restoration) period is 
appropriate. Voivode Czech was an ideologue and a Silesian. A reliable interpretation of 
his regional policy has to refer to the history of Upper Silesia with its distinctiveness 
being due to its early separation from Poland and its privileged position after its 
incorporation into Poland in 1922. His identification with Silesia was so strong that it 
dominated over other post-Solidarity features, and differentiated his rule from those of 
most voivodes at that time, for example, because of the hints at autonomy. In other 
words, understanding the policy of voivode Czech and his elite -  the first Silesian elite 
in the region since the Middle Ages -  is not possible without a knowledge of regional 
history.
On the other hand, in the description of Ciszak, the bureaucrat, reference to history is of 
marginal importance as he concentrated on preserving power. The replacement of Czech 
with Ciszak illustrates Putnam’s shift from ‘the specialist in ideas to the specialist in 
control and cohesion’. If Ciszak referred to history, he referred only to one period, that 
of socialism (the pre-revolutionary period) -  the time of the dominant role of 
coalmining in the national economy and the prominent position of the regional elite. 
Thus, he shared with the national post-communist elite most of the features of 
restoration, and the investigation of the specific history of Upper Silesia is secondary in 
understanding his rule. The appointment of Ciszak, a newcomer and a former 
nomenklatura member, therefore meant a shift to concentration on preserving the status 
quo of coalmining and the rest of the regional heavy industry.
According to Btasiak, Nawrocki and Szczepanski (1994: 52-53), the regional elite was 
organised into two groups.381 The first category consisted of the hastily-formed and 
inadequately-prepared Solidarity elite. They came to power on the crest of the wave of
381 This is the last scientific paper on the regional administrative elite, published a few months before the 
appointment of Ciszak. There have not been any direct references to the regional elite in any scientific 
papers since then.
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triumph which followed the political change-over at the turn of 1989/1990. Their 
position was based on so-called ‘combatant achievements’ and not on actual political 
skills and competencies. The second group was made up of the elite of nomenklatura 
originating from the socialist period, mainly in the mining and metallurgical sectors and 
performing according to socialist values. As they had gained their position during the 
socialist period, this elite had a strong interest in extending and reinforcing the existing 
economic position based on raw materials and heavy industry, which meant, however, 
strengthening the peripheral character of the regional economy. They believed that the 
main difficulty in creating an alternative elite in the Katowice voivodship had been the 
paucity of potential recruitment groups because a large number of people with the 
necessary professional qualifications had already been absorbed during the socialist 
period.
4.3 The regional policy of Ciszak
i. The policy o f modernisation o f heavy industry
At the heart of Ciszak’s regional policy was his declaration of reform of the coalmining 
sector, with frequent references to the social costs of the rise in mass unemployment 
caused by radical restructuring. He argued, therefore, for modernisation and the search 
for new markets for coal rather than liquidation:
I understand restructuring above all as modernisation, not liquidation, which means both 
modernisation and economic development beyond the traditionally-dominant coalmining 
sector...
The question whether this industrial sector [coalmining] is unprofitable is very disputable.
Let’s not forget that liquidation of these unprofitable sectors also costs money. So I believe 
that liquidation should not be introduced but instead we should create the conditions 
leading to profitability... The easiest would be to close several coalmines and steelworks 
but several thousand people would be made redundant from one day to the n ex t... We have 
to look for compromises. 82
The desire to preserve the heavy industry character of the region resulted from his view 
of the socialist past, when Upper Silesia had been seen as the most important region and 
its fate decided the development of the whole state:
382 Ciszak quoted in Gazeta Przemyslowo-Handlowa, 20 August 1994.
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In the past, one quater of the national product came from here. Although I would now be 
cautious about unequivocally defining the Katowice voivodship’s share in the national 
revenue, as this is changing. I can repeat with complete conviction that Silesia was and will 
remain the region deciding the economic potential of the country.383
The fact that his whole career had been spent in this sector also influenced his belief in 
the socialist myth of the significant role of the heavy industry sector, and especially 
coalmining. Thus, he still believed in its exceptional position at the time, although he 
legitimised this by referring to the importance of this sector in western Europe and the 
USA:
The voivodship is not only inhabited by coalminers. My duty would be to represent the 
whole of society. But we all know that this is the most important occupational group. 
Coalmining covers the whole sector of supply, trade and transport. The Americans estimate 
that one post in coalmining creates four to seven jobs outside a coalmine.384
The move towards restructuring by the liquidation of heavy industry could also be 
understood as a threat to the regional power of the traditional heavy-industry elite, 
whose interests had been carefully protected by the national elite until the transition in 
1989. As a result, preservation of the coalmining sector seemed to be not only a defence 
against the danger of mass unemployment in the region but at the same time 
maintenance of the huge interests of the coalmining elite.385 And Ciszak, whose whole 
professional career had been within this sector, declared:
The office which I hold I understand as a link which brings coalmining issues to the 
representatives of central government. Through the medium of the ‘Trybuna Gornicza’ 
[The Coalmining Tribune], I confirm that I shall not forget the group from which I came.386
In other words, reform of coalmining was for him not only a problem of social 
dissatisfaction and unemployment but also a matter of the preservation of the regional 
status of its traditional elite. This can be compared with Gierek’s efforts as a 
representative of the regional elite (1957-1970) to maintain the heavy-industry character 
of the region.387 This view of prosperity during the socialist period set Ciszak apart from 
the attitudes of the Upper Silesian Union and voivode Czech, with their much more 
revolutionary vision of regional restructuring. By contrast, Ciszak proposed the 
conservative option of reforms which preserved heavy industry, making regional
383 Ciszak quoted in Dodatek do Rzeczpospolitej, 9 December 1994.
384 Ciszak quoted in Gazeta w Katowicach, 19 April 1994.
385 Compare Blasiak, Nawrocki and Szczepariski, 1994.
386 Ciszak quoted in Trybuna Gornicza, 4 August 1994.
387 Walczak, 1996.
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development during the socialist period the main point of reference. Thus, it is not 
surprising that victory to the post-communist group in autumn 1993 gave emphasis to 
the preservation of coalmining and the heavy-industry character of the region.388 The 
policy of Ciszak and especially the national post-communists’ policy was aimed at 
preserving the heavy-industry character of the region despite the fact that the industry 
had become more and more obsolete, and that the ecological conditions in the region 
were critical. Also, external conditions changed significantly with a substantial drop in 
the need for the coal. But, despite all this, the prominent position of the heavy-industry 
lobby meant that the coalmining reform was delayed as long as possible.
The political importance of the coalmining lobby and its efforts to preserve coal 
production amounted to economic irrationality. Dudek (1997: 326) points out that at 
that time Polish coal was subsidised and sold for 40 dollars a tonne and at the same 
time, Polish coke plants were importing coal for 55 dollars a tonne. This was because it 
was much cheaper to import than to buy Polish coal, sold at much higher prices inside 
the country. However, the situation of the coalmining industry was also a result of lack 
of reform, as it had not gone through any comprehensive reform since 1989. The 
situation was worsened by the last post-Solidarity government of Suchocka, which was 
blackmailed by strikes organised by the Solidarity Trade Union as the existence of the 
government depended on its support. An example of this was the strike which spread to 
all 70 of Upper Silesia’s coalmines, causing the withdrawal of the project to close down 
unprofitable coalmines and instead bringing about the backward step of uniting 
profitable and unprofitable coalmines in a few holdings. This destroyed the will of the 
coalminers to make any effort to be efficient, as state subsidies were provided 
independent of their economic performance.
According to Ciszak, his concept of the development of the region was not very 
revolutionary. It was to be based on heavy industry.389 He also justified the continuation 
of coalmining development by the regional elite by waiting for the proposals for 
regional development from the central elite.390 This led to further delays in regional 
restructuring, in which the regional economy began to be seen as a whole, and to the
388 Compare Djilas (1957) on the primacy of heavy industry in socialist countries, and the view of 
Schopflin (1993) that the heavy industry lobbies were the groups most interested in preserving the 
socialist status quo.
389 Gazeta w Katowicach, 27 May 1994.
390 Polityka, 17 December 1996.
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breaking of the isolated, sector-orientated, socialist type of reforms conducted by the 
national elite.
Ciszak’s passive wait for the central elite’s proposals for reforms in Upper Silesia was 
also prompted by his acceptance of the popular myth of Upper Silesia’s crucial role in 
the country’s development during the socialist period and, as a result of the country’s 
debt to Upper Silesia. To some extent, this declaration of the country’s debt also 
contained an echo of the inter-war belief in the special status of Silesia, enhanced by 
regional autonomy:
So, in fact, the country owes a debt to our region. It is enough to say that years ago one fifth 
of Polish exports came from here, while the Katowice voivodship contains ten per cent of 
the Polish population.391
ii. The vision o f regional administration
The different professional careers of voivodes Czech and Ciszak during the socialist 
period had profound effects on their views of administration. First, it influenced their 
views on the voivode's role. Second, it affected their assessment of the relationship 
between the voivodship administration and central government. The third issue 
concerns Ciszak’s opinion on the need for territorial reform (for regional and district 
levels). Did Ciszak see the regional administration as effective and thus as defending the 
status quo or did he see it as rather ineffective and, as a result, demanding 
administrative reform? The difference of opinion on administration between voivodes 
Czech and Ciszak will be investigated to support Putnam’s division into the 
revolutionary ideologue (Czech) and the bureaucratic apparatchik (Ciszak). 
Furthermore, the particular feature of voivode Ciszak’s rule of populism will be 
investigated.
391 Ciszak quoted in Trybuna Slqska, 3 June 1996.
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a. The Voivode’s role
The wish to preserve the regional status quo is evident in Ciszak’s definition of the 
voivode's role, which contrasts with that of his predecessor, Czech. Ciszak described his 
role as that of an agent of central government.392 Other members of the regional 
administrative elite also saw him mainly in this role, an opinion quite often presented 
during my interviews. Also, Jan Rzemelka, the deputy chairman of the voivodship 
assembly, criticised him for being a passive, subordinate agent of central government:
I believe that each day the voivode confirms that he is an efficient manager. It is only a pity 
that in negotiations with Warsaw he does not feel behind him the four million people who 
live in the region.393
Ciszak’s opinion on the voivode's role contrasted with that of his predecessor, Czech. 
For Czech, the role entitled acting as an agent of central government in the voivodship 
as the rule of law defined the voivode's role and meant forgetting about the presentation 
of regional interests, which to him was unacceptable. For Czech, it also meant 
continuing the former socialist system of dysfunctional administrative structure, 
especially at the voivodship level.
Czech saw his role as that of a representative and defender of regional interests, which 
even led him to declare opposition to the central government. The administrative roles 
created in the former socialist polity were extremely inadequate in the new 
administrative situation (in the democratic system, for example, presentation of interests 
other than at the national level is demanded). Thus, Czech’s definitions of new 
responsibilities were often strongly personalised. Czech can be described as a man of 
the revolutionary period, when roles often went beyond their traditional borders as 
during stable periods, and this fits the period of transition after the fall of communism in 
1989.
For Czech, ‘passive’ actions in complete accordance with to the wishes of central 
government were not acceptable. He saw the centre as hindering the urgent reforms of 
the voivodship level of administration. Thus, quick action by reformist forces at
392 Dziennik Zachodni, 27 March 1995
393 Rzemelka quoted in Pustulka, Dziennik Zachodni, 21 November 1994.
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voivodship level would weaken the deeply-rooted opposition at the centre, which 
wanted to preserve vertical fragmentation and centralisation, which was the same as 
maintaining the weak role of the voivodship-level administration. In other words, 
Czech’s interviews indicate that he believed that impulses for decentralisation of the 
regional level and unification of the numerous special administration territorial units 
should not only be prompted by central government decisions but should also be driven 
by pressure from reformist forces at the voivodship level of administration.
Czech wanted to be the regional leader of a big, strong region despite his actual 
achievements as a voivode and sometimes the poor estimation of his administrative 
abilities by other members of the regional elite. Ciszak, in contrast, saw himself as a 
representative of central government, which was more in line with the official definition 
of the voivode's position, although it was not actually effective due to the very limited 
responsibilities of the position. Unlike Czech, Ciszak is a man of the restoration -  a 
low-profile diplomat and a more devoted representative of central government interests 
than the ministers themselves, according to one my respondents:
When the one who speaks most loudly and most badly for us [the Katowice voivodship] 
during negotiations with the government in Warsaw is the voivode, our Katowice voivode, 
that reflects a conflict of interest.
Other members of the regional elite saw his representation of central interests as being 
at the cost of the region. They perceived the regional interest to be different from what 
the national elite proposed irrespective of whether the national elite was post-Solidarity 
or post-communist.
Thus, it does not seem accidental that the different views of the voivode's role (as a 
regional representative or central government representative) were held by men of 
opposite political origins, that is post-Solidarity and post-communist voivodes, Czech 
and Ciszak. This difference in the voivodes' opinions also illustrates Putnam’s division 
between the ideologist and the bureaucrat {apparatchik):
After the turning-point of 1989, we obtained as a voivode a visionary who had an idee fixe 
and, within this, a specific vision of Upper Silesia. I do not know if they [ideas] were a 
stroke of genius or a disaster or they were only so-so. But they were ideas. For this the 
voivode was fiercely, bitterly, attacked by journalists, political opponents, and even by the 
groups which raised him to his post. His successor was the world champion in being bland.
He represented, he added splendour to meetings, he opened events, visited, and inspected.
For nearly four years he did not present any idea, did not take any decision. And it was for
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that that he was boundlessly loved by the press, by his own group, and even by his
394enemies.
b. The relationship between the voivodship administration and central government
Ciszak’s definition of the voivode's role as that of a representative of central 
government also sprang from his positive view of central government (in contrast to 
voivode Czech) and his belief in a good relationship with the voivodship authorities. In 
contrast to Czech’s vision of central government as an enemy, it was now seen as an 
understanding and co-operative body. A prime example of its goodwill were the 
frequent visits mentioned below:
So far, none of the ministers invited to the Katowice voivodship has refused to participate 
in meetings at which we have presented regional problems.395
At those meetings, the economic and social difficulties of the region were presented. 
Ciszak does not consider the effect of these visits and proposed regional reforms, but 
rather emphasises the attention and recognition bestowed by central government on 
these regional difficulties.397 This has echoes of the ceremonial visits of the socialist 
period, although it is also a fact that the flow of grants to the voivodship increased 
substantially during Ciszak’s rule (under post-communist central governments). The 
voivodship’s revenue rose from about fortieth-odd position to tenth among the 49 
voivodships.398 However, this revenue was spent on preserving the status quo on, for 
example, subsidies to prevent the closures of coalmines and on substantial salary-rises 
for managers in this sector.
Voivode Ciszak also avoided any comments referring directly to the present functioning 
of the voivodship administration, despite the fact that it had been profoundly affected by 
the legacy of socialist centralisation and was thus extremely dysfunctional.399 His lack 
of criticism of the heavy centralisation was surprising. It was an extremely unusual 
stand among the regional elite (the voivodship office and local government), as is
394 Smolorz, Dziennik Zachodni, 12 December 1997.
395 Ciszak quoted in Dziennik Zachodni, 27 March 1996.
396 Stowo - Dziennik katolicki, 5-7 August 1994.
397 Polityka, 17 December 1997.
398 Trybuna Slqska, 3 June 1996.
399 For example, 80 per cent of the voivodship budget was spent on activity related to one of the 20-odd 
departments -  the Health Department. Thus the roles of the others could be considered purely symbolic.
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confirmed by the opinions expressed in the interviews conducted, as well as in official 
interviews in the press and, especially, by the opinions of his predecessor, Czech. He 
only occasionally referred to the Regional Contract as a means of decentralisation, 
which seemed to have been rather a catch-phrase as he did not precisely say what he 
meant by it.
c. The need for territorial reform (at regional and district levels)
The opinions of voivodes Czech and Ciszak about the present functioning of the 
voivodship administration were closely related to their attitudes on further territorial 
reform. Czech vehemently advocated the need to form strong regions with powerful 
‘heads’ {voivodes), sometimes to extremes; for example, the concept of Great Upper 
Silesia. By contrast, in Ciszak’s interviews, the issue of merging voivodships to form a 
few big and strong regions was not mentioned explicitly; he also said nothing about the 
need to strengthen the voivode's role as he was satisfied with its existing 
responsibilities.400
In one of his interviews during a meeting with local government representatives, 
voivode Ciszak declared support for the formation of districts. However, his declaration 
in favour of the formation of districts made no mention of the voivodship-level mergers 
which would be necessary as these reforms were directly interlinked. As a result, his 
support for only district-level territorial reform sounded confused and unconvincing, as 
the partial reform, limited to this level of administration, was not possible.401
Some of his interviews indicated that he recognised the need for administrative reform, 
in relation to one issue -  the granting of a larger amount of revenues to the regional 
level of administration -  although according to Ciszak’s proposal it was to be done in 
the form of centrally-controlled grants (not sharing in taxes). Even in relation to this 
issue, his opinion was imprecise; for example, he did not explain whether he was in 
favour of public administration or self-government administration being adopted at 
regional level. In addition, he avoided any definition of the size of these grants, thus 
making his ideas sound very cautious and fragmented. Comparison with the French
400 Dziennik Zachodni, 27 March 1996.
401 Nowiny Gliwickie, 22 December 1994.
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restoration again seems attractive because of the similar replacement of actions by 
demonstration, as was also the case at the national level.
In addition, his interviews suggest that Ciszak viewed administrative financial 
discretion at local and regional level conservatively, as in the former socialist system, 
decisions were to be taken centrally and earmarked funds distributed from there. 
Although Ciszak’s vision of reform was conservative, even he recognised the need for 
larger revenues to be sent to the lower levels of administration since local government 
had proved itself to be more financially efficient than the central administration. His 
view differed from that of Czech, who strongly emphasised at the same time the need 
for decisions to be taken at local and regional levels.
Ciszak’s proposal was a compromise between the interests of central and local level 
administrations. He wanted to achieve this compromise by slight financial corrections, 
assigning some additional grants to the local (and regional) level, but without 
comprehensive reform of the territorial administration and system of finances. Thus, his 
declaration of maximal financial decentralisation, separated from territorial 
administrative reform, seemed to make decentralisation appeal as a populist phrase.402 
In other words, his proposal for reform would preserve the socialist privileged position 
of central government, which, with the exception of the 1990 local government reform, 
had been able to maintain a centralist style of rule. His imprecise arguments in relation 
to the Pilot Programme403 also suggested a conservative view of reform, aimed at 
prolonging a status quo, as the following quotation from the interview with voivode 
Ciszak shows:
The specific size [of grants] should be discussed but increasing the scale of discretion in the 
region is what is wanted. With wise compromise, this does not have to become a conflict of 
interests with the centre, as those increased grants could be spent on aims decided for the 
whole state. On the other hand, they could be divided more efficiently at the local level, 
even for the better carrying out of the Pilot Programme.404
Ciszak often advocated gradual reforms, preceded by carefully-prepared policies, which 
seemed to be an excuse for delaying the introduction of the administrative reform, a
402 Dziennik Zachodni, 3 January 1995.
403 For example, it is not explained for how much longer the Pilot Programme is supposed to last having 
been prepared only for a year; nor whether and how it will lead to further reform. The other important 
issue is the method by which the territorial administration is financed by central government.
404 Ciszak quoted in Polityka, 17 December 1996.
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subject which was dividing the central political elite. This behaviour is typical of the 
restoration period.
In addition to Ciszak’s lack of explicit commitment to regional reform, he differed from 
his predecessor in his attitude to voivodship autonomy. He tried to neutralise the 
region’s traditionally strong desire for autonomy (sometimes mixed with separatist 
inclinations) by blurring its earlier meaning and limiting his proposals to promoting the 
socially-supported demands for greater financial decentralisation. This financial 
decentralisation was generally demanded not only in relation to Upper Silesia but also 
to all other regions and was to be the natural consequence of the territorial reform. 
Autonomy however, had one more feature, the competency of the regional diet to enact 
law. This difficult issue was not mentioned at all by the man who wanted to maintain 
his popularity, as this quotation from the press-interview with him shows:
The discretion of this region means, at least in my opinion, that money produced here 
should stay in the voivodship to a greater extent than it now does. This does not mean 
autonomy, the separation of Silesia... It is just related to financial issues, because the scale 
of the problems to be solved here is beyond compare.405
d. The man of ‘compromise’
The second similarity to the restoration period concerns Ciszak’s definition of the 
voivode's role. This was closely tied to his predominant declaration of the need for 
compromise, which enabled him to maintain popularity by avoiding decisions which 
would be painful and unpopular. He took especially into consideration two groups: first, 
regional society as a whole, and second, the regional elite. Below is Ciszak’s first 
declaration indicating on himself as an advocate of regional society interests:
The voivode has to feel the pain of that which is painful to inhabitants of the region. Most 
of all, this is the issue of economic stability. The most important thing is to maintain 
workplaces for people. This also includes what happens with coalmining, metallurgy, and 
the infrastructure, which serves those industries. After all, a citizen does not care what will 
happen after a century; he is not concerned with far-reaching policies extending beyond the 
life-span of this generation 406
405 Ciszak quoted in Slowo -  Dziennik katolicki, 5-7 August 1994.
406 Ciszak quoted in Gazeta Krakowska, 2 February 1995.
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Although the main role of the voivode was to be a representative of the central 
administration, he also declared that he wanted the voivode to become a tribune 
presenting the most important social issues of regional society, above all, the 
elimination of unemployment and the guaranteeing of social stability. He wanted to 
achieve these even at the cost of difficulties which might occur in the future, as 
illustrated by the quotation above. This identification of the voivode with regional 
society and with support for actions aimed to satisfy it sounds like a populist escape into 
easy solutions, leaving difficulties for future generations. His populism is also 
confirmed in his provision of solutions which did not contradict central government 
policies. For example, in the end despite earlier declarations of sympathy in the division 
of grants, regional society interest had to be subordinate to the aims of the centre.407
Voivode Ciszak’s populist stand was also seen when he declared that he wished to 
satisfy the second main group, the whole regional elite.408 On the one hand, he wanted 
to establish close co-operation with the post-communists, that is the regional SLD 
members of parliament. On the other hand, he wanted to continue the opposite policy of 
the group linked to the Upper Silesian Union and voivode Czech, where the anti­
communist emphasis was strong. Just prior to his appointment he made the following 
explicit political declaration:
I do not offer any programme, as I believe one man cannot change much in the region... In 
my opinion to heal the situation in the region, action is needed by whole groups of people, 
not just a voivode.409
His wish to remain popular led to his definition of the voivode's role as a low-profile 
man of ‘compromise’. The declaration of the need for compromise justified his frequent 
changes of policies to keep the support of the strongest political factions, whatever their 
political agenda may have been. His careful diplomatic statements allowed frequent 
changes of political actions and also enabled him to evade personal responsibility for 
the changes of regional policy. For instance, he declared his support for the introduction 
of the Pilot Programme and local government activities, trying to increase their 
discretion 410 He also advocated the need to increase the size of their subsidies.411
407 Polityka, 17 December 1996.
408 Dziennik Zachodni, 9 June 1994.
409 Ciszak quoted in Dziennik Zachodni, 30 May 1994.
410 Nowiny Gliwickie, 22 December 1994.
411 Dziennik Zachodni, 27 March 1996.
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However, later, at the Arbitration Tribunal, despite his declaration, he did not recognise 
the financial claims of local governments, arguing that they received sufficient funds.
His populism was also evident in the contradictory and confused views expressed in his 
interviews as he said whatever people most wanted to hear, despite the fact that the 
opinions contradicted each other and thus were impossible to put into practice. This 
wish to gain and preserve popularity led him to make incomplete, bland statements 
which could be shifted smoothly to accord with the changing tastes of the dominant 
groups. For example, on the one hand, he expressed satisfaction with the voivode's 
‘adequate’ power and on the other he demanded greater decentralisation. He was 
equally contradictory in his defence of the slow pace of reform as maintaining social 
stability and minimal unemployment while, at the same time, he advocated quick 
reform, suggesting that rapid changes would quickly bring improvements to living 
conditions, as expected by society. He stated:
I believe that the more quickly the solving of problems begins, the more decisively 
unpopular decisions are taken, then and more quickly, despite difficulties at the beginning 
of the reform, the expected positive effects will appear.412
4.4 The voivodship office during Ciszak’s tenure
Ciszak’s policy in the voivodship office, in addition to his conservative vision of 
industrial reform and his gradualist, cautious attitude to regional administrative reform, 
confirms his restoration-style approach. His policy will be examined in two areas:
i. the rise of bureaucracy: in this respect, the sectoral re-designing of the 
voivodship office structure, and the weakening of the position of directors of 
departments and formation of the Social Council of the Economy are the most 
important;
ii. changes in voivodship office personnel, which will be investigated through the 
example of the appointments of a new deputy voivode and directors of 
departments and the politicisation of administration.
412 Ciszak quoted in Dziennik Zachodni, 27 March 1996.
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i. The re-designing o f the voivodship office
The restructuring of the voivodship office departments took only one form: the rise of 
bureaucracy. This took place via a moderate increase in the number of departments. 
However, the sectoral approach is nevertheless evident in the formation of several new 
positions of co-ordinator and the establishment of an advisory body for the voivode, the 
Social Council of the Economy.
The formation of the Social Council of the Economic of the voivode in October 1994 
was Ciszak’s beloved brainchild, and his first serious decision. The Council was chaired 
by Zygmunt Nowak, a professor from the Central Coal Institute in Katowice. The 
formation of the Council confirms Ciszak’s preservation of close ties with coalmining 
lobbies and the former nomenklatura. Nowak declared that the council would be the 
most democratic advisory body as members selected themselves. To begin with, 126 
people volunteered to work in the Council, but by June 1995 the number had already 
increased to 272. According to Nowak, the most evident positive aspect of the council 
was the presence of highly-qualified professionals, among them413 the former Deputy 
Minister of Coalmining, the leaders of the former Polish-Russian Association, SLD 
candidates for senators, and former voivode Wnuk.
The Council worked on the principle that nearly all departments in the voivodship office 
had commissions relevant to their work. The voivode compared this to the division of 
the councils in parliament. In 1996, the Council was divided into 12 commissions, each 
chaired by a leader. The leaders of commissions made up the Presidium of the Council 
and met with the voivode once a month.
Professor Nowak himself confirmed the strong political pressure of the Council when he 
declared that some of its members treated their work so seriously that they were in the 
voivodship office daily and demanded that the voivodship office civil servants give 
explanations of their work. The Director of the Ecology Department, Beblo, who later 
resigned in protest at the politicisation of the voivodship office, also confirmed the 
Council’s wish to give orders. He compared its actions to the political pressure exerted 
by the ‘voivodship committee’ during the socialist period.414
413 Cieszewska, Rzeczpospolita, 30 June 1995.
414 Cieszewska, Rzeczpospolita, 30 June 1995.
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It was also on the Council’s initiative that new departments of Agriculture, Foreign Co­
operation, and Sport and Tourism were formed. Although Nowak declared that the 
Council did not put any proposals to the voivodship office for the dismissal of civil 
servants, Klimczak415 believes that it did put strong political pressure on the voivode by 
criticising the qualifications of the employees of certain departments.
The administrative structure of the socialist period also guided Ciszak’s redesign of the 
voivodship office itself, maintaining the socialist tendency to divide the economy into 
separate industrial sectors. This was reflected in the formation of a few new 
departments. During Ciszak’s rule, the departments of Foreign Co-operation and 
Agriculture were formed out of the Department of Economy. As a result, the 
Department of Economy, headed by Czamik, which was actively engaged in the 
preparation of regional restructuring, was substantially weakened.416 After this, the 
regional policy of the voivodship office had to be co-ordinated through several 
departments.
The most vivid example is the formation of the department of Agriculture for which the 
only reason was the desire to satisfy the Peasant Party Prime Minister, Pawlak. The 
formation of a government headed by the leader of the Peasant Party, Pawlak, after the 
1993 parliamentary election meant that new voivode candidates in various voivodships 
declared it necessary to create those departments.417 In the case of the Katowice 
voivodship, the establishment of this department in such an industry-dominated region 
seemed to be highly dysfunctional as agriculture plays a marginal role in the voivodship 
economy. Thus the establishment of that department was a purely political decision 
aimed at satisfying the expectations of central government and the regional political 
elite of the ruling coalition, and not, as Ciszak argued, to accommodate local 
government wishes:
The creation of the Department of Agriculture was warmly welcomed by local government 
groups. The role of the newly-established Department of Foreign Co-operation is to initiate 
contact with trade representatives and the services of foreign delegations and guests. That 
also brings good results. The Social Council of the Economy was also formed as an 
advisory body to the voivode.418
415 Klimczak, Gazeta w Katowicach, 20 June 1995.
416 This is also noticeable in the decrease of the Department of Economy employees from 150 to 50 after 
restructuring and redundancies.
417 Lipszyc Rzeczpospolita, 28 December 1993; Gazeta Krakowska, 25 March 1994.
418 Ciszak quoted in Trybuna Slqska, 3 June 1996.
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Ciszak’s policy of forming new departments differed from that of the local government 
elite; as one of the mayors explained, the number of departments in local government 
bodies was being reduced. This mayor also considered Ciszak’s formation of new 
departments, especially of agriculture, as highly dysfunctional and costly. The 
formation of new departments was clearly a return to the socialist-tradition when the 
new administrative units reflected the political strength of certain sectoral lobbies rather 
than following an economic rationale. This same approach is seen in Ciszak’s 
arguments for the formation of additional departments, especially that of agriculture. 
The formation of the Department of Agriculture was also seen as an opportunity to 
employ PSL sympathisers in the new positions surfacing in administration, especially as 
administrative personnel had substantially increased in number during Pawlak’s 
tenure.419
The establishment of these new departments was variously assessed by the directors of 
the voivodship office. Many believed that each voivode had the right to adapt the 
structure to his taste, and that the rise in the number of departments was not significant. 
Some also emphasised the importance of certain sectors and, in particular, the 
distinctiveness of agriculture from other sectors of the economy. They believed that the 
formation of a separate Department of Agriculture was necessary to recognise the 
specificity and difficulties of that sector as, for example, the opinion of one of my 
respondents working in the voivodship office, quoted below indicates:
In other voivodships a Department of Agriculture does not need to exist because if the 
voivodship is agricultural, the voivode and his deputy will both be engaged in agriculture. 
However, in a voivodship where industry is very strong, there has to exist this element of 
organisation of the voivodship office’s structure according to the sectors of economy and 
strong agricultural units in the form of departments seem necessary
I think that in the not-very-distant past a mistake was made and the department was 
eliminated. This department had existed, I believe, since the beginning of the voivodship 
office. However, just after 1989 it was wrongly thought that the market would take care of 
the agricultural agenda. The elimination of the agricultural agenda was evidently a mistake.
During Ciszak’s tenure the Departments of Sport and Tourism was also formed, the 
Katowice voivodship office being the only one to follow the Warsaw voivodship office 
in this respect.420 The formation of this department, especially in the Katowice 
voivodship, was clearly superfluous given the region’s unattractiveness to tourists due 
to its ecological crises.
419 Lipszyc Rzeczpospolita, 28 December 1993.
420 Dziennik Zachodni, 27 March 1995.
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Some members of the regional administrative elite referred to the ineffectiveness of 
forming new departments which could lead to a snowball effect and the further 
separation of other distinctive sectors, resembling the socialist division of 
administration into several ministries. One regional administrative elite member also 
emphasised that the formation of separate departments increased the fragmentation of 
the voivodship office structure and raised difficulties in the co-ordination of policy as 
communication between the various departments was slower:
There is a need for more co-ordination at the level of directors of departments which was 
not necessary before. That is how it is now and this slightly hinders work. Moreover, the 
amount of information circulating is less, slower and selective, and as a result of some 
personnel changes, some data contains mistakes. There is no reason to exclude the idea that 
this is deliberate and connected to personal relations, but this is secondary.
Earlier it was much easier: first, direct contacts were easier between various sectors. There 
were no reasons for agriculture, or for example, power engineering, to be treated 
differently. They have their own place in the structure of the regional economy and 
therefore should be closely tied to each other. This separation strengthens the pattern of 
‘sectoral Poland’, which was characteristic of the totalitarian system with its case-by-case 
method of governing industry, and I do not think that it is a good move [the formation of 
new departments].
The same director of department also emphasised the substantial increase in costs; for 
example, the rise in the cost of directors’ salaries due to an increase in their number, the 
employment of secretaries for them, and new equipment (faxes, telephones etc). 
However, this view was quite rare, and most of my interviewees believed that the 
formation of additional departments (three) by voivode Ciszak was not significant and 
saw it as an adaptation to the personal preferences of the voivode.
To sum up, the formation of the agricultural department during Ciszak’s tenure showed 
the political significance of agriculture and preserved its privileged status. Generally, 
the establishment of new departments and co-ordinator positions also resembled the 
tendency to bureaucratisation and fragmentation that marked the socialist period.
ii. The personnel policy o f the voivodship office 
Personnel policy will be investigated in relation to five areas:
a. the scale of personnel changes;
b. the typical feature of this period; that is, the politicisation of the administration,
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expressed in such phenomena as perceiving the inner elite (voivode, deputy 
voivode, and director general) as a pool of spoils;
c. the question of who selected the voivodship office elite;
d. political pressure on the voivodship office authoritie;
e. the shift from external channels of appointments during Czech’s rule into internal 
ones during Ciszak’s tenure;
f. delaying the appointment of directors of departments.
a. The scale of personnel changes
During Czech’s tenure, the changes in personnel in the voivodship office were initiated 
by the take-over in the national elite in 1989. Similarly, the 1994 politicisation of the 
voivodship level reflects the phenomenon which occurred at national level but in the 
voivodship office was much more limited in relation to the scale of personnel changes.
In the Katowice voivodship the change of voivode took place after the change from a 
post-Solidarity to a post-communist national elite in 1994. However, after the initial 
total purge in 1990 by voivode Czech, the voivodship office administration as a whole 
was much more stable. At the time of transition there was extreme fluidity at the central 
level; during the post-Solidarity period (1989-1993) prime ministers changed four times 
and during the post-communist period three times (1993-1997). In general, there was 
much lower turnover at voivodship level than at the central level where changes of 
government were accompanied by ministerial changes.
b. The politicisation of the administration -  the inner elite
The changes in the voivodship administration were much more limited, especially 
compared to the purges of Pawlak’s tenure (which included the removal of voivodes and 
the ministerial elite: ministers, deputy ministers, and directors of departments) in the 
same period. It was due to Ciszak’s personnel policy that only a small number of 
directors of departments changed (13 out of 17 directors appointed by his predecessor 
stayed during his tenure). However, the politicisation of administration in the 
voivodship office was still visible in the mainly political criteria applied in the
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appointment of the deputy voivode and the director general with those positions being 
divided according to the spoils.
The appointment of a new Prime Minister, Olesky, at the beginning of March 1995, 
when power within the coalition shifted from the PSL to the SLD, meant that Ciszak’s 
position itself was at risk. The pressure was increased by the efforts of the regional SLD 
elite to reallocate the spoils. The SLD leader, Zaborowski, vigorously attacked Ciszak:
Eugeniusz Ciszak has been a voivode for eight months and that seems to be enough time for 
him to state publicly what his programme is. Up to now it has not been presented. 
Moreover, decisions about personnel have been delayed. For example, in all this time, no 
director of the Department of Privatisation has been appointed. We are watching Ciszak’s 
actions carefully all the time.421
The new chairman of the PSL in the voivodship, Soska,422 united with Zaborowski in 
his criticism423 and issued a warning to the voivode. Moreover, Zaborowski openly 
demanded personnel changes in the voivodship office elite:
The appointment of subordinates is the independent decision of the regional head [voivode] 
although it of course demands political consultations.... The truth is, however, that we have 
some doubts about the directors of certain economic departments, and we have the full right 
to raise them.424
Although, voivode Ciszak publicly declared the apolitical character of the voivodship 
office civil servants,425 the deputy voivode was nevertheless dismissed. However, 
changes in directors of departments were rather limited during his tenure.
c. Who selected the voivodship office elite?
According to Grossner 426 the appointment of the new deputy voivode, Machnik, was a 
decision on which Ciszak was not consulted; Machnik: was chosen by the regional 
coalition MPs, and was then presented to Ciszak. Such weakness in the voivode's 
position, in relation even to the appointment of his deputy, suggests the extreme
421 Ciszak quoted in Dziennik Zachodni, 9 February 1995.
422 Korytko, Gazeta w Katowicach, 31 January 1995.
423 Dziennik Zachodni, 13 March 1995.
424 Zaborowski quoted in Grochowska, Trybuna Slqska, 27 April 1995.
425 Jaworska, Starzynski, Gazeta w Katowicach, 16 March 1995.
426 Grossner Dziennik Slqski, 6-8 June 1995.
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dysfunction at that time of the role of voivode. Moreover, it shows the lack of 
democratic representation at the regional level due to the lack of an elective institution 
and instead reveals the strong, although informal, political pressure of regional MPs. At 
that time, the voivodship assembly, formed by members of local government, was a 
weak institution with extremely limited responsibilities. Thus, the regional MPs had a 
free hand in putting political pressure on the voivode.
Ciszak’s explanation of the dismissal of deputy voivode Wrobel referred to additional 
duties which were to be performed by the new deputy, namely, closer co-operation with 
local government, and work on the preparation of the Regional Contract.427 The 
dismissal of deputy voivode Wrobel caused a strong reaction in the voivodship office: 
the director general of the voivodship office, Klatka, was strongly against Wrobel’s 
dismissal, pointing out that only very general explanations had been provided, which 
made this decision totally unconvincing. He also believed that the position of deputy 
voivode should not be political 428 According to Beblo, deputy voivode Wrobel was the 
only man ensuring the apolitical functioning of the voivodship office after the 
appointment of voivode Ciszak. Beblo declared that he had not tendered his resignation 
in December 1994 as he had been asked by Wrobel to stay, but he did so in May 1995 in 
protest against the political character of Wrobel’s dismissal 429 This shows the strong 
loyalty and even friendship among Czech’s revolutionary-period cadres:
The voivode did not explain his motivation. He only stated that certain posts were to change 
with the change of the political parties in power. There was no assessment of the deputy 
voivode's work. Arguments of merit were not presented. In this situation, I cannot perform 
my duties. Yesterday’s events were no surprise to me.430
This strong protest against Wrobel’s dismissal suggests post-Solidarity’s exclusiveness 
in appointments. The strict division of the pool of spoils was described by them as a 
return to the nomenklatura system. They believed that politicians should not change 
administrative staff too often, and that the evaluation of civil servants, should 
concentrate on qualifications and achievements rather than on their political affiliations. 
However, after post-Solidarity lost the parliamentary election in 1993, a change of 
philosophy took place and in 1997 they considered it natural to dismiss Ciszak as a
427 Filipowicz Trybuna Slqska, 1 June 1995.
428 Filipowicz Trybuna Slqska, 1 June 1995.
429 Gazeta w Katowicach, 31 May 1995.
430 Beblo, quoted in Filipowicz, Trybuna Slqska, 1 June 1995.
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result of their victory in the national election.
A different opinion on deputy voivode's position as a political one was presented by the 
appointee Machnik, who believed that voivode and deputy voivode appointments should 
reflect election results:
These [voivode and deputy voivode] posts should be held by those who take responsibility 
for ruling the country and the region. My colleagues [ruling coalition MPs from the 
voivodship] felt that we should have certain responsibilities in our voivodship. On the other 
hand, we [SLD] did not persist. When the voivode became a PSL candidate, we accepted 
this decision.431
The new deputy voivode, Zygmunt Machnik, was an SLD member, and like voivode 
Ciszak, a coalminer. His appointment not only confirmed the SLD’s rising position after 
the change of prime minister but also the crucial position of the coalmining lobby. For 
nearly a decade after his graduation, Machnik had worked at a scientific institute of 
management (this resembled Ciszak’s academic experience; like Ciszak he had 
graduated from the local Technical University of Silesia432). When he was promoted to 
deputy voivode, he had several years’ experience in management, having been a director 
of a state company in the period 1985-1992. Then, in 1992 he was chosen as a 
councillor. As a result, at the time of his appointment he had had three years’ experience 
of work in local administration and a year as town mayor of Czeladz in the D^browa 
part of the voivodship. Thus, although he had never worked in public administration, he 
already had some administrative experience due to his work in local government.
In December 1996, a new director general, Wiltos, was appointed in the wake of the 
purges by the Minister of Internal Affairs, Miller.433 He had extensive previous contacts 
with administration as he had 26 years’ experience of work in the voivodship office, and 
previous experience of managerial work, having been a director of the legal department 
since 1983. His education as a lawyer also seemed relevant to his work in the 
administration. To sum up, all three careers differed from the revolutionary period’s 
appointment of outsiders to the inner administrative elite of the voivodship office, as 
practised during Czech’s tenure.
431 Machnik quoted in Gazeta w Katowicach, 5 June 1995.
432 The analysis of the voivodship office and local government elite suggests that this regional university 
was essential in the preparation of the regional elite, as it seems that at least 80 per cent graduated from
this university.
433 Gazeta w Katowicach, 22 January 1997.
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Moreover, the fact that voivode Ciszak did not participate in the selection of either of his 
deputy voivodes (Wrobel had been appointed by Czech, and Machnik was appointed by 
the regional political elite) had a strong impact on the restrained relations between the 
voivode and his deputies. The same can be said of the directors of departments, the 
majority of whom were not selected by Ciszak but by Czech. The elements of distrust 
were present especially between the voivode and his deputy and this affected the work 
of the voivodship office. A member of the regional administrative elite recollected:
Co-operation between the voivode and the deputy voivode was the basis of good 
functioning in the voivodship office. It is a pity that when voivode Ciszak arrived it was 
already not working well. Wrobel tried to carry out his ideas as he had done during Czech’s 
tenure. He carried them out without consulting with voivode Ciszak, but voivode Ciszak had 
different ideas and ways of dealing with them. I do not know how it was exactly. In any 
case, there was conflict and later it was the same. Perhaps it wasn’t so bad with Machnik, 
but he was not a person whom the voivode trusted... It is the case that the voivode takes 
personal responsibility for handling business. When the voivode is politically appointed 
from one party and the deputy is from a different political party or anyway is politically 
appointed, it is very bad. The deputy should be the voivode's right-hand man.
d. Political pressure on the voivodship office authorities
The politicisation of administration was present both in the application of the pool of 
spoils to the appointments of the inner elite, and in political pressure executed by the 
regional MPs on the voivodship office. There were even open public declarations that 
the regional political elite of the ruling coalition had ambitions to influence the 
functioning of the voivodship office. My interviewees also pointed out the regional 
political elite’s efforts to influence its functioning directly.
This politicisation of administration was mentioned by the voivodship office elite, 
irrespective of their political views (post-Solidarity and post-communist). However, 
members of the regional elite from Solidarity origins saw politicisation as linked to the 
post-communist period. One of the regional administrative elite’s member indicated the 
politicisation of administration as a whole during Pawlak’s rule. The same person also 
indicated the changes in ministries at the central level and the politicisation of the 
voivodship office itself: politicisation of their actions and politicisation of 
appointments.434 This director of the voivodship office elite also emphasised the
434 Compare also the regional administrative elite opinions that the appointments of voivode Ciszak and 
Machnik were politically driven.
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different styles of the personnel changes in the administrations of the post-Solidarity 
governments in contrast to Pawlak’s. In his opinion, the post-Solidarity governments 
had a more amateurish character. Their priority was not retaining power; rather, they 
concentrated on solving problems (and appointing experts), with strict appointment of 
their own cadres considered secondary:
It was noticeable until September 1993 that these governments were -  I would say -  
amateurish, in the positive meaning of that word. It was not their main aim to strengthen 
their power. They were enthusiastic and they behaved emotionally. They tried to solve 
problems. They did not come from the harsh school of fighting to regain power and thus 
they directed little effort to this issue. There were of course frequent changes of voivodes 
but these were not according to the spoils system, not as it is now. I do not know if it is a 
good thing that political membership now counts for much more.
The Minister of Finance in Mazowiecki’s government, Balcerowicz, the architect of the 
economic reform, drew a distinction between traditional politicians and people who 
entered the elite in a period of radical political changes. The last were more concerned 
with transforming the system than with staying in power:435
There are, in my opinion, fundamentally two types of politician. The first type is a person 
professionally trained to take up a political position, who shapes his actions in a certain way 
to keep his post. The second arrives in particular conditions, such as in Poland and other 
post-socialist countries in 1989. He is a politician directed to solving particular issues, 
especially in situations where problems normally do not appear with such intensity ... I was 
then interested in the task, which I declared that I would carry out.436
The above opinion resembles that of a member of the regional administrative elite and 
seems typical of the post-Solidarity groups. This suggests that the change from post- 
Solidarity to post-communist governments also meant a change of priorities, with 
personnel policy playing a crucial role, and being in power dominating over the 
introduction of reforms.
During my interviews, the political pressure on the regional administrative elite was 
often mentioned. It was often suggested in relation to the position of voivode, through 
whom influence on the voivodship office was to be extended. Moreover, the director of 
one department mentioned attempts to put pressure on him directly, and he referred to 
phone-calls from regional MPs trying to influence the appointment of civil servants 
sympathetic to their policies:
435 After the 1993 victory of the post-communists, Balcerowicz substantially modified his opinion and 
appreciated the need to retain power.
Balcerowicz quoted in Toranska 1994: 15.
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Till September [1993, the time of the parliamentary election] I had no phonecalls from 
Senators and MPs presenting personnel propositions. Since September I have had phone­
calls from Senators and MPs with various propositions. This shows the ‘personalisation’ of 
positions. It is a fight for posts. In administration, the emphasis shifted to personnel 
matters; it is not what he thinks but who he is [to what party he belongs].
This seems to mirror the politicisation of the administration which was initiated by 
Pawlak at the central level. The appearance of those phonecalls since 1993 also suggests 
a shift of the previous voivodship office’s loyalty from central government towards the 
voivodship coalition parties (which were making the phonecalls). This tradition of 
intervention also resembles Grudzien’s tenure (1970-1980) when intervention was 
crucial to maintaining political supervision over the voivodship administrations.
In the opinion of this director, the scale of politicisation was so noticeable after the 1993 
election because, from the beginning, Pawlak began the systematic appointment of 
sympathisers of the victorious coalition down to the lowest level of the pyramid, the 
‘borough’. During the post-Solidarity government, there had previously been 
politicisation but it was not systematic and ended at voivode level:
Of course there were changes of voivodes, many changes [during the post-Solidarity 
period], but these were not according to the pool of spoils due to a coalition agreement that 
down to positions in X ‘borough’ everybody had to be appointed according to the pool of 
spoils. I did not see strong pressure on the voivode before ... Now personnel issues have 
become much more important than they were. I do not know whether this is good or bad, 
but there is much more talk about personnel issues than there was before.
Olejniczak, Czech’s spokesman and devoted sympathiser after his dismissal, 
commented on the strong shift toward politicisation during Ciszak’s tenure:
There is no end to the differences between Ciszak and Czech. The latter finally decisively 
resisted political pressure, believing that he was under the direct supervision of the Prime 
Minister and that he himself represented the state interest, that is, he was a representative of 
the Third Republic. Ciszak understands his role differently. He often meets with regional 
political parties, talks, listens and asks for their advice. Relying on any political force 
means dependence and dependence means vulnerability to their political pressure.437
The politicisation of Ciszak’s tenure is also demonstrated by his strong political 
dependence on the regional political parties of the ruling coalition and his clientism. For 
example, his presence during the pre-election meeting in Sosnowiec with SLD 
candidates for councillor (before the election in June 1994) was interpreted as his wish
437 Pustulka, Dziennik Zachodni, 13 March 1995.
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to gain the support of the other coalition party, the regional SLD elite. During my 
interviews it was also stated that voivode Ciszak intervened to change decisions by 
directors of departments, especially according to the wishes of outside clients:
On the other hand, during Czech’s tenure, the director of a department decided for himself 
and the voivode did not force him to do anything else. Later, the new voivode came. He did 
not really know the people. As a result, it was difficult for him to trust them, so he looked 
into details. And this looking into details most often occurred when somebody came to the 
voivode with a problem, claiming that a director had not solved his problem as he wanted. 
Sometimes, the director of the department did not even hear that somebody had intervened, 
as he came directly to the voivode. The voivode started to solve these problems, and this 
complicated the issue -  although not that much.
It seems that being influenced by different regional groups was causing voivode Ciszak 
to blur the division of responsibilities between the voivode and deputy voivode (as well 
as to intervene in how issues were dealt with by directors of departments). During 
Czech’s tenure there had been a clear division of responsibilities between him and his 
deputy, and this was strictly adhered to. When voivode Ciszak arrived, he accepted the 
voivodship office structure prepared by his predecessor, and there were no changes even 
after Machnik’s arrival. However, the structure was not adhered to. This was due to 
clientism, in addition to political division, the suggestion being made that there was no 
trust between the voivode and the deputy voivode as they represented different parties 
even though they were from the same ruling coalition.
The elite of nomenklatura origins considered politicisation as no different in the post­
communist and the post-Solidarity periods, and that it was normal behaviour. 
Politicisation did not apply only in public administration -  ministers or voivodes -  but 
also took place in local government, when mayors were changed according to local 
election results. One of my interviewees believed that after 1989 political affiliation was 
not enough to outweigh the professional qualifications and abilities of appointees. 
However, he added that apolitical professionals could not be appointed as political 
affiliations were crucial, and that the voivode's personnel policy was also under 
pressure.
Competence determines recruitment. However, someone who is extremely competent but 
does not belong to a certain party does not have any chance [to be recruited]. Only the 
person who is competent and who is from that political group has a chance, and this is how 
it works. In this sense, we can talk of the politicisation of public administration. That means 
that the voivode, after all, is under various kinds of pressure.
438 Dziennik Zachodni, 15 June 1994.
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The main difference between the post-Solidarity period and post-communist 
politicisation, the same respondent believed, was the return of people who had been in 
power during the socialist period. During the socialist period, the current post-Solidarity 
elite was not, as in democratic countries, in opposition (not due to election results which 
reflected the wish of society), but it was persecuted before 1989 and their members 
were often in prison. Thus, the political division between persecutors and persecuted 
endured for a long time. The return to power of the post-communists was deeply-felt 
and sometimes raised moral doubts about whether they had the right to be in power. It is 
interesting that this sense of social stigma and isolation was emphasised by the elite of 
nomenklatura origins. As a member of the voivodship office elite stated:
Because of this [the situation in the eighties] ‘we’ were the opposition and ‘they’ were in 
power, ‘we’ were in prison while ‘they’ were in office and so on. I think this is a bad 
situation but understandable. It will end when this, or maybe the next generation matures 
and starts to rule the country.
This interviewee also pointed out that in democratic states it was accepted that any 
party, even the post-communists could win elections. Moreover, he explained that 
victory for left-wing parties was natural at times of rapid transition, causing the rise of 
poverty in society. The socialist ideology was, therefore, enjoying strong support. 
However, he also mentioned that the election victory of the left brought a return to 
power of those who had ruled during the socialist period, the nomenklatura, as the post­
communists did not have sufficient new cadres.
These words also indicate that the political divisions were not caused only by 
differences of opinion about current economic and political issues, but that the historical 
experience of the socialist period was a significant factor. The ascendance to power of 
the post-communists was seen as being different from a victory of any other party 
because of their social associations with the nomenklatura cadres, and the socialist style 
of ruling, which meant that society was much more critical of them. In his opinion, only 
when a new cadre appears, after a decade or more, will those historic divisions no 
longer be important:439
439 This view described behaviour similar to that which was observable in the inter-war period, when 
differences between the Korfanty and Grazynski elite could be traced to the conflict during the Third 
Silesian Rising and the then-existing political divisions.
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As a result of the situation in which a lot of people had become poor because of the 
transition, the left won. It is a fact that some positions were then taken by people who had 
previously been secretaries of the voivodship committee, which is rather shocking. This is a 
temporary situation as at the moment this is the only cadre the left has. In ten years' time 
this cadre will not exist. If the left after some time wins an election, then it will have totally 
different people. I believe the present situation has been exaggerated and that this 
generalisation is based on worry, but this is just a normal [provisional] situation.
e. Internal channel for appointments
Ciszak’s rule was, in general, a continuation of Czech’s personnel policy, as a majority 
of the directors of departments (13 out of 17) had been appointed by his predecessor and 
remained in office during his tenure.440 However, in the inner elite -  the deputy voivode 
and director general -  changes did take place, but they did not occur directly after 
Ciszak’s appointment. Deputy voivode Wrobel remained for more than a year after 
Czech’s dismissal, till 31 May 1995, and his dismissal occurred under pressure from the 
regional SLD. The situation was similar to a later event when the director general was 
changed at the time of Miller’s purges of these positions in most voivodship offices. 
The dismissal of deputy voivode Wrobel at the end of May 1995 was preceded by 
changes in three high positions of the voivodship office: first, the director of 
privatisation (a crucial position in the voivodship office) was dismissed, albeit as a 
result of external administrative control by the Highest Supervision Chamber. The two 
others who were dismissed his spokesman and the director of cabinet positions, which 
seem to be natural changes after the appointment of a new voivode.
These rather limited changes of voivodship office elite seem to be related mostly to the 
lack of voivode Ciszak’s own cadre. It also seems that Ciszak believed in the stability of 
administrative cadres -  directors of departments and the deputy voivode. Thus, the 
changes of the voivodship office elite were mostly conducted as a result of the external 
pressure exerted by the regional political elite. The other reason explaining these limited 
changes of directors of departments was that there was an extremely limited number of 
available managerial personnel. At that time, work in the administration continued to be 
perceived as unattractive because of particularly poor salaries and very low prestige, 
according to the respondents. This could be the main reason for the limited number of 
dismissals and the domination of internal promotion within the voivodship office. One
440 Letter of voivode Ciszak to Editor, Gazeta Wyborcza. 22 January 1997.
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interviewee, when defining the main criteria for the appointment of directors, replied: 
‘negative, negative’. Thus, this last mentioned reason seems to be the main cause of the 
limited changes of administration, rather than voivode Ciszak’s declared need for 
continuity of administrative personnel and the establishment of civil servant cadres.
The limited changes of the voivodship office elite were also caused by the fact that 
Ciszak knew that his position among the regional elite was extremely weak. Ciszak was 
not, for example, even consulted by the regional political elite about the appointment of 
his deputy. Moreover, he did not have the personality of voivode Czech and did not 
have the chance to attract professionals from outside the voivodship office, with one or 
two exceptions. The main exceptions were the politically highly influential positions of 
directors in the departments of the economy, and of privatisation where highly qualified 
newcomers entered the administration. In many other cases, the desire to remain 
professionals often meant the appointment of deputy directors to the position of 
directors.
The limited administrative changes to the voivodship office personnel and the 
appointment of former deputies to positions of directors, some of whom had worked in 
administration for several years 0nomenklatura cadres), suggest a change of personnel 
policy. They represent a shift from the radical changes of the revolutionary period, 
when three quarters of directors were outsiders, to internal channels of appointments 
and personnel stabilisation. This has an important impact on the re-definition of 
administrative roles, with some return to the socialist period view of administration. 
However, it seems that policies shaped during Czech’s tenure maintained quite a 
significant role because of the preservation of cadres appointed by him. It is also worth 
noting that in many countries -  in Italy, for example -  seniority is the main mechanism 
of recruitment for managerial posts in administration.441
f. Delaying the appointment of directors of departments
The last feature of Ciszak’s personnel policy to be examined is the delaying of the 
appointment of directors of departments. This was similar to Prime Minister Pawlak’s
441 Putnam, 1976.
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policy, although it was less prominent in the voivodship office than in central 
administration due to Ciszak’s efforts. However, the delay of appointments is a specific 
feature of the restoration period as the main cause was the political bargains within the 
coalition over the political spoils. The most striking example of these delays in 
appointments was evident in the formation of a few departments without the 
appointment of directors. As a result, in most of these new departments the directors 
were appointed to work in proxy and were only approved as directors after eight or nine 
months.442 This indicates one more feature of restoration: a lack of vision of the future 
and thus the wish to preserve the state of being provisional, where nobody is responsible 
for his actions.
4.5 The dismissal of voivode Ciszak in November 1997
On 22 November 1997, as a result of the post-Solidarity victory (AWS and UW) in the 
October 1997 parliamentary election, voivode Ciszak was dismissed due to 
constitutional arrangements accepted in summer 1997 by the then-ruling PSL-SLD 
coalition with the support of the post-Solidarity Freedom Union. The Constitution 
recognised the position of voivode as political. This constitutional arrangement ended a 
prolonged period of uncertainty about the distinction between administrative and 
political positions, which was now finally defined. As a result, a change of power after 
parliamentary elections was to be accompanied by the compulsory tendering of 
resignations by voivodes and deputy voivodes.U3
To sum up his tenure, voivode Ciszak expressed great self-satisfaction:
I would not like anybody to think that I am uncritical of myself but I do not feel any lack of 
self-fulfilment. It is only painful to me that economic processes are so slow.444
On the other hand, Ciszak’s view of the change in the position of voivode differed from 
that of voivode Czech. For him, a shift in position after an election defined as political 
was a natural feature of democratic rule and he calmly accepted the handing over of
442 Despite the fact that they had managerial and administrative experience, as they often worked as 
deputy directors.
443 Janicki, Wladyka, Polityka, 11 October 1997.
444 Ciszak quoted in Dziennik Zachodni, 10 October 1997.
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power to the former post-Solidarity opposition:
In my life I have served in many posts. I know well that there is a time for promotion and a 
time for dismissal. That should always to be taken into account. That is the natural order.445
Conclusion
Ciszak’s rule displays many features common to restoration. This is evident in his view 
of the role of the regional administration and the voivode. In contrast to Czech, he was 
satisfied with the preservation of heavy centralisation and with the voivode's being a 
passive agent of central government. Moreover, Ciszak’s tenure also meant the attempt 
of the coalmining elite to regain its prominence by delaying the heavy industry reforms. 
Finally, Ciszak adapted the socialist style of administrative rule, looking for political 
patronage in the region.
445 Ciszak quoted in Dziennik Zachodni, 10 October 1997.
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CHAPTER 5
CAN ‘WE THE PEOPLE’ RULE IN UPPER SILESIA?
THE TRANSFORMED LOCAL ADMINISTRATION, 1990-1997
Introduction
This chapter concentrates on the re-establishment of local government institutions and 
the arrival of the new local government elite of the Katowice voivodship. The 
description of local government focuses on four events: the 1990 and the 1994 local 
elections, the Pilot Programme and the establishment of the Big Towns. The local 
elections were crucial to the setting up of a new local elite and its stabilisation. The Pilot 
Programme and the establishment of the Big Towns represented a gradualist approach to 
further local government reform. Indeed, there were some evident retreats from the 
reform which were clearly reflected in the lower administrative performance of 
communes. All these events had a fundamental influence on the self-perception of the 
local elite their attitudes towards central administration, and their opinions on the 
necessity of further administrative reform.
5.1 ‘An administrative initiation’ -  the first democratic election
The local government elite in the Katowice voivodship presents itself as a strong and 
confident regional force. This confidence was drawn from its first success of highly 
effective administrative performance even though most of the councillors only started in 
this line of work following the 1990 election. The administrative initiation will be 
considered in relation to three significant features of this election; first, the decision of 
members of the regional Solidarity opposition to engage in public life and stand in the 
local government election in 1990 despite their lack of administrative experience; 
second, the plebiscite nature of this election, which was primarily a choice between the 
ruling nomenklatura and the Solidarity opposition; third, the clean-cut change of elite 
may be described as power being taken over by the new post-Solidarity elite. In
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addition, a specific feature of the regional local government, its close ties with the 
Upper Silesian Union, will be underlined. Finally, economic data indicating its positive 
economic performance, especially when compared with public administration, will be 
presented. This is investigated because the local government elite’s conviction of its 
effective administrative performance was one of the crucial factors influencing its self­
perception, attitudes toward administration in general and attitudes towards further 
administrative reform.
i. Engagement in public life -  political choice
Most of the local government elite in office at the end of the second term in 1998 started 
work in local government in 1990 after the May election. This was the pivotal event in 
the emergence of the new local government elite, with eight of the 13 mayors of the 
Katowice voivodship Big Towns being elected at that time: (Chorzow, Bytom, Dqbrowa 
Gomiczna, Gliwice, Ruda Slqska, Rybnik, Swiqtochlowice and Zabrze).
This election was the first free election after 40 years of socialism, and from that 
moment local government broke free of its subordination to higher levels of public 
administration as communes gained financial and legal discretion. This essential 
freedom from subordination to a higher level of public administration was described by 
Urbanczyk, mayor of Zabrze since 1990, as a factor fundamentally transforming its 
functioning. Communes gained the freedom to choose on the spot what they thought 
was good for them. Consequently, local government has been crucial to the 
development of democracy as have been the inhabitants who selected councillors and 
participated in the decision-making process instead of fulfilling the wishes of the centre 
{voivode), as had until then been the case. In Urbanczyk’s words:
This is a great power: one depends only on his conscience and on legal regulations. It is an 
unheard of thing that we can say ‘no’ to a voivode.
While we do not depend on the voivode, we do depend on the people who elected us... That 
means that we listen to the people.446
446 Urbanczyk, Nasza Gazeta, no. 2, 1996.
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The local government elite, like their national counterparts, decided to engage in public 
life by standing for election. They recognised the political transition initiated by the 
Round Table Agreement and the national election in 1989 as historic events:
For me it was evident that in 1989 we faced a historic opportunity, the kind which appears
in the history of nations only once in several hundred years, and that it would be a big sin
« • 447not to use this opportunity.
They decided to stand for election, despite the Polish tradition condemning this type of 
activity as being associated with collaboration with communists or, before that, with the 
authorities of the partitioning powers.448
Thus, the new local government elite, like the voivodship office elite and the national 
one, did not have any previous administrative experience. This situation reveals another 
interesting phenomenon in general society and among the Solidarity opposition and its 
leaders, that is, the poor knowledge they had about the administration, its institutions 
and how it functions. Until 1988-1989 Solidarity had limited its actions to being in 
opposition, not imagining the situation of taking power. The proposals for local 
government reform were prepared only by tiny groups of academics while the 
opposition definitely did not have any cadres prepared. Only in December 1988 was the 
first Citizens’ Committee formed as the shadow cabinet and in April, two months before 
the June 1989 national election, regional Citizens’ Committees were formed in 
preparation for the election.
Despite the fact that there was relatively more time to prepare for the local election in 
May 1990 as compared to the national one, my interviews confirmed that the decision to 
stand for this election was still rather a political choice. On the whole, the future town 
mayors regarded their decision to participate in the 1990 elections as their national duty 
and as the natural consequence of their political activity in the opposition movement 
against the communist authorities. They did not mention any other motive, although one 
can also suspect the desire to follow a professional administrative career as being at 
least part of the attraction. However, this was not the case as they did not have even a 
basic knowledge of how the administration functioned.
447 Balcerowicz quoted in Toranska 1994: 18.
448 Davies, 1984.
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Thus, the arrival of the new regional (as well as central) elite was related to a sense of 
historic mission, as the events happening in Poland at that time were seen by the elite as 
extraordinary. Moreover, after forty years without any independent administrative 
institutions, the town mayor did not have a clear understanding of administrative 
functioning in general, or of local government in particular. The following three 
quotations from my interviews are highly typical:
I have not been connected with this type of activity before, as I would say that local 
government was, in general, not known here. I was slightly involved in politics through 
opposition activity, but not in local government.
The opinion below of another mayor shows a similar poor knowledge of administration 
and a striking similarity of career:
The political changes in the eighties, especially in 1989 and 1990, interested me then more 
as an engineer than as a politician. I read the Act on Local Government just after it was 
published. Although at that time it did not give too much knowledge, I entered the Citizens’ 
Committees movement and became a member.
This lack of knowledge about administration was exacerbated by the traditional attitude 
of distrust towards state and its administration. For example, one of the mayors declared 
that during the socialist period he tried to distance himself even from contacts with the 
administrative institutions and did not know how the administration functioned, or why 
it existed at all:
I had never been in any administrative office. I do not even remember that I ever had any 
dealing with one, or that I ever knew how an [administrative] office functioned and here I 
was, a chief of Solidarity... And after the victory in the Contract Diet [in 1989], I heard 
about local government. Everybody was talking about local government...
Accordingly, as their main qualifications were the virtues of anti-socialism and national 
opposition, these had to substitute for the lack of specific administrative qualifications 
and experience.
ii. The plebiscite nature o f this election
In general, mayors’ decisions to stand in these elections were, according to my 
interviews, based on political participation in actions aimed at decreasing communist
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power, which had started at central level with the national elections in 1989. This desire 
to remove nomenklatura was so strong that the issue of local politics was completely 
absent from the 1990 local elections:
The first election was a bit strange... As a group, we stood ‘against’ the left, against the 
authority which had ruled until then. We won in local government (and I, of course, was in 
this group among the local government candidates). In the case of town ... this was 95 per 
cent against the authorities then in power.
The quotation below is also a vivid illustration of the wish to vote against the long- 
resident ruling of communist authorities:
This was a plebiscite, not a local government election. Thus, the names were not important; 
only the political ‘logos’ [such as Solidarity or communist] counted.
This view of the 1990 elections as action against the ruling nomenklatura was shared by 
the post-communist mayor:
I was not here, as I mentioned. I was working out of the country in the diplomatic service. 
Nevertheless, it is not difficult to guess what this election was. It is difficult to call it an 
election, as in the whole of Poland this was, in principle, a plebiscite as there was a rejection 
of what had happened before 1990. It was, above all, tied to the hopes that things would be 
different, that they would be better.
To sum up, local government elections accordingly took the form of a plebiscite against 
the local nomenklatura, that ruled prior to the parliamentary election in 1989. In the 
Katowice voivodship, as in Poland as a whole, the Citizens’ Committees won.
iii. The new post-Solidarity elite
The 1990 election totally broke the hold of the local nomenklatura elite, which was 
replaced by the Solidarity movement elite of inexperienced outsiders. For example, in 
Gliwice, 43 out of 50 seats were taken by the Citizens’ Committees; in Ruda Slqska, the 
results were even more in favour of Solidarity as they took 43 out of the 45 seats.449
449 According to data presented in interviews.
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In this respect, the election differed from those in more advanced democracies, where 
civil society is more developed and in local elections various political options and 
interests are presented. Indeed, by the time the next local elections were held in 1994, 
some elements of social diversification were seen in the appearance of various political 
parties and electoral committees.
The quotation below of one of my respondents emphasises another typical feature of the 
1990 election -  the difficulty of selecting able candidates due to the sudden political 
changes that started only in the aftermath of the Round Table negotiations. Thus, the 
lack of able candidates in the Citizens’ Committees in the Katowice voivodship was 
typical of Poland as a whole.
In 1990, the Citizens’ Committees, to which I belonged, were looking for candidates for 
councillors. At that time, this search was not easy and there were difficulties in finding 
people. When the lists were due to close they were still short of able people qualified for 
this type of work. Just as the lists were nearly closed my colleagues from the old Solidarity 
came to me and exerted such pressure that I agreed to stand in the local government 
election. I agreed only under pressure as they were short of people.
Szczepanski and Nawrocki (1995) quote one of the councillors of Tychy to the effect 
that even in Big Towns there was enormous difficulty in forming independent teams of 
candidates for councillors:
It was total tragedy! Literally everybody was afraid. There was no other solution than to 
catch people in the streets and urge them to stand for the [towns] council if they more or 
less fulfilled the conditions... We tried to adopt the widest formula, to go as ‘an umbrella 
party’ and win.450
iv. The Upper Silesian Union mobilisation
Consequently, one political option, the Upper Silesian Union, which entered the Citizens’ 
Committees movement with an appreciation of the importance of the local elections, 
proposed its own candidates and easily gained dominance in the voivodship.451 Such strong 
domination by the regional association over the Citizens’ Committees in a voivodship 
seems to be the exception. However, it is understandable, in the light of strong religious
450 Szczepanski, Nawrocki 1995: 96.
451 Blasiak, Dziennik Zachodni, 14-16 January 1994.
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emphasis and the prominent role of the Catholic church in the Upper Silesian Union. Close 
links between the opposition and the Catholic church were also present in other 
voivodships, where members of the Clubs of Catholic Intelligentsia were on voivodship 
councils of the Citizens’ Committees. In fact, in Przemysl, a member of the Bishop’s Curia 
was on the voivodship council.452
Mayors connected to the Upper Silesian Union shared with other Solidarity leaders an 
opposition past (compare the two quotations below). However, they also emphasised the 
need to engage in the public life of the region as their motivation for standing in local 
elections. This second argument seems to confirm a difference between the Polish 
partitions’ territories. In the case of Prussian Poland, the introduction of democratic 
institutions came much earlier than in the other two partitions. The existence of this 
democratic tradition, as indicated in my interviews, led to the need to engage in the 
public life of the region and their towns. This was emphasised more often and more 
strongly by members of the Upper Silesian Union (or native Silesians). In other words, 
as regards motivation to stand for election, in the majority of interviews with Upper 
Silesian Union members, the fact that they belonged to the Solidarity opposition and 
regional concerns were underlined as equally important.
When in 1990 Solidarity won in Poland we thought about this with our close acquaintances 
[Silesians] and I decided to run for local government in the election. I was chosen to be on 
the council...
The other Silesian I interviewed also strongly emphasised the need to participate in the 
public life of the region and his town:
Officially, I started to participate in local government in 1990. I became a councillor and 
from the beginning I participated in organising self-government administration. Before 
[during socialist period], the only way for me to express activity, to participate in the public 
life of the region, which could be in neither political nor economic organisations, was in 
tourist organisations, some cultural associations or in the Upper Silesian Union. In any case, 
it was not political activity, since politics, as an activity [in which I would to be involved] 
was against the official policy of the state and could not be carried on.
Activity, in accordance with state policy, was, for me and many other people, alien. So 
those who did not want to be persuaded by an ideology alien to us [society] could stay at 
home and do nothing or act in areas where the state did not exert such strong pressure. 
Thus, I was active in the Polish Association of Tourism and Hiking, in professional 
organisations like the Associations of Engineers and Technicians of the Chemical Industry 
and so on. In areas such as these, people found a place under the former system for public 
activity.
452 Rykowki 1993: 15.
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Mayors connected with the Upper Silesian Union also emphasised that their decisions to 
stand in the elections were in reaction to the social passivity forced on them during the 
socialist period by the monopolisation of public life by the nomenklatura. Under 
socialism, they mentioned that they had very sharply experienced the fact that they were 
forbidden to engage in the public life of the region. This was also strengthened by their 
view of Upper Silesia as being ruled by an alien during the socialist period.
In the former system there was a stereotype of what was required of a citizen of the Polish 
State, which was that he would grant infinite trust to the Polish United Working Party. He 
would work scrupulously in his place of work and not worry about anything. All issues 
would be solved by a town council and a party committee established in each town....
In 1990 we came to power with the belief that local government is a representative of local 
community in the area where the members of the community live and that this community 
was to decide about itself.
The pace of change in the aftermath of the first parliamentary election in 1989 and then 
in 1990 led to the election on the national and regional level of the Solidarity movement 
elite, who had hardly any administrative qualification or training. This illustrates the 
quotation below from the Parikow article representing a quite typical opinion of a 
member of parliament (a member of the national elite) about the lack of professional 
experience which was to be a common feature of the elite of the transitional period:
As politicians we are still very unprofessional, as this is a typical quasi-revolutionary period 
when careers are quickly formed.453
According to Pokladecki (1995: 74), the first local election concentrated on the removal 
of the old system, which led to the accidental membership of various political groups in 
the communes. Many of the councillors elected in 1990 recollected that when they came 
to office they had neither any experience nor comprehensive knowledge of local 
government or of work in the administration. As a result, one third of them declared 
themselves to be incompetent while 61.9 per cent declared that they had a lot to learn.454 
The local government elite of the Katowice voivodship also declared during my 
interviews their lack of professional qualifications and need to learn ‘on the job’. As one 
mayor stated:
453 Pank6wl994: 164.
454 Pokladecki, 1995.
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In relation to our knowledge about the functioning of communes, when we were elected we 
started to learn in the same way as one can say doctors learn how to operate only on the 
living bodies of their patients. None of the councillors elected in 1989 had any experience 
in this area. Moreover, I reckon that our experience was the ideas which we had earlier 
espoused [when we were in opposition].
As a result, the mayors learned only after the local elections. Only one person was an 
exception, as he had been on an apprenticeship abroad, organised before this election; 
this was a result of his own initiative. The remaining councillors elected at that time 
learned after the election, ‘on the job’, and on state-organised courses, such as, for 
example, ‘Wings for Democracy’, with the co-operation of foreign specialists.
The specific town in question was Zabrze, where administrative stability was preserved 
after the 1990 election. The last communist mayor retained his position for a year after 
the election, to facilitate the handing over of power to the Solidarity mayor who was 
also a member of the Upper Silesian Union, despite the fact that either of these 
organisations could have proposed their own candidate from the beginning.
The last council [in the period 1990-1994] was able to achieve such a decided majority that 
this made possible one of the most efficient and stable rules in Zabrze. For the first year, the 
former mayor was again chosen by the town council; later he was dismissed and another 
mayor was chosen. The plan was not to destroy everything in the beginning, not to introduce 
everything from the beginning, so the former mayor, who was an appointed mayor [the 
mayor before the 1990 election -  a nomenklatura mayor], was retained. But it should be 
acknowledged that he worked very well for the benefit of Zabrze. He was a real local 
government activist, but he could not have acted differently before [during the socialist 
period]. Although he was dismissed after a year, he looked back on his last year as the time 
of his best work because there were no [intervention] phone-calls from the party, from the 
town or the voivodship committees.
In other towns, the first term was more turbulent, with one mayor recollecting that the 
board changed twice. Changes were not caused, according to him, due to rational 
arguments but were tied to the strong distrust which developed during the time in 
opposition, and they turned against their own former Solidarity leaders:
Those first years of local government were very turbulent. Twice during the first term the 
board was changed and what happened in the ‘X' local government was heard about in all 
Silesia. That was a pity; it was very uncomfortable in general. All the participants in these 
events have bad memories of this term. The board was certainly pure Solidarity; the mayor 
and the only deputy were symbols of underground Solidarity. He [the mayor] was dismissed 
in unacceptable circumstances.
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Many mayors who were in office during my interviews were appointed after about 
nearly a year of work in local government (after they had shown their skill) and they 
remained in these positions for a long time, through the second local election. Nearly 
half the existing mayors were appointed during the first term (1990-1994); those in 
Chorzow, Gliwice, Rybnik, Swi^tochlowice and Zabrze. Moreover, in Bytom, Dqbrowa 
Gomicza and Katowice, the existing mayors had been deputy mayors during the first 
term. In 1994, in recognition of their success during the first term, they were chosen for 
the second term (1994-1998). This indicates that although standing for the position of 
councillors was often casual, during the first term a crystallisation of the local 
government elite was already taking place and the majority of the first term’s leaders 
remained in power in the second term.
v. Economic performance
Despite the lack of administrative experience on the part of the local government elite in 
Poland as a whole, it has demonstrated high efficiency since the beginning of the 
nineties. This economic efficiency of local government was achieved despite the very 
limited financial resources which were available during that period.
Since 1990 -  the beginning of the transition -  local governments were suddenly 
burdened with the new task of renewing the local infrastructure. At the same time, the 
economic conditions of society worsened while the expectation of social assistance rose. 
The worsening of the financial conditions of society was primarily related to the first 
bankruptcies in the industrial sector and the appearance of unemployment for the first 
time since the Second World War. Moreover, this transition liquidated the best sources 
of budgetary income which had previously come from state-owned industries. As a 
result, new sources of revenue had to be found by both central and local administrations. 
According to Surazaka (1993), local government seemed to adapt better to new 
conditions and the financial performance of local government was significantly better 
than the economic improvements achieved by the central government.
The balance of the central budget by Mazowiecki’s government in 1990 was, to a large 
extent, achieved by transferring the deficit from the central government to the
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communes by means of transferring additional responsibilities to the local level (some 
health and educational services). In 1991, the first year of independent local budgets, 
despite an 11 per cent drop in subsidies, the communes preserved an economic balance 
and often achieved a financial surplus.
Table 7. Dynamics of local and central budgets in Poland, 1991455
Revenues Minus Expenditures
Central Budget Local Budget
First quarter -6.127 3.555
Second quarter -13.150 5.811
Third quarter -22.377 6.426
Fourth quarter -30.973 5.244
A large proportion of local expenditure was also spent on investment -  25 per cent more 
than planned by the central budget. Moreover, the proportion of subsidies which went 
from local budgets to the areas of education and culture exceeded central subsidies. 
Most local investment concentrated on improving the infrastructure and the construction 
of housing.
5.2 Stabilisation of the second term, 1994-1998
On 19 June 1994 the second local election took place. This election and the second term 
of local government will be investigated in three main areas: First, the shift from the 
bifurcated political division of 1990 to a gradual consolidation of political parties in 
town councils will be considered. Second, the role of local associations, among them the 
Upper Silesian Union, in contrast to national parties, will be analysed. The issue of why 
the national political parties were quite isolated and at the same time such associations 
as the Upper Silesian Union were able to gather much stronger followings are 
particularly interesting. Third, the reappearance of electoral divisions in the voivodship, 
with the Dqbrowa part of the voivodship dominated by the post-communist party, will
455 Surazka 1993: 94.
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be examined. This will be contrasted with the Upper Silesian part, where the post- 
Solidarity elite with its strong emphasis on Christian values (closely tied to the Upper 
Silesian Union) remained in power after the 1994 election.
/. Gradual consolidation o f political parties
The 1994 local election was marked by the relative continuity of the elite as five mayors 
retained office while three deputy mayors from the first term became mayors. Despite 
this certain continuity, the second election of 1994 and the second term (1994-1998) 
already varied in political terms as intensive changes had taken place since the 
administrative initiation in the first 1990 election and 1990-1994 term.
After the first 1990 election, the mayors widely declared themselves to be tied to 
Solidarity ideas (Citizens’ Committees), but the 1994 election had a much stronger 
political character. The mayors either had clear political sympathies or they were already 
members of certain parties or associations, with the exception to some extent of the 
three ‘contract mayors’ who wanted to be seen principally as managers rather than 
politicians.
Comparing the first and the second term of local government, the mayors emphasised 
that during the first term there were divisions within town councils but these were not 
subordinate to party agendas. Although councillors had various political options (liberal 
or more socialist), they were united by their common Solidarity origins, and the town 
council resembled one umbrella party:
This [political situation in relation to party divisions] changed fundamentally, as until 1994 
people who it is difficult to call right-or left-wing ruled. They were a Solidarity team, 
Citizens’ Committees committed to the ideas of Solidarity...
Needless to say, there were also socialists [among the members of Solidarity] but even they 
[the political divisions] were definitely not expressed then as political party slogans but was, 
rather, the discussion was a mertiocratic about how to help the have-nots [so the division 
went according to their beliefs and not party membership]. The whole group which won the 
election had Solidarity origins, so there were no internal divisions, only divisions according 
to someone’s merits, or personal good or bad will towards ‘Mr Smith’ with someone else.
There were terrible quarrels but no political divisions.
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Another mayor also noted the difference between the 1990 ‘extraordinary politics 
election’ and 1994, when political crystallisation was apparent.
On the other hand, in 1994, the situation was different. Certain political groups consolidated 
and the social mood changed as there had been a few quite normal years. As a result, a 
normal political campaign started, as there was not just one electoral driving force such as 
the Citizens’ Committees had been before.
This political consolidation went at different speeds in the Katowice voivodship towns. 
In the first group during the second election relatively advanced political consolidation 
had already appeared. This was despite the process having only started at the turn of 
1989-1990, when the post-Solidarity movement began to be formed. Moreover, at the 
time of the research, the national post-Solidarity movement was going through the initial 
stage of political fragmentation as it was divided into numerous, relatively small 
political parties whose programmes sometimes resembled catch-all platforms.456 Most 
were created by the national leaders from the top down and usually had poor political 
support in the region. At the same time, the communist party was transformed into the 
SdRP and consolidation of the post-communist side went relatively quickly. In 1991, the 
SdRP and leftist organisations formed the SLD bloc.
In towns where political consolidation was nearly complete, councillors were members 
of national parties and often planned to stand for the next parliamentary election, 
although this occurred in only a few towns. In these towns, as one of the mayors, 
(quoted below) judged, national politics took precedence over the economy, and 
national issues over local ones:
One third of our councillors... have political ambitions. They want to stand for the next 
election to parliament. It [the council], is very politicised. Is this good or bad? We are at the 
beginning of the road, and sometimes it is ridiculous when political arguments dominate 
over economic ones. It is sometimes like this.
In 1994 we came to absolute political divisions... On the one hand, this is good, as the 
political scene is more visible, and on the other hand, it is bad, as, in my opinion, what 
should dominate in communes is local thinking. It should concentrate on issues to be solved 
here and, let’s us say, not the presenting of a political agenda as happens in the Sejm, where 
political opinions are perhaps more important or where they decide what the next economic 
solution will be. Here, this is rather secondary; economic issues are central here.
456 Polish sociologists argued that political fragmentation was a natural reflection of fragmentation of 
social structure as a result of radical social changes after the end of socialism, when new social groups 
were not yet developed.
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ii. Local associations, among them the Upper Silesian Union, versus national parties
In the second, much larger group of towns, the process of consolidation began and 
divisions on the right and left were clearly distinguishable though party membership was 
limited. In these towns there were SLD party candidates. However, the right option was 
concentrated around regional associations like the Upper Silesian Union or local 
organisations representing town boroughs like Halemba, or Klodnica, rather than 
belonging formally to right-wing political parties.
It is likely that this process of the slower consolidation of national parties was more 
characteristic of the Upper Silesian part of the voivodship, where two additional factors 
influenced their slow appearance. First, there was the strong impact of the Upper 
Silesian Union, emphasising local and regional interests over national ones, especially in 
those towns where traditional native districts had been preserved. At the same time, the 
national parties concentrated on national politics and did not have local or regional 
agendas.
Moreover, according to the mayors of these towns, it was also related to the taste of the 
voters, especially the blue-collar workers, who dominated there. They did not accept 
party membership due to its association with the communist party.457 One of the mayors 
of the Upper Silesian part of the voivodship mentioned that this was the case in his town 
where both features appeared: the strong role of the Upper Silesian Union, and the 
marginal role of political parties.
On the other hand, in 1994 it was a bit different as the people again united in various 
associations. There are no political parties with the exception of the SdRP and a single 
member of the KPN; other parties do not exist here. Ordinary people do not want to join 
parties and they do not even like them. They prefer to judge people individually, but voters 
do usually recognise which associations they [the candidates] represent, as here people more 
often act in associations. For example, recently, the X  Land [unit] of the Upper Silesian 
Union was formed.
Despite the fact that in some Upper Silesian towns, mayors emphasised that the 1994 
election was still an election on individual rather than on party lines, other mayors 
suggested voting for individuals was impossible in the Big Towns as people did not
457 This attitude also illustrates the actions of leaders of the national post-Solidarity parties who 
consciously avoided the word ‘party’ in their names (the Freedom Union, the Labour Union, the Centre 
Coalition, and so on).
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know each other. The exception in voting for individuals was when the person was 
known for his work during the first term; for example, the former mayor.
However, party membership also played a role as people voted against members of 
political parties; in other words, they made negative selection. This was evident in the 
case of the SLD members in the Upper Silesian part of the voivodship. They voted for 
associations, among them the Upper Silesia Union. Thus, the USU played the same role 
as parties did in other countries, as its membership was defining the political and 
regional attitudes of candidates for councillors. Thus, the opinion that people voted for 
individuals is not correct even though there a were few party members in the council. 
The quotation above also emphasises that for many Silesians during the second election 
the regional origins of candidates were the main factor deciding for whom they voted. 
Otter, the USU leader, was proud of the fact that in the 1994 elections, 150 positions out 
of 2,384 were taken by members of the Union, compared to 147 in the first term.458
In the other town, the mayor similarly recollected that party membership was disliked 
(by both town inhabitants and councillors). However, he mentioned that the distinction 
of right, left and centre was evident in his town:
In relation to the second election, politics had some influence as political groupings took 
place and councillors defined themselves as left, right or centre. At the moment, the council 
is clearly divided between those more to the right, and those to the left and the third group 
more neutral, who are at the centre. The first group to the right has the majority. This 
together with the centre clearly hold two thirds of the council, so it is obvious that I have my 
roots and sympathies with the right group. I sympathise with the right but I am not a party 
member and in the council there are no party members. In general, party members did not 
enter the council, with one or two exceptions.
The election in this town also suggested that despite the fact that there was a lack of 
membership of national parties, pre-electoral associations seemed to a large extent to 
define councillors’ sympathies to the right or left wing.
These election results, which showed the relatively weak role of national political 
parties, especially in the Upper Silesian part of the voivodship, were also due to the 
weak regional policies of the strongly centralised national parties. This lack of regional 
policies on the part of the national parties, in addition to their formation from the top
458 Gazeta w Katowicach, 29 September 1994.
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down, was also, according to Surazka (1993), a result of their organisational 
administrative structure. It was due to the fact that a voivodship assembly was weak. It 
had only a consultative role in relation to a voivode. A voivode could, but did not have 
to, consider its opinions. Moreover, it was indirectly elected from among the 
representatives of communes from a voivodship territory. Thus, there was no direct 
political representation at the regional level. The assembly’s merely consultative role 
also did not promote co-operation between the political parties to create a coherent 
regional policy. As a result, political parties concentrated on national policy and, to a 
smaller extent, on problems of local communes, but there was no regional policy at all.
This lack of regional policies on the part of the national parties seems to be related to 
the fact that in many towns there was no connection between a career in the regional 
elite and promotion to the central elite. This had a major impact on the local government 
elite open criticism and actions against the central elite. This was especially so as they 
thought that the regional and district administrative reform, which they saw as urgent, 
was slowed down for political reasons.459 This opposition relationship between the 
regional and the central elite contrasted with the situation in other countries: for 
example, the Scandinavian countries. There, administrative apprenticeship in local 
government was a traditional stage on the way to the central elite 460
According to Bennett (1994), regional tensions are strongly related to the territorial 
policies of the state, which are strengthened by factors such as the following:
1. The representation of local interests in the central state is weak.
2. The participation of local individuals and elites in central administrative decision­
making is weak.
3. The extent of the local decentralised administration is weak.
4. Regional issues are more specially differentiated from the objectives of central 
government.
5. The economic and political activities of the central state are more dominant.
This description concurs with the critical view of the local government elite in the 
Katowice voivodship in relation to the central elite, especially in course of the Pilot 
Programme and during the ‘Big Towns’period 461
459 Compare with the section on the Pilot Programme.
460 Osinski 1995.
461 Presented in the next sections of this chapter.
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iii. Dqbrowa part o f  the voivodship, dominated by the post-communist party
The third tendency observable during the 1994 election was the radical shift towards the 
left which took place in the Dqbrowa part of the voivodship (where support for the post­
communist national SLD party was visible). At the same time, in the Upper Silesia part 
of the voivodship, the SLD had only 13 seats in the 50-member council of Katowice. In 
other towns, such as Ruda Slqska and Rybnik, membership of the councils was only 
marginal, as in Ruda they took three seats out of 45 and in Rybnik four out of 45. This 
thesis concentrates on the Big Towns, since thorough investigation of the Upper Silesian 
and Dqbrowa political division would go beyond the scope of this work. However, this 
political division in the voivodship was also suggested by the result of the presidential 
election. Kwasniewski won in Dqbrowa where around 70 per cent of the electorate 
voted for him. On the other Upper Silesian side of the voivodship Walesa won.462
In the Upper Silesian part of the voivodship, a tendency to isolate the SLD appeared. 
Grossner states that in Katowice it had been decided not to give any position on the 
board to the SLD’s councillors 463 Similarly, in Zabrze, although the SLD came second 
in the election, the associations of Christians, the so-called ‘Association of Catholic 
Families’, the Freedom Union and the Upper Silesian Union formed a coalition, which 
preserved relatively stable rule.
This tendency to support left-wing (post-communist) parties in the Dqbrowa part of the 
voivodship was explained by the blue-collar character of the towns, with their big 
heavy-industry plants and domination by blue-collar workers. However, in the Upper 
Silesian part of the voivodship there were some similar towns, so this factor alone did 
not explain this left-wing sympathy. Among other factors, the lower living conditions in 
the Dqbrowa part of the voivodship compared to those in Upper Silesia were also 
important. The economic and social divisions became even more evident during the 
transition, as seen in the difference in the level of unemployment in the two parts of the 
voivodship. In the Upper Silesian part of the voivodship, in Katowice, unemployment in 
1996 was 3.4 per cent while in Dqbrowa Gomicza it was 10.2 per cent464 (despite the 
fact that these towns were located less then thirty minutes apart by bus!) The mayor of
462 Dziadul, &lqsk no.4 1996.
463 Grossner, Dziennik Slqski, 5 July 1994.
464 Wojewodztwo katowickie 1996. Raport o rozwoju spolecznym.
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Sosnowiec, Czarski, emphasised, with regard to this left-wing tendency in the Dqbrowa 
part of the voivodship, the improvement of economic and social conditions during the 
socialist period:
In the perception of many people, this region received economic and cultural advancement 
under the PRL [Polish People’s Republic 1945-1989].465
5.3 The Pilot Programme 1994-1996
i. The aim o f the Pilot Programme
In 1993, Suchocka’s government initiated the next stage of ‘bottom up’ administrative 
reform. They assumed that after four years of existence, the communes were 
substantially strengthened by their administrative experience and it was possible to 
introduce radical reform of district and regions. After the formation of communes in 
1990, the districts were to be the second level of local government with the formation a 
few big regions to follow later. Finally, as the third stage after the completion of 
territorial reform (districts and regions), the central level of administration reform was 
to be carried out, ending the vertical fragmentation of central administration.
Suchocka’s district reform was to be initiated in the Big Towns466 with the so-called 
Pilot Programme. The Big Towns were the first to receive new responsibilities which in 
the future would be prescribed to town-districts. It was assumed that their institutional 
structure would adapt most easily to taking over these new responsibilities. Thus, the 46 
of Poland’s Big Towns which had volunteered were to receive new (future district) 
responsibilities in such important areas as: health, social assistance and education.
465 Czarski, quoted in Dziadul Slqsk no. 4, 1996: 13.
466 Big Towns were defined as those with populations over 100,000. Out of 44 Polish towns, 42 
volunteered to take part in the project. Furthermore, towns with populations close to that number were 
added; one was located in the Gdansk agglomeration and three others in the Katowice agglomeration: 
Myslowice, Siemianowice and Swi^tochlowice. An additional programme was to be prepared separately 
for Warsaw.
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According to Dziewior 467 the Pilot Programme was the largest decentralisation 
programme of its kind, affecting a quarter of all Polish citizens. The aim of the Pilot 
Programme was to increase the responsibilities of the Big Towns and thereby 
decentralise administrative power, heavily concentrated at the central level during the 
forty years of socialism. At the same time, it was to streamline the administrative 
structure by the creation of a clear division of responsibilities between public 
administration and self-governing administrative institutions (communes, districts and 
later, regions). Up to this time, administrative responsibilities had been dispersed and 
overlapped among numerous central ministries, which had led to further fragmentation 
and blurring of responsibility. This vertical fragmentation of administrative power was 
repeated at both regional and local levels. There, in addition to voivodship and local 
(general) administration offices, numerous so-called special administrations were also 
active. The special administrations’ activity was limited to narrow areas while the 
perspective of national or regional interests was often lost. As a result of the Pilot 
Programme, some of these responsibilities were to be taken over by the Big Towns, 
which were to unite in their office many of the functions which had until then been 
scattered.
The taking over of additional responsibilities by these towns was, in the opinion of their 
authorities, crucial because, until then, their responsibilities were quite limited and 
tailored for the smallest communes. This was despite evident opportunity for those
A f l Q
towns to perform a wider range of duties. Moreover, such narrow definition of their 
powers substantially hindered towns’ performance even in relation to those duties 
ascribed to them due to heavy dependence on various special administration units 
directly subordinate to ministries.
This ability to perform additional duties indicates the fact that, during the interviews, the 
mayors recollected that even before the Pilot Programme started in 1994, some of the 
largest Upper Silesian towns had already increased some of their responsibilities. Since 
1991, by agreement of town mayors with the voivode (renewed annually), the voivode 
delegated public administration tasks to local government as these tasks were closely
467 Sejmik Samorzqdowy, January 1995.
468 Dziewior, mayor of Katowice, in Sejmik Samorzqdowy, January 1995.
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related to the functioning of these towns. However, the Pilot Programme was to delegate 
permanently a whole set of responsibilities.
ii. The drawback o f the administrative reform undertaken by Pawlak’s government
After the unexpected shift of power from post-Solidarity to post-communist 
governments as a result of the autumn 1993 election, all administrative reforms were 
suspended. The coalition government (The Peasant Party -  PSL and post-communist -  
SLD) headed by Pawlak (PSL) had different views of the administrative reform initiated 
by the previous post-Solidarity governments, among them the most advanced project of 
the Pilot Programme.
The majority of the Peasant Party voters came from villages and small towns and 
therefore Pawlak’s government saw the proposed reform as politically dangerous. The 
government assumed that the amalgamation of voivodships and the formation of a few 
big powerful regional administrative units would weaken the administrative and 
economic position of small towns and ultimately reduce their prestige (compare the 
similar motivation of Gierek’s reform).469
After a temporary stoppage of the Pilot Programme for more than a month, local 
government pressure forced Prime Minster Pawlak to rescue the programme, although 
the number of tasks prescribed to communes was reduced.470 The new government’s 
efforts to curtail the administrative reform were also seen in the substantial reduction of 
funds to finance the Pilot Programme. The 14.3 billion zloty which Suchocka had 
proposed was decreased to 8.3 billion zloty. Moreover, they were to be allocated in the 
form of earmarked funds sent separately from each ministry instead of the subsidies 
planned by Suchocka’s government, which would have enabled the communes, rather 
than the ministries to decide how to divide the money. Finally, Suchocka’s government 
had planned to limit the Pilot Programme to just one year, and if it proved successful, to 
replace it with the next stage, district reform. Instead, what actually happened was that 
the Pilot Programme alone was continued by the new government until 1996.
469 Rolicki, 1990. b.
470 Baranski 1995.
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Among the 46 towns selected for the Pilot Programme, a large per centage -  14 towns - 
were located in the Katowice voivodship: Bytom, Chorzow, Dqbrowa Gomicza, 
Gliwice, Katowice, Jastrz^bie, Myslowice, Ruda Slqska, Rybnik, Siemianowice, 
Sosnowiec, Swiqtochlowice, Tychy and Zabrze. However, after the shift of power to the 
Pawlak government, three of the 46 towns declaring a wish to participate in the Pilot 
Programme withdrew. In the Katowice voivodship, Chorzow and Sosnowiec withdrew 
(before the start).
iii. The local government response: the motivation to participate or withdraw from the 
programme
The main motive declared by town mayors in press interviews for their participation in 
the Pilot Programme was that it would substantially improve the quality of public 
services by integrating them. Big Towns would take over administrative services which 
had, until then, been divided among various administrative units. Furthermore, the 
services taken over by the towns were also to bring financial savings as integration was 
to make their performance more economical. For example, the mayor of Ruda Slqska, 
Zygmunt Zymelka, declared:
The communes rule better even if their revenue is not very great.471
§mialek, mayor of Katowice, 1990-1994, emphasised another advantage, that is the 
improvement of services which would be noticed by town inhabitants:
We decided to go for it, as the Pilot Programme was to bring evident benefits to the 
inhabitants of Katowice. A lot of issues which were dealt with by various offices are now to 
be governed by us such as secondary schools and health service centres. It is certain that the 
inhabitants of our town will gain from the fact that we provide these services.472
Smialek believed that the reform would bring about an increase in administrative 
efficiency and the inhabitants would have more influence over the aims of local 
development. The local government elite also often emphasised that local government 
services had primacy as elective councils (local administration) were more democratic,
471 Zymelka quoted in Tylec, Dziennik Slqski, 26 January 1994.
472 Smialek quoted in Trybuna Slqska 3 March 1994.
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in that they reflected public wishes, than public administration where decisions were 
taken by appointed civil servants. Zagula, mayor of Dqbrowa Gomicza 1990-1997, 
emphasised even more strongly that local government could develop civil society by 
teaching the local population that they had influence over local administration actions. 
This, in consequence, would lead to greater engagement in public life, to development 
of civil society and, at the same time, to a change in the negative attitude towards 
administration:
The main idea of the Pilot Programme was that we, as heads of the town, had to be 
responsible for what was happening here. An inhabitant is not interested in the fact that in 
certain areas the commune can do nothing as that is the responsibility of the voivode. He 
votes and the town council is elected which in turn chooses a mayor. After that, the 
inhabitant expects them [the council] to solve problems. Sending a client to a voivode or to 
another manager is a mistake. The Pilot Programme was to correct this and in many cases it 
did. We do not teach society in any other way than by example... The Pilot Programme was 
our reaction, indicating that we wanted to influence the shaping of social behaviour [in 
public life].473
On the other hand, care of the town’s interests and protection of its inhabitants were 
presented by Kopel, the mayor of Chorzow, as an argument for the town council’s 
decision to resign from the Pilot Programme after the change of government in 1993:
It was our sense of responsibility. W e... treat our duties seriously in relation to the Pilot 
Programme. However, when a partner representing the voivodship office in Katowice 
presented to the communes the new financing conditions for negotiations [delegated tasks], 
we recognised that we would have to add substantial sums to the Pilot Programme, at the 
expense of other communal investments, and so we withdrew from the Programme.
It cannot be that certain tasks are delegated without allocating relevant funding for their 
realisation. That is what discredited the central state policy.474
Sosnowiec was the second town in the Katowice voivodship to withdraw from the 
programme. The town councillors interpreted the decision to stay in the programme as 
‘financial suicide’ for ‘political rationale’, and thus the town board voted against 
entering the programme475 and the mayor of Sosnowiec, Kleszcz, declared:
Taking over the schools would be good for the town if there were money with which they 
could all be maintained. I support the Pilot Programme with my heart but I cannot with my 
pocket.476
473 Zagula, Wspolnota, no. 29, 1995.
474 Kopel quoted in Wspolny Chorzow, October 1995.
475 Cieszewska, Rzeczpospolita, 5 January 1994.
476 Kleszcz quoted in Gazeta w Katowicach, 4 January 1994.
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Kopel described the decision of other towns to participate in the Pilot Programme and to 
take on additional responsibilities as, above all, political:
The towns are politically engaged in the process of state decentralisation... It happens that 
the state authorities represent the left option while local government represents the right.477
According to Barariski (1995: 95), the financial difficulties of the Big Towns were 
twofold. The first was the objective worsening of the public finances from which the 
Pilot Programme was financed. The second was definitely political in that Pawlak’s 
government wanted to delay the district and regional administrative reform.
Towns embarked on the Pilot Programme for the political reason that it would enlarge 
the town's responsibilities, despite the fact that from the beginning they knew that there 
would be high financial costs to pay. They knew that they would have to add from their 
own revenues for the tasks delegated by government, as the government had lowered the 
quotas which the communes were to receive. For example, the government did not take 
into account the number of personnel employed in institutions such as schools, hospitals 
and libraries, taken over by the towns. Quotas for the salaries of their personnel were 
lowered while the cost of rebuilding and refurbishing those institutions was not 
considered at all.478 According to Barariski (1995: 99), towns participating in the 
programme had to supplement all the Pilot Programme tasks from their own revenues. 
The highest sums of money required to be added were for the health service, the 
maintenance of the communal infrastructure, and the running of cultural institutions. As 
a result, Starkowska479 estimates that the Pilot Towns added 42 per cent from their own 
revenues to the grants which they received from the state budget.
iv. Local government versus central government
The political decision of central government to slow down the Pilot Programme and 
consequently to put off the whole administrative reform caused local government 
authorities to declare their opposition to the central government. Thus, the local elite 
publicly criticised central government for not providing sufficient revenue (even some
477 Kopel quoted in Karawat, Dziennik Zachodni, 12 January 1994.
478 Koral, Gazeta Wyborcza, 26 August 1994.
479 Starkowska Wspdlnota, no. 10,1995.
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voivodes agreed publicly with this, despite being representatives of central 
government!480). The local government elite also criticised the political character of 
their decisions. They showed little respect for the central government’s actions as they 
did not believe it treated local government fairly. However, what was even more 
important was that they also did not believe that the central government’s policy 
preserved the most basic interests of the state but believed rather, that it was driven by 
narrow political pursuit. This was often mentioned in the interviews I conducted as well 
as in press interviews:
We felt cheated. We do not see any logic or concern for the state [by central government] in 
it.481
Moreover, Makosz, mayor of Rybnik, specifically criticised central government and its 
policy towards local government, and especially the Pilot Programme:
The slowing down of the Pilot Programme by Pawlak’s government is a big deception... 
The Pilot Programme was good and it should not be hindered just because it was initiated 
by Suchocka’s government. This country does not have time for such seesawing. We are 
suffocated by the extent of our external and internal debts. This is a criminal matter, that 
actions which are necessary are not taken because they are not in the interest of a particular 
group. This is painful for everybody who is engaged in the reform. We know that a 
commune is a good thing but it is too little. Districts are needed, while mergers of 
voivodships and the formation of big regions are also necessary. We went into the Pilot 
Programme with all our energy and heart. However, calculations [on allocations of funds] 
are the best measure to show if the game was honest [if central government gave enough].482
The radical criticism of central government was shared by nearly the whole local 
government elite. The opinion expressed below by Urabanczyk, mayor of Zabrze, also 
indicates an extremely strong conviction that central government was not fulfilling basic 
state duties, as it did not maintain even basic conditions for local government to perform 
its duties effectively:
In the Pilot Programme we took responsibility for all the schools, which we were allowed to 
take, and we did not give back anything, although logically, all should have been returned as 
the state was making complete idiots of us. It was laughing at local government. A year ago, 
Gliwice did not stand for [central government actions], and gave up some of the pilot tasks 
as they could not accept the way they were treated by central government.
480 Koral, Gazeta Wyborcza, 26 August 1994.
481 Makosz, qouted in Nowiny, [Rybnik], 23 November 1994.
482 Makosz, qouted in Wspdlnota, no. 29,1995.
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We hoped, however, and after many discussions with the board and the whole council ... we 
decided to put our own money into those tasks in the interim. We had a consensus for this.
We have hope that we will be able to wait till normal times come.
At the moment we are not in normal times. We are in a time of semi-reform, where there is 
no conception of the state, when the state budget takes too much and then it collapses.483
The criticism of the local government elite was expressed not in the language of 
democratic compromise, as could be expected after the political transition in 1989 
towards democracy. Instead, it maintained the language of confrontation and combat 
typical of the opposition under socialism, even though the system itself had changed. A 
similar language of opposition and confrontation with central government was evident 
in the statements of voivode Czech.484 His interviews indicate that he had been in 
opposition from the beginning of his rule, so he applied this combative language not just 
to the post-communist governments after 1993 (although after that date it was 
significantly intensified). Instead, he criticised all governments since 1989 for 
maintenance of administrative centralism and vertical fragmentation. Moreover, the 
voivodship office elite was also critical of the central government’s presenting itself as 
the advocate of the region’s interests.485
This opposition by the regional administrative elite could, to some extent, be explained 
by its tradition, rooted in the socialist period, of being in opposition. As a result, even 
when they came to power, they still maintained these attitudes and criticised the central 
elite for acting against them. However, the main reason was that the interests of the 
national and regional elites continued to be seen as completely contradictory after 
1990 486 This was related to the preservation by the central elite of the highly centralised 
and ineffective administrative structure of the state.
Opposition to the central government by local government was so strong that it was 
independent of the party political choice of local government councillors, in the opinion 
of Frankiewicz, mayor of Gliwice.487 For example, the board of the town as a whole, 
independent of councillors’ membership of political parties, was in favour of taking part 
in the Pilot Programme (and decentralisation).
483 Urabariczyk, Nasza Gazeta, no. 2, 1996.
484 See chapter three.
485 Compare, for example, their opinions before signing the Regional Contract.
486 Compare Bennett’s reasons for regional tension, page 244.
487 Frankiewicz Wspolnota, no. 31, 1995.
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This strong centralisation of the state and the underprivileged situation of the communes 
in relation to central government meant that the opposition of the local government elite 
was not limited to Upper Silesia. This is suggested in many press interviews and 
common actions of the Pilot Programme Towns against central government. Opposition 
to central government was also strengthened by local government’s belief that they were 
more efficient that the public administration. Furthermore, the local government elected 
officials saw themselves as the real advocates of systemic reforms, caring not only about 
local, but also about national interests, whereas the post-communist governments were 
fighting to preserve the highly-centralised and sectoral structure of administration.
The interviews I conducted and public press statements suggested that the arrival of 
Pawlak’s government was seen not as a normal shift of policy as in a democratic state, 
but as a radical retreat, strongly inspired by the former socialist system. It was a return to 
old habits ( ‘restoration’). This was still possible, as only a short time had passed since 
the beginning of the transition in 1989. The opinions of my respondents, from local 
government are also likely to have been strengthened by the fact that this government 
had post-communist origins. Thus, the local government difficulties were not interpreted 
as ordinary casual difficulties. Instead, this was considered ‘not a normal time’ (as 
suggested in the above quotation of Urbariczyk). The criticism of central government 
was extreme; its policy was called a ‘criminal matter’, and it was accused of not having 
even the most basic interest in the state. Many other similarly radical negative opinions 
were also expressed.
The regional administrative elite belonged to a transitional period, when the definition 
of roles and relationships within the administration was fluid. Thus, ‘blind’ abiding by 
rules, as proposed by central government, was not much appreciated by the local 
government elite. The revolutionary character of this elite indicates also their highly 
emotional language and their rebelliousness against central government. The opinion of 
the deputy mayor of Rybnik, Kogut, illustrates their emotional attitudes:
We are aware that it is a step backward. It is our personal tragedy.488
488 Kogut quoted in Troszka, Nowiny, [Rybnik] 7 December 1994.
256
v. The withdrawal from  the Pilot Programme
The public protest of the Pilot Towns did not change their financial conditions, and the 
new agreements with central government for 1995 were even more unfavourable to 
them. In addition, the district reform promised for 1995 was postponed while the Pilot 
Programme was to last for an indefinite period. In response, on 30 November 1994, the 
Convention of Mayors of the Big Polish Towns participating in the Pilot Programme 
ended their meeting with a declaration of their inability to continue the Pilot Programme 
as central government was not fulfilling its agreement with them.489 As a result, they 
gradually began to give up certain responsibilities in order to decrease the scale of their 
financial losses. For example, in the first quarter of 1995, Gliwice, Jastrz^bie and 
Rybnik all withdrew.
The decision to withdraw from the Pilot Programme was primarily caused by the 
financial difficulties of the towns, which received insufficient grants to carry out the 
tasks delegated to them. In the end, their decision to withdraw was a solution to ‘a 
painful dilemma’ between, on the one hand, increasing the responsibilities of the towns, 
streamlining administrative functioning, and thus improving services, and, on the other 
hand, increasing their financial burden. Makosz said:
When the projected budget for 1995 came, with revenues below those for 1994, we had to 
withdraw. We had to withdraw despite it being a government coalition which had come to 
power declaring an end to under-funding for education and the health service. If they gave 
even less money, despite these declarations, somebody had to take responsibility.
We have given up the health service and it is in debt again [when it is in the hands of public 
administration]. At the time of the Pilot Programme we were successful in balancing 
payments dates and we did not pay even a million in penalties on interest.490
After the withdrawal of Rybnik from the Pilot Programme, Makosz called the central 
government actions a cynical game to discredit local governments by suggesting their 
low financial efficiency. However, this was caused by insufficient central government
4 91grants.
489 Dziennik Slqski, 8 December 1994.
490 Makosz quoted in Wspolnota, no. 29, 1995.
491 Troszka Nowiny, [Rybnik] 7 December 1994.
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The Pilot Programme towns recognising that the programme was stretching into an 
indefinite future and that it was not known when the inadequate financing would finish, 
tried to withdraw from the most expensive tasks, while attempting to fulfil the rest.492 
According to Starkowska,493 the Pilot Programme towns resigned from about 30 per 
cent of their initial responsibilities.
At that time, in their opinion, further decentralisation of the administration was to be 
achieved by applying a gradualist approach. This meant persistently forcing central 
government to delegate new responsibilities with financial assistance, as indicated by 
the quotation below of Zymelka, mayor of Ruda &l^ska:
This is not a capitulation. We are going to seize the power from central government and the 
money which they promised us for those tasks.494
Although towns finally withdrew from the Pilot Programme, Frankiewicz believed that 
the Pilot Programme should not be assessed altogether negatively. Despite the 
difficulties of conducting the programme, in the end, the towns had gone a few steps 
forward, gaining more responsibilities, and decentralisation was gradually appearing:
I reckon for all its negative aspects, this programme did in the end give a lot. It brought 
about certain irreversible changes. People received something good, they got accustomed to 
it, and now nothing can take it away. Gliwice withdrew from the programme, but this does 
not mean that we returned to the starting point.495
Thus, the improvement of services as a result of the Pilot Programme in such important 
institutions as schools and hospitals was crucial in bringing about a change in social 
opinion towards administration. A few years later, the view of the Pilot Programme was 
modified. Some local government leaders lost their belligerence, and some of their 
confidence, as a result of the prolonged period of unfavourable local government 
conditions, ‘when the financial burden clipped their wings’. Then they concentrated 
more on surviving than fighting for decentralisation or investing in long-term 
development. This shift towards far less rebellious attitudes than presented above 
illustrates the opinion of one of my respondents:
492 Frankiewicz Wspolnota, no. 31, 1995.
493 Starkowska Wspolnota, no. 10, 1995.
494 Zymelka quoted in Gazeta w Katowicach, 30 December 1994.
495 Frankiewicz Wspolnota, no. 31, 1995.
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These tasks were undertaken too ambitiously at that time... and debts were incurred... The 
Pilot Programme was to be the trial-run for the formation of districts and consequently state 
decentralisation. The idea would have been good if it had been accompanied by a real wish 
to decentralise finances. Then this Pilot Programme would have left good memories. It is a 
pity that it has not left good memories as tasks were transferred, but not the money... We 
delayed our investments, our property was deteriorating and we took the loans. In other 
words, we could not properly conduct our own town’s tasks [as all the money went on Pilot 
Programme tasks]. The Pilot Programme was rather an unhappy experience and fell short of 
expectations for decentralisation.
vi. Suing the voivode
The second group of the Katowice voivodship towns -  Dqbrowa Gomicza, Katowice, 
Ruda Slqska and Zabrze -  did not withdraw from their tasks but instead decided to sue 
the voivode as the representative of central government. He was sued for not fulfilling 
the financial obligations of the Pilot Programme Agreement. However, suing the 
voivode for not complying with the financial regulations of the Pilot Agreement was not 
only limited to this one issue but reflected a wider phenomenon -  the long-running fight 
for equal rights between the public administration and local government. The fight was 
for recognition by central government that finally the situation had changed since the 
end of socialism and that the independence of local government was to be recognised 
and respected. Local government emphasised that they were receiving less for tasks 
delegated to them than if these tasks had stayed in the hands of the public 
administration.496
The verdict of the Arbitration Tribunal (after agreement on both sides to solve the 
problem by Tribunal and after common selection of the judges) in 1995 confirmed the 
breaking of the law on the equal treatment of communes compared to the public 
administration. The verdict was unequivocally confirmed by all seven judges, who were 
MPs and the most prominent professors of law. Although the verdict was agreed by both 
sides as final and binding, the voivode appealed against the decision and negotiation was 
prolonged until after 1997.
Even though local government did not receive the money granted to them by the verdict, 
they still regarded the case as a success. This was primarily because suing the voivode 
for not fulfilling the Pilot Agreement was a method of protecting themselves against
496 Zymelka quoted in Jaworska, Trybuna Slqska, 29 November 1994.
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future discrimination, and of gradually increasing their authority, as one of the mayors 
of these four towns mentioned. This was only a formal victory by local government, but 
it was nevertheless important for them, as the judges and the most prominent scholars 
had agreed and advocated the arguments of the communes. In other words, this was to 
help them to break free from the expectations of central government, going back to the 
socialist period of blind subordination of local government to their will:
Four towns sued the voivode [for not fulfilling the Pilot Programme conditions] and we won 
the case morally, although there are still no [financial] results. We won. The Tribunal 
recognised the reasoning of the communes. However, we did not receive the financial 
resources. The voivode appealed against this verdict to the voivodship court, where the case 
is still being heard. The voivode did not receive money from the state budget to pass on to 
local government despite our victory, so, as I said, this is only a moral victory. Maybe that 
will also change and there will be some money, ... But this Arbitration Tribunal was good 
on the basis of this decision (there were authorities on local government law and 
representatives of central government) and we can use this verdict to demand the relevant 
financial subsidies for financing the Big Towns’ tasks from government.
5.4 The efficiency of the Big Towns, 1996-1997
i. The reasons fo r  Big Towns reform
On 1 January 1996 the Act on Big Towns was introduced, replacing the Pilot 
Programme. The financial difficulties of the Pilot towns, as well as the continuation of 
the Pilot Programme throughout 1995, although it had been proposed initially only for 
1994, without any proposals for following up administrative reforms, led to a gradual 
withdrawal from the programme of successive towns. The towns remaining in the 
programme also gradually resigned more and more responsibilities. As a result, the scale 
of the Pilot Programme decreased substantially compared to the responsibilities taken 
over in January 1994. Moreover, it began to resemble a mosaic of continuously- 
changing commune responsibilities.497
To solve the problem of towns withdrawing from the Pilot Programme, at the end of 
1994 a group of MPs proposed a new act which was suddenly supported by government. 
The new Big Towns Act increased their responsibilities permanently (for example, all 
secondary schools were delegated as own tasks to the Big Towns) and at the same time
497 Jakowska, Wspolnota, no. 51-52, 1995.
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streamlined them. In contrast to the Pilot Programme, all towns received the same 
tasks.498
At the time when the interviews were conducted, the mayors had a few months’ 
experience of the operation of the Big Towns Act and the resulting relative 
administrative autonomy. Their remarks concentrated on three main issues; first, the 
relative autonomy of Big Towns in comparison to the situation in rural areas; second, 
the financial and legal obstacles substantially weakening the effectiveness of their 
performance; and finally, the need for further territorial reform 499
ii. The relative autonomy o f Big Towns
As a result of the introduction of the Big Towns Act, the mayors interpreted that they 
received responsibilities relevant to those of the future town-districts. Thus, one of the 
mayors stated that in relation to Big Towns, reform was ended, as tasks of district-towns 
were already performed by local government there. However, a different situation 
prevailed in rural areas where rural-districts were not formed. As a result of the absence 
of districts in less populated areas, there were no supra-local scale development 
programmes:
This year the Big Towns Act was introduced. X  was defined as a Big Town and this act 
applied to it. I have to say that our town is practically a town-district, with all the 
responsibilities a town-district should have. The influence of expected administrative reform 
is felt only in the context which was mentioned [indirectly, with a lack of regional reform 
and formation of districts in rural areas].
In other words, the Big Towns Act was treated as the establishment of the second level 
of local government (the districts) in urban areas, as responsibilities were transmitted to 
Big Towns. Thus, in the opinion of the same mayor, the towns would be better off in 
future than the rural areas, where the lack of administrative reform of districts slowed 
down their further local and regional development.
498 Jakowska, Wspolnota, no. 51-52, 1995.
499 Their specific proposals for administrative reforms will be presented in chapter seven.
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Thus, the achievements of the Big Towns can be fully evaluated only in comparison 
with the situation in rural areas. At the time of conducting interviews, according to the 
mayors in the rural areas and small towns local governments did not carry out local 
long-term development projects. Local governments in rural areas, due to lack of 
decentralisation, were only able to meet immediate needs but were not able to undertake 
further development. Due to the absence of districts, the small communes had limited 
financial resources and concentrated only on local aims. There were no administrative 
institutions capable of promoting and co-ordinating the performance of supra-local tasks 
or of preparing a coherent long-term vision of local and regional development, which 
was also strongly related to economies of scale. Thus, the main achievement of the Big 
Towns was their concentration on long-term development, as they had the opportunity 
and resources to form town planning centres employing various professionals and 
advisers.
However, town mayors often emphasised that in the Big Towns decentralisation was not 
a completed process. At that time, the Big Towns were able only to propose 
development projects on the scale of districts. There were no administrative institutions 
integrating the regional level development policy due to the lack of further 
administrative reform (formation of big regions and re-definition of their role).
Nevertheless this autonomy of the Big Towns, as the reform in relation to town-districts 
was ended, gave the local government elite a relative sense of strength and confidence. 
Although some the financial and legal obstacles existed, these were relatively small in 
comparison to those in the rural areas (to be described later).
I think that it may be noticed after some time that despite the fact that the Big Towns have 
some limitations, (legal and financial about which I talked), they are not relatively serious 
and thus, these towns-districts develop. However, the rural districts [to be formed] do not 
develop at all. There will be no further development. There will only be development of 
communes, but not on the scale of districts.
All these arguments, which are used by the PSL to fight against formation of districts, are 
absurd and I do not want to discuss them. This is evident stupidity, it is unworthy of 
discussion, so that policy is a loss for the state [its future].
This quotation shows that the local government elite I interviewed believed that despite 
the importance of the territorial reform which was to lead to the formation of districts 
and a few big regions, it was delayed due to the parochial interests of the PSL.
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Moreover, they thought this policy would be most severely felt in the rural areas, where 
the majority of the PSL electorate came from.
a. The financial obstacles
Despite the fact that the Big Towns were in a relatively advantageous situation in 
relation to the rural areas, the mayors emphasised at the same time that their Big Town 
authorities worked in highly unstable conditions. They referred to two issues: the 
instability of financial and of regulations legal acts, which forced the communes to 
provide from their own funds for the tasks delegated to them by the state.
In relation to the issue of financial regulations, the mayors unequivocally emphasised 
political whims as favouring central government. This was related to the fact that at that 
time a mathematical formula was applied to divide revenues among the Big Towns 
(instead of applying the permanent share of tax between various levels of 
administration). First, the use of a mathematical formula was criticised by mayors as an 
artificial solution, partial and highly unstable because it was dependent on the will of 
finance ministers:
Towns are independent. It is not possible for central government to give political or 
administrative orders to local governments, which they do not accept. This is a mainstay of 
democracy, but this is not enough. The amount of money is not sufficient, this issue is to be 
solved. Now we have a situation in which a minister of finance with one stroke of a pen can 
decide the size of subsidies.500
Another mayor presented a similar criticism:
At the moment this is painful, as I receive money from Warsaw, not a share of taxes. 
Instead, money is calculated according to a special formula. This is bad in general, as the 46 
towns [the Big Towns] in Poland each receive their relevant money from the state budget, 
calculated according to this model. This formula is bad as the significant figure appears 
behind the sixth zero after the comma and in the eighth place there are billions of [old] 
zloty.
This arbitrary view of allocation of funds by central government raised strong emotions. 
One of the mayors mentioned that the introduction of this formula as the method for
500 Frankiewicz, &lqsk, no. 5, 1997.
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dividing money was, in his opinion, the main cause of the retreat of local government 
power, which, from 1990 until then, had gradually been increasing:
This bill about Big Towns, which by the ‘Q’ formula defines the amount of money which 
we receive for certain services, is a retreat for local government in Poland. My situation is 
that each year I have formula ‘Q \ which is not related at all to the budget percentage. This 
formula is so complex that the commune is shackled. So this is really distribution by the 
central authorities [as in the socialist period] on a whim.
A second criticism of the use of this method for financing local governments, in the 
opinion of the mayors, was that it allowed savings on these Big Towns. Instead of 
receiving a certain percentage of the budget, the ‘Q’ formula was calculated in this way 
to allow for central government manipulation. Accordingly, the Big Towns which were 
thrifty were penalised for their efforts as they received even less money the following 
year, while towns which were not economic were supported by additional funds, 
obtained, in their opinion, from savings on those towns which tried to limit their 
spending:
Simply speaking, calculating money in this manner [according to formula ‘Q ’], not 
according to which towns need money, and not according to a general solution [share in tax 
sharing] is bad. Calculating money for a town based on its previous expenditure is also bad 
as it gives towns no incentive to make savings. So, in general, this financing of the public 
tasks of communes in the form of subsidies is incorrect. I absolutely believe that these 
should be financed from taxes, and it should be mentioned that these taxes are from our 
inhabitants.
Thirdly, local government elite also criticised this manner of allocating money as it was 
transferred twice; first it went to Warsaw to the central budget, and then it was 
transferred again from Warsaw to the communes. As a result, banks earned charges on 
these funds twice (it has been suggested that former communists have substantial shares 
in the banking sector). This also indicates the high bureaucratic costs incurred by the use 
of central government grants:
The money is absolutely wrongly arranged. At the moment there is a new Act on Big 
Towns, which imposes a lot of duties on us. At the same time, a curious formula was 
reached to calculate how much each town should receive. This money, without any sense or 
need, is transferred from our Treasury Office to Warsaw and they return it to me in the form 
of subsidies, and in this way a few banks make a good living out of it.
As a whole, the use of formula ‘Q’ was also seen as a tool to blur and then to lower 
local government subsidies. For example, the formula was based on expected state
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revenues which were much higher than real revenues, and these over-estimated revenues 
caused the final amount of local government subsidies to be lowered. However, as the 
mayors emphasised, central government did not correct its estimate and thus the 
retention of these calculations was seen as a deliberate action. Communes made efforts 
to introduce more objective criteria and after two years some changes appeared; for 
example, the size of the subsidy for schools depended on the number of pupils or 
teachers, and so on.
The shift to a post-communist government in 1993 was seen by the local government 
elite as a radical change of policy toward the communes. In 1994, when the Pilot 
Programme was started, two tendencies were already observable: first, a gradual 
decrease in the amount of money given to local government, and second, as one of my 
respondent recollected, assigning them more and more tasks:
This second tendency, which has existed till now, is that central state, by little steps, not by 
parliamentary bills but most often by regulations of less importance, by central government 
or separate ministries, takes away certain revenues and adds tasks at the same time. Those 
local government revenues cannot be taken directly and there can be no bill that says 
commune revenue can be lowered from 15 per cent to 14 per cent of the ‘poll tax’. It is 
done in a much more sly manner.
During the Big Town period, the towns began to resign from certain tasks (for example, 
they handed back to central state administration some of their hospitals which had 
specialist units serving the whole region). This indicates the change in local government 
philosophy towards ‘decreasing their ambition’. One of the mayors, referring to the 
earlier period, recollected:
We made one mistake, the mistake of ‘too large ambition’ as we did not see our ambition in 
relation to the abilities which we had.
The financial difficulties of the Big Towns resembled, to a certain extent, the situation 
which the towns had already experienced in the Pilot Programme. In both periods, the 
funds allocated to the Big Towns were not sufficient to cover the additional 
responsibilities taken on by them and they had to add funds from their own savings. 
However, the difficulty of these towns during ‘the Big Towns period’, in contrast to the 
Pilot Programme, was that they received certain obligatory tasks -  for example, 
responsibility for secondary schools -  which they had to perform and could not give up.
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The situation of adding their own money and not being allowed to resign from many 
tasks caused the towns to become poorer. For example, they could save less for 
investments, which would influence their further long-term development, as town 
mayors recollected:
We have only nine per cent invested; at the beginning it was 20 per cent, now it is nine per 
cent. As a result of our impoverishment the town’s future is endangered. I believe that if 
there is not money for investment we will not develop. The money is decreasing, as we have 
to add [from our own revenues] to cover the tasks which the government delegates us. It 
does not give us the necessary financial funding for them. Those are clearly calculated 
amounts but they do not want to acknowledge them, as they say unanimously that this was 
not enacted in the budget law and they send us to the Sejm. That is why we want legislative 
guarantees for the financing of these tasks.
At the time when the interviews were conducted, some of the communes had nearly 
stopped investing in town development; they were ‘merely surviving’, spending all their 
money on current payments and ‘waiting for better times’. Respondents often mentioned 
the substantial impoverishment of the communes as a result of the post-communist 
government’s policies. Local government had partially changed their attitudes and the 
angry demands and protests of the Pilot Programme period began to be replaced by 
cautious actions and sometimes resignation and ‘survival’ until ‘normal’ times.
Another mayor mentioned finances as being the main limitation to their actions and the 
primary causes of their weakness as they received only 19 per cent from their own 
revenues and the remaining 81 per cent from state subsidies:
I said during the voivodship assembly meeting that at the moment our discretion could be 
counted in percentages, and the size of these percentages is defined by the state budget in 
relation to our own revenues. 19 per cent of our budget is based on our local revenues and 
the other 81 per cent we just receive in the form of grants, so our discretionary power is the 
percentage of our own revenue.
Thus, sharing in taxes was seen as a fair solution, allowing a division of financial 
resources relevant to the tasks delegated to local government. This mayor’s solution to 
the financial problems would also to bring stability to the financial system, as it would 
be regulated by a parliamentary act and would not change annually. This would be in 
contrast to the then-existing situation in which finance ministers had a free hand to 
make changes each year. This was to replace the present means, which favoured central 
government in relation to the communes. Thus, the efforts of the communes were not
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recognised because there was no correlation between their own economic performance 
and money left for investment.
In this context, the formation of districts and regions was presented as a prerequisite for 
financial reform and the direct sharing in taxes of local governments (communes, 
districts) and later regional government. Also, the adoption of a new financial system 
only by parliamentary act was seen by one of my interviewees as a guarantee of 
establishing the necessary conditions for the effective performance of the communes:
I would like to say that these tasks, delegated mostly by the various town acts, we receive in 
the form of subventions and that is bad. This should be regulated by an Act on Finances of 
Communes, and later of self-governing districts to be formed as another level of local 
government. There should be clearly-defined rules for participation in taxes which the 
inhabitants pay, which should be assigned to the commune (later the local government at 
district level) for the fulfilment of its own tasks. We demand that this be unequivocally 
defined for local governments as all the subventions are usually defined for the year ahead 
on the basis of criteria which the government defines. As a result, the government saves on 
local governments in relation to the money given to them.
b. The legal obstacles
The second main area where unfinished reforms were leading to difficulties in the 
functioning of the Big Towns, mentioned by my respondents, was that of legal 
regulations. These were, at that time, highly unstable and imprecise, sometimes even 
contradictory, and often protected central government interests against local 
government. As a result, as one of my respondents mentioned, the communes had 
several tasks prescribed without legal acts to enforce them:
In the meantime, the legal acts did not go forward and at a certain time the central 
government stopped reforms altogether. Thus, we have legislation on duties but we do not 
have the power to carry them out.
One of the most important problems related to legal regulations which enable ministries 
to give communes additional obligations without sufficient funds to deal with them is 
mentioned below:
It does not directly affect Big Towns’ functioning [the fact that districts had not been 
established]. But it does affect them indirectly because of the existing climate and law, in 
which local government is weak. Thus, local government has little opportunity to demand
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the money due to it. Local government is treated in such a way that the central government 
gives as much as it wants, not as a result of the actions carried out. It does not result from 
any rational division of funding and that is our problem that the unions (for example, the 
Union of Polish Towns,) are fighting against.
The quotation below suggests that future territorial administrative reform should be 
assisted by legal bills curbing the arbitrariness of central ministries to issue their own 
regulations to maintain power and control over the communes’ activities. The absence 
of coherent and impartial law was illustrated by the Electricity Act, by which the state 
monopoly regulated the conditions in which energy was provided while the communes 
were responsible for protecting the supply of energy to their inhabitants. In the words of 
one mayor, the communes have responsibilities without the means to fulfil them:
The necessity of finishing the local government reform I see in the formation of coherent 
law in the form of the Local Government Act. This means clearly defining our duties -  the 
tasks which are allocated to us as our own tasks. For example, the Local Government Act 
requires local government to supply inhabitants with energy and to light the streets. 
However, the whole property is still in the hands of the energy sector, so the actions 
required of local government cannot be properly delivered by them. Local governments are 
forced to be responsible for the supply, while at the same time there are government 
programmes, like the Electricity Act, which are far from coherent. In this situation, we [the 
local governments] protest. [...]. The law should be coherent and if local governments are 
required to fulfil certain tasks, they should have the ‘guns’ to do it.
The legal regulations after 1993 were also seen as a method of centralisation and linked 
to supervision over local government activity:
The fight for local government has not ended. As local government began to be pulled back 
from its responsibilities in 1990, centralisation began to be carried out. At the moment, I 
receive more and more letters requiring me to explain many issues. The Regional Chamber 
of Accounting interprets the regulations, but it should not interpret the regulations [further 
limiting responsibilities] as what is not forbidden can be done. But the X  Chamber of 
Accounting extends its interpretation of regulation, thereby limiting our activity....
iii. The need for further territorial reform
Improvement of the financial conditions in which local government functioned and a 
change of legal regulations were closely linked to further administrative reform. The 
reform was intended to end the completely artificial administrative structure with its 
absence of regional level administration which distinguished Poland from ‘all’ other
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European countries. However, despite the evident necessity of the reform it was, 
according to one of my respondents, delayed as it was seen as a political issue:
The main limitation affecting the communes is that the Polish State continues to be a 
centralised state. In general, two types of administration exist in Poland: there is the local 
government in the communes, and there is the public administration at central level, and 
there is nothing in addition to that. I believe that according to the concepts of a democratic 
system, this is rather odd. In no country with a developed democratic system is there any 
such division. Instead, there are gradations: there is a commune, which has 30 per cent of 
the money and power; then there is a region or a land or other area, which has the next 30 
per cent of the money and power; and finally, there is the central state, which has at its 
disposition the remaining 40 per cent of money and, in consequence, 40 per cent of the 
power.
Here [in Poland] simply speaking, there is an arrangement of power whereby the communes 
have 15 per cent of the money and 15 per cent of the power and the state administration has 
85 per cent of the money and 85 per cent of the power. That is the situation at the moment 
and until the end of 1997 [the expected date of the national election] nothing will change as 
long as the coalition of SLD and PSL feel comfortable with such an arrangement, especially 
as it has this 85 per cent of the power and money.
Other opinions also pointed to the post-communist governments as responsible for 
slowing down the administrative reform:
As such, political forces won the battle for power [the post-communists]. I believe that as 
long as the SLD have power, the tendency to capture [the whole power] and divide it at the 
top will last. We see now the renewing of the tendencies to take successive responsibilities 
[from the communes] to the top ...
How can one trust these people to conduct reform? The political parties which rule the 
country will have to change for there to be a chance for reform.
5.5 The evaluation of achievements, 1990-1997
The local government reform initiated in 1990 was recognised by the mayors as a great 
success in providing opportunities for effective rule in the towns, as the reform 
established the basic acts guaranteeing their financial and legal autonomy. The re­
establishment of local government in 1990 led, in their opinion, to several 
achievements. They emphasised firstly, its economic effectiveness; secondly, the 
introduction of local democracy; and thirdly, that autonomous local government was 
significant in the political transition of the state. Finally, the achievements of local 
government were in their opinion even more evident when their performance was 
compared with state administration.
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i. Economic effectiveness
The economic achievements were emphasised as, according to the local government 
elite, the period of less than eight years since 1990 brought more intensive local 
development than the 40 years of socialism as a whole. Moreover, those changes began 
to be appreciated socially. ‘People began to see changes’; for example, in renewed town 
buildings’ facades, as the communes took care of the local infrastructure, which had 
been greatly neglected during the socialist period. People remembered always seeing 
broken paving on the pavements and for the first time these were removed and replaced 
with new paving. This symbolic change from socialist neglect of local development 
was, according to one of my respondents, noticed by everybody. Thus, economic 
efficiency was the main element which caused people to appreciate local government 
work. One of the town mayors praised the economic achievements of local government 
as one of the most successful reforms and pointed out its social appreciation:
When people talk about the Polish State in the last six years, they emphasise that local 
government is a success; this effort and commitment have not been wasted.
Comparison of their economic performance with the public administration gave the 
local government elite a lot of confidence. They suggested that local government was 
several times more thrifty than the public administration -  at a moderate estimate, over 
20 per cent. This issue was emphasised in numerous of my interviews. The opinion of 
Dziewior is a good example:
The achievements by local government authorities in the first five years, despite 
considerable legislative and financial hindrance, are surely big, some would even say 
impressive. Local government authorities showed much greater economic rationality than 
the public administration. They made financial savings on the majority of tasks ranging 
from a few to several dozen per cent in comparison to the public administration.501
Dziewior illustrated this efficiency of the towns with the example of schools, as no 
schools which were run by communes were ever in debt, in contrast to the situation of 
those schools which were run by the public administration, the majority of which were
501 Dziewior quoted in Sejmik Samorzqdowy, August 1995.
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in debt.502 As a result, Dziewior estimates quite radically that local government was 90 
per cent more efficient than public administration.
This greater efficiency of local government compared to public administration also 
illustrates the case of local government taking over the Health Service Office from the 
public administration. Substantial financial savings were made in the aftermath of the 
restructuring they conducted:
In 1995, the debts of the Health Service Office [ZOZ] in my town amounted to 16 billion 
zloty. When we took over the ZOZ on 1 January 1996, that year ended with no debts. Was it 
a miracle? We did certain things which were necessary; 180 people were made redundant 
and often without searching too much for those people. There was even a storeroom which 
had been empty for the previous six years, but four people worked there. They were still 
employed according to the belief that: ‘As there is a post, it is a pity to dismiss anybody, as 
they [public administration] would not be able to take on anybody later [ministerial 
permission would be needed to employ somebody]’. This is their way of thinking [central 
administration’s] and it will always function like this. Only local governments will perhaps 
find out that so many people are not needed.
On the other hand, local government is like a state firm. We were not so marvellous -  please 
do not believe it. I could give many examples of ‘safety positions’ in ‘town administration’.
The mayors sometimes presented their economic achievements with some criticism. 
Although they saw themselves as more efficient than the central administration, they 
still saw local government as a type of administration which has a natural tendency to 
increase the number of employees as well as to alienate inhabitants. This was especially 
the case in Big Towns of over one 100 inhabitants and was more of a problem, 
according to my respondent, in towns which often had around 200 inhabitants (in which 
research was conducted).
Still I am convinced that we organise public life much better than the public administration, 
which by its nature has a distant view of the concrete tasks, of concrete building, of certain 
positions and so on. Thus, their inefficiency is inevitable, it also takes place here in local 
government. I believe that some squandering of money also takes place, or rather some 
unavoidable squandering of money takes place and will always take place in local 
government. In bureaucratic structures, money is not spent as it is in private hands where 
each zloty is looked at several times before it is spent.
In such Big Towns, in the opinion of a mayor, development of civil society -  that is 
‘self-organisation of society’ -  was to oppose the processes of alienation. For example,
502 Compare also Makosz’s statement -  quoted earlier -  that during the Pilot Programme when, as a result 
of local governments’ resigning from running hospitals, they were again taken up by the state and fell back 
into debt.
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if six families decided to set up a kindergarten, they would do it much more cheaply 
than local government and it would be better organised. It would also adapt better to 
specific needs with regard to opening hours and so on. This ‘self-organisation of 
society’ was also to limit the tendency to bureaucratisation by central institutions. For 
example, the Ministry of Education issued several regulations about the minimum 
temperature in kindergarten rooms, and so on.
At the same time, my respondents believed that private ownership was the most 
efficient. They often planned to privatise many firms run by local government. An 
example of the inefficiency of local government was the running of a hotel which they 
owned; when this was run by them, it was 400 million zloty in debt. However, when it 
was rented to a private business, it produced profits of 2 billion zloty (and as a result 
local government received a commission). Although local government was not as 
efficient as private business, it was, in the opinion of one of the town mayors, at least 
rational compared to public administration. It was rational as it privatised or rented 
enterprises which did not produce profits, and this distinguished local government from 
the public administration, which continued to run most of its unprofitable enterprises 
without any restructuring.
Privatisation and development of civil society were also seen by some mayors as 
solutions aimed to change the behaviour of town inhabitants by ending the ‘social 
passivity’ which was a legacy of the socialist period. The most striking example of ‘this 
social passivity’ was the habit of towns inhabitants going to the administration with all 
their problems instead of trying to solve them themselves. Moreover, when in 1990 
communes were suddenly burdened with all these overwhelming social expectations, the 
situation was aggravated further by the quite radical impoverishment of some social 
groups:
In the case of our state or our town, there are relatively low living conditions and high 
expectations after forty years of socialism. People expect that when there are problems, they 
will be solved by the authorities. Instead of them trying to solve issues by themselves by 
forming [non-governmental] organisations, such as associations or foundations or 
companies, they go to the town hall or the voivode or somewhere else to solve them.
Those social expectations constituted a financial burden which the communes were not 
able to bear. Moreover, as one of my respondents mentioned, privatisation and
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development of civil society would lead to better allocation of resources than the 
arbitrary decisions of local government councils; for example, decisions on issues such 
as the percentage of their budget that should be allocated to the maintenance of 
kindergartens, an issue important to only to a small proportion of the towns’ inhabitants, 
while the majority might prefer to spend town revenues on building a recreation centre 
or new roads instead.
ii. Local democracy and political transition
The political significance of the revitalisation of local government was emphasised in 
the context of state polity transition. The opinion of Dziewior emphasises this:
On 8 March 1995, exactly five years had elapsed since the Local Government Act was 
passed. This was the most important and probably the most pregnant of legal acts, which 
fundamentally changed the polity of our state...
The Local Government reform should be recognised as a primary element transforming the 
polity of our state and the building of a new Republic, based on normal, healthy and 
civilised rules.503
It has sometimes been emphasised that the introduction of democracy started with the 
first local election, as this was the first free election after 40 years of communism. At 
the same time, it was an opportunity for ‘us the people of Upper Silesia region’ to 
decide about the most important issues. This is illustrated by the opinion of a Silesian 
mayor:
I believe that local government was badly needed in Poland after about 45 years or more of 
socialism. It was good that in 1990 the Sejm enacted the Local Government Act and that 
democratic elections to town and village councils took place. I believe that this organisation 
of communes as independent legal entities is very necessary in our state. It makes it possible 
for us inhabitants to be masters of our own house [the region is identified with the house], 
enabling us to decide on the most important issues of our lives.
503 Dziewior quoted in Sejmik Samorzqdowy, August 1995.
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iii. Reformed local government versus public administration
All the above statements suggest a highly enthusiastic assessment of local government 
performance since its establishment in 1990. These enthusiastic responses are worth 
emphasising, especially after the socialist period, as it might have been expected that the 
negative attitude towards administration would last.
Therefore, I can say one thing; the most successful was the local government reform and 
many local government employees judge it in the same way. However, if there is no further 
decentralisation of administration and if the next levels of local government are not formed 
as they are in Europe, since it was through local government that the quick development of 
those regions was possible, then our country will move backward. Maybe I see it radically 
but this is how I see it. Concerning district reform, it must be conducted, since all 
preliminary work has been done. Districts are accepted by the inhabitants; even the latest 
opinion polls show that people are in favour of districts as a level of local government. This 
consciousness is already appearing after six years and this is a success.
In contrast, unequivocally negative opinions of the administration were still felt strongly 
by the voivodship office elite. They believed that administration always has little 
prestige. The following example is the opinion expressed by a director of the voivodship 
office:
I think that work in administration is not good, it has never had a good reputation. A lot of 
political movements made their careers out of the fight with bureaucracy. It has been like 
that since Lenin, who wrote a lot of treaties on bureaucracy, and also other political 
movements, like the right wing, for example, fascism, which believed that...
The other interviewees from the voivodship office indicated similarly extreme negative 
opinions of administration in general:
For a few years I stopped being an ... I work in an administration office, which always 
worries me. I feel ashamed of it; I feel awfully ashamed, I have to say.
Why?
This is not a good job; being a civil servant in Poland is not a good profession. A civil 
servant is usually accused of corruption, a desire to govern, lack of competence -  such 
things. These are common opinions and I feel ashamed that I am a sort of civil servant. I 
have hope that I may ‘disentangle’ myself from it somehow.
These extreme and opposite sentiments regarding the administration and its performance 
by the voivodship office and the local government elites were related to their opinions 
on how much power they had. In this context, the earlier quotation by a member of the
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local government elite indicating its highly effective economic performance (as 
measured by its spending being several times lower than that of the public 
administration, for example on hospitals, despite the same quality of services provided) 
is significant. The voivodship office did not have its own budget and was fully 
dependent financially on the central-level budget. In the period under discussion the low 
esteem in which administration was held was preserved at the voivodship level. This 
resulted from the fact that this institution did not go through the reform which would 
probably have strengthened its powers. In other words, positive opinions on 
administration were held by the local government elite. Related to this was the fact that 
this institution had already been reformed and thus lost its socialist legacy. It also had 
relative autonomy and, in consequence, the members of this elite felt responsible for 
their own actions, in contrast to the administration in the voivodship office, which 
preserved the socialist-type subordination:
Our local government [institution] was a fully new construction, not bringing into the new 
Republic a legacy going back to the PRL [Polish People’s Republic], It is an institution 
whose first years of functioning should be considered a success, which to some extent is its 
internal feature due to its institutional self-government arrangement.504
That is why the local government elite felt a sense of satisfaction, despite the fact that 
people did not always fully appreciate their actions. Society was sometimes impatient, 
after the neglect of the socialist period, having unrealistic expectations of the results of 
the national transition which was only started in 1989. However, as the opinion below 
indicates, mayors also believed that inhabitants did, at the same time, begin to notice the 
economic development appearing in their communities after 1990. They believed that 
what was noticed most was the renovation of buildings and the new tidy look of streets, 
in contrast to the unkempt environment that prevailed in the socialist period. They also 
emphasised the economic rationale of decisions taken by town boards:
Why is that the local government administration not respected? People would of course be 
against state power [and its administration]. It should be recognised that people will always 
be against power, however it is organised. Partly they are right as they expect to have good 
roads immediately... when in actuality the neglect [by the socialist regimes] cannot be so 
quickly made good. That is why those expectations cannot be met by the abilities [of 
administration] and this always causes dissatisfaction. But I rate the achievements of the 
local governments very highly. They had their heads screwed on and spent money sensibly.
It is strange that it was virtually decided by a group, which was selected out of 48 people 
[town-council] in the case of our town. However, as a group they can choose the things 
which are essential in the end.
504 Dziewior quoted in Sejmik Samorzqdowy, August 1995.
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Another opinion also shows appreciation of local government work despite its low 
social recognition:
The rule in town should be quite efficient and up to date, and having in mind the town’s 
interest, but after all no action could satisfy everybody. We do not avoid criticism; we have 
to accept it. We have to prove one thing, that we do care for the town, care for its security, 
care for its future and care for its inhabitants. This is difficult to prove but emphasis should 
be put on it.
In other words, the town mayors were also able (in contrast to the voivodship office 
elite) to distance themselves from the negative attitudes towards administration 
substantially strengthened in society during the socialist period. They also understood 
that a lot of people had poor knowledge of how administration works. However, they 
were quite confident that, thanks to frequent meetings with towns’ inhabitants, the 
achievements of local governments would gradually be recognised more and more by 
local societies:
Administration is still perceived this way. We meet inhabitants very often. A voivode does 
not have to meet inhabitants, but a mayor does. On the other hand, at these meetings, 
inhabitants very often raise such objections as: ‘you only’ shut yourself away, ‘these 
officials only’ ... and so on. It is difficult to explain to simple people, peasants and blue- 
collar workers, that these investments need to be prepared, surveyors need to be employed, 
measures need to be taken and projects have to be drawn up. These projects cost a few 
million zloty but this does not need to be explained. There is no need to make a problem out 
of it. It is like this everywhere, in each country.
Mayors met regularly with inhabitants and they emphasised that this was in contrast to 
the public administration, who were appointed and did not have to meet local people. 
The low educational level of the inhabitants, as well as their limited knowledge of 
public administration and local government in particular, were additional facts which 
the mayors mentioned in explaining why their efforts were not fully recognised. This 
extremely low level of knowledge of how administration works and the low turn-out in 
local elections did not disappoint them; instead, they talked about the long-term process 
of changing social attitudes.
They also saw the differences between their achievements and the ineffective 
performance of the public administration. They suggested that this kept up the bad 
opinion of administration in society, as well as the fact that responsibility for nearly 
everything was put on local government, despite their limited legal and financial 
opportunities. For example, local government was blamed for the bad condition of roads
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(maintenance of which in many cases was in responsibility of central administration). 
One of the mayors interviewed by me recollected:
Therefore, I can constantly say one thing: the most successful issue was local government 
reform... This awareness began to appear after six years. Maybe the turn-out for elections is 
not good. Turn-out was low compared to the first election when there was this enthusiasm; 
this cooled a bit, people were discouraged and did not go to vote. But this is because many 
people expected too much. And still there is a lack of knowledge about what local 
government can do and what is beyond its powers. As a matter of fact, everything is 
expected from local government.
This is similar to the opinion of another town mayor who evaluated town administration 
achievements highly despite the poor knowledge of people about administration as a 
whole and local government in particular:
People in Poland are not prepared yet. They are often helpless and it seems that self- 
government has a very important role to play despite the fact that local government, for 
example, in such big communes as towns of 250, is often anonymous. I would bet all my 
money that half the inhabitants of X  do not know the name of their mayor, that 80 per cent 
do not know the councillor from their ‘borough’. I also believe that 95 per cent of them do 
not know the division of responsibilities among local government, the voivodship and the 
special administration. This awareness is missing, and only time, education, patience and 
the use of economic means can cause this awareness to appear. As a result, there will be a 
higher turn-out in elections; at the moment, this is between 20 and 30 per cent in the 
majority of Upper Silesia’s communes. In others it is even worse. So it is a long, a really 
long process to raise this awareness.
In the opinion of the mayors, these local government achievements were also related to 
the fact that local government reform led to the arrival of better cadres than in the public 
administration. This was due to different selection mechanisms, as the democratic 
character of local government encouraged the selection of able candidates. They 
believed that, by contrast, the public administration maintained the same personnel 
policy as during the socialist period. This led to the selection of ineffective and 
irresponsible candidates for whom a few positions at the top of central administration 
ensured good salaries and offered safe, permanent jobs. These were jobs in which they 
did not need to take responsibility as they would have to do if they worked in private 
business. In extreme cases they saw central administration officials only as careerists 
who did not care about the state. This also seems to be related to different political 
views and origins. The post-Solidarity elite, although they were not the mainstream 
activists, often dominated in local government, in contrast to the post-communist central 
government at that time. However, this radical assessment of central administration is 
also likely to indicate the local government elite’s preservation of negative attitudes
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towards administration formed during the socialist period -  ‘the schizophrenic attitudes 
toward the administration’.
On the contrary there are far more valuable people in self-governing administration than in 
the state administration and central government together.
Here, there are activists who have been working in local government administration for six 
years. They know how to manage, at least on the scale to which their responsibility extends.
The people in local government administration have proved themselves. Meanwhile, the 
people who govern the country have not even managed firms with two or three employees.
They are so-called political activists, sometimes innately, who have done nothing else but 
been political activists. They have not shown that they know how to manage a small group 
of people, let alone govern a state. To govern, to hold certain posts, to perform certain 
duties, experience must be gained and this experience is gained gradually by managing and 
supervising larger and larger groups of people.505
In contrast, positive opinion were expressed about local government cadres due to their 
selection during local elections:
I have been in local government the whole time I have been a councillor. I did not 
understand in the beginning what caused the strength and energy of local government. Later, 
the ‘big lords’- prime ministers, when they talked with the mayors of small towns felt a 
respect for them as they knew that behind the mayors of even small towns, stood the people 
[who elected them].506
The criticism of central administration personnel is surprising. It might be expected that 
the local government officials would be less efficient as they began to manage 
communes in 1990 after only a few months of preparation and without any previous 
experience or professional qualifications. It was unlike the central administration, which 
preserved some continuity of administrative personnel and thus should have had at least 
some professionals. However, economic performance indicated that a lot of local 
government opinions have not been exaggerated. Town mayors suggested that this was 
related to the fact that, for example, a minister was not responsible to anybody as it 
takes the four years of parliament to assess his performance, but a mayor is supervised at 
the very time when his actions are carried out by the town council.
However, there was some criticism of local government civil servants. One of the town 
mayors indicated that a director of a department in one of the Big Towns of the region 
had been appointed by a former mayor despite charges of corruption against him. This 
was, in his opinion, in striking contrast to the situation of local governments in Germany
505 Dziewior quoted in Nasza Gazeta, no. 7, 1996.
506 Urbanczyk quoted in Nasza Gazeta, no. 2, 1996.
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(which he knew about from co-operation between his town and its partner-town in 
Germany). In Poland, local government was still in a period of formation. Thus, there 
were no laws, for example, protecting against the appointment of a criminal to the 
position of mayor (indicating the lack of experience of the authors of the new 
regulations). This mayor also appreciated the importance of seniority in the career-paths 
in administration in Germany, where mayors had wide experience and administrative 
qualifications. By contrast, in Poland, there was far less administrative continuity and 
there were still some destabilising events, such as the referendum to dismiss the mayor 
of Dqbrowa Gomicza, and the stalemate over the election of a new mayor in Bytom in 
1994. Moreover, the same mayors also complained that, although salaries in local 
government were a few times larger than in the public administration, they were still 
relatively low, and an exodus of specialists into private business was taking place as 
salaries there were several times larger still.
This negative assessment of central government was also important because it 
influenced the redefinition of local government’s role, as the local government elite saw 
themselves as the main reformist force. As a result, they put themselves in opposition to 
central government. In particular, they accused central government of not thinking about 
the state but being driven by parochial interests. Central government was also criticised 
for its arrogance and immoral actions. This is illustrated by the stories that central 
government always had money to build recreation centres for itself but at the same time 
gave less for the maintenance of orphanages.507
This moral disgust at the behaviour of central government was also reinforced by the 
case of the deputy minister who publicly declared that whether a mayor would receive 
grants depended on his whim. My interviewees referred to this deputy minister as a 
hooligan. The arrogance of the central administration was also highlighted, with the 
financial situation of the Polish communes being contrasted with the conditions of local 
governments in the Czech Republic and Hungary. They suggested that despite similar 
local government reforms starting there only in 1990, those countries’ communes 
received about 30 to 40 per cent of the state budget, while in Poland it was only 14 per 
cent. Thus, they believed that this situation was deliberately maintained by the post­
507 That year, the orphanages received one third less money, when inflation was above ten per cent. The 
number of children there rose and it was the town administration which found money to help the 
orphanage although it was not their responsibility.
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communist governments. They also criticised these governments for preserving 
comfortable conditions for themselves, for example, by avoiding all reforms as they 
might be unpopular.
However, local government conditions had changed to some extent from the socialist 
period. For example, when Prime Minister Oleksy did not arrive on time for a meeting 
with the mayors of the Katowice voivodship towns, and did not even try to phone them 
to inform them of his delay, they left after waiting for him for 50 minutes. They saw this 
as a success, as the next time when the Prime Minister arranged to meet them, he was on 
time. He had to respect them, and could not dismiss mayors for insubordination as had 
been the case under socialism.
This recognition of high economic performance by local government, and at the same 
time the conviction that central government was deliberately slowing down the 
introduction of administrative reform for political reasons was crucial. Thus, the mayors 
believed that local government was the main force capable of exerting pressure for 
decentralisation.508 It was especially the case as they thought that further delays in 
administrative reform would not only prevent improvement of their performance but, 
more importantly, would slow down the further economic development of the country. 
Thus, their opinions about the present functioning of local government often referred to 
the necessity for further reform.509
I can therefore say one thing: the most successful was the local government reform. 
However, I and many local government employees also believe that further decentralisation 
of local government is necessary, Our country would move backward [if the reforms were 
not carried out]. That is how I see it, maybe in a radical way, but I see the role of local 
government reform in this way.
To sum up, the local government elite saw itself not only as an effective agent of 
transition in communes but, above all, as a powerful reformist force of the national 
economic restructuring and, at the same time, the crucial institution guaranteeing 
democratic functioning of the new state. The opinion of Dziewior below illustrates this 
view of the crucial role of local government in rebuilding a new democratic 
administrative structure after the fall of communism:
508 Compare also, for example, Kopel’s statement about the political motivation of the communes to 
participate in the Pilot Programme.
509 Their vision of administrative reform will be presented in chapter seven.
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The Polish local government elite can take the credit for success not only in constructing the 
local dimension, but also as co-founder of the new state and a new mechanism of governing 
in our country.510
Conclusion
This chapter focused on the development of local government since its recreation in 
1990. The first sections described the local elections of 1990 and 1994. In the 
investigation of the local elections of 1990 and 1994 the development from the 
plebiscite type of election against nomenclatura to the gradual development of political 
parties was shown. Moreover, the arrival of new Post-Solidarity elites and the 
mobilisation of the Upper Silesian Union were presented as these were closely related to 
the local government elite’s high evaluation of its actions. The third and fourth sections 
of this chapter dealt with the re-centralisation of local government and local attempts to 
react to it. Thus, a lot of attention was paid to the mayors’ opinions of central 
governments’ actions and their reactions such as the withdrawal from the Pilot 
Programme or suing the voivode, and finally the constant emphasis on the necessity for 
further administrative reform. The chapter finished with a positive, even enthusiastic, 
evaluation of local government achievements by its elite. What was especially 
interesting was that local government was created from scratch and had existed only 
since 1990. This was even more striking in the mayors’ contrasting of local government 
achievements with negative opinion on unreformed central administration.
510 Dziewior quoted in Sejmik Samorzqdowy, August 1995.
281
CHAPTER 6
THE REGIONAL CONTRACT -  AN INTERIM SOLUTION FOR 
THE KATOWICE VOIVODSHIP, 1995-1997
The region is not and does not want to be a privileged 
region, but the uniqueness of its problems -  social, 
ecological, and industrial -  caused by excessive and 
wasteful exploitation in the several previous years, and their 
size, demand the effort not only of its inhabitants and elite, 
but also the effort and assistance of the whole of Poland and 
international support organisations.511
Introduction
The aim of this chapter is to show the development of regional policy. It starts with the 
Programme of Regional Economic Policy for Upper Silesia prepared at the beginning of 
the nineties and the regional administrative elite’s aspiration to be the sole agent of 
change and it proceeds to the second stage in 1995 when the Regional Contract was 
signed. Thus, the next issue investigated is the main change in the regional elite’s policy 
at that time, with its efforts to incorporate the national elite in the regional restructuring. 
The expectations of both sides towards the Regional Contract are presented, followed 
by a description of the main ideas proposed by the regional administrative elite in the 
Regional Contract: formation of the Council of the Regional Contract, Local Segments 
and the Upper Silesian Fund. In this part the main chapters of the Regional Contract are 
also presented, with the last two sections placing this quite untypical document for 
Poland in a wider political and historical context. Comparisons with inter-war autonomy 
are made and the question of the role of the regional elite is raised.
Section four of this chapter is based on the elite interviews I conducted after the 
introduction of the Contract (1995-1997) supplemented with the press-interviews, the 
emphasis being placed on their opinions about the Regional Contract. The analysis 
develops around the issues most frequently mentioned by my respondents of 
substituting the reform by the Regional Contract and the expectation of further
511 Kontrakt Regionalny, 1995, volume 8 Part I, p. 7.
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administrative reform. An evaluation of the Contract is also presented according to three 
distinguishable groups: its advocates, its critics and the most populous group of 
‘sceptics’, who see in the signing of the Contract nearly the same number of advantages 
and disadvantages.
6.1 The aims of the Regional Contract
The Regional Contract was signed in October 1995 by representatives of the regional 
elite of the Katowice voivodship and the government. This Contract was the only case 
when an agreement was signed by central government and representatives of a region. 
The Regional Contract can be interpreted as an interim solution in the situation of a lack 
of regional economic restructuring and suspension of administrative reform. After the 
change of political power in autumn 1993, despite the fact that the district and regional 
level administrative reform was declared by the SLD as necessary, the regional 
authorities did not expect its introduction in the foreseeable future. In fact, they did not 
exclude the possibility that, in unfavourable conditions, this reform could be 
significantly delayed, even by a few years.
The origins of the Regional Contract can be traced back to the frustration of the regional 
elite, among them the administration (especially the voivodship office), over the fact 
that they had very limited responsibilities and were not able to react to the economic 
and social ‘catastrophe’ in the region. In addition, the national elite was seen as passive 
and uninterested, and unable to propose comprehensive projects for regional 
restructuring. The Regional Contract was a project to modify the regional institutional 
structure of the administration. It aimed to strengthen the position of the regional 
authorities and integrate policies at ‘district’ and ‘regional’ levels, which were necessary 
preconditions for the initiation of regional restructuring of heavy-industry. Thus, the 
Regional Contract was an effort by the regional elite to put pressure on the national elite 
to decentralise power and to accept certain proposals for reform presented in the 
document that would lead to engagement of the central elite’s in the regional 
restructuring. Thus, the Regional Contract was proposed and prepared by the regional 
elite and signed by central government under significant political pressure from regional 
lobbies, especially the regional Solidarity Trade Union.
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In the long run, the Regional Contract was to bring about even greater decentralisation 
of administration in the region, for the final aim of this contract was the radical proposal 
for the formation of a self-governing region. This proposal assumed that the regional 
government would be the main body to decide regional policies. This meant that 
strategic decisions would be taken by a democratically-elected council of the region, in 
contrast to the position of the voivodship office at that time as an arm of central 
government.
The Regional Contract proposals indicate the regional authorities’ desire for 
decentralisation and the democratisation of power by the formation of an elective 
institution at the regional level. However, the fact that in the long-run it was planned 
that Upper Silesia should become a self-governing region suggests another particularly 
important feature. The fact that the Regional Contract’s proposals were mainly prepared 
under the inspiration of experts from the voivodship office suggests that they also 
believed the regional administration (regional government) should represent first and 
foremost regional society. Their vision was that future regional development policy 
should be prepared in the region, not in the centre, as it was taking place there. Regional 
society should decide what its wants, while the regional government, as an elective 
institution, should create the opportunity to fulfil these expectations. The fact that the 
regional elite demanded decentralisation is natural after the period of socialist 
authoritarianism. However, the regional proposal for a self-governing voivodship 
(heavily inspired by inter-war autonomy) reflects the belief among the then current 
voivodship office (despite being formally the representative of central government) that 
it was regional society that was the ‘master’ of regional politics. As a result, a 
particularly significant issue is the role of central interests as subordinate to regional 
ones.
Moreover, the idea of the self-governing region was supported on financial grounds, as 
the formation of such a region assumed strong financial discretion, which should finally 
be sufficient to conduct regional restructuring. At the same time, this idea of the self- 
governing region meant also that the decisions on region’s restructuring would be taken
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there. Czamik, the director of Economic Department, indicates strong support for this 
idea among the regional elite:512
The contract is the introduction of self-government at the voivodship level. It made it 
possible to initiate restructuring of the region, which will spread over decades. For the first 
time, a large representation of the Katowice voivodship gathered together, and they 
supported the idea of the formation of the Contract.513
6.2 The origins of the Regional Contract
i. The role o f the regional Solidarity Trade Union
The origins of the contract are twofold. On the one hand, it grew out of the Solidarity 
Trade Union’s proposals for the creation of a special system of social guarantees in the 
region, in the expectation of mass redundancies in the heavy industry sectors. This 
reflects the fact that coal exploitation and iron production supported the existence of 60- 
70 per cent of the other firms in the region.514 On the other hand, the Regional Contract 
was also the result of the new administrative elite’s own project for regional 
restructuring in the absence of such projects by the national elite.
The project of the Regional Contract was first presented in February 1994 at a meeting 
of the regional Solidarity Trade Union, by its leader Kempski.515 The original Solidarity 
project was more a list of economic and social demands than a project for regional 
restructuring. It was only in the final version of the Contract that the emphasis shifted 
towards regional restructuring and the expectation of social privileges was limited. 
However, Solidarity’s achievement lay in popularising the idea of the Regional Contract 
beyond the region, gaining the support of the national elite, and finally getting it signed 
by the government. First, on 17 October 1994, President Walqsa, preparing for the next 
presidential election, offered his support to the project of the Regional Contract after a 
demonstration organised by regional Solidarity in Warsaw. As a result, this proposal 
was discussed by the national elite, although earlier, before Walqsa’s (Solidarity Trade
512 In this part of the chapter the opinions of the founders of the Contract are presented; in the second part 
of the chapter the more varied opinions of the regional administrative elite will be presented, that is, those 
of Contract participants, sympathisers, and those who were strongly against it.
513 Czamik quoted in Dziennik Zachodni, 5 October 1995.
514 Dziadul, Polityka, 13 May 1995.
515 Zurek, Gazeta w Katowicach 6-7 August 1994.
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Union origins) recognition, the regional Solidarity demonstration had not been taken 
into account by the national elite at all.516
The political strength of regional Solidarity distinguished it from other regional 
organisations, among them the political parties. Regional political parties were top- 
down organisations, strong due to the personalities of their leaders rather than their 
membership numbers. It was regional Solidarity which enjoyed the support of several 
thousand blue-collar workers. Among them there was a strong representation of 
coalminers (Kempski himself was a coalminer), who expected to be made redundant. 
Thus, they were very militant and ready to demonstrate in Warsaw to ‘force’ the 
national elite to recognise the economic and social difficulties of Upper Silesia. 
Gradually the regional Solidarity protests and threats were noted by the national elite, 
and they expected large-scale political unrest in the region. Kempski himself threatened 
to instigate strikes and demonstrations by the regional Trade Union. This sounded 
especially convincing as the regional trade unions, wishing to strengthen their political 
power, created the special military-type, ‘so-called quick-response groups’ of the Trade 
Unions.517
On the other hand, the Regional Contract proposals became much more attractive to the 
national political elite immediately before the presidential election, especially due to the 
fact that, ten per cent of the Polish population lived in the Katowice voivodship.
ii. Regional policy o f the Katowice voivodship, 1990-1994 -  the independent actions
The origins of the Regional Contract also lie in the regional policies prepared by lobbies 
independent of heavy industry at the beginning of the nineties. After 1990, the new 
regional administrative elite arrived. For example, 80 per cent of the councillors chosen 
then had been selected for the first time.518 A similar shift of the elite took place at that 
time in the voivodship office elite.
516 Dziadul, Polityka, 13 May 1995.
517 Starzynski, Gazeta w Katowicach, 18 October 1994.
518 Kolczynski, 1996: 17.
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The Regional Contract was the next stage of the regional elite’s work on preparing 
programmes for regional restructuring, initiated after their arrival in 1990. These early 
projects for regional restructuring went through significant modifications. At first, there 
were demands for autonomy, typical of a period of radical and revolutionary change 
(1990-1994). Gradually, these proposals for autonomy (although what exactly that 
meant was often unclear) were replaced by more moderate proposals for 
decentralisation which were more politically acceptable to the national elite. The 
Regional Contract, formed in the more stable, ‘restoration’ period in 1995, is the best 
example of this change of approach. However, all the projects prepared by the regional 
administrative elite, both the early ones and the Regional Contract, have in common an 
attempt to adapt a dysfunctional state structure of administration, and to address the 
even more critical situation of Upper Silesia.
The early concepts of regional restructuring assumed above all that regional 
restructuring could only be initiated and conducted by the regional and local elite. The 
situation in Upper Silesia was described by regional scientists as critical because of 
internal colonisation, that is, the unequal relationship between the centre (the capital) 
and Upper Silesia (the ‘periphery’).519
One of the main projects from which the Regional Contract evolved was the Programme 
of Regional Economic Policy for Upper Silesia prepared by the Department of the 
Economy of the voivodship office in October 1992. It was an interesting attempt to 
improve the economic and social situation in Upper Silesia by extending the discretion 
of the regional administrative elite. The programme was an attempt to adapt to an 
extremely centralised state, where strong legal obstacles existed at the regional level 
enabling the regional administrative elite to introduce and conduct any regional policy 
directly. The difficulties of the voivodship office authorities were further increased by 
national conditions, as at that time there was little awareness of a need for regional 
policies and this issue was missing from the agendas of all the governments after 1989 
(until the reforms were initiated in 1998).
Thus, the national elite’s decision to sign the Regional Contract was significant, in the 
opinion of Czamik, the Director of the Department of Economy of the voivodship
519 See for example Blasiak Przeglqd tygodniowy 1989 or Szczepanski (1995).
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office, who was the key figure in preparing the regional restructuring programmes for 
Upper Silesia and the founder of the Regional Contract. It shows a meaningful 
achievement of the voivodship office in Katowice, which gradually made the national 
elite aware of the need for decentralisation, and for carrying out regional policy.
This process of ‘educating’ the national elite about the need for a regional policy was, in 
Czamik’s opinion, hindered by the almost annual changes of government. Thus, not 
until July 1994 did the Minister of Finance, Kolodko, use the concept of a regional 
policy for the first time in his ‘Strategy for Poland’. At that time, the regional concepts 
proposed by ministries repeated whole paragraphs from the programme presented by the 
Department of Economy of the voivodship office, although, in Czamik’s opinion, this 
was not followed by supportive central government actions:
At most, sentences taken verbatim from our programme appear in some statements of the 
ministerial civil servants. It is a pity that in practice nothing results from this. Governments 
and civil servants change too often, but the programme [the Regional Contract] has to 
operate for 15 to 30 years.520
The Programme of Regional Economic Policy for Upper Silesia was the first stage in 
the formation of regional policy. At this stage, the regional elite showed considerable 
confidence in trying to solve the regional problems alone. The programme concentrated 
on two main regional actors: the communes and businesses located in the region. The 
role of the voivodship office, in contrast to other institutions, was much more limited, 
despite its main authors’ coming from there. The strong role of local government and 
the simultaneously limited role for the voivodship office prescribed in this programme 
reflects the situation that existed at that time in regional administration. As a result, 
despite its strong desire, the voivodship office’s opportunity for participation was 
limited. Its participation was only possible through indirect action in a network of 
economic institutions on whose boards the voivode sat.
This programme was criticised by Blasiak, Nawrocki and Szczepariski (1994) for its 
lack of integration with state institutions. However, it is questionable whether this 
criticism is justified, given the situation of such limited voivodship administration 
responsibilities and abundant legal obstacles which prevented the voivodship office 
from directly conducting any regional policy. Additionally, central government’s
520 Czamik qouted in Gosc Niedzielny, 8 May 1994.
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passivity itself brought about the actions of the regional authorities, until the national 
elite signed the Regional Contract and it was incorporated into regional restructuring.
In such a situation, the only administrative institution which could play a crucial role in 
the region was the commune, which had gone through the 1990 reform. As a result, 
local government had its own financial resources and administrative independence from 
central government and was thus able to concentrate on local aims. In the Programme of 
Regional Economic Policy for Upper Silesia, the commune was to be the nucleus of the 
network of local institutions, co-operating closely with the firms and economic, social, 
cultural, and educational associations located in its territory, together pursuing common 
local aims. Moreover, in the situation of a lack of administrative reform, the communes 
were also trying to expand this network to district and regional levels.
The Programme of Regional Economic Policy for Upper Silesia did not aim to change 
institutional state structure but instead tried to adapt (to modify, but not transform) its 
highly dysfunctional system. Thus, despite the necessity of a powerful institution 
forming and implementing regional policies at the regional level, the voivodship 
office’s role remained as limited as it had been during the socialist period and was not 
modified by administrative reform after 1990. In part, voivodship office responsibilities 
were increased by the formation of several economic institutions supervised by the 
voivode or by directors of various departments, which was to compensate for the 
limitation of administrative responsibilities at voivodship level. One of the members of 
the voivodship office elite engaged in regional planning explained the reason for the 
formation of the new institutions in this manner:
Conducting regional policy is necessary. Because there was ‘a gap’ [of responsibilities], it 
was necessary to create such institutions, which would be a sort of replacement for the lack 
of institutions representing the regional entity. They were to replace those institutions 
which should function at the regional level, mainly around the voivode.
The most important institutions established by the voivode were the Upper Silesian
Agency of Development and Promotion, an institution organising international
commercial exhibitions, an agency promoting Katowice’s international airport, and an
institution responsible for the development of a regional network of roads. This group of
institutions was aimed at attracting foreign and internal investors by means of
improving regional facilities. Other agencies were aimed at the recovery of the region’s
economic performance; for example an agency responsible for regional co-ordination of
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construction and another responsible for the electricity supply system. An additional 
important agency was designed for consultation about the privatisation of some one 
hundred state companies in the region, which were suffering from the effects of under­
investment during the socialist era.
All the regional programmes, from the beginning, had to deal with the problem of 
collecting the substantial amounts of money necessary for regional restructuring. The 
Programme of Regional Economic Policy for Upper Silesia was prepared in the absence 
of substantial funds for regional restructuring. Thus it was crucial for even the smallest 
revenue gathered in the region to stay in there instead of being transferred to the central 
budget, as it was believed that the central ministries would not return even a small 
proportion of the money produced there.
The revenue gathered in the region was to be channelled and circulated into the network 
of regional institutions. The crucial role in the horizontal circulation was to be played by 
the new institutions formed by the voivodship office. In other words, the money earned 
by one institution in the network financed other institutions in the programme, instead 
of being sent to the voivodship budget and then to central coffers.521 However, this was 
only a partial substitute for the preservation of money produced in the region to be spent 
on regional restructuring. The best solution was thought to be the expected 
administrative reform of districts and regions assisted by the decentralisation of 
finances.
Czamik, the co-author of the Regional Contract, believed that as long as the money 
produced in the region did not remain there, talk about Upper Silesia as a privileged 
region or as a burden for which all of Poland was to be sacrificed would be groundless. 
In other words, only if the national financial system became transparent, and the money 
produced in regions stayed there, could the myth that the region subsidises the rest of 
Poland, or the contrary myth that the national economy subsidises the region, be 
verified or refuted:
Silesia does not need charity but more discretion and freedom... Besides, not only Silesia 
but the rest of the voivodships demand the abolition of the centralised tax system. A 
rational tax structure would be as follows: 35 per cent for the commune, 35 per cent for the 
region, and 30 per cent for the centre for the performance of national tasks. ‘Render unto
521 Kontrakt Regionalny, 1995, volume 1:5.
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Caesar what belongs to Caesar, but what is left we should control ourselves... Then the 
money would be here, not in the capital, and it is here that real ideas for Silesia originate.522
6.3 The concept of the Regional Contract -  the agreement of the regional and 
national elite
Analysis of the Regional Contract will concentrate first on why, in contrast to earlier 
regional programmes, the decision was taken in the Regional Contract to incorporate the 
national elite. The second issue to be discussed will be the consolidation of the regional 
elite before the negotiations with the national elite. The third to be discussed will be 
negotiations with the central elite and their decision to agree to sign the Regional 
Contract, and the fourth will be the formation of a common body of central and regional 
elite, the Council of the Regional Contract, will be discussed. In the fifth section, the 
main topic areas -  ‘chapters’ of the Regional Contract. However, attention will be 
concentrated mostly in the chapter 4 which deals to the administrative dimension. In 
the next two sections (six and seven) the two crucial administrative institutions will be 
presented: Local Segments and the Upper Silesia Fund. Finally in section eight, the 
inspiration of the inter-war period of autonomy in the work on the Regional Contract 
and references to the belief that Upper Silesia had been ‘a privileged region’ will be 
discussed. All these issues indicate the role of the national elite but more importantly 
the role of the regional elite in initiating the regional restructuring. Thus, in the last 
section, direct comparisons will be drawn between the role of the regional elite in 
initiating reforms and the national elite’s actions in 1989 which initiated the national 
transition.
i. Why was the participation o f the national elite necessary?
In early 1993, the idea of the Regional Contract emerged within the framework of the 
Regional Economic Policy for Upper Silesia. The Regional Contract shows the 
evolution of concepts concerning regional policy by the regional elite. At the beginning 
of the nineties there were calls for autonomy. These had a rather ideological character 
and were an expression of the frustration of the regional elite with the national elite’s
522 Czamik quoted in Polityka, 17 December 1994.
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complacency (the concept of internal colonisation) rather than including serious 
proposals or actions aimed at introducing the idea. The Programme of Regional 
Economic Policy for Upper Silesia introduced in October 1992 concentrated on 
increasing informal power at the voivodship level by the formation of institutions 
supervised by the voivode. However, the voivodship office authorities, as my interviews 
indicated, gradually recognised the exhaustion of all the opportunities for action 
available to the regional elite after the introduction of this programme. In other words, 
the efforts of the regional elite by itself to be more efficient were exhausted and the 
incorporation of the national elite was therefore seen as necessary. Thus, the Regional 
Contract was to increase voivode responsibilities but, at this stage, co-operation with the 
national elite was viewed as essential.
At the same time, the creation of the Regional Contract shows the change in the 
relationship with the national elite. Radical demands, at the beginning of the nineties, 
for strong power for regional authorities were made so that they would conduct 
restructuring alone, and threatening calls for autonomy were replaced by a more 
diplomatic approach for decentralisation of power. The regional elite still wanted to 
play the crucial role, but, after 1994, in dialogue with the central elite. One of the 
founders of the Regional Contract and a member of the voivodship office elite recalls 
this evolution of regional policy and the decision to incorporate the national elite as the 
most important change in regional policy until then:
The period when voivode Ciszak came to office already required a change in the 
programme of regional development. The regional programme in the form in which it 
existed in voivode Czech’s time, had reached a certain barrier in its evolution... Later [when 
voivode Ciszak came], it was necessary to create such institutions as, for example, the 
Upper Silesia Fund, which could not be created without the substantial participation of the 
central budget. As a result, there was a need to incorporate the ministries into the regional 
programme... This was the main reason for the creation of this idea.
The attempt to redefine the division of powers between the voivodship and central-level 
in the Regional Contract arose from similar diagnoses to those presented in the earlier 
programmes at the beginning of the nineties. The national elite was not thought to be 
able to carry out regional restructuring, as it lacked a comprehensive vision of regional 
restructuring with all its regional ‘reforms’ being driven by sectoral and narrow 
ministerial interests. The national elite was also accused of conscious delays in 
introducing reforms in Upper Silesia compared to other parts of Poland. It was finally 
accused of spending insufficient funds on regional restructuring. Moreover, even the
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limited amounts of money spent by the separate ministries were being used 
uneconomically. Thus, more power for the voivodship office administration was seen as 
necessary for better use of at least those limited resources.523
The lack of the national elite’s engagement in the regional restructuring was also 
explained by the expected size of the financial resources estimated to be necessary and 
the anticipated difficulties; for example, the scale of social dissatisfaction and possible 
unrest. Moreover, the frequent changes of government meant that each new elite only 
gradually learnt about the ‘urgency’ of the regional problems, and the policy towards 
Upper Silesia lacked continuity. As a result, the central authorities were perceived as 
being unwilling or unable to solve regional problems even though this elite was carrying 
out fairly radical restructuring on a national scale. Czamik argued that the cost of 
restructuring Upper Silesia was seen as the main obstacle to Polish reform, slowing 
down state development or, more radically, its largest burden. Czamik contradicted this 
popular opinion, however, when he argued that not initiating the restructuring of Upper 
Silesia could slow down the national transition:
Do you remember what Silesia meant for Polish reconstruction after the war? But how is 
Silesia seen now? In various situations it is seen as a problem -  I know this from my own 
experience. But I argue the opposite; is it really Silesia, with its outdated industry, requiring 
enormous expenditure on reconstruction, with its devastated technical infrastructure, that is 
a problem for Poland? Is it Silesia with half of the ecological and health problems in the 
country, with hundreds of other issues, which brings discredit to civilisation at the end of 
the twentieth century that is a problem for Poland? On the contrary I argue: Is not it rather 
due to the maintenance of the conditions which I mentioned earlier in Silesia that reforms in 
Poland are slow?524
The pre-election situation was seen by the voivodship office elite as a rare chance 
created by the regional Solidarity Trade Union to force negotiations on regional 
restructuring with the national elite. The regional elite saw itself as being both more 
knowledgeable about regional needs and more efficient than the national elite, and 
believed that consultation with them, even on the sectoral reforms then being carried out 
(for example, in coalmining) was necessary. In the next stage, the comprehensive 
projects for regional restructuring were to be worked out by the national and regional 
elite together.
523 According to Kontrakt Regionalny, 1995, volume 8 Part I: 3.
524 Czarnik quoted in Polityka, 17 December 1994.
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Today, many exceptionally serious aspects of the Silesian problems escape voivode 
tutelage. There is an attempt to solve problems concerning the functioning of Silesian 
coalmining and metallurgy in isolation from their natural environment. Similarly, ‘Job 
Centres’ are run by special administration units. Let us look, for example, at social 
assistance, which is mostly addressed to coalminers from liquidated coalmines, who 
voluntarily resigned from work in the pits. The social assistance schemes were established 
by a government act and the money was guaranteed. But the fact is that there is little 
interest in them as coalminers persistently prefer to work in the jobs they always had.525
The regional elite saw itself as the main actor whose participation was considered 
necessary to carry out regional restructuring. Prolonging the situation while it had very 
limited responsibilities was completely unacceptable. The regional administrative elite 
often emphasised the critical ecological and health conditions in the region:
In the meantime, Silesia cannot wait any longer with its problems! We want to speed up 
what the politicians have been talking about for a long time -  we want real restructuring, 
not declarations.526
Moreover, as Czamik, one of the key figures in the formation of the Regional Contract, 
said, they regional elite wanted to initiate the regional reforms immediately as they felt 
that they had finished preparation of a comprehensive vision of regional restructuring.527 
The signing of the Regional Contract was to create the opportunity to introduce regional 
restructuring and conduct a coherent regional policy by formation of an effective 
institutional structure, one of the most important institutions being the Council of the 
Regional Contract.
The Regional Contract was to redefine the division of power between the voivodship 
administration (voivodship office and local governments) and central government. 
However, this solution was to be applied only in the Katowice voivodship, although 
administration in Poland, as a whole structure, was seen as ineffective. This redefinition 
of responsibilities was to be achieved by the creation of the Council of the Regional 
Contract, formed by representatives of the regional and central government authorities. 
They were to take decisions on the most crucial issues for the region and divide the 
money allocated for heavy industry reforms more economically:
525 Czamik quoted in Trybuna Slqska, 28 July 1994.
526 Czamik quoted in Trybuna, 10-11 June 1995.
527 Dziennik, Zachodni, 22 September 1994.
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Due to the contract, it will no longer be possible for a decision about the Katowice 
voivodship to be taken in Warsaw, and for those who are affected by it to learn about it 
from newspapers and television. Now the decision will be in consultation with the Council 
of the Regional Contract.528
The Regional Contract was also to create its own -  albeit modest -  financial resources, 
the Upper Silesia Fund, and new institutions -  Local Segments, from which common 
plans were to be worked out for ‘district’ restructuring. However, the negotiations with 
the central elite and their acceptance of the Council of the Regional Contract, the Upper 
Silesia Fund and Local Segments, were preceded by consolidation of the regional elite 
as a necessary condition for the creation of the Regional Contract.
At the beginning of the work on the Regional Contract, voivode Ciszak, appointed on 1 
June 1994, accepted the idea of the Regional Contract as a continuation of the 
voivodship office regional policy, until then carried out by the Department of Economy. 
The proposal for the Regional Contract prepared by this department was accepted by 
voivode Ciszak despite the negative views of the ruling coalition which had just 
appointed him. Instead, Ciszak made signing the Regional Contract an instrumental part 
of efforts to solve regional problems529 and preserve social peace in the region.530
ii. Consolidation o f the regional elite
On 6 June 1995 the Regional Social Agreement was signed by the representatives of the 
regional elite. It symbolised the consolidation and ability of various political, 
administrative and social actors in Uppers Silesia to present a common and coherent 
regional policy. The list of signatories shows the participation of various regional 
groups in the Regional Social Agreement: economic and trade unions, local 
governments, and regional organisations, among them the Upper Silesia Union.
Among the main signatories of the Contract were the voivodship assembly, the 
Regional Economic Council, the Regional Economic Chamber, Silesia-Dqbrowa 
Solidarity Trade Union, the Union of Upper Silesian communes and Northern Moravia, 
the Agreement of Coalmining Trade Union ‘Cadre’, the Transport Association of Upper
528 Czamik quoted in Grygiel Wieczor, 2 October 1995.
529 Gazeta w Katowicach, 20 December- 1 January 1995.
530 Przeglqd katowicki, no. 1, 1995.
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Silesia, Silesia-D^browa Economic Association, the All-Poland Agreement of Trade 
Unions, and the Upper Silesia Union.
Consolidation of the regional elite was presented by the founders of the contract as an 
aim per se. Even if the Regional Contract negotiations with the national elite had not led 
to signing of the contract, or the implementation of the Regional Contract had not been 
successful, the first stage, the regional consolidation, by itself would have been an 
achievement. The founders believed that the regional consolidation in any case moved 
the work of introducing regional restructuring one step forward.
Its fundamental value is that it has been bom in a climate of full consolidation of regional 
groups -  at least, those which are to be respected. So it is an attempt to create consensus, to 
create together a common policy [of regional restructuring].531
The need for regional consolidation was especially emphasised after the socialist period, 
which had left society extremely fragmented. Only after 1989 did some rudimentary 
social organisation take place. This consolidation of the regional elite was hindered by 
the extreme centralisation of power, with strong subordination of the regional elite in 
the socialist period, although in the Katowice voivodship the tradition of inter-war 
autonomy weakened, to some extent, the socialist legacy and eased regional 
consolidation. The scale of consolidation is indicated by the number of participants: 55 
of the 99 communes, 39 firms, 28 economic associations, 33 trade unions and 24 other 
institutions.532 As engagement in public life and the proliferation of social organisation 
had only started in 1989, it was still at the first fragmentary stage. This regional 
organisational fragmentation illustrates the number of regional signatories, for example; 
several trade union organisations. The existence of many, usually small, organisations 
was somewhat dangerous as potentially common action could be destroyed by 
contradictory aims since the actions of these organisations were often motivated mainly 
by opposition to a stronger organisation in order not to be absorbed by it.
Although this organisational fragmentation was, to a large extent, caused by the 
socialist period, and similar difficulties could be observed in many post-socialist 
countries, in the case of Poland it appeared in such a radical form that it is to be 
explained also by one more factor. This was the pre-partition Polish cult of
531 Czamik quoted in Trybuna, 10-11 June 1995.
532 CieSlak, Gazeta w Katowicach, 22 August 1995.
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individuality, placing personal freedom above consolidation, which was seen as 
‘subordination’. In pre-partition Poland this reached such an extreme that the objection 
of an individual nobleman could invalidate the decision of the whole parliament 
(liberum veto).
The consolidation of the regional elite before the signing of the contract was the first 
time that this had taken place on such a scale. For example, MPs from one of the ruling 
coalition parties (the SLD), which at the beginning had been against the project, arguing 
that it attempted to legalise the special, privileged treatment of the region, joined the 
work on the Contract. They joined the project so not to stay isolated from the 
mainstream regional consolidation. Exclusion from work on the Regional Contract 
would meant the absence of their voice during negotiations with central government and 
later, when the Contract would come into force, their absence from participation in the 
work of the Council of the Regional Contract. The SLD’s arguments were politically 
motivated; their opposition to joining the Regional Contract was also due to political 
division at central level, and the fact that the Contract had been initiated by the 
Solidarity Trade Union prompted them to attack it.
This regional consolidation in the end forced even those who had earlier been opposed 
to join the work on the Regional Contract. However, signing the Regional Social 
Agreement raised the question of what the role of the voivode and the voivodship office 
should be. The question was whether the voivode or the voivodship office -  the 
representatives of central government in the region -  should also join the regional 
consolidation ‘movement’ and put their signatures to the Regional Social Agreement.
In the end, voivode Ciszak did not sign, despite the major role of the voivodship office 
in initiating and co-ordinating the work on the Regional Contract. During the drafting of 
the Contract, the members of voivodship office administration had presented a 
comprehensive project for regional restructuring as they were the main agents in 
developing the regional policy. There was also a main centre promoting regional 
consolidation. The voivodship office authorities preparing the projects for regional 
policy were especially aware of the critical economic situation in the region and the 
necessity for quick regional restructuring. This inclined them to define themselves as 
defenders of regional interests, despite the fact that in law they were representatives of
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central government. One of the members of the voivodship office elite and a co-author 
of the Regional Contract recollected this ambivalence of the voivodship office role:
From the beginning of the work on the Contract, the voivode was on the regional side, but 
the constitutional arrangement put him on the central government side. As a result, the 
voivode and the voivodship office decided to stand in the middle [despite their wish to stand 
on the regional side], to be a mediators between the social (regional) side and the central 
government side. It happened that the initiators and organisers of it all were voivodship 
office civil servants. Thus, it happened that in those early negotiations the voivode's civil 
servants served as experts on both sides, for the social and the central governments, and that 
is how it worked.
The conflict around the role of the voivode intensified a few days before the signing of 
the contract. The signing of a contract between the central government and the regional 
elite, aimed at increasing the powers of the regional elite, was expected to force the 
voivode to declare on which side he stood. Despite legal arrangements, the voivode and 
the voivodship office authorities’ actions during negotiations suggested that they would 
‘choose’ the regional side. Only a few days before the agreement, the regional press 
suggested a change of mind by the voivode and was surprised by his decision not to sign 
the Regional Social Agreement.533 The same person from the voivodship office 
indicates this inner conflict over the voivode's role:
The constitutional arrangements concerning the position of the voivode meant that the 
voivode was an arm of the government in the voivodship. Thus, the voivode signed the 
contract as a representative of the government. The voivodship office’s civil servants were 
pushed from the regional side towards the central government side and to some extent 
became more conservative.
However, despite the fact that formally the voivode was separated from the regional side 
and remained the representative of central government, one of the voivodship office 
interviewees mentioned, during negotiations, that central government had to remind the 
voivode that he was its representative. This was because the voivodship office identified 
and sympathised strongly with the region and was ‘forcing from the centre’ obligations 
in favour of the region.
533 WiSniewki, Gazeta Wyborcza -  Handlowa, 8 June 1995.
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iii. The negotiations
After the signing of the Regional Social Agreement in June 1995, negotiations with 
central government started. Five months later the Regional Contract was signed between 
the representatives of the regional and central elite. Although the central government 
signed the Regional Contract, the negotiations and the Regional Contract formula 
suggest the national elite’s reservations about the regional elite’s proposals. For 
example, the negotiations were initiated by the Ministry of Agriculture, which was 
surprising considering that Silesia was a region of heavy industry.
The central government’s indecisiveness and wilfulness were also seen in relation to the 
decision about who should sign the contract. In the end, the main government 
representative who signed the Regional Contract was voivode Ciszak, in the presence of 
the Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Finance, Kolodko; the second Deputy Prime 
Minister and Minister of Agriculture and Food Economy, Jagielinski; and the Minister 
and Head of the Council of Ministers’ Office, Borowski (the ministers ‘put their 
signatures’ to the contract to confirm their presence and validate the voivode's 
signature).
There were no regulations which decided or explained why the voivode should sign and 
those representatives of central government confirm his signature, or why the Prime 
Minister did not sign the Regional Contract, since he had declared his support for the 
idea. Moreover, the Prime Minister, Oleksy, was present during the signing of the 
Contract but, unlike his ministers, his presence was not mentioned in the document, and 
he did not put his ‘confirming signature’ to the Contract. This suggests central 
government’s wish to reduce the importance of the Contract and to avoid responsibility.
The fact that central government decided to sign the contract indicates that they wanted 
to gain pre-election support from the Katowice voivodship inhabitants, but it seems that 
they wished at the same time to decrease its importance. Only three days before the 
signing of the contract, the regional press suggested that the contract would be signed 
by the Prime Minister himself, while up until then it was not even certain if the contract 
would be signed at all.534 This illustrates the government’s indecisiveness about the 
contract and the fluidity of opinion during the negotiations.
534 Dziennik Zachodni, 2 October 1995.
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Cieszewska indicates that the contradictions clung to the Regional Contract as a pre- 
electoral decision and that central government did not really wish to decentralise power 
and engage in the introduction of the Contract. She points out that on the same day on 
which the government accepted the Regional Contract in which it declared the wish for 
decentralisation, it did not agree to a bill proposing an increase of voivodes' powers. In 
her opinion, this last decision reveals the real face of Oleksy’s government which 
wished to preserve the centralised model of ruling.535
The main signatory for the region (the so-called ‘social side’) was the chairman of the 
voivodship assembly, Frqckowiak, assisted by representatives of various economic, 
trade union and regional organisations.
iv. The Council
Although the founders were not fully satisfied with the results of the negotiations, 
they decided to sign the Regional Contract. However, the Contract, with all its 
imprecision and weaknesses, was to guarantee the initiation and continuation of regional 
restructuring. The main advantage of the Regional Contract was the limitation of the 
good or bad will of the central government. The Council of the Regional Contract was 
composed of representatives of the national and regional elite, and its formation meant 
their joint decision on regional restructuring. As a result, central government wilfulness 
was expected to be limited. After the formation of the Council, the region was supposed 
to be less vulnerable to the frequent changes of government and their policies. It would 
be the council’s efficiency which would determine the speed of regional restructuring. 
In addition, the founders expected that the Council’s position would be substantially 
strengthened by a parliamentary act defining the powers and obligations of all 
participants in the restructuring (limiting central government’s wilfulness). However, 
this was not passed.
The formation of the Council of the Regional Contract was also to put the decision­
making process close to the region. The inspiration was derived from the regional 
restructuring experiences of such countries as Germany, France and Denmark, where 
such councils had been formed. Czamik remarked in a press interview:
535 Cieszewska, Rzeczpospolita, 6 October 1995.
536 Grygiel Wieczor, 2 October 1995.
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Do you not believe in the goodwill of the government?
How to restructure the region? In democratic states it is done by regional councils, which 
are constitutionally arranged. For example, such councils were formed in Germany, France 
and Denmark. You made the assumption that I do not believe in the goodwill of 
government. Until now, we acted waiting for the goodwill of the government. And in the 
meantime five years went by and many people lost in consequence of this transition. Only 
agreement with the government, independent of political and government games, will start 
the real restructuring of the region.537
The Council of the Regional Contract was a body formed by the voivode and 
representatives of 13 ministries and central institutions. The regional elite consisted of 
the chairman of the voivodship assembly, representatives of regional trade unions, 
representatives of the communes and commune associations, organisations of 
employers, and, finally, representatives of social and cultural organisations. Altogether, 
the council comprised of 32 members, although right up to the last moment, the size of 
the council had not been defined.538 In the end, the number agreed seemed to have been 
tailored to the composition of the regional elite.
v. The Chapters o f the Regional Contract
The contract was divided into six chapters, according to main subject. These were the 
areas recognised as the most crucial for regional restructuring. The first chapter 
concerned education. Its aim was to promote higher and secondary education and to 
change educational profiles to fit the new economic structure of the region (note that the 
Katowice voivodship was traditionally the region with the lowest level of education). 
Second, came social security. This chapter was mostly written in accordance with the 
demands of regional trade unions and was to compensate for the difficulties of regional 
restructuring by introducing additional social assistance systems. The third chapter, 
about the environment, aimed to co-ordinate regional transportation and planning of 
construction.
The fourth chapter focused on the development of self-government {samorzqdnosc) by 
the formation of elective institutions above the existing local level of the communes as 
it referred to districts and, most of all, to a self-governing region. The final aim of this 
development was declared to be the formation of a self-governing region, with the inter­
537 Czamik quoted in Trybuna, 10-11 June 1995.
538 Dziennik Zachodni, 20 November 1995.
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war autonomy to be replaced by larger discretion for a self-governing voivodship ruled 
by an elective regional council.
The sides participating in the contract recognise that the aim of the contract is the 
permanent increase of the responsibilities and discretion of voivodship institutions, with the 
final aim of the formation of a self-governing voivodship.539
In the situation of the absence of further reform of the administration, the development 
of self-government {samorzqdnosc) in the Katowice voivodship was due to the 
formation of two institutions: first, self-governing voivodship, and second, Local 
Segments at the district level. These proposals for further development of self- 
government (at district and regional levels) received their greatest inspiration from the 
establishment of local government at the commune level in 1990. As a result, the 
communes became effective administrative institutions, in contrast to central 
government.540 For example, the effectiveness of communes indicates the economic 
effectiveness of towns participating in the Pilot Programme, compared with public 
administration performing similar tasks in rural areas. Thus, the promotion of self- 
governing regional institutions was seen as better than being ruled by a ‘far away’ 
ineffective centre.
The Contract was expected to lead in the long-run to the formation of the self-governing 
Katowice voivodship. This process was to resemble the process of decentralisation of 
the Big Towns as a result of their participation in the Pilot Programme. In the case of 
Big Towns, their economic efficiency, despite political hindrances, had finally brought 
about the permanent delegation of the powers they first received during the Pilot 
Programme. In other words, their economic effectiveness forced decentralisation, and 
consequently systemic administrative reform moved one step forward. In the same way, 
it was hoped that in the long run the Regional Contract would promote decentralisation 
and force further systemic administrative reform, which would transform current 
voivodships into self-governing voivodships in Poland as a whole. In this context, the 
Regional Contract was seen as an instrument of decentralisation and a means of forcing
539 Kontrakt Regionalny, Project Version 2.1. Chapter 6 p: 16.
540 During the Pilot Programme the Big Towns performed the same tasks as the public administration in 
rural areas, but the economic results of the Big Towns were several times better, whereas the institutions 
supervised by the public administration (such as schools) were often declared bankrupt (see also chapter 
five).
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administrative reform at the regional level in the long run. This is illustrated by a 
quotation from the official declaration:
The parties understand that the condition necessary for the implementation of the Regional
Contract is the permanent enlargement of the authority and competence of local
• • 541communities.
A self-governing voivodship also meant that in the future the voivodship office would 
represent a region. This contrasted with the situation during the Regional Contract 
negotiations, when the voivodship office had been the representative of central 
government despite its having to be reminded of this fact. This distinguished the 
voivodship office from the communes, which were ‘the true representatives’ of the 
region.542 Thus, the communes could present independent opinions, even those 
opposing the views of central government, and criticise its actions when these were 
against their interests, as when local government grants were insufficient. In the 
opposite situation was the voivodship office, which could not officially criticise central 
government, even if it was very critical, especially on the issues of regional 
restructuring and extreme centralisation of administrative power.
vi. Local Segments
One of the central ideas of the Regional Contract was the formation of Local Segments, 
which were substitutes for districts and were organised by the communes in co­
operation with the economic and social organisations in their territory. In addition, each 
Local Segment was supposed to have a representative of the voivode. As one of the 
negotiators recalled, in addition to central government’s agreement to form the Upper 
Silesia Fund, Local Segments were the second issue for which it was the most difficult 
to gain approval by the central elite, while concessions on those two issues were 
considered impossible by the regional elite. The formation of Local Segments was to 
compensate for the sectoral reforms, isolated from other sectors and from local needs, 
which had been carried out until then.
541 ‘Kontrakt Regionalny’ compact disc, 1997.
542 Similarly, in Great Britain local government is also only representative of the local community, 
without being representative of central government. However, in Poland, at least at the district level, there 
has always been a representative of central authorities.
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The core of the Regional Contract was an answer to the problem of how to restructure 
heavy industry. This reform could not be isolated from the problem of finding new 
places of work and re-training the unemployed in a situation of mass redundancies. 
These problems were to be solved by the specially-formed Local Segments. As a result, 
the main aims of the Local Segments were decrease unemployment by the development 
of new places of work, to create conditions to facilitate the formation and existence of 
small businesses, and finally, to assist in the restructuring of heavy-industry firms.
The difficulty central government had in accepting the idea of Local Segments during 
the negotiations was related to the fact that the power of ministries would be 
substantially limited and it would also be necessary to change the way various 
ministries functioned. ‘Independent’ until then, the reforms proposed by each ministry 
separately had to be co-ordinated at central level to reflect a correlation among those 
economic sectors and those co-ordinated projects that would be presented to Local 
Segments.
Moreover, the communes and representatives of the voivode, economic firms, and 
educational and social institutions located in Local Segment territory would participate 
in decision-making as they had to be consulted about decisions taken by ministries. 
Moreover, financial decisions had to be reached together. As a result, the existing 
situation, which the regional authorities found completely unacceptable, of not being 
informed about programmes of regional restructuring, would come to an end. The 
director of the Department of Economy in the voivodship office argued:
It should be remembered that the restructuring of coalmining and metallurgy in our country 
is subordinate to the Ministry of Industry. Due to the law, there is no participation by 
regional authorities in planning on those issues at all. After all, the social results of sectoral 
actions which are within ministerial scope concern us directly, so we should have the right 
to say something!543
In this context, the Local Segments and their councils could be treated as smaller units 
of the Regional Contract for the Katowice voivodship, which was to be governed at 
voivodship level through the Council of the Regional Contract. In the same way, the 
Local Segments operating in the territory of a few communes, similar to ‘district size’, 
were to be smaller units, each forming its own council composed of representatives of
543 Czamik quoted in Gosc Niedzielny, 8 May 1994.
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organisations acting in those segments. The co-ordination of policy and its adaptation to 
the particular needs and advantages of the territory in which the segment was formed 
was to take place in this council.
It was assumed that the Katowice voivodship was too big and too diversified an area for an 
effective initiation of regional policy, and therefore it should be divided into smaller 
entities: the Local Segments.544
The formation of Local Segments also aimed to enable the voivode to participate in the 
activity of the segments through the presence of his representatives on their councils, 
and later, through a network of Local Segments, the voivode would be able to co­
ordinate policies in the whole voivodship. At the same time, the Local Segments to a 
certain extent were to substitute for the non-existence of district-level administration 
and to make possible the formulation of a common policy at a supra-local level, thus 
uniting the actions of isolated communes. By the middle of 1997, 11 Local Segments 
had been created, consisting of 69 (that is two-thirds) of all the Katowice voivodship 
communes.
At times, it was also emphasised that the effects of extreme centralisation of 
administration were even stronger in the Katowice voivodship, which differed greatly 
from other typical Polish voivodships in relation to its dense population, urbanisation 
and heavy-industry production. However, the central government treated every 
voivodship in the same manner, not recognising any particular needs of a voivodship, 
which in the opinion, of the regional administrative elite, resulted in the region not 
being treated fairly. The key example was subsidies for transport out of the towns. As 
the Katowice voivodship was one big metropolis, almost all transport was within towns, 
and, as a result, the Katowice voivodship did not receive these subsidies. The main 
explanation for this ‘unjust’ treatment was the central government’s lack of knowledge 
about the particular problems of the region. In the regional administrative opinion, it 
was also one of the main reasons why the government did not know how to govern 
Upper Silesia, and this was another argument used in the Regional Contract for 
decentralisation.545
544 Kontrakt Regionalny’, compact disc, 1997.
545 Compare also chapter seven, especially section 7.4.
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The heavy urbanisation of this voivodship also meant that the Regional Contract 
considered the issue of a specifically-metropolitan type of administrative arrangement to 
improve the co-ordination and effectiveness of local governments. However, this was 
defined as a long-term aim and the Regional Contract did not present any detailed 
proposals on this kind of problem.
The fifth chapter on the economy is also particularly important. These proposals of this 
chapter were the continuation of policies put forward by the Programme of Regional 
Economic Policy for Upper Silesia in 1992. In contrast to earlier projects, the critical 
issues for the further development of the region -  the restructuring of coalmining and 
metallurgy -  were at the core of the programme. Thus, the Regional Contract is to be 
interpreted as the next stage of the work of preparing a regional policy, trying to solve 
the most challenging issue of regional restructuring.
The Regional Contract assumed firstly that the modernising of coalmining would 
require substantial grants from the central budget. Secondly, it assumed that the central 
government had heavy obligations to regional society. The contract required that 
redundancies in coalmining be preceded by preparation in terms of re-training, the 
provision of educational centres and investment in the development of new places of 
work:
Coalmining needs help -  most of all, the transformation of its structure into a highly 
profitable and competitive economic organisation; when it achieves this condition, the 
sector will get the chance to rise to the position of the leading European coal producer...
Second, the state and the region are obligated to assist its reform and free coalmining from 
excessive employment. Doing this in a civilised manner means the obligation first to form 
new places of work outside coalmining and in this manner avoid mass redundancies.546
vii. The Upper Silesian Fund
The last chapter, concerning finances, concentrates on obtaining the means for regional 
restructuring. The major institution aimed at guaranteeing revenues for regional 
restructuring was the Upper Silesia Fund formed in December 1995. The fund was
546 Czamik quoted in Trybuna Gornicza, 9 March 1995.
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headed by Czamik, the former director of the Department of Economy of the 
voivodship office.
The concept of the Upper Silesia Fund was in part inspired by the Silesian Treasury, 
which existed in the inter-war period. It was to be the region’s own budget. Moreover, 
both these institutions (Local Segments and the Upper Silesia Fund) were to be peculiar 
only to this region. The Silesian Treasury was formed out of taxes gathered in the 
region, as 83 per cent of these were left in the region. The new name, the Upper Silesia 
Fund, was to emphasise its distinctiveness from the Silesian Treasury, which during the 
inter-war period had been the institution guaranteeing economic autonomy.
The Upper Silesia Fund also had different means of operating as money needed for 
restructuring would be received in four payments transferred from central government. 
It would not be a permanent inflow of money as it had been in the inter-war period. In 
1996, a total of 100 million zloty was to be received from the central budget. For each 
of the next two years 40 million zloty were to be added, and in the last year, 1998, 30 
million zloty.547 Central-level revenues from the state budget were given by separate 
ministries in the form of earmarked subsidies. This form of financing the Upper Silesia 
Fund shows the maintenance of socialist vertical fragmentation in administration.
Second, the Upper Silesia Fund was also to be financed from regional and local 
resources, that is, from local government budgets. In addition, Czamik expected to 
receive money from regional banks, but this demanded state guarantees which would 
encourage banking activity. He argued:
It is a pity but there is no serious capital in the region, and the changes proposed by us 
require financial revenues to be spent on investment at high risk. Thus, the banks will not 
give credit, so investment funds which receive government guarantees need to be formed. 
Without central government guarantees, the contract does not make any sense.548
The World Bank analysis of February 1994 indicated that the region needed 200 million 
dollars in a period of between 15 and 30 years, depending on the speed of the 
restructuring. According to Czamik, this was an unimaginable amount of money for the 
Polish central budget.549 As a result, the third important source of revenue was to come
547 Cieszewska Rzeczpospolita, 22 December 1995.
548 Czamik quoted in Trybuna Slqska, 13 December 1994.
549 Gosc Niedzielny, 8 May 1994.
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from foreign sources in the form of loans and grants. Among these, the most important 
was the European Union’s PHARE fund and its earmarked programme, STRUDER, 
directed towards the structural development of selected regions in Central and Eastern 
Europe. In the case of Poland, Upper Silesia was one of these regions.
The Upper Silesia Fund was aimed at collecting capital, organising regional 
infrastructure projects, and providing financial guarantees to banks giving loans for the 
restructuring of heavy-industry firms. In 1996 the Fund co-operated with nine banks. 
The Upper Silesia Fund also aimed for closer co-operation with the communes, (or 
example, communes were educated on how to issue bonds).
viii. The Regional Contract -  towards autonomy or decentralisation
The creation of the Regional Contract raised the issue of the special treatment of Upper 
Silesia, especially with reference to its earlier experience: autonomy in the inter-war 
period and the privileged status of the heavy-industry centre during the socialist period. 
Despite this, the Regional Contract was not presented by its founders as an example of 
special treatment but rather as a demand for more discretion and decentralisation.
However, despite declarations of founders of the Contract trying to distance themselves 
from the inter-war autonomy on political grounds and thus interpreting the Regional 
Contract as a demand for stronger decentralisation, the inter-war inspiration is evident. 
The Regional Contract was a more moderate version than earlier proposals for regional 
autonomy, and was thus more easily acceptable to the national authorities. Nevertheless, 
it was also, to a large extent, inspired by the regional autonomy of the pre-war period. In 
the opinion of the regional elite, there had been intensive regional development as a 
result of the efficient rule of regional authorities who had a great deal of autonomy. 
They also emphasised that the region had been able to reinvest regional revenues 
through the Silesian Treasury, only seven per cent of which went to central government 
in Warsaw.
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However, the political conditions of the nineties, when the restructuring of Upper 
Silesia was to be carried out, differed from those of the inter-war period.550 The question 
was how far the inter-war inspiration should go and what the final result of the Regional 
Contract was to be. The final aim of the Regional Contract was ambiguous -  there were 
two contradictory opinions. The first body of opinion suggested that interpreting actions 
of the regional elite as aimed towards autonomy was unreasonable, while the second 
group argued the opposite. The first body of opinion was presented by the voivodship 
office administration, which declared that its members made the central elite aware of 
the need for regional policy and for forcing the decentralisation of a highly-centralised 
state. According to this option any suggestions that autonomy was to be a final aim were 
unreasonable. The argument that the Regional Contract was only limited to 
decentralisation was also to be confirmed by the fact that similar projects could be 
prepared for other regions. They considered that the solutions proposed in the Regional 
Contract could be repeated in other regions wishing to decentralise and obtain more 
discretion for their regional and local authorities.551
For us, it is about a decentralised model of the state, as in reality we are in an extremely 
centralised state. The situation... is no different from the Stalinist period, at least in relation 
to the state budget.
So it is about administrative reform with an element of autonomy?
By no means. Let us look at it from another angle. Would an act in the constitution cause us 
to become a decentralised state? Or would the administrative and local government reforms 
lead to the formation of a regional entity? After all, we have heard about introducing reform 
from Prime Ministers since Bielecki and Suchocka. The former minister Strqk postponed 
this problem to 2015. And the present minister, Borowski, only drew it back to 1997.
In other words, the regional elite promoted the idea that they did not want any special 
treatment for the Katowice voivodship. Instead they wanted to pilot a regional 
decentralisation programme which could then be carried out in other regions. This was 
to resemble the Pilot Programme for the Big Towns which was to precede the district 
reform.553
550 To mention the most important issues: after the Second World War, the change of border meant that it 
was ‘natural’ that the whole of Upper Silesia would belong to Poland and the special autonomy of Upper 
Silesia became redundant.
551 Dziadul, Polityka, 13 May 1995.
552 Czamik quoted in Trybuna, 10-11 June 1995.
553 Compare section 7. 3. on the Pilot Programme.
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Silesia does not want special status but an agreement for piloting [regional administration 
reform]. The agreement is not even named a contract for the Katowice voivodship but is 
regional, so other regions could follow the same path.554
However, the other group of opinions shows that some felt endangered by the signing of 
the Regional Contract as in their opinion it could lead to autonomy or even the 
secession of the region. For example, accusations of autonomy were made in relation to 
the formation of the Upper Silesia Fund.555 Cieszewska556 accused the Regional 
Contract of confirming the privileged status of the region.
Despite the declaration of the founders of the Regional Contract, its signing only in the 
Katowice voivodship was often interpreted as the special treatment of Upper Silesia, 
which however did receive some social acceptance. The national opinion polls indicated 
that respondents believed that although during the transition initiated in 1989 certain 
regions went into recession, 25 per cent of Poles believed that Upper Silesia had lost 
most during the national transition. This research also confirms that half the Poles 
believed that the scale of the difficulties of the region meant that they accepted the 
region’s right to larger state grants than other parts of Poland. However, one quarter was 
against this. It is also interesting that the research suggests that 72 per cent believed that 
before 1989 living conditions in Upper Silesia had been better than in the rest of the 
country.557
The inter-war autonomy and the Regional Contract also seem to differ with respect to 
the administrative arrangements. The inter-war autonomy had its own legal 
arrangements -  ‘the Regional Constitution’ (Status Organiczny). By contrast, the 
Regional Contract initiative had a much more provisional character: it was valid for a 
period of 20 years (till the end of regional restructuring, which was to last at least for 
two decades); and it was only a governmental agreement, without parliamentary 
legitimisation. The Regional Contract initiative of the regional elite had been proposed 
in the absence of regional restructuring and in the absence of any wish on the part of 
central government to decentralise finances and introduce administrative reforms at 
district and, above all, at regional level. Thus, the Regional Contract was to be, to some 
extent, a temporary substitute for the lack of administrative reforms. One of my 
interviewee in the voivodship office, and the founder of the contract, said:
554 Czamik quoted in Dziadul, Polityka, 13 May 1995.
555 Madej, Dziennik Zachodni, 6 July 1995.
556 Cieszewska Rzeczpospolita, 6 October 1995. b.
557 Gazeta w Katowicach, 15-16 July 1995.
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The Regional Contract was always seen as a sort of substitute for a self-governing 
voivodship. Through the contract we wanted to take responsibility at least for some issues, 
and we wanted to act. So it was a sort of breakthrough in our efforts to decentralise. And if 
somebody says that the Contract experience should be used for proposed decentralisation, I 
believe this is very proper and right. The contract certainly was a break in centralisation.
The central government’s changes of opinion during negotiations, the imprecision of the 
Regional Contract documents, the fact that the voivode signed the contract, and that the 
role of Prime Minister Oleksy was not defined all contrasted with the inter-war period. 
In the inter-war period regional privileges were guaranteed in the Status Organiczny and 
in the constitution. Instead, the Regional Contract was quite imprecise and had a 
voluntary character. This strengthened the argument that central government preferred 
to sign the Regional Contract rather than carry out real administrative reform, and that 
made the central government’s response inauthentic.
ix. Regional restructuring -  does the regional elite matter?
The Regional Contract indicated the crucial role of the regional elite in attempts to 
initiate regional restructuring. This resembled the primary role of the national elite in 
initiating the national transition in 1989. Similarly, both national and regional reforms 
were possible only after the Round Table agreement of the national elite or, in the case 
of the regional elite, by the regional consolidation, as the signing of the Regional 
Contract with the national elite was preceded by the regional elite’s consolidation 
(Regional Social Agreement).
On the other hand, the Regional Contract, like the Round Table Agreement, was an 
agreement of elites, the first between the regional and the national elite, and the second 
between the opposition and the national post-communist elite. But in contrast to the 
Round Table Agreement, the effects of the agreement of the Regional Contract elite 
seemed to be much more limited and provisional. This was due to the unequal balance 
of power between the central and regional elite; for example the financial wilfulness of 
the central elite, which substantially hindered the conducting of regional restructuring. 
As a result, the discretion of the regional elite (after the formation of the Council of 
Regional Contract) also seemed be much more limited than was expected before the 
contract was signed.
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The Regional Contract is interesting also as it indicates the crucial role of the 
administrative elite in the promotion of regional consolidation. Its reveals the actions of 
the administrative elite going beyond the confines of its role. This is typical of less 
stable periods, when a redefinition of roles takes place. In the case of the regional 
administration, the definition of roles imposed during socialism was completely 
inadequate after 1989. On the other hand, the absence of systemic administrative reform 
meant that the new roles were not defined yet. The absence of regional administrative 
reform with the lack of elective institutions also meant there was a political institutional 
vacuum at this level, with no political actors who could present the interests of regions. 
Thus, the regional administrative elite usurped the role of presenting and consolidating 
regional interests. In addition, because of the above-mentioned structural arrangements 
with an absence of elective institutions at voivodship level, regional consolidation was 
not promoted by the political regional elite (MPs from the region). The political elite 
was strongly divided at regional level, as there was no incentive to integrate around 
common regional interests. Instead, the elite's opinions rigorously reflected the political 
divisions at central level in parliament. This deep division over national issues made it 
difficult for them to unite around common regional policies, even on a basic level.
The institutional vacuum at regional level contrasted with much stronger consolidation 
at central and local levels, where elective institutions existed. According to Surazka 
(1993), this resulted in the provisional character of institutional solutions at regional 
level with the formation of an indirectly elected voivodship assembly with limited 
responsibilities. It was expected that in short time, as a consequence of reforms at 
district and regional levels, voivodship assembly would be replaced by directly elected 
regional and district governments, equipped with wide powers. To some extent, the 
Council of the Regional Contract was a substitute for regional government, an 
instrument for the co-ordination of action at regional level and a means to maintain the 
unity of the regional elite.
Finally, work on the Regional Contract led to self-selection of the regional elite to 
negotiate with the national elite. As such, the behaviour of the regional elite resembled 
that of the national elite during the Round Table talks in 1989. Although this was an 
agreement by a self-selected national elite, only a few months later it gained its social 
legitimisation via the ballot box. (The election, which took place in June 1989, was 
democratic, at least in relation to the opposition, for although 35 per cent of seats were
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reserved for the communists, all other seats were available for the opposition to fight in 
a fully-democratic competition.) In contrast, in the case of the Regional Contract, no 
electoral legitimisation took place and the self-selected Council of the Regional 
Contract was formed.
6.4 The opinions of the regional administrative elite about the Regional Contract
Assessment of the Regional Contract is quite difficult as the regional administrative 
elite’s opinions developed over time. The contract first evolved from radical regional 
demands presented by the regional Solidarity Trade Union in 1994. Later, before it was 
signed in October 1995, during negotiations with central government there were certain 
changes and concessions. The third stage was its introduction throughout 1996 and 
1997.558 The regional administrative elite opinions changed in each of these periods, 
gradually becoming more negative.
/. Substitute
The Regional Contract was regarded by my respondents from the regional 
administrative elite as an interim solution, and assessment of its strengths and 
weaknesses was related to this fact. An example of this opinion is presented by one of 
the towns mayors:
On the Regional Contract I have a quite clear opinion. The written record pretends to be an 
agreement; this is not an agreement. ‘Contract’ is not an adequate name. The form in which 
its articles are written is a nightmare; they say nothing and they are sometimes 
contradictory, or do not make sense. Of the written record nothing good can be said; it is a 
nightmare. On its idea little good can be said as it is artificial, phoney. It is a substitute for 
regional reform which was not introduced despite being necessary. If reform was conducted 
establishing regions in a proper form, with proper definition of the voivode's role which 
should be strengthened, that contract would not exist. Thus, it is a substitute [for 
administrative reform].
The Regional Contract was seen as a temporary substitute for anticipated territorial 
reform which would lead to the formation of big regions ruled by a voivode provided 
with wide responsibilities. This regional reform was to enable regional policy to be
558 The role of the Contract changed radically after the 1997 parliamentary election and the ensuing 
preparation of work on further administrative reform.
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conducted and would make regional restructuring possible. However, in the meantime, 
when it was not known when such reform would be introduced, this provisional solution 
was accepted despite -  in the opinion of the majority of respondents -  its evident 
weakness. Nevertheless, the necessity to do something in the region to start regional 
restructuring was seen as essential. This was the reason why the members of the 
regional administrative elite was much more critical of the Regional Contract in my 
interviews than the same persons had been in the press interviews, when they felt that 
although it was an imperfect solution, it had to be accepted.
The mayor quoted above added that the provisional character of the Contract was 
related to the regional administrative elite’s opinion that central government did not 
really wish to decentralise responsibilities and strengthen the voivode. Thus, the 
formation of the Council of Regional Contract was a substitute for regional government, 
transferring substantial power to the voivode, who, if the administrative reform was 
conducted, would prepare the regional policy. However, in the meantime, the Council 
enabled the regional elites to at least partially participate in Silesian restructuring. The 
Council was criticised for not being a democratically-elected body but instead being 
self-selected. A further negative feature was that responsibility lay in this collective 
body, making it difficult to hold it accountable for its actions, rather than responsibility 
being given to a single man, the voivode, in the case of decentralisation.
The government and Social Side signed the contract. The Social Side is a sort of social 
emanation but how it was chosen was quite arbitrary. It was selected, not democratically for 
sure and it was selected without any clear criteria. Nobody could explain who should 
represent regional society or why.
This provisional character of the Regional Contract document meant that it was 
criticised for its ambiguous statements. In consequence, division of responsibilities 
between the central elite and the regional side was blurred and putting the Regional 
Contract into effect was uncertain. In addition, the money promised by central 
government was seen as depending on their inclination as there was no stable, long-term 
obligation based on plans for regional restructuring but merely an isolated declaration 
by central government. Another member of the regional administrative elite also saw 
the Regional Contract as an artificial solution. However, his opinion was more positive 
as for him it was, at the same time, an opportunity for the regional elite to introduce 
regional restructuring:
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I agree more or less with those who say that there is nothing in the Regional Contract, 
although I am one of its co-authors. However, we could never sign an agreement which 
solves all our problems. Personally, I call it a declaration of goodwill, of co-operation 
between all those who signed the contract. However, whether it is put into effect depends 
on us here in the voivodship.
Sometimes the idea of the Regional Contract was seen by members of the regional 
administrative elite as artificial as it is not possible for a region to sign a contract with 
central government. The explanation for this ‘strange’ idea was, in the opinion of the 
interviewee, to gain some more money from the highly-centralised state:
To be honest, I do not know if the contract could be signed -  with whom? With the 
government? So, what can we offer? What were our expectations? In particular, finances 
were never sufficient here and we were always making up various ideas to gain revenues.
This is the misfortune of a state which is ruled from the centre. We invented the contract, 
again counting on the money to come, but half a million is still too little.
The first person quoted in this section, who interpreted the regional elite’s efforts to sign 
the Regional Contract as a substitute which was to bring at least partial decentralisation, 
spoke at the same time about the danger of a political ‘fig-leaf’. The Regional Contract 
was to confirm central government’s efforts even though in reality its influence on 
regional restructuring was minimal. It was due to mere token financing. However, in his 
opinion, the blame would be put on the regional elite -  the Social Side, rather than on 
central government.
ii. Advantages
Despite various opinions about the Regional Contract, at the moment of its signing two 
main advantages were nearly always presented, both related to work on the preparation 
of the Regional Contract. The first issue was the recognition ‘at last’ of Upper Silesia’s 
problems by the national elite. The second was regional consolidation and the formation 
of a common regional strategy. Many members of the regional elite argued that it 
convinced the national elite that conditions in the region were critical and thus it was 
necessary to introduce the regional restructuring as quickly as possible. At the same 
time the national elite recognised that they were not able to carry out regional 
restructuring alone and decided to include the regional elite. This also indicates the 
dysfunctional performance of the centralised state, where the role of the national elite
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was all-important, and it took a very long time to inform them and induce them to 
recognise a problem, not to mention solve it.
In the case of Upper Silesia, one of the voivodship office departmental directors 
mentioned that the Regional Contract was eventually achieved only as ‘they’ (the 
regional elite, although he especially emphasised the role of the several members of the 
voivodship office) had spent a lot of time in repeatedly presenting the regional problems 
to the national elite. Thus, he and a few other respondents from the voivodship office 
considered the initiation of discussion with the national elite on regional restructuring as 
being in itself an achievement. In this context, the Regional Contract was sometimes 
seen as an initial stage in the development of the national elite’s involvement in regional 
restructuring, and therefore worth pursuing, even if it was not a success due to its 
minimal financial influence on restructuring. The voivodship office departmental 
director in question mentioned that as a result of this repeated presentation of regional 
problems in their contacts with central government, the national elite began to recognise 
the Upper Silesian problems, talk about them, and stopped avoiding this issue as it had 
been doing earlier. The national elite also began to appreciate its financial obligations:
There is a certain critical moment when something has to be done. And we referred to this 
critical moment and said that we had an idea. Here is the idea. Nobody from outside is able 
to do it. The centre not only had to agree with this but recognised it as logical that for a real, 
thorough restructuring they had to do it together with us.
The second issue was that it was hard to push our way through, but we did make our way 
through to central government’s awareness and to take separate ministries and made them 
aware that there were a lot of issues which could not be dealt with by local action only.
There has to be certain legislative and financial support from the centre, and that is written 
in the Regional Contract. There are some financial obligations of central government’s 
budget which must be enforced, and that is a very positive result of the contract.
Another member of the voivodship office elite had an opposite opinion, suggesting that 
‘Warsaw’ wanted to get rid of the problem by signing the Regional Contract. In other 
words, ‘they’ did not recognise the seriousness of the regional problem, or did not care 
about Silesia, as another member of the voivodship office suggested, but instead reacted 
to the danger of social unrest and the militancy of the regional Solidarity Trade Union. 
Finally, they were not convinced but rather signed due to the nuisance of constant 
reminders by the regional authorities’ of Upper Silesia’s problems:
There is no chance to present Silesian interests and problems. Poland does not see Silesia.
Poland does not like Silesia. Poland has never liked Silesia and probably never will like it.
Why should it?
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However, the dominant opinion among the regional administrative elite concerned the 
right to special treatment due to regional peculiarities (urbanisation, heavy-industry 
production) distinguishing Upper Silesia from most of other regions:
We were hammering [on Warsaw’s door] that Silesia was something different from the 
‘respected’ rest. There could be no talk here of equality between at least 45 voivodships in 
Poland and the Katowice voivodship... Many times, in many ministerial departments I 
explained... that the regulations were appropriate to 45 voivodships but not to the Silesian 
agglomeration.
These opinions emphasised the region’s expectation of special treatment because of the 
particular and distinctive situation in Upper Silesia compared to other regions rather 
than its political prominence as a heavy industry region in the past. Others attributed it 
to the industrial and highly-populated character of the region. These peculiarities of the 
region resulted in the widespread opinion of the regional administrative elite of the 
unjust treatment of the region, evident, for example, when central government was 
dividing money. The voivodships generally received more or less similar amounts. 
However, in relation to issues where the number of inhabitants had primary influence on 
the amount of money which had to be spent (like the construction of flats and transport), 
the fact that ten per cent of the Polish population lived in this voivodship was a big 
disadvantage. This is illustrated by the opinion of a member of the voivodship office 
elite:
I believe that central government will try to repeat the programmes which made up the 
Regional Contract with similar programmes, which could be applied in other regions of 
Poland and that could be done with little money. So I believe the government and 
parliament still believe that Upper Silesia is similar, for example, to Western Pomerania, or 
Mazo via, that there is nothing distinctive [about the Katowice voivodship], and it seems to 
me that this thinking is wrong.
Moreover, the regional administrative elite indicated that the Regional Contract brought 
about regional consolidation, which was especially important as it was initiated from 
below -  ‘self-organisation’. Moreover, the consolidation was seen as important due to 
the scale of those who joined the discussion on regional strategy -  ‘all the important 
regional forces’ put aside their individual and often opposing aims and recognised their 
basic common interest. This ability of the regional elite to present a coherent strategy 
could be contrasted with the functioning of the central government, orientated towards 
separate sectors, so that the common aim was often greatly obscured there. As a result, 
the Contract was to change the way in which resources were spent, as the narrow sector-
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orientation of central government was to be replaced by territorially-based projects. For 
example, money which, until then, had been spent by ‘coalminers’ (the only ministry 
which had spent some money on restructuring) was considered to have been 
squandered. The central elite did not know how to prepare a comprehensive, 
territorially-based regional policy which the regional authorities thought should also 
deal with organising the educational system in the region to adapt it to new, more 
modem, regional production, or how to re-train former coalminers. The Regional 
Contract was to be a solution as it was to promote a different organisation of the 
administration as sector-orientation was to be replaced by territorially-based projects: 
regional -  the Council of the Regional Contract, and by ‘districts’ -  Local Segments.
The contract is above all an opportunity to reach central government funds. This is how I 
see it. At the moment the industry is still divided into sectors [due to vertical 
fragmentation], it is ‘sectoral Poland’: it is construction [sector]; it is coalmining [sector].
They have money for restructuring but do not know how to spend it.
In other words, the critical economic situation of the region led to regional 
consolidation. Thus, the regional elite saw itself as more progressive since it had broken 
with the sectoral-orientation, replacing it with much more efficient territorial 
orientation, while the central level preserved the sectoral-orientation resulting from the 
vertical fragmentation of central administration and thus was much more conservative. 
The opinion of one mayor illustrates this:
The contract is to be an alternative to ‘sectoral’ Silesia and that is the most important thing, 
as central government is sector-orientated and central government could not free itself from 
the sector-orientated thinking which had been established during the socialist period. There 
it is divided case by case, as if market rules were applied in industry and agriculture, and 
they would have nothing else to do.
Another member of the local government elite added that even those limited central 
government revenues could be spent more economically. Thus, regional consolidation 
and the formation of a common strategy was as important as receiving large revenues:
Financial revenues are of course needed, but the truth is that we squander revenue 
enormously, that we are not able to use it... If we started really professionally by preparing 
a strategy, there would be a chance for the maximal use of revenues.
Others also emphasised the importance of the contract as the real regional restructuring
would be initiated only if the policy for the region’s restructuring could be prepared in
the region by the regional elite. However, for many, the revenues which were to be
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given were the main basis on which the Regional Contract and central government’s 
‘goodwill’ was judged. Nawrocki, the mayor of Myslowice, argued:
It is an idea. If we did not have a common programme or conception here, nobody else 
[outside the region] would prepare those concepts and solve the problems ... With goodwill 
on all sides the contract could be signed. The main problem is how the money for its 
realisation is to be found.559
iii. Criticism
After more than a year of the Regional Contract’s existence, the main criterion by which 
it was assessed was the amount of money received from central government, which was 
described as symbolical, and thus the opinions of the Regional Contract were often 
negative or very negative. For example, it was emphasised that the money which was to 
arrive in the next three years would total one half or one-third of the revenues needed to 
close just one coalmine, when there were in fact more than 60 of them:
How do you assess the Regional Contract ?
The same way you do ... Very weak, what does the Regional Contract mean? How much 
money is there? It would be enough for a very small commune. Is it possible to carry out 
the restructuring about which we dreamed then? -  40 thousand -  it is absolutely nothing.
What is happening with this money? Have you heard in the last two years that it has 
organised anything?
iv. The ambivalent attitudes
There were also two other types of attitude: some rather positively assessed the Contract 
but they also had some doubts. Others were ambivalent about the Regional Contract as 
they believed that it brought the same amount of advantages as disadvantages -  the 
ambivalent attitude. The Regional Contract was considered positively by some as it was 
an opportunity to gain additional revenues after the preparation of a comprehensive 
local government development project (the Council of the Regional Contract gave 
money to a few projects selected by them). Before 1989, communes had received 
money automatically, but after the free market regulations were introduced, conditions
559 Nawrocki quoted in Echo, 10-11 October 1994.
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for their functioning had changed and they had to be active to gain grants. Thus, some 
believed the Regional Contract created such opportunities and mayors urged commune 
civil servants to make efforts to prepare such projects. Sometimes they had positive 
expectations as the Regional Contract was just beginning -  in the organisational stage -  
and felt that they should wait longer for its results to appear.
The third type of attitude, the ambivalent attitude, was often related to the fact that the 
Regional Contract was seen rather negatively as its role was minimal, but at the same 
time, the discussion with central government was more concrete, and it began to see 
Upper Silesia’s distinctiveness and its problems. Moreover, as one of the members of 
the Council of the Regional Contract observed, the formation of this Council initiated 
discussion between the regional and the national elite about regional development and 
common strategy. The obligation to consult with the regional elite which sat on the 
Council of the Regional Contract, even in the case of sector-orientated projects for the 
restructuring of heavy-industry in Upper Silesia proposed by the central elite, also had 
the side-effect of producing some decentralisation of decision-making. In the opinion 
of the above-mentioned member of the Council of the Regional Contract, it was an 
achievement that members of the regional elite were, for the first time, consulted on 
projects of regional restructuring. However, the fact that the Council was not 
democratically-elected cannot be forgotten. x
What could this contract lead to? -  It has certainly already contributed to the initiation of 
discussion on the formation of big regions and the need for regional policy. That is a great 
achievement of the creation of this contract, for the organisers of this project. In addition, 
the existence of the contract has brought about some decentralisation of power, and this is 
an interesting phenomenon. Maybe this decentralisation was not even planned. In the 
contract the Government Side had to promise, for example, to consult on restructuring 
programmes or other issues in the council where the social side is represented. In this way, 
local government, economic associations and other groups in public life will gain insight 
into what the government side prepares, and in fact, decentralisation to some limited extent 
will take place.
v. The Regional Contract and the administrative reform
It is interesting that some communes protested against taking on the new obligations 
imposed on them by the Regional Contract which they called ‘the next burden’. These 
additional powers were related to formation of Local Segments, as the association of a
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few communes and various organisations located on their territories, were to perform 
supra-local (district-type) tasks.
The Regional Contract was much less attractive to the powerful communes’ elites than 
to the voivodship office authorities, who had very limited responsibilities and thus 
played only an advisory role. For voivodship office authorities, the Regional Contract 
was an attempt to strengthen their powers. Sometimes they had much larger 
expectations of local government activity, as indicated by the opinion of one member of 
the voivodship office elite.
However, today it is still like that; often, the functioning of local government is not only 
local administrative duties per se. But in this interim period local government has to engage 
in certain additional obligations. The commune administration is to define -  it has to define 
-  how it can serve, what it can do for the town [and region] despite this going beyond its 
obligation, but it has to help to create conditions for wider-scale development. On the other 
hand, the public administration, we [the voivodship office] are strongly engaged, we are 
aware that our help is needed; we offer our ideas; we are here the link [between the central 
administration and local government].
During ‘the Big Town period’ communes saw themselves being handed numerous tasks 
which were difficult to fulfil due to limited revenues. Thus, the mayors of the Big 
Towns sometimes felt that their responsibilities were too extensive. These additional 
tasks should be carried out by higher levels of administration, by ‘proper districts’, not 
by associations of communes. This would not happen if the administrative reform were 
complete (district and regional). Thus, the towns mayors advocated ‘proper’ 
administrative reform, not a substitute in the form of the Regional Contract. Thus, as 
one of the mayors argued, making communes the main agents responsible for 
organising projects for restructuring at local level was seen as too much:
We will not, as communes, take restructuring on ourselves; we will not take on ourselves 
the task of developing new jobs. We can only provide some building under certain 
conditions [favourable to promoting small business] but it is not our role to create new 
places of work in order to retard unemployment. We have other tasks; we have enough to 
occupy our time; and we do nt have the means for these [new] tasks.
In general, for the communes, the Regional Contract was not that attractive as some 
mayors believed they did not need to increase their responsibilities; for them, the option 
of district and regional reform would have been better than commune associations in the 
form of Local Segments. In particular that idea of the Contract itself and Local 
Segments was quite imprecise for them:
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Do we have to talk about the Contract? For me it is nothing very concrete, neither the 
Contract nor the Local Segments. I tried to deal with this idea of Local Segments, really, 
with a lot of goodwill; I tried, but I couldn’t.
The other mayor expressed a similar negative attitude:
The Contract as it is now is just a collection of slogans... It is empty words. I did not get 
involved in it, with the exception of the Fund [the Upper Silesian Fund]... I do not know 
how the contract could help me.
It is strange, this so-called Contract, strange, short of being a precise project, full of rather 
pompous slogans from which not very much results are achieved. It is to assure somebody 
that something is being done, that is all.
Local government was in favour of administrative reform, not of the formation of such 
additional administrative institutions as the Agencies of Development, the Council of 
the Regional Contract, or even the Upper Silesian Fund, proposed by the Regional 
Contract. These institutions were criticised for unclear definitions of their functions and 
employment of large numbers of officials and for being costly. However, most of all, 
they duplicated functions which could be conducted by communes, districts and regions 
if the reform was conducted.
Sometimes the idea of the Upper Silesian Fund was highly valued, and this concept was 
the only positive element of the Regional Contract. Thus, the Upper Silesian Fund was 
considered worth establishing even if regional reform was conducted:
I said I had not become involved in it [the Regional Contract]. I do not see any action [by 
the Contract] despite the Upper Silesian Fund, which I believe is a marvellous idea. The 
fund would embark on a task, for example assisting in the restructuring of a company, and 
at a certain time it would withdraw. When the company restructuring would begin to bring 
results, the money would be reinvested somewhere else.
However, some mayors were in favour of the idea of leaving in the region the taxes on 
the goods produced there, instead of the Upper Silesian Fund, which was formed out of 
central government subsidies. Leaving the taxes in the region would mean that the 
amount of money expected would be much higher and more stable.
This idea was tied closely to regional reform, as decentralisation of powers was to be 
assisted by decentralisation of finances. The idea of retrieving taxes on goods produced 
there was supported by native Silesians. In contrast, some newcomers believed that this
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solution might work against the region as it was not strong enough to finance itself and 
the state would probably have to add subsidies to the region:
I would be satisfied with what is produced in the Katowice voivodship by all those firms 
which pay taxes if all the money would stay. Of course, I believe that the situation which 
exists now is not acceptable. Now taxes are paid where the headquarters of a company is 
located, not in the voivodship where the revenue is really produced. The tax should be paid 
where the company is located; as it carries its production/service in that territory, so that 
area should benefit.560
These opinions on the insufficient proportion of money left in the region were often 
assisted by negative opinions of the Upper Silesian Fund. Its role was seen as minimal 
and inadequate to stop regional recession, which raised fears of total catastrophe and the 
abandonment of the whole region. The Upper Silesian Fund was also accused of 
concentrating its revenues on restructuring firms and of not granting any loans to the 
communes.
The discussion around the introduction of the Regional Contract versus regional reform 
also focused around the extent of certain decentralisation of power. In the first case it 
was only to be applied to Upper Silesia, and in the second case to Poland as a whole. 
According to my respondents, Upper Silesia did not want any privileges from the 
central government. Instead, they expected the regional and district reform, assisted by 
decentralisation of finances, to create opportunities for effective performance of 
regional administration. At the same time it would mean that central government and 
other voivodships would not need to contribute to this region, as the region would have 
its own financial resources. However, sometimes the Upper Silesian Fund was seen as 
an interim solution for regional finances.
There was one more financial proposal (to release the region from paying taxes derived 
from regional production for a certain period of time) but this was understood not as a 
privilege but rather as a repayment of inter-war and socialist period state ‘debts’ to the 
region. In other words, ‘do not give us anything extra but give Upper Silesia only what 
we have the right to’, as Upper Silesians believed that the development of Poland had 
been achieved at the expense of the region. Native Silesians sometimes had very strong
560 In many cases, the headquarters of firms were located in Warsaw and it was that voivodship which 
received the taxes although most branches were located somewhere else. For example, even if these firms 
were contaminating other voivodships, these voivodships or communes did not receive any 
compensation. Compare also the quotation on slag-heaps in Ruda Slqska -  (next quotation). This form of 
tax-collection was a legacy of the socialist period’s highly centralised state.
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memories of the region’s sacrifice to the Polish state, mentioning, for example, the 
inter-war regional loan to the Polish state which was never paid back. Another native 
Silesian emphasised:
I consider the Contract as a very static body without any future as only real administrative 
reform could solve our problems. The Regional Contract -  let us not pull the wool over our 
eyes -  when they gave Upper Silesia the Regional Contact, they gave Upper Silesia a few 
groszy [100 groszy -  1 zloty] and we [the commune] have produced a miracle.
If the state, for a period of 40, 50 years, lived off this voivodship which was breaking its 
back, then it should assume the moral responsibility of giving something to this voivodship 
for five years. But it is not to be taken from other voivodships and given to us. Let us not 
collect taxes from the voivodship for, let us say, five years and leave them all here, and we 
would be able to solve the regional problems here. We would deal with that land despoiled 
by the extraction of coal, those contaminated slag-heaps ... In Ruda Sl^ska there are about 
30 different types of slag-heaps with different heavy metal and coalmine slag... and this has 
to be got rid of, has to be recycled ... This poor commune was badly exploited and now it 
has to deal with it.
To sum up, the regional administrative elite’s opinion of the Regional Contract indicates 
that the Contract raised more expectations than it was able to realise. As a result, it was 
rather negatively considered. The attitudes of the member of the regional administrative 
elite towards the Regional Contract also indicate their dissatisfaction as the regional 
restructuring had still not started despite their opinion of its urgency; the lack of 
financial resources was the main source of their criticism. Regional restructuring was 
therefore seen as closely related to the introduction of regional and district reform. 
Lastly, the regional administrative elite’s opinions suggest the importance of regional 
consolidation and work for a common strategy.
Conclusion
This chapter aimed to investigate the role of the regional elite in initiating the region’s 
restructuring, which culminated in the proposal of the Regional Contract. It was of 
special interest to show the development of early proposals of restructuring, which were 
to be conducted only by the regional administrative elite, which in 1995 were already 
seen as insufficient. Thus, the national elite was to be incorporated. However, the 
successes of restructuring were to be achieved only after adopting three institutions 
proposed by the regional administrative elite: the Regional Contract Council, which was 
to guarantee its participation in the decision-making process and Local Segments which 
were to enable ‘district-scale’ restructuring. The last institution was to be the Upper
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Sielesian Fund, which was to guarantee its own, although minimal, regional finances. 
Although the often sceptical regional administrative elite’s opinion towards the 
Contract, discussed in the last section, suggests that they would rather have been 
supporters of further regional and district reform than the Regional Contract embodied, 
nevertheless the signing of the Contract was particularly important. It shows their great 
efforts and the advancement of their regional planning, at a time when the central 
authorities were introducing separate industry sectoral-orientated restructuring projects. 
By contrast, the regional administrative elite was advocating the necessity of 
preparation of the comprehensive territorially-integrated restructuring projects at three 
levels: local, district and regional.
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CHAPTER 7
THE REGIONAL ADMINISTRATIVE ELITE’S PROPOSALS FOR
REFORMS:
AUTONOMY, SEPARATISM, OR DECENTRALISATION?
Introduction
In this chapter, the regional administrative elite’s attitudes towards further 
administrative reform are to be investigated, starting with the negative evaluation of the 
current situation and the demand for further reform, which it saw as necessary. Next, the 
regional administrative elite’s expectations of regional reform, are presented, as radical 
changes are expected: the formation of a few big regions, re-division of power and 
finances between the centre and regions as well as substantial strengthening of the 
voivode's role. Then, the district reform closely related to the regional reform is 
presented. This section is followed by two issues of particular importance for Upper 
Silesia region: the proposal for agglomeration regulation, and regional autonomy as a 
viable solution.
7.1 Assessment of the current situation
The views of the regional administrative elite regarding the need for further 
administrative reform were closely related to its assessment of conditions after the fall 
of communism -  conditions which the new elites considered to be highly dysfunctional. 
Their description of the administrative performance is therefore inextricable from their 
plans for reform.
The majority of my respondents thought that district and regional administrative reform 
was an urgent necessity. In almost all cases this view was held independently of 
whether the respondent was a right- or left-wing party member or sympathiser. 
Sometimes the left-wing party members refrained from criticising the administrative
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situation. However, at the same time, they wanted decentralisation and substantial 
strengthening of regional-level administration. Thus, the differences between the right 
and left party members or sympathisers in the case of the regional administrative elite 
was secondary, as far as this issue was concerned. Moreover, at that time, division on 
the right- and left-wing was only important at the national level. Instead, the regional 
administrative elite was rather a coherent group. In practice, it formed a ‘regional party’ 
integrated around the defence of regional interests. At that time there was a tendency to 
present interests in terms ‘us’ (regional society) against ‘them’ (central government).561
If there is a factor which distinguished the members of the regional administrative elite, 
it was their Silesian origins. This tended to be associated with higher and more radical 
expectations in the area of administrative reform. This was probably due to their 
favourable impressions of the inter-war autonomy period. Most native Silesians 
believed that the inter-war period had been characterised by effective regional 
administration. They associated this with ‘autonomy’, which they mostly defined as 
extreme decentralisation of power that allowed most decisions concerning the region to 
be taken in the region itself. In other words, they emphasised not the distinctiveness of 
Silesia compared to other regions, but rather the fact that its regional authorities used to 
enjoy wider powers. They also had a very strong sense of the need for some form of 
‘home rule’ in Upper Silesia; that is, for regional society to ‘rule itself in Upper Silesia’. 
Thus, the regional elite’s views on decentralisation were much more radical than in the 
other regions. Gradually, newcomers too living in Upper Silesia began to demand 
radical decentralisation; for example, for the voivode to be elected by the regional 
society. This decentralisation proposal was even more radical than even the inter-war 
arrangements.
561 Political division within the regional administrative elite would start to have a significant impact on its 
policies only after the completion of those administrative reforms that were seen by itt as essential. 
Moreover, the formation of elected regional government would lead to the formation of political parties at 
that level with different political agendas on further regional development.
562 This however does not mean demands for the revival of autonomy at that time. More details are 
provided in section 9.5.
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i. Why the further administrative reform was seen as urgent
The regional administrative elite strongly believed that further administrative reform 
was necessary, not only in the interest of improved performance at the regional and 
local level, but also because it was crucial for the development of Poland as a whole.
The lack of further administrative reform aimed at the formation of local government at 
district level and regional government is a big problem for all of Poland. It causes losses 
each day, colossal losses, malfunctioning... and most of all it slows down the development 
of the whole state.
Indeed, most of the regional administrative elite saw further administrative reform as 
one of the most fundamental issues facing post-communist Poland. For example, 
Urbanczyk argued that it was unacceptable to wait any longer for the reform. The delay 
in carrying out the necessary reform prevented local and regional authorities from 
fulfilling their administrative obligations; it also had decisive consequences for the 
further development of the state:
Five years went by and the next level of local government was not formed in Poland, 
districts were not formed. Current voivodships were not merged into few big voivodships, 
we did not carry out the reform to the end. Five years is too long. It was necessary to take 
the next step so that we would not have so many problems.563
Moreover, in the opinion of the regional administrative elite, administrative reform was 
a necessary precondition for the economic restructuring of Upper Silesia. The existing 
vertical fragmentation of the administration meant that reforms carried out on the basis 
of industrial sectors would not give due attention to the common aims of regional 
development. For example, reform in the coalmining sector was improving the financial 
conditions of the coalmining industry, but only at the cost of higher debt burdens for the 
communes in whose territory the coalmines were located. In consequence, the host 
communities were becoming poorer as the financial conditions of the coal industry 
improved. According to Frankiewicz, mayor of Gliwice, the unreformed administrative 
structures were an obstacle to development at regional and national levels:
563 Urbanczyk, Nasza Gazeta, no. 2, 1996.
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Decentralisation is a necessary condition for the quick and stable development of our state. 
Without it, we will not go further and, at a certain moment, we will find ourselves up 
against a wall. This obstacle is slowing down our development already. The industrial 
restructuring of Silesia illustrates this as programmes according to sectors of industry have 
been developed. These sectoral programmes were not optimal, only the territorially- 
orientated projects could be optimal. It is not important for citizens that metallurgy 
performs well, or that coalmining is carried out at the cost of communes. They want to have 
good conditions of life.564
The urgency of further administrative reform was related to the recognition of the poor 
efficiency of the existing regional administrative structure, a state of affairs that was 
rooted in the institutional arrangements inherited from the socialist period.565 During 
that time, most of the power had been transferred from the territorial (general) 
administration made up of voivodships, districts and communes, to central ministries, 
where it was divided among numerous narrowly-defined sectors. The central ministries 
exercised their power in the territory through ‘special’ administrative units that were 
controlled directly from the centre. As a result, central ministries as a whole would 
have to lose significant powers if any meaningful administrative reform of districts and 
regions was to take place. It is therefore not surprising that they were the most 
conservative part of administration, in contrast to the communes and voivodship levels. 
Dziewior suggested that the central bureaucracies would not only lose their dominating 
role, but that their employees would not be able to retain their positions if they were 
under such supervision as existed in elective bodies such as communes.
It should be asked, who does not want local government at district level and regional 
government [elective institutions] in Poland? Those most against it are the ministries, as 
those in the public administration system [not elective institutions] who will lose their 
positions and also the opportunity for additional ‘earnings’ that exist when they allocate 
goods [concessions]. The strongest defence [of the status quo] is therefore in the 
ministries.566
Moreover, the expected administrative reform was to improve administrative 
performance in regions and districts not only by decentralisation of power, but also by 
democratisation of its institutions. The reformers strongly believed that self-governing 
institutions (<elective regional and local government) would perform much better than 
the public (central) administration, as their members were appointed, not elected. Thus, 
the proposed reforms had two mutually reinforcing objectives: the first was the 
decentralisation of competencies and the integration of fragmented powers around new
564 Frankiewicz Slqsk, no. 5, 1997.
565 See chapter two for a full discussion.
566 Dziewior quoted in Slqsk, no. 1, 1996.
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focal points at the regional, district and local levels; the second was the democratisation 
of public life at all levels of Polish society.
The transfer of power to regions and districts was to involve the abolition of the vertical 
fragmentation and sectoral orientation that characterised central government. Several 
ministries were to be merged; their special administrative units would be abolished and 
their power transferred to regional, district and local administrations. This sectoral 
orientation of administration was highlighted by almost all respondents, irrespective of 
whether they worked in the voivodship office or in local government. All of them 
emphasised that it was one of the main obstacles to effective performance by the 
regional administration. The opinion reproduced below is just one of the many arguing 
this point.
So a voivode is, in principle, the governor of the economy of a territory. He cannot do much 
here. And the restructuring cannot be carried out from Warsaw. Problems would appear, as 
at the moment with the restructuring of the coalmining industry. One deputy minister is 
interested in developing the industrial sector for which he is responsible, without looking at 
the effect this restructuring would have on neighbouring industrial sectors, or local 
government, or the region as a whole. These sectoral programmes are at the heart of our 
misfortune.
This transfer of competencies was also to improve administrative co-ordination. For 
example, voivodes, sub-prefects and mayors were to co-ordinate administrative action in 
their territories (as in the inter-war period). In other words, decentralisation would limit 
vertical fragmentation because, for example, effective co-ordination of regional policy 
was not possible at the central level.
The next factor, in addition to this vertical fragmentation left by the socialist period, was 
that the administrative reform was incomplete. At the beginning of the transitional 
period, some responsibilities had been transferred to the communes, but the tasks which 
were to be delegated to the districts and regions in the next stage were, for the most part, 
still retained by the central ministries, partly because it was recognised that this could 
not be done within the territorial framework inherited from the socialist period. In 
consequence, Dziewior that argued there was an administrative gap at the regional and 
district levels:
567 This vertical fragmentation was similarly repeated at the voivodship level in relation to local and 
supra-local issues. The solution to this was, as in the first case, decentralisation: from voivodships to 
districts and communes.
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First of all, it should be said that the Polish state is, according to its administrative structure, 
badly organised. And from this statement arises the question, so how should it be 
organised?... At the moment the public administration does not have any connection with 
self-governing administration. It could be drawn like this: vertically there is the central 
(public) administration, then a gap [at district and regional levels], and below, horizontally, 
there is local government at the level of the commune.568
The existence of the administrative gap at the regional and ‘district’ levels (as the strong 
administrative units existed only at central and local levels) also meant weak 
representation of regional society at those levels. At that time, the voivodship assembly 
existed only as a gathering of local government councillors with rather limited and not 
precisely-defined responsibilities.
The absence of strong regional-level administration was strongly felt, as the role of the 
voivodship office was minimal and the voivode was a figurehead. At the time, the 
voivodship office was formally an arm of central government. However, there were 
numerous special administrative units at voivodship level, all of them answering to 
ministries at the centre, which were not supervised by the voivode; the voivodship office 
was not even informed about their actions in its region. The voivode also had only 
marginal financial competency as the voivodship office did not have its own budget. 
This low status of the voivode, as well as lack of an independent budget, were often 
mentioned in my interviews. The following critical opinion was expressed by one of the 
mayors:
The voivode is strictly speaking an executor of the Prime Minister in a certain territory.
And he spends money, which he receives from the state budget as he has no competency, 
with the exception of monitoring if the funds delivered for voivodship tasks are spent 
according to the current budget bill.
Moreover, my respondents added that any expenditure by the voivodship office had to 
be authorised by the centre, and any surpluses had to be sent back to the central budget. 
The voivode could not shift revenues among the various administrative departments. 
Moreover, the voivode did not receive any ‘general’ or ‘contingency’ funds to cover the 
cost of handling emergencies (by definition unforeseen) such as forest fires.
The voivode receives money from the state budget as he does not have his own budget, only 
a scrap from the state budget. Before 1990 the voivode had his own budget and his role was 
much stronger, and not because of the money alone. It is well-known that he who has 
money rules, but this is of course simplifying the matter. At the moment he is to a large 
extent blocked by Warsaw because he does not have money. About 80 per cent of his
568 Dziewior quoted in Slqsk, no.l, 1997.
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budget consists of funding which he has to spend on the health service; so with some 
exaggeration it could be said that the voivodship office is a big Department of Health.
There is no money for any other activities that the voivodship office conducts.
In other words, the voivodship office in that period was a passive agent executing 
central government policy, with no opportunity to adapt policies to regional needs, 
despite its knowledge of these needs. Moreover, the fact that there were 49 voivodships 
also limited the communication of their interests to central government. As a result, 
communication was primarily one-directional, from the centre to the regions.
However, a small minority of the regional administrative elite, while favourable to the 
idea of extending administrative reform to the regional and district level, did not 
consider the issue to be of overwhelming importance. One respondent believed that the 
heart of the problem was the absence of active public participation in local and regional 
societies. In his opinion, in richer societies people were more active and often tried to 
organise facilities themselves: libraries, kindergartens or sports clubs. As a result, the 
role of public administration and of regional and local governments should be 
substantially limited and their tasks performed by foundations and other non­
governmental organisations. The role of the administration was to create the conditions 
for civil society to develop:
In my opinion, even the best organisation of state institutions, decentralisation of 
administration and transfer of power is less than 20 per cent of the solution to this issue, 
and 80 per cent is just the economic condition of society, which results from economic 
development [which this town mayor believed would guarantee the development of civil 
society].
Another opinion suggested that further administrative reform would have been better 
delayed until 1998 (for about two years), till the end of the second term of the local 
governments. The electorate was very tired of elections, since elections had recently 
been taking place every year (local, parliamentary and presidential). Thus, an election 
for the district council and regional diet, held in the middle of a term, would not attract a 
high turnout and social support would be marginal.
It seems that it is necessary to form districts, and necessary also to create a few big 
voivodships [by merging the existing voivodships] and to establish them as self-governing 
institutions. I would be against the formation of districts in the middle of the term. 
Consequently districts would not be established before 1998, but there would be elections 
to the communes and district councils at the same time. I say this because I have the 
feeling that our society is very tired of turning out for elections ... We do not in Poland have 
the habit of participating in elections or having the experience that our participation enables
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us to influence decisions. So, as many things as possible should be gathered in a single 
election.
Although this respondent considered that administrative structure and financial 
conditions at that time were not favourable to local government, he also believed that 
the ideal situation would never arrive (not even after the administrative reform). It was, 
therefore, better to concentrate on improving existing performance as a lot could still be 
done, than so strongly to demand further reforms. However, it is significant that this 
opinion was presented by a mayor -  at that time conditions were much more favourable 
to mayors than to voivodes, as he himself points out:
There are two contradictory arguments which I believe in. On the one hand, of course, I am 
in favour of decentralisation. However, on the other hand, I argue the opposite when there 
is talk of decentralisation, which means for us taking additional responsibilities. I always 
ask whether we use adequately all the opportunities which we have now, due to already 
transferred responsibilities. Today, we [local government] already have extensive 
responsibilities, so the second, contradictory argument, means that maybe after all we 
already have enough responsibilities.
The regional administrative elite’s proposals for administrative reform called for 
substantial changes at the regional and district levels. In addition, they proposed some 
changes at the commune level to improve their functioning, and sometimes special 
solutions for the Katowice agglomeration. The last issue was regional autonomy. The 
purpose of this last section is to see their attitudes towards autonomy. Was it a historic 
administrative experience only applicable to the inter-war period? How did inter-war 
autonomy modify their proposals of administrative reforms, if they were affected at all? 
Or was the inter-war influence so strong that the demand for autonomy was still seen as 
a viable solution to the region’s future?
7.2 The expectations of regional reform
The regional reform was expected to have a major impact on the future role of the 
regional administration (local government and the voivodship office). First, it would 
strengthen the position of the Katowice voivodship as the formation of big voivodships 
would lead to an increase in its economic potential in the new regions. Second, it would 
precisely define the division of powers between the central and territorial administration 
and, in consequence, limit the wilfulness of the centre. Thirdly, the relationships 
between society and the regional administrative elite would change as the system
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became more democratic, with public administration being replaced by democratically - 
elective local (communes and districts) and regional governments. Fourth, the 
decentralisation of finances would create the conditions for the effective performance of 
regional administration. Fifth, the role of the voivode would be substantially 
strengthened and a new regional institution, the regional government, with wide 
responsibilities, would be established.
i. Territorial mergers and formation o f strong regions
The main purpose of the territorial reform was to form a few strong administrative 
regions. The members of the regional administrative elite believed that the Katowice 
voivodship would preserve its independence, whatever was accepted as the final number 
of regions the state was to be divided into. As a result, projects proposing a radical 
reduction in number, to 12 regions or even fewer, gained the strongest support (for if the 
proposals were accepted, the political and economic strength of the region would be 
even greater). Thus, two other less radical central government proposals, calling for a 
system of 17 or 25 regions, were considered unattractive.569
Division of the country into a few large voivodships was seen as necessary for the new 
regions to be able to shoulder substantial responsibilities. Division into a larger number 
of relatively small regions would mean that the new regions would be too small to carry 
the range of powers that the reformers wanted to see transferred to the regional level. 
Thus, the formation of 12 voivodships was seen by my respondents as a guarantee of 
substantial decentralisation. Sometimes there were proposals for an even smaller 
number -  ten, even eight -  than the minimum of 12 proposed by central government. 
This was seen as the best solution as the new regions would then have the greatest 
economic potential and would be able to carry out their own regional policy, even 
though it was a radical change from the traditional number of regions (17 in the inter­
war period and before the 1975 reform). A small number of regions would also mean 
that each would have a substantial economic base; this would eliminate the need for the 
wealthier regions to subsidise the poorer ones. These opinions were fairly typical, as 
the quotation below from an interview with one of the Silesian mayors indicates:
569 One respondent said that he supported the introduction of any reform, even the PSL’s proposal to 
change the administrative character of the 49 voivodships by making them self-government institutions 
(instead of units of public administration ruled by a centrally-appointed voivode). He believed that this 
solution would be better than the provisional arrangements in which he currently had to perform. 
However, if he could choose, he would be in favour of reducing the number of voivodships.
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12 is the number talked of -  17 is too many. So 12 is the maximum, as the creation of 
regions has to be related to the decentralisation of finances. The state then has to transfer 
the majority of its responsibilities and leave itself relatively few as most of them would be 
transferred to the regions.
Another opinion of my respondent from the voivodship office shows the advantage of 
big regions as guaranteeing their economic potential.
I am of course in favour of voivodships being both self-government institutions and being 
relatively big ones. On the scale of the country, it should be ten to 12 regions. They would 
be independent and they would be able to conduct their own economic policy.
It was suggested, for example, by one interviewee from the voivodship office, that 
economic potential, not always size, should guide the formation of the new regions 
because despite the fact that in most cases big regions should guarantee economic 
potential, there could be some exceptions. Just as there were small states, like 
Liechtenstein, which had large economic potential, so there were small voivodships, 
such as Bielsko-Biala, which were very efficient and should stay. However, as the 
quotation below suggests, he also saw the other side of the argument and criticised the 
formation of too many small voivodships as this would increase the costs of running 
national administration, which would mean higher taxes for all taxpayers.
In my opinion, 12 is optimal from the state’s point of view, at least I see it like this. In 
relation to the Katowice voivodship, to tell the truth, it does not make any difference [how 
many regions are formed]. We will always be a big voivodship and have the economic 
potential which a voivodship should have. However, if those small voivodships were 
preserved and they did not have the potential, it would be their fault.
On the other hand, size is not the decisive criterion in relation to a voivodship. There are 
small states which work well, such as Liechtenstein, which probably has fewer people than 
Bielsko-Biala voivodship and yet it is a state and exists. In my opinion, it is not a matter of 
the size of a voivodship in relation to its performance. However, it matters in relation to the 
price which every taxpayer would have to pay for administration, and therefore, there 
should be few voivodships.
The mayor of Katowice also believed that the territorial division of the regions should 
be based on economic rationale rather than inspired by traditional regional borders.
I would like to emphasise that discussions about the administrative division of the state 
should never start with topography as that leads to a dead end. They should start with the 
functionality of a certain region, which should be able to fulfil certain functions for its 
inhabitants. The region should be big enough to be strong and have efficient administration. 
It should be strong enough to be financially self-sufficient and to pay its part for providing 
public services delivered by central [national] administration. On the other hand, if it is 
possible, it should be said clearly when and how much certain regions are subsided by other 
stronger regions through the central budget. Discussions should start with a simulation of
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the financial costs and profits of formation of a region, and geography should be only 
secondary.570
The formation of strong, self-sufficient regions, as respondents both in the voivodship 
and local government emphasised, would bring transparency to the financial system by 
substantially limiting central government subsidies. The reform would end the existing 
financial system which obscured financial flows between the centre and the regions and 
confused the issue of how much a voivodship gave to the central budget and how much 
it received from the central budget. This gave rise to the sense of unjust treatment 
common in nearly every voivodship as the quotation below from one of my 
interviewees, the departmental director in the voivodship office, indicates:
Each voivodship must have the right of self-rule and to create its own fortune. The state 
administration system should be transparent, so should the financial system. Nobody [ in 
the voivodship] should feel cheated, nobody should think that he has won, which is heard 
sometimes.
ii. The re-division o f powers between the centre and the regions
At the same time, the formation of these few strong regions was to raise the problem of 
re-division of tasks between the regional and central administration. The division of 
powers between the centre and the region was often considered according to the liberal 
concept of the state -  the less state, the better, with the greatest possible decentralisation 
of all powers which could be assured by regions and districts. This was especially 
emphasised by the local government elite, as seen for example in the opinion of 
Frankiewicz below:
As few state responsibilities as possible, only as few as are necessary. The state [central 
administration] should only perform those tasks which nobody else is able to perform: 
foreign policy, the national economic policy and internal affairs. 71
It was also Frankiewicz’s opinion that calls for the maximum decentralisation of 
responsibilities were often prompted by criticism of central government’s low 
efficiency. As a result, the most radical proposals for decentralisation advocated
570 Dziewior quoted in Slqsk, no. 1, 1997.
571 Frankiewicz, Slqsk, no.5, 1997.
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extreme limitation of Warsaw’s functions and the assumption of most of these by
5 7 2regions.
iii. The democratic territorial administration
It was the opinion of my respondents that the formation of a few strong regions and the 
transfer of substantial power to them would achieve two aims: it would raise the 
economic efficiency of administration, and establish more democratic forms of rule. 
The central administration in Warsaw was seen as distant, and not just in geographical 
terms: the respondents felt that it was unable to recognise and satisfy regional and local 
needs. The establishment of the regional and district levels as self-governing 
institutions (rather than arms of the central public administration), as one of my 
interviewee argued, would allow policies to be decided closer to their final consumers -  
regional society. Moreover, establishment of elective local governments (at commune 
and district levels) and regional government would oblige administrative personnel to 
listen to regional and local societies. Thus, as one of the town mayors emphasised, 
formation of elective institutions would encourage the development of civil society as 
people would gradually become more active, and their participation would not be 
limited to a vote once every four years.
Administrative reform is needed. Big and self-governing voivodships are needed, as those 
levels of administration could be directly supervised by the inhabitants. It would not be the 
case that a man is satisfied as he votes once every four years and then he washes his hands.
In other words, it was expected that the reform would achieve two things. It would 
substantially reverse the centralisation and vertical fragmentation of administration by 
transferring powers to lower levels, and at the same time heal the rift between 
bureaucrat and citizen by removing the barriers that were at the root of society’s 
alienation from the administration. The new regions would be equipped with regional 
government, which would replace weak and indirectly elected voivodship assemblies. 
The new regional governments would give a voice to regional interests; as the native 
Silesian elite used to say it would enable ‘us the people of the region to decide’.
572 Frankiewicz, Slqsk, no. 5, 1997.
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Engagement of society in public life would also be increased by the fact that all the 
most crucial decisions related to regional development would thereafter be taken in the 
region. The regional government in the opinion of my respondents would be the best 
institution for recognising regional peculiarities and preparing a regional strategy 
reflecting them. The regional government position would also be strengthened, as many 
of my respondents, believed transfer of powers to prepare regional policy would be 
assisted by granting regional authorities with substantial revenues (their own regional 
budget) to carry out those policies. According to some of the interviewees, the regional 
government should also select the voivode.
The formation of regional strategy was important as it would lead to the consolidation 
of the administration around unanimously-selected goals for further development. It 
would end the existing administration’s performance, in which many actions were 
uncoordinated or even contradictory, as the main aims of regional development had not 
been formulated. This resulted in wasted money and effort, vividly illustrated by sector- 
orientated coalmining reform.
iv. Finances
Decentralisation of state responsibilities to regions was to be accompanied by radical 
change in the method of financing the administration, as earmarked grants received 
from each ministry separately would be replaced by participation in taxes. Some of the 
interviewees (especially from the voivodship office) mentioned that the number of the 
Katowice voivodship inhabitants should be taken into account as a necessary condition 
for the just treatment of the region. The decentralisation of finances to the regional 
government, which was to allocate regional funds was often the main indication of 
central government’s true intention. The current experience of earmarked financing of 
local government and extensive supervision by the central elite of the local budget 
caused members of the regional administrative elite to be suspicious of central 
governments’ intentions to decentralise finances in the future. For example, one of my 
respondents mentioned that he doubted about ‘Warsaw’s desire to decentralise finances, 
despite decentralisation of finance and financial decision-making in the regions being a 
core aspect of reform:
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It is high time that Warsaw was not deciding about the money which a region earns.... If we 
talk about seeing development on a wider scale, in regional development programmes, it is 
to be done by self-government. It would be these people selected by the region’s own 
inhabitants, it would be a representation of the whole self-governing region. Regional 
government would function like a national parliament, which would decide a certain vision 
for the further development of the state. I believe that if there were a regional government 
here, it would be closer, it would be better versed in what should be done, having the 
revenues and having certain means. The central government would carry out those tasks 
which have arisen out of the need for unification of the whole state.
Sometimes the percentage of a region’s share in taxes was precisely defined; for 
example voivode Czech calculated precisely that 30 per cent should be left at regional 
level and 40 per cent sent to the centre. It was understood that leaving this amount of 
money at regional level was a test of the real desire of central authorities to decentralise 
finances, as transferring a smaller proportion of the budget would not guarantee the 
effective performance of regional administration.
v. The voivode
The second important issue, in addition to the formation of a new institution at the 
regional level (the regional government), was the redefinition of the position of the 
voivode (and of the voivodship office). Both these issues would have a major influence 
on the future role of the regional administrative elite.
The fundamental question was whether a voivode should be the representative of a 
region or of central government, or should perform both functions.573 Opinions on this 
issue varied. Some declared that he should unite both functions, but most of all it was 
emphasised that the voivode should be the head (gospodarz) of the region. Those who 
believed that a voivode should represent regional interests felt that the voivode's existing 
role, as a representative of central government, was highly dysfunctional. As a result, 
there was nobody who would present and defend regional interests. This meant, for 
example, that in negotiations between the regional and national elite related to the 
Regional Contract, voivode Ciszak was the strongest advocate of central government at 
the cost of regional interests. He was seen not as trying to balance both interests but as 
acting against the regional interests, leading to a sense of betrayal.
573 This issue probably does not raise such emotions in Britain, where in local governments there are no 
representatives of central government. However, in Poland it was a very sensitive issue. A voivode was 
traditionally the representative of central government and this debate indicated the possibility of radical 
change in his role.
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Always when we meet with the voivode there is the problem of who he represents. Is he our 
[regional] representative in Warsaw? Or does he primarily represent Warsaw in the region? 
According to law the voivode should be the representative of central government in the 
region. And I have to say with regret that in our case... during negotiations with the 
government in Warsaw the harshest and worst voice for Upper Silesia is that of our 
Katowice voivode. That is a contradiction. In the Poland of the future [after the regional 
reform] in my opinion a voivode should be the representative of a self-governing region. It 
should be our voice in Warsaw, not the voice of Warsaw in Katowice.
In consequence, many of my respondents expressed extreme dissatisfaction with the 
existing situation when the voivode was only the representative of central government 
and they advocated a quite radical redefinition of his role, making him only the 
representative of the region. Such a radical redefinition of the voivode1 s role seems to be 
tied to the desire to strengthen regional authorities. This would be achieved by 
substantial decentralisation of power and making the voivode the guarantor that regional 
interests would be presented and defended.
The best guarantee that the voivode would represent regional interests adequately was if 
he was elected by regional society. Thus, he would be independent of the prime 
minister, according to the respondent:
It should be a directly-elected voivode, because if he were directly elected, it would be 
positive. If he were elected, he would not need to bow in the front of the Prime Minister, 
but it is very difficult to get this idea accepted by central government. Can you imagine 
how they would lose importance?
The mayor of Gliwice emphasised that the voivode should be elected by regional 
society. This would strengthen the regional feeling that society is really engaged in the 
rule of the region (and state). This would be positive for the development of civil 
society after the socialist period of forced social passivity.
This idea of an elected voivode pointed to the strong democratic tendencies of the 
regional administrative elite, which were, to some extent, inspired by the inter-war 
autonomy. However, it is also, a reaction to the extreme ineffectiveness of regional 
administration left by the socialist period, as a result of excessive centralisation and the 
vertical fragmentation of central government. Moreover, this radical demand that the 
voivode would became the representative of the region also seems to have had its roots 
in proposals by voivode Czech when he called for a substantial strengthening of regional 
authority. The definition of the voivode's position proposed by the regional
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administrative elite therefore broke with the prevailing traditional view (among the 
national elite) of the role of the voivode as a central government representative.
The second group of regional administrative elite opinions on the future character of the 
voivodship and the voivode was more moderate. They suggested that although the 
voivodship level should first of all be a self-governing unit (an elective institution) in 
the form of regional government, there should also be a representative of the central 
government, a voivode. These respondents emphasised that the influence of both types 
of administrative institutions, central and regional government, should be balanced. The 
voivode should be a representative of central administration, but he was to be assisted 
by a regional government equipped with wide responsibilities, which would maintain 
the significant role of elective institutions. In other words, this elective institution would 
make possible social participation and the formation of regional development strategy in 
the region. At the same time, emphasis was put on the need for a representative of 
central government at the voivodship level to co-ordinate central government policy, 
although the respondents added that central state powers should be substantially reduced 
compared to the situation at that time.
Those big voivodships should be public and (elective) self-governing administrative units.
Other moderate opinions expressed included the following:
I believe that a voivodship should be a public and (elective) self-governing administrative 
unit. Self-governing administration is as follows: in a commune, a district and a voivodship.
The strategy of development is to be prepared in voivodships. They should decide on 
finance and the strategy of development. People have to know what they want, it has to be a 
social consensus, as a strategy is put in practice with money earned by those people.
On the other hand, I cannot imagine that there would not be a representative of central 
government in the region, but he should concentrate on public order, foreign policy, on the 
image of the region and so on.
There were a few opinions that the regional level should be the public administrative 
unit only, (although its shape was not precisely defined), as the role of regional 
representation would be nearly marginal. These respondents feared that the formation of 
a self-governing administration at the voivodship level would mean giving those 
authorities extensive powers (similar to those at the commune level) that could endanger 
state unity.
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In Poland in the inter-war period, to which reference is most often made, the voivodship 
administration was the public administration. The voivodship office was always the 
representative of the central government. Now the talk is only that the voivodship should 
have its fixed share of the budget. In consequence, how the money is spent should be 
decided according to the needs of the region. Of course, the formation of a new regional 
structure would be needed. The issue is not that a voivode should himself decide on the 
division of that money, or how to spend it, instead the voivode could be assisted by a mixed 
body [state administration officials] and also local government representation which has the 
competence to decide, or at least to offer its opinion about how to divide those funds.
7.3 Opinions about district reform
The formation of a few big regions would necessitate the creation of an intermediate 
level between them and the communes. The resulting districts were to manage supra- 
local tasks such as secondary education or the running of hospitals. It was mentioned 
during my interviews that at the time the voivodship office, like the central-level 
administration, was overburdened with responsibilities as it decided on numerous 
detailed issues, ruling case by case and often losing the overall perspective. After the 
reform, the voivodship administration would concentrate on defining regional 
development, and the performance of many tasks would be delegated to the districts 
according to the principle of subsidiarity.
At the moment the public administration at voivodship level is totally overburdened with 
responsibilities. There is no doubt about it. Like the central administration, it is burdened 
with several detailed tasks which it is not able to carry out. The public administration at 
voivodship level in the future has to decide strategic issues, not rule case by case. Certain 
things are absolutely to be decided at lower levels.
It was sometimes felt that in the Katowice voivodship the district reform was not as 
important as the regional. The Big Towns were already performing district tasks (they 
were to be the future town-districts). This was in contrast to rural areas where a few 
communes were to be united to form rural districts.
Concerning the districts in principle in X. and in the Katowice agglomeration [as a whole] 
not much would be changed as in those Big Towns a change of responsibilities is not 
expected with the establishment of districts.
The opposite opinions were presented by the mayors of Katowice and Rybnik as 
although the Katowice voivodship was highly populated and most of the future town- 
districts’ tasks were already performed by Big Towns, they still emphasised that the 
formation of rural districts would improve the performance of regional administration.
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They recognised that the Big Towns were subsidising the small towns or villages 
surrounding them as their populations were not paying for the services which they 
received in the Big Towns.
Districts are also needed. Let us imagine a situation which takes place now in a Big Town -  
commune which is surrounded by several hamlets. How should such a town be governed?
For the town itself, money is needed, and in the meantime several heads of hamlets want to 
take this money for the commune’s surrounding areas. Water pipelines are needed there, a 
road has to be built there. These are tasks just for a rural district, not for a town- 
commune... Thus, district reform is greatly needed.574
The formation of districts would enable the introduction of economies of scale and the 
employment of professionals. Moreover, supra-local (district) development plans would 
be prepared, in contrast to the local scale development plans existing at that time. These 
wider supra-local plans would be especially important for the poor in disadvantaged 
circumstances, such as in the rural communes.
In relation to the Silesian communes (the Big Towns) the introduction of districts would 
also have an indirect influence. This would strengthen the position of self-governing 
administration relative to central government and should lead to a more positive 
approach towards them. At the same time they believed the main obstacle -  that is 
further administrative reform -  to quick development at the state level would be 
removed.
The formation of districts and regions would also improve communication with central 
and regional administration. At that time small villages found it difficult to gain the 
attention of the voivode and inform him about their problems as there were hundreds of 
such villages in a voivodship. The Big Towns (although they were in fact districts) also 
had difficulties communicating their problems to central administration, which reached 
decisions case by case. For all of them the substantial decrease in the number of regions 
and formation of districts provided a chance to be heard. Even more, as one respondent 
said, the mergers of voivodships meant the decentralisation of powers, so that those 
problems dealt with by ministries could very likely be solved in future by a voivode.
574 Dziewior quoted in Slqsk, no. 1, 1997.
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The most important point is the participation of the communes in the division of state 
revenue. It is also a problem that our voivode is weak according to legal definitions of his 
position, so problems can only be efficiently tackled in ministries, in Warsaw. There are a 
lot of towns and ministries, that do not want to know them, as they have hundreds of towns 
to deal with.
The success of territorial reform -  regional and district -  was often related to the size of 
the future units, which were to be quite large in order to be strong enough to be 
independent and financially efficient. Moreover, emphasis was often put on the fact that 
delegated responsibilities had to be assisted by transferring revenues sufficient for their 
performance.
7.4 The proposals of the Katowice Agglomeration Association
Despite the formation of districts and regions, the heavy urbanisation of the Katowice 
voivodship raised the question of adapting the administrative solution to this region’s 
peculiarity. The formation of a metropolitan association was to unite the fragmented 
Katowice voivodship towns (communes). It was supposed that this would improve their 
performance substantially as their activity was already closely connected. For example, 
the borders between towns were often only symbolical and some streets ran across 
several towns. Moreover, the inhabitants of those towns often worked in neighbouring 
towns, and the children attended schools in other towns; when they were ill they were 
often treated in specialist units of hospitals located in neighbouring towns. All these 
facts pointed to the need for close ties between towns. Thus, the concept of the 
Metropolitan Association of the Katowice Agglomeration, a legally-established self- 
governing administrative unit was sometimes proposed to replace the voluntary unions 
of communes often aimed at fulfilling one task, for example, the Communication Union 
of the Katowice voivodship.
A metropolitan association is desirable as the Upper Silesian agglomeration towns would 
be seen as one Big Town, which in fact they are. This is not in fact an area which is clearly 
separated as one town flows into another. One could talk about 11 Big Towns which make 
one town. This idea does not meet a response in the Polish legislature. The idea of this 
metropolis was seen as an attempt to create something new [better]. But why does Warsaw, 
which is de facto a smaller town than Upper Silesia, have its special bill and as a result 
special privileges, but Upper Silesia does not?
Until 1990 the activity of this area was co-ordinated by the functioning of the 
voivodship administration, to which the communes were subordinate. However, the
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local government reform, which brought independence to the communes and made them 
local government institutions, created a problem of co-ordinating their functioning on 
the scale of the metropolis. The problems, according to my respondents, were worsened 
by the attitudes of communes, which in 1990 were suddenly freed from blind 
subordination to higher levels of administration, and cherished their individuality and 
independence which they had gained with such difficulty. These attitudes often hindered 
their integration and co-ordination, which they saw as risking centralisation and 
subordination.
The other issue was recognition of the peculiarity of Upper Silesia by the central elite. 
My interviewees felt that the Katowice agglomeration could perhaps be ‘compared’ to 
the Gdansk agglomeration and Warsaw, although the Katowice agglomeration was 
much larger, with a population 2.7 million people. The peculiarities of the Katowice 
voivodship, which were not recognised by the central elite due to continued 
administrative centralisation after 1990, brought financial disadvantages to those towns. 
For example, due to the regional specificity, Silesian towns did not receive certain 
transport grants. Other voivodships received grants for transport out of the towns but in 
the Katowice voivodship almost all communication was within towns. Thus, the 
voivodship was given hardly any grants and the burden of financing transport had to be 
borne by local governments. Formation of a metropolitan association would mean 
recognition of this specificity and guarantee subsidies for voivodship transport.
In Poland, talk about specificity is not liked (as they think we want privileges). However, if
somebody comes here, he sees what it looks like, that it is different from, for example,
Rzeszow, or most other Polish regions where there are cottages all around regional capitals.
Here it is a totally different situation.
Opinions about the formation of a metropolitan association varied. There were many 
supporters, some were rather indifferent, but there were also a few opponents. One 
mayor from the D^browa part of the voivodship was against obligatory association to 
form ‘one town’. He argued that it would cause centralisation and the subordination of 
the communes to the vision presented by the metropolis. Nevertheless, it is likely that 
the desire to preserve D^browa region’s historical distinctiveness also promoted his 
opposition to this project which would probably lead to domination of the Upper 
Silesian part of the voivodship. In his opinion, the association of communes would be 
efficient enough to co-ordinate the functioning of the agglomeration.
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In the opinion of the supporters, formation of such an obligatory metropolitan 
association would strengthen regional co-ordination. After a short period of functioning 
of independent local government, communes sometimes concentrated only on local 
interests, not seeing the metropolitan (regional) perspective. As a result, they were 
against the formation of various aims co-ordinating units and the only solution to 
improve co-ordination in the whole voivodship was the formation of an obligatory 
body. For example, if one commune participating in an association considered that the 
financial conditions were unfavourable to it, this commune could withdraw and paralyse 
a transport network. The issue of co-ordinating transport and state subsidies seemed to 
be of special importance and was mentioned by nearly everybody.
7.5 The administrative reform and the myth of regional autonomy
The living memory of the inter-war autonomy and demands for its renewal suggested by 
the Upper Silesian Union and the marginal Movement for Autonomy for Silesia at the 
beginning of the nineties meant that the opinions of the regional administrative elite 
were closely observed. Their views on more discretion for the regional authorities were 
also carefully listened to for any hints of leaning towards autonomy.
In Poland, which regained its independence only in 1918 after more than a hundred 
years of partition, the concept of regional autonomy raised strong fears of separatism. 
This was the case especially at the beginning of the nineties, when painful economic 
transition sometimes inspired warm sentiments in Upper Silesia towards prosperous 
neighbouring Germany. This sense of the vulnerability of the Polish state caused 
misunderstandings and accusations of separatism, even when it came to demands for 
more discretion for Upper Silesian authorities and a larger proportion of financial 
revenues to be divided by them. The accusations were made despite the fact that the 
administrative structure of the state left by the socialist period was highly centralised 
and, as a result, extremely dysfunctional, and that demands for decentralisation were 
justifiable. It seems that when such demands were formulated by Silesian authorities 
they raised more suspicions than if the same demands were formulated in other regions.
Moreover, at the beginning of the nineties, the demands of the Silesian elite were 
radical, befitting the period of revolutionary changes; the word ‘autonomy’ was often
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used. The experience of pre-war autonomy distinguished Upper Silesia from other parts 
of Poland. Elsewhere, reformers demanded decentralisation, but in Upper Silesia this 
was not enough. They asked for autonomy, but what exactly that meant was often 
unclear. Thus, in other parts of Poland, this provoked strong fears about the accusation 
of ‘separatism’ and regional betrayal of Silesians because they were not considered 
really Polish.
The first revolutionary period left a deep fear of their separatist tendencies. In my 
interviews in the middle of the nineties, the opinions of the regional administrative elite 
had evolved and were presented in a much more moderate manner, that was more 
acceptable to Polish society as a whole. However, it seems that the desire for autonomy 
remained deeply hidden, and sometimes found strong supporters, although without any 
desire for separatism. The regional administrative elite’s views in relation to the 
question of autonomy were varied, although on many other issues they were quite 
similar due to their frequent contacts, discussions and common aims. In relation to 
autonomy there were strong sympathisers and those who were totally against it.
First, the concept of regional autonomy sometimes arose from warm sentiments about 
the inter-war autonomy, which was seen by native Silesians as a period of prosperity:
In relation to the management of the voivodship I am definitely in favour. I believe that the 
voivodship before the war was ruled well and this structure turned out to be successful. It is 
a pity that it was not adopted in other voivodships and that after the war Silesian autonomy 
was abandoned.
This opinion of a sympathiser of autonomy (a native Silesian) is quite typical as he does 
not go into considerations of precisely-defined institutional arrangements for the region; 
it is related more to the wish for decentralisation and a return to the inter-war ‘golden 
age’. Moreover, the inspiration of the inter-war regional rule seemed to be important in 
the middle of the nineties, when the same respondents often mentioned the 
ineffectiveness, arrogance and centralist tendencies of the post-communist central 
authorities. Thus, autonomy or decentralisation was to be the solution, limiting the 
negative influence of central government. It seems that sometimes the concepts of 
autonomy and decentralisation overlapped. The difficulty in making a clear-cut 
distinction is indicated, for example, by their reference to the concept of ‘partial 
autonomy’. My respondents mentioned that they did not want separate bills to be issued 
by regional authorities, and in nearly all opinions ‘autonomy’ was instead only related
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to greater financial discretion. The opinion presented below was rare in quite precisely 
distinguishing between autonomy, self-government and decentralisation:
In my opinion the autonomy should not take place. Insofar as it refers to legislation I am 
strongly for law in Poland to be the same everywhere. There should not be any separate 
legal regulations anywhere... However, in relation to the creation of a budget and its 
spending, it is not autonomy, but self-government. And this self-government should 
certainly exist at the regional level. However, what form the state participation will take 
place (whether the voivode is appointed by the government or appointed by the regional 
council) is not very important.
The opposite view was presented in public declarations by the mayor of Katowice, 
Dziewior, for whom autonomy and self-government were treated as one:
Let us give autonomy its proper meaning, as it is regarded with prejudice. It should be 
explained how it was formed. It was the Upper Silesians’ efforts which brought Silesia into 
the Polish state -  that is a fact. Let us add that in the autonomous Silesian voivodship, 
administration functioned best, as in Greater Poland. And if the inter-war Poland lasted 
longer, maybe the Silesian solution would be adopted in the other regions. Then one could 
talk of a Poland formed out of autonomous regions. Thus, autonomy is not separatism, but 
the highest level of self-government [regional discretion]. And this is the need. Man is due 
to form the state, to use the state but he is also to serve this state. It is difficult to serve a 
centralised state. Somebody from a faraway location has no chance to make his voice 
heard, much less be understood.575
In this context, autonomy was to guarantee minimum central government participation 
and interference in regional policy. This was also linked to the considerable confidence 
of the Katowice voivodship communes and their belief that the closer to regional issues 
decisions are taken, the more rational and economical they are. Moreover, autonomy 
was to make possible the development of civil society by promoting a high degree of 
social participation. Whereas the highly-centralised system led to citizens’ passivity and 
alienation from state institutions, by contrast, autonomy would represent the greatest 
possible level of state decentralisation. This optimal administrative structure could 
accordingly be adopted in the whole of Poland.
This attitude towards autonomy as the most effective and possible decentralised 
administrative structure often differed between native Silesians and newcomers. For the 
latter, autonomy still mainly aroused fear and thus they did not see this greatest possible 
level of decentralisation as an advantage. By contrast, some Silesians were still attracted 
by the concept of autonomy, although in a modified form, compared to the inter-war
575 Dziewior quoted in Slqsk, no. 1, 1997.
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model, as it would not mean special treatment for the region but instead more discretion 
for a Poland divided into autonomous regions.
Unlike the central elite of the day, the inter-war administration was respected and seen 
as effective. For example, people pointed to the reduction in administrative personnel 
due to its efficiency. The inter-war rule in the Silesian voivodship by regional 
authorities was presented as a model of honesty and prosperity.
Accordingly to what people who remember this inter-war period say, one has the feeling 
that somehow this voivodship was probably better ruled. My grandpa always said of 
something that was good that it was like in old Poland [the Second Republic], so during the 
time of old Poland they lived well.
Moreover, the strong tradition of administrative order and great respect for the state 
which took root during Prussian rule in the region seemed to influence native Silesian 
attitudes towards the state and its authorities; thus they mentioned the arrogance of the 
central authorities more frequently than the newcomers. The inter-war autonomy was 
also seen as enabling Silesians to participate in the rule of the region even though at that 
time the newcomer Poles had already arrived, and they were much more lordly in their 
behaviour than the previous German officials.
As for autonomy, to make it clear, I am Silesian in flesh and blood, as is the whole of my 
genealogical tree. Thus, I do not have any inhibitions in relation to this issue [separatist 
fears] and in fact we feel that these Silesians behaved strangely, but the Poles also caused a 
lot mischief. My grandpa was a commissar during the Rising, and it seems that when they 
brought Silesia back into Poland, it was believed everything would be marvellous. And then 
the Poles came and established their rule [This he evaluated negatively but the existence of 
the Silesian Diet made it possible to defend the native population interests. This was in 
contrast to the situation when the interview was conducted when he believed the region did 
not have any elective institution defending against central arrogance.]
In the majority of cases, the concept of autonomy was rejected by its opponents on the 
grounds of political or national arguments. However, there was also the opinion of a 
native Silesian who saw it as a dream. He believed that the region could not afford it as 
the cost of regional restructuring was too great to be borne mainly by regional society. 
In this situation, he demanded an improvement of the financial situation of the 
communes by replacing the wilfulness of central government’s allocation of grants with 
local government’s sharing in taxes
We are not in a good position to pursue autonomy at all costs. We would not be able to 
sustain it. At the moment this is a dream.
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Another opinion of a Silesian suggested that Upper Silesia could not afford autonomy 
due to its financial cost:
We are in a different situation from that before the war. The situation has arisen several 
times that Silesia (I mean the Katowice voivodship) was not first in relation to revenues 
sent to the central budget; instead it was probably the Warsaw voivodship [This meant that 
the regional revenue was insufficient to demand autonomy and costly especially as the 
regional restructuring was necessary].
The next opinion also indicates the positive attitudes towards autonomy which arose 
from the inter-war experience. However, at the same time, the respondent believed the 
region had been drained by ‘the centre’ so that it could not afford autonomy. Thus, ‘the 
state’ should re-pay its debts to the region
But I am afraid of what lies ahead for Upper Silesia. I think about restructuring in the whole 
region in relation to the backlog of the past. If people talk about autonomy, that would be a 
mistake. We would not be able to bear all this burden, which is related to restructuring, 
rebuilding and improving the environment and so on. It is high time for ‘the state’ to repay 
some of its debts to Silesia.
However, he saw the formation of autonomous regions for the whole state as an 
alternative.
The opponents of autonomy could be divided into two groups. First were those who 
were totally against it, who considered autonomy as being negative and dangerous and 
not worth thinking about:
They are really irresponsible, these opinions about Silesian autonomy. They are very 
harmful. I cannot find any specific essential argument in favour of it, not any.
Similar opinions were expressed by another (newcomer) respondent:
I am an enemy of solutions involving autonomy. This should not take place in Poland.
The second group of opponents considered that autonomy was primarily a historical 
phenomenon, inappropriate in the situation at that time and dangerous in that it raised 
animosity towards Upper Silesia:
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I believe that inter-war autonomy had a mainly political character. As in the case of Poland, 
which is one nation state, the granting of autonomy to only one region would cause a lot of 
bad feeling in the national-perspective.
He also mentioned the evolution of the concept of autonomy, which at the beginning of 
the nineties had been used by very militant Upper Silesian Union activists, who, 
however, gradually replaced this with a more moderate idea of Poland as a Republic of 
Regions. Because the concept of autonomy for one region had previously aroused fear 
and animosity, they began to advocate larger financial discretion for the regions to be 
formed as a result of the anticipated territorial reform.
It could not be said that opposition to the concept of autonomy was limited to 
newcomers; there were also some Silesians who were strongly against it. All 
emphasised that it could be a threat to the preservation of sovereignty and national 
unity.
I say sincerely that I am not in favour of autonomy. I believe that the unity of the Polish 
State must be preserved. As for autonomy, when we become integrated into Europe, I do 
not know if in the future Upper Silesia may not be more attracted by Berlin than Warsaw.
We could not lead to this. Thus, I am against autonomy on political and national grounds.
We have had bad experience in the past... After all, we live in Poland [geopolitics], the 
issue of Silesia existed before the Second World War, much earlier we had the partition and 
then we had the national risings. So we have to think about the integrity of the Polish state, 
and the nation.
Concerning entrance into the European Union, Poland’s accession with the preservation 
of its national and regional identity was seen as not endangered. Thus, ‘closure’ of a 
region or nation was seen as contrary to the whole European principle of unification and 
openness.
The early hints of autonomy, which later evolved into demands for decentralisation, 
meant that the region was at the forefront in its demands for introduction of regional 
reform. This was also the view of Frankiewicz, the chairman of the Union of Upper 
Silesian Communes, an organisation previously closely linked in its radicalism to the 
Upper Silesian Union (during Paczocha’s leadership). In the middle of the nineties 
Frankiewicz had, however, broken away from the concept of autonomy. Nevertheless, 
he demanded radical decentralisation, breaking even with the inter-war tradition, as the
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voivode would not be a representative of central government but only the representative 
of the region.576
We would like to avoid reference to Silesian autonomy. We believe that what is needed is 
decentralisation of the state administration, so that everything it is possible to deal with 
below the level of central institutions and of the voivodship offices is dealt with below then. 
In other words, all possible responsibilities should be given to the communes. Those 
responsibilities which cannot be carried out by a commune should be performed by a 
district. The rest should be in the region, but on the condition that we effect it from its own 
budget and through its own executive power, with an elected voivode and the participation 
of the region in the sharing of taxes. Then, separate economic policies could be conducted 
in various regions, not a unified one.577
Later, the concept of a self-governing voivodship, prepared by the regional Freedom 
Union, became the national policy of the Union.578
Conclusion
The regional administrative elite took the view at the time of the research that regional 
and district administrative reform was necessary and urgent, as their situation was 
unbearable. This unequivocally confirms their opinion of functioning in the transitional 
period. They all emphasised that the local government reform broke the socialist legacy 
but, at the same time, that further district and regional level reform was necessary. This 
was to be the pre-condition for ‘normal’ and effective functioning of the regional 
administration as a whole.
At the back of their minds, and often, as the interviews show, at the forefront of their 
minds was the inter-war autonomy, thought to be a crucial experience that inspired the 
regional administrative elite as a whole, making them the strongest advocates of 
decentralisation and democratisation. This was often declared by Silesians in the form: 
‘We are the people of the region who want to rule in our region -  home’.
576 In the inter-war period even the sub-prefect at district level (one level below) had been a representative 
of central government.
577 Frankiewicz, Slqsk, no. 5, 1997.
578 CieSlak, Gazeta w Katowicach, 22 August 1995.
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CONCLUSION
This study has investigated the regional administrative elite of Upper Silesia in the period of
the administrative transition between 1990 and 1997.
■ The first chapter presented the aims of the project and its research methodology. The 
main aim was to analyse the role of the Upper Silesian regional elite in the new 
decentralised administrative structure of Poland, and to trace the sequence of events 
which, after 1997, finally stabilised its position. The research is based on a historical 
narrative and on the analysis of political decisions. This has been supplemented by 
unstructured-interviews (of one to two hours) with 30 members of the regional elite, and 
by detailed analysis of press reports, about both my interviewees and other members of 
the regional administrative elite, published in the main regional and national press over 
the years 1990-1997. These methods of investigation were the only methods available to 
discover the decisions and opinions of the regional elite, given that most official records 
remain inaccessible. The last two sections of this theoretical chapter present Polish local 
government reform in the wider European context. It starts with the section on the 
administrative reforms 1990-1997 in the context of European inspirations and Polish 
tradition, followed by the literature review on elites in local government.
■ Chapter two is a historical introduction. It explained the geographical setting and early 
historical background. This chapter also described more recent historical experiences, in 
particular the taking over of a part of Upper Silesia by Poland and its social and 
administrative integration into the state in the inter-war period. Some regional 
distinctiveness was preserved at that time. This is most evident in the granting of special 
rights and privileges in the form of regional autonomy for Upper Silesia, with significant 
powers for the regional authorities. This period is important as it was later redefined by 
the native regional elite as the ‘golden age’ of highly decentralised or even autonomous 
administration. References to this period were central to the debate about whether the new 
region of Upper Silesia should regain autonomy or be endowed with administrative 
institutions specially designed only for this region. The last part of this historical analysis 
focused on the crucial period of socialism. This was the strongest influence on the
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formation of the regional elite in the ‘restoration’ phase of the transitional period (1993- 
1997). This influence was most evident in the re-appearance of some nomenklatura 
personnel among the regional elite, and the continuity of socialist policies towards heavy 
industry.
■ Chapter three described the personality and policies of voivode Czech (1990-1994), 
whose ‘radical and romantic’ characteristics were seen in his policy towards regional 
administrative reform, and the restructuring of the voivodship office. A second important 
issue during his tenure was the renewal of Silesian regional identity. The consequences 
of this were seen in his identification with Silesian ethnicity, and in his redefinition of the 
voivode's role, since he saw himself mainly as a representative of the region, not of 
central government.
■ The next chapter concerned his successor, the ‘Bourbon’ voivode Ciszak (1994-1997). 
The analysis of his rule started by presenting his attitudes towards the need for 
administrative reform. In contrast to his predecessor, Czech, he seemed much more 
content with the legacy of the socialist era, which limited the importance of regional 
administration and marginalised the role of the voivode, making him, in reality, little more 
than a figurehead. In addition, the very evident politicisation of the administration in the 
restoration phase was investigated.
■ Chapter five focused on the developments in local government between 1990 and 1997, 
especially the local elections: the motivation of people who stood for these elections, and 
the role of the political parties. The chapter also aimed to describe the power of local 
government in these years, the gradual decentralisation at the beginning of the nineties 
and, after the post-communist take-over of power, the subsequent centralisation of 
administration. This chapter also considered the importance of elective local and regional 
government administration and the consequences of the perception that these 
communities really represented local society: that ‘we the people’ can rule in Upper 
Silesia.
■ Chapter six investigated the efforts of the regional administrative elite to decentralise the 
administration and give regional authorities more power, a move that the regional 
administrative elite saw as necessary to initiate regional restructuring. These actions by
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the regional administrative elite culminated in 1995 with the proposal of the Regional 
Contract.
■ The final chapter presented the regional administrative elite’s demands for further 
administrative reforms. This chapter also dealt with issues related to the uniqueness of 
the Silesian region’s experiences and characteristics: its inter-war autonomy, and the 
metropolitan structure of the region. This chapter also addresses the question of how the 
experience of inter-war autonomy influenced the regional administrative elite’s proposals 
for administrative reform, and also considered the issue of the special administrative 
proposals for the cities of the region.
The distinctive contribution of this research lies in the analysis of a regional elite over a 
seven-years period of flux, when the process of the formation of the elite was particularly 
interesting due to the pace, scale and intensity of political and economic change. In the past, 
elite studies concentrated for the most part, on stable periods, and most dealt with national 
elites. The transition from socialism brought a renewed interest in Poland as elsewhere in the 
composition of elites during periods of change. Wasliewski and Wesolowski’s researches on 
the parliamentary elite, which used both quantitative and qualitative approaches, and 
prosopographical research by Drqg and Indraszkiewicz on the regional elite, were particularly 
notable. There were similar researches on local elites in Upper Silesia.579 There has, however, 
been little or no research of the kind conducted in this thesis, that is, of regional level elite, 
through the period of transition which makes use of a qualitative approach. Since the 
transition must, if it is to succeed, be a multi-level process, this investigation has been 
conducted in the belief that the role of the regional elite is of quite fundamental importance.
Overall, the thesis brings to the fore the role of the regional elite, a new and distinctive agent 
in the Polish polity. This agent appeared as a result of initial decentralisation of power after 
the fall of communism in 1989, through the years 1990 and 1997; this was the creative phase 
in its formation, crystallisation and stabilisation.
579 Dobrowolski (ed.) 1994, Dobrowolski and Frqckiewicz (ed.) 1994, Dobrowolski, and Wrobel, (ed) 1995.
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The emergence of this group is significant at least in two ways:
1. as part of the establishment of political freedom and the emergence of native Silesian 
groups defending their political rights and culture, which had been impossible under 
socialism;
2. it challenged the centralised ‘socialist monopoly’ of decision-making and participated in 
the redefinition of the central-regional balance of power, regarding:
A. the decentralisation and democratisation of administration, and
B. the engagement of the national elite in the regional restructuring.
First, in relation to the establishment of political freedom and the emergence of native 
Silesian groups these are to be seen in the context of political liberalisation. One of the main 
reasons for the fall of communism was the nomenklatura's control over the whole public 
sphere and the elimination of even the most basic of political freedoms for citizens. Thus, 
during the Round Table negotiations in 1989 and after the formation of the first non­
communist government of Mazowiecki, the main aims of the new elite were not only the 
transformation of the economy, which was in a critical condition, but also a fundamental 
redefinition of the role of the state. The state was expected to guarantee the right of all 
citizens to participate actively in political life. This necessitated the complete rebuilding of 
the whole framework of the political and administrative institutions.
The establishment of freedom and democracy in 1989 led, most of all, to the emergence of 
very fundamental issues that could not have been raised during the socialist period: the taking 
over of power from the nomenklatura and taking responsibility for the management of the 
state and the region. In the case of Upper Silesia, an additional issue was the preservation of 
regional identity by the native population. The first issue characterised the national election 
of 1989 and the local elections in 1990, which concentrated on removing the nomenklatura 
elite in Poland as a whole. In Upper Silesia, the local election was also concentrated on the 
opportunity of native Silesians ‘to rule in the region themselves’, especially as they had, in 
practice, been forbidden that right previously. Thus, the most distinctive feature of the new 
revolutionary elite which arrived in 1990 (directors of the voivodship office appointed by 
voivode Czech and councillors elected in local elections) was their Silesian origins.
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An understanding of the regional elite’s policies and its demands for decentralisation of 
power in the period under examination requires some reference to their motivation in entering 
the administration. The decision to work in administration was a re-definition of citizens’ role 
as being of fundamental importance. It broke the deeply-rooted tradition which went back 
some 200 years to the period of the partition, which had been significantly reinforced during 
the socialist era and which completely separated the public and private spheres. Working or 
participating in public institutions was then understood as a betrayal both of national and 
regional interests: the state, its administration and all public organisations were seen as alien 
and indifferent to the public interest, whether regional or national. Those who entered the 
public sphere were seen as careerists and national traitors.580
In 1989/1990, for the first time in several centuries, the role of the patriotic citizen enabled 
him/her to serve the state and society by working in public institutions. This re-definition 
was only possible due to the national and regional post-Solidarity elite’s view of the events of 
1989 as ‘an extraordinary opportunity in the history of the nation’. For the first time, the elite 
felt that the society as a whole, rather than external powers, could and should form the policy 
of the state and that they, as its members, could also participate in this process. However, 
this view was still limited to rather narrow self-selected groups, at both the national and 
regional level, who had entered the public sphere, and formed the respective post-Solidarity 
elites.
Among the native Silesians in the regional elite there was a quite different motivation to enter 
the administration. This seems to have drawn on some memory of the native population’s to 
participate in the administration of the region during the inter-war period of regional 
autonomy, as well as the earlier effective and democratic Prussian state and its 
administration. This gave rise to a motivation completely distinct from that of the other 
Poles. Native Silesians had a strong tradition of social activity, and, in contrast to other 
Poles, remained active in the public sphere in a covert manner, even during the socialist 
period. For example, they often participated in such organisations as the Scout movement, 
professional organisations, or Catholic organisations. Like other Poles, however, they
580 However, informal and unofficial networks, sometimes even quite sophisticated ones, could exist and 
preserve various social interests. This tradition of comprehensive and efficient, though informal, networks of 
organisations is best illustrated by the ‘underground state’ during the Second World War, which managed to 
perform all the basic state functions, and indicated the ability of Poles to organise themselves. However, those 
organisations were opposed to the ‘official’ state and its institutions, and did not disturb the sense of the relative 
autonomy of the private sphere, effectively separated from the public-official sphere.
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declined to enter political organisations which they saw as exclusive to the nomenklatura. 
The only organisation in which all Poles enrolled quickly and in large numbers was 
Solidarity, and then only in the last decade of socialism.
The regional tradition of inter-war autonomy, with its decentralisation in favour of a strong 
regional authority and high degree of discretion for regional and local democratic institutions 
(most of all, the Silesian Diet), had substantial influence in overcoming the traditional 
negative social attitudes to the public sphere. This was reflected in the widespread Silesian 
belief that it was regional society which should rule in the region -  ‘in their own home’.
The appearance of the regional elite was also significant, as it was the challenge to the 
centralised ‘socialist monopoly’ of decision-making by the regional administrative elite’s 
active, even usurper, role. In addition, they demanded that the new decentralised institutions 
be democratically-elected. Their demands for the formation of an elective and decentralised 
administrative structure have to be seen in the context of the socialist legacy. The structure 
of administration in the socialist period was extremely centralised, vertically fragmented, and 
not only inefficient but above all alienated from the citizens. This extreme centralisation is a 
unique feature of socialist countries. In Western European states, although administration has 
gone through periods of decentralisation and centralisation, there appear to be few cases 
where the administrative structure was ever as centralised, or ever thought to be as distorted 
and ineffective as that of the socialist countries. Accordingly, the issue of the division of 
administrative competencies among the various levels of administration, with the 
transference of as many of them as possible to the lowest levels, was of primary importance 
to the whole transition process. These issues were first strongly raised by the regional elite.
This regional reform meant the first substantial shift of power to regional authorities. 
Decentralisation was seen as the pre-condition for regional and national development. 
However, this handing over of powers was to be assisted by the equally important 
transformation of regional public administration units into elective institutions at district and 
regional levels. The elective institutions (local government at the district level and regional 
government equipped with wide powers) were to be the backbone of all social activity, the 
development of civil society, and democracy. It would lead to a situation where the regional 
society would realise that they, ‘the people’, and not the ‘officials’ had the power to decide.
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Social activity was to emerge gradually as people recognised that they could organise 
themselves to present and defend their aims and interests.
The experience of the success of local government reform in 1990 (which established the 
communes as elective bodies and made them financially independent) made both the local 
government elite itself and the voivodship office aware that similarly elective units, with 
substantial power and financial resources, were also necessary at the district and regional 
levels. This belief in the need for administrative reform at these levels was much stronger 
among the regional than the national elite. Moreover, the experience of inter-war autonomy 
prompted native Silesians, and, after some time, newcomers as well, to believe that the 
solution to extreme centralisation was not only for the administration to be decentralised, but 
also that for institutions to be elective. Thus, the primary expectation from further 
administrative reform was that it would create conditions for the region to have its own voice 
at the national level, and above all enable ‘the people’ to rule in the region.
Finally, analysis of the whole 1990-1997 period reveals the crucial role of the regional 
administrative elite in initiating regional restructuring. A year earlier, in 1989, the national 
transition had been initiated with the introduction of a comprehensive package of 
simultaneous political and economic reform. In May 1990, the transition at the regional level 
began: the new voivode was appointed, and the first democratic local election took place. 
However, throughout this whole period of 1990-1997, the national elite concentrated on 
projects on the national scale, not recognising the issues on the regional scale. This was due 
to the vacuum of power at the regional level; all public administration was still extremely 
centralised and fragmented by branches of industry, as in the socialist years. Thus, the 
central elite only noticed the interests of narrow sectors of industry and was not able to put 
them together and see them interacting in the context of the region. The administrative 
structure which centralised power at the national level and marginalised the regional level 
also limited the central elite’s ability to exercise power effectively at the regional level. In 
the case of Upper Silesia, the regional problems were exacerbated by the distinctiveness of 
the region within Poland as a whole, and in particular by its unique problems related to the 
restructuring of heavy industry.
In this critical situation, the regional elite tried to assume responsibility from the national 
elite, and even to usurp power, in order to initiate the regional restructuring by themselves.
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However, these efforts failed, and, as the Regional Contract of October 1995 indicates, their 
policy since then has gradually shifted towards an integration of the national elite into 
regional policy prepared by the regional elite, as it were forcing the national elite into action.
Thus, the regional administrative elite’s great achievement over this period was to compel the 
central elite to recognise the need for Silesian restructuring, as well as for the formation of an 
effective decentralised regional administrative structure. The political reforms carried out by 
the national elite since 1997 have recognised these issues. They have created the opportunity 
for regional scale restructuring programmes, and power has been decentralised by the 
establishment of elective institutions at all levels: commune, district and region.
On 10 November 1998, local government elections were held at the commune, and for the 
first time at the district and regional levels. The national turnout was around 45-47 per cent, 
in contrast to four years earlier when only 34 per cent of those eligible voted.581 These 
elections suggest that, in general, Polish society had started to believe that local and regional 
response made a difference, and that the community has a voice in local and regional policy. 
Although turnout in one election can hardly be conclusive,582 data for these elections would 
seem to suggest that the local, district and regional administrations are considered to be as 
legitimate as national institutions: the turnout in the national elections in the previous year 
was 47.9 per cent. In most countries, turnout in local government elections is much lower 
than in national elections, so the roughly equal turnout is of some significance.
The period of administrative transition may be said to have ended with the establishment of 
the framework of decentralised and elective institutions and its legitimisation by the 
electorate. However, there is no reason to think the situation is now completely stable: the 
central-regional relationship is not finally determined, nor is the role of civil society, although 
both, it seems safe to say, will change within the framework that has been established in the 
past decade and that has been the subject of this thesis.
This thesis aims to contribute research on the role of the regional elite in the decentralised 
and democratic states. Such research may be interesting both for Poland as a whole and for
581 Wrobel, Rzeczpospolita 24 October 1998
582 Rose, Munro and Mackie, Elections in Central and Eastern Europe Since 1990, Glasgow: University of 
Strathclyde Studies in Public Policy No.300.
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other post-socialist countries. In the case of Poland, the number of regional elite studies is 
rather limited. Wasilewski (1997) one of the most authoritative contributors to elite studies in 
Poland (the chairman of the first department of elite studies) ended of his review of elite 
studies in Poland with a summarised bibliography of all the literature on the Polish elite. 
However, among around 110 researches, only 3 entries concentrated on regional or local elite 
studies.
This academic over-concentration on the national elite has to be re-addressed. The main 
challenge for the near future will be to draw a portrait of several or all regional elites, 
probably according to the lines of the 16 new regions. These researches will first concentrate 
on answering the basic questions such as: a comparison between who the regional elites are, 
their policies, their roles in democratic states, and their similarities to, distinctiveness from 
and relationship with the national elite. As such researches do not yet exist, one can only 
speculate about how this portrait will look and how many observations drawn from Upper 
Silesia can be generalised to other regions. The research of Indraszkiewicz and Drqg, that 
compared Upper Silesia with two neighbouring regions, Cracow and Tamow, revealed 
certain similarities between the three. For example, in comparing the local government elites 
in all three voivodships to state administration and business elites, they found that changes of 
personnel were much more radical in the first group. The second group, the state 
administration elite, also had Solidarity origins in all three regions. However, the changes 
there were much less radical, and the elite was more stable. The last group - the business 
elite, had, in general, post-communist origins in each of these three regions.
One suspects, however, that history still matters and Upper Silesian distinctiveness will be 
preserved, to a large extent, as a result of its inter-war period autonomy, which distinguished 
it from the rest of Poland. The regional elite in Upper Silesia is probably more assertive, and 
the plans for regional policies are more advanced in comparison with the other regions, as the 
process of emancipation of the regional elite, as a result of its inter-war based experience, had 
already shown itself from the beginning of the nineties.583 Moreover, one suspects that the
583 For example, the Regional Contract signed in 1995 and the Upper Silesian Fund are now seen as solutions, 
which should be repeated in other regions to make them better-equipped for conducting regional policy in the 
European Union after enlargements. There are now plans to sign fifteen regional contracts and to establish a 
regional fund in every region.
This assumption also preliminarily confirms the prominent role of the regional elite in national organisations of 
local government, Polish towns and so on.
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portrait of regional elites in Poland as whole, will be more important as EU enlargement
r o i  #
proceeds and regions are given a more prominent role. One can also speculate that with 
the experience of living between two national cultures - borderland awareness, the Upper 
Silesian authorities, with their experience of decentralised and powerful regional authorities
c o r
will be particularly well equipped for the challenges and demands.
Despite the certain distinctiveness between Upper Silesia and the rest of Poland it still seems 
that comparison with certain regions can be particularly provocative. A comparison with the 
traditionally much poorer and stringently communist Dqbrowa will be particularly 
illuminating, due to the fact that since 1945 they formed one administrative unit. Is the 
division between these two parts of the region still significant? For example, Aberg’s 
research on the development of social capital in Lvov, western Ukraine (formerly Galicia) is 
contrasted with eastern Ukraine due to its different historical experience as the former Soviet 
Ukraine.586 Similarly, it will be interesting to see how much earlier historical experiences 
count and how much the fact that Upper Silesia was part of Prussia and Dqbrowa belonged to 
Russian partition matters in Poland. Among foreign regions, comparison with Moravia will 
be particularly illuminating due to the fact that it was once united with Upper Silesia and was 
part of one administrative unit. At the beginning of the nineties it also demanded autonomy 
within the Czech Republic.587 Comparison can also be made with ‘Padania’, in north of Italy 
especially the role of the Lega LombardafLzaguQ North, which explicitly introduced the issue 
of regionalism into national politics, asserting that the territorial organisation of state for 
preserving the centralised power was similar to the influence of the Upper Silesian Union in 
promoting regionalisation in Poland.588
Finally, the issue, that should attract particular attention from academics is the cross-regional 
comparison of regional elites in Poland and cross-national comparison of regional elites in 
the post-socialist countries. I wish to emphasise, once more, that in democratic societies, the 
local and regional elites are as important as the national one. These cross-regional and cross­
584 One of the first examples of this type of research was conducted in 1990 by Bokajlo in his study of local 
elites’ attitudes towards ‘the Europe of Regions’ on the Polish German Border in Lower Silesia.
585 Thus, it is not surprising that its representatives, headed by the marshall of the region, Jan Olbrych, enhance 
European integration ideas and the concept of subsidiarity and are the most active among Polish lobbies in 
Brussels.
586 Aberg, Europe-Asia Studies, vol 52, no 2,2000.
587 Dostal and Hampl (1993: p. 267) indicate similar separatist and autonomous tendencies in Moravia.
588 Keating, Environment and Planning C: Government and Policy 1997, volume 15. p. 391.
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national researches will be critical to identify more general trends of the formation and 
stabilisation of regional elites in these countries. This is especially, so due to the similarity of 
the regional elite’s role in other post-socialist countries over time that is, the decentralisation 
of power to the communes at the beginning of the nineties and re-centralisation in the middle 
of the nineties.589
Moreover, investigation of certain cross-national trends should be considered to see: Do they 
mirror the national elites, are they confident new actors deserving much more academic 
attention? What is their role in the new democratic states? Many have argued that in Poland, 
local administration was more efficient and democratic than the central administration, but 
was this also the case in other post-socialist countries? If so, was this due to the fact that local 
government elite alone changed? What about administrative reform, especially 
decentralisation of power and democratisation of its institutions? How does this affect the 
formation of self-reliant regional elites?
589 Illner 1998: 1-7.
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